- sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type
+ `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
index 000cfe9942..ceea0d7351 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
+ `okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf
index ae6ea0814b..09403376a7 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf
+++ b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ label = DNS Hijacking
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
disabled = 0
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_dns_hijack_enrichment___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task"]
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_darkside_ransomware]
label = DarkSide Ransomware
@@ -489,6 +489,13 @@ disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task"]
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_compiled_html_activity]
+label = Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
+description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic]
label = Suspicious DNS Traffic
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
@@ -524,6 +531,13 @@ disabled = 0
panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task"]
+[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity]
+label = Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
+description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
+disabled = 0
+
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
+
[panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_regsvr32_activity]
label = Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf
index 0a770e2568..875b72a5ed 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf
+++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-08-12T18:21:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-08-16T22:57:30 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
definition = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks"
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+[aws_config]
+definition = sourcetype=aws:config
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
+[aws_description]
+definition = sourcetype="aws:description"
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
[aws_s3_accesslogs]
definition = sourcetype=aws:s3:accesslogs
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
@@ -18,6 +26,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:finding"
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+[aws_securityhub_firehose]
+definition = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose"
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
[brand_abuse_dns]
definition = lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true
description = This macro limits the output to only domains that are in the brand monitoring lookup file
@@ -130,6 +142,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet
definition = (eventName = CreateNetworkAcl OR eventName = CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAcl OR eventName = DeleteNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclEntry OR eventName = ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation)
description = This is a list of AWS event names that are associated with Network ACLs
+[notable]
+definition = index=notable
+description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+
[o365_management_activity]
definition = sourcetype=o365:management:activity
description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
@@ -367,6 +383,22 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[aws_network_acl_details_from_id_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -375,6 +407,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -431,6 +471,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[add_prohibited_processes_to_enterprise_security_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[all_backup_logs_for_host_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -455,6 +503,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -499,6 +551,62 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[baseline_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_per_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_per_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_api_calls_per_user_arn_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_command_line_length___mltk_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_dns_query_length___mltk_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_excessive_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_network_acl_activity_by_arn_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_s3_bucket_deletion_activity_by_arn_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_smb_traffic___mltk_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_security_group_activity_by_arn_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[baseline_of_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_aws_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[batch_file_write_to_system32_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -611,6 +719,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[count_of_unique_ips_connecting_to_ports_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[count_of_assets_by_category_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -623,6 +739,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[create_a_list_of_approved_aws_service_accounts_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -675,6 +795,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[dnstwist_domain_names_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[dsquery_domain_discovery_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1143,6 +1267,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[discover_dns_records_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[download_files_using_telegram_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1319,6 +1447,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1331,6 +1463,106 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[get_all_aws_activity_from_city_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_all_aws_activity_from_country_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_all_aws_activity_from_region_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_backup_logs_for_endpoint_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_dns_server_history_for_a_host_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_dns_traffic_ratio_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_ec2_launch_details_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_email_info_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_emails_from_specific_sender_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_history_of_email_sources_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_notable_history_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_outbound_emails_to_hidden_cobra_threat_actors_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_parent_process_info_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_process_file_activity_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_process_info_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_process_information_for_port_activity_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[get_web_session_information_via_session_id_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1371,6 +1603,70 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[identify_systems_creating_remote_desktop_traffic_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[identify_systems_receiving_remote_desktop_traffic_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[identify_systems_using_remote_desktop_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_okta_activity_by_app_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_previous_unseen_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_user_activities_in_okta_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[investigate_web_posts_from_src_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1511,6 +1807,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[monitor_successful_backups_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[monitor_unsuccessful_backups_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -1755,6 +2059,138 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_aws_provisioning_activity_sources_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_aws_regions_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_images___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_regions___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_cloud_regions___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_ec2_amis_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_ec2_instance_types_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_running_windows_services___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_running_windows_services___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___initial_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_zoom_child_processes___update_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_api_call_per_user_roles_in_cloudtrail_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_s3_bucket_access_by_remote_ip_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_command_line_arguments_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2211,6 +2647,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[systems_ready_for_spectre_meltdown_windows_patch_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[tor_traffic_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2263,6 +2703,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[update_previously_seen_users_in_cloudtrail_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[w3wp_spawning_shell_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
@@ -2351,6 +2795,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+[windows_updates_install_failures_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
+[windows_updates_install_successes_filter]
+definition = search *
+description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
+
[windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter]
definition = search *
description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives.
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf
index 5f3351c02a..3c7566f95f 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf
+++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-08-12T18:21:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-08-16T22:57:30 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -22943,6 +22943,28 @@ search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.Audi
### ESCU BASELINES ###
+[ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security]
+action.escu = 0
+action.escu.enabled = 1
+action.escu.search_type = support
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
+description = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
+action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
+action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware"]
+action.escu.data_models = []
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
+enableSched = 1
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
+dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
+schedule_window = auto
+action.escu.providing_technologies = []
+action.escu.eli5 = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = This search should be run on each new install of ESCU.
+disabled = true
+is_visible = false
+search = | inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count
+
[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
action.escu = 0
action.escu.enabled = 1
@@ -23043,9 +23065,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-09
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-09
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23065,9 +23087,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Unusual Processes"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23087,9 +23109,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Command and Control", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"]
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23109,9 +23131,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23133,9 +23155,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23157,9 +23179,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23179,9 +23201,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-07-17
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-07-17
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23201,9 +23223,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Ransomware"]
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23223,9 +23245,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-17
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-17
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23245,9 +23267,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command and Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23267,9 +23289,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23289,9 +23311,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Asset Tracking"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23311,9 +23333,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23333,9 +23355,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23355,9 +23377,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-14
action.escu.analytic_story = ["DNS Hijacking"]
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23377,9 +23399,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23399,9 +23421,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23421,9 +23443,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23443,9 +23465,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23465,9 +23487,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Monitor Backup Solution"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23487,9 +23509,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-04
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-04
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cross Account Activity"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23553,9 +23575,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23575,9 +23597,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23783,7 +23805,7 @@ action.escu.eli5 = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have
action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
disabled = true
is_visible = false
-search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
+search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
action.escu = 0
@@ -23905,9 +23927,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23927,9 +23949,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23949,9 +23971,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-15
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-15
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -23971,9 +23993,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-05
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-05
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24125,9 +24147,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16
action.escu.analytic_story = ["AWS User Monitoring"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24147,9 +24169,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24169,9 +24191,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01
action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01
action.escu.analytic_story = ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Netsh Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Icedid"]
action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24191,9 +24213,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24213,9 +24235,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24235,9 +24257,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24257,9 +24279,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24279,9 +24301,9 @@ action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
action.escu.analytic_story = []
action.escu.data_models = []
-cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
+cron_schedule = 10 0 * * *
enableSched = 1
-dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
+dispatch.earliest_time = -1450m@m
dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
schedule_window = auto
action.escu.providing_technologies = []
@@ -24314,7 +24336,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation
+search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation
[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24335,7 +24357,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType
+search = `cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType
[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24356,7 +24378,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage
+search = `cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage
[ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24377,7 +24399,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*
+search = `aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*
[ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24398,7 +24420,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp
+search = `aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp
[ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24419,7 +24441,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList
+search = `aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList
[ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24440,7 +24462,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$
+search = | search `netbackup` dest=$dest$
[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24461,7 +24483,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip
+search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip
[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24482,7 +24504,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type
+search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type
[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24503,7 +24525,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
+search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24524,7 +24546,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
+search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24545,7 +24567,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
+search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24566,7 +24588,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
+search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
[ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24587,7 +24609,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature
+search = `netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature
[ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24608,7 +24630,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$ by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
[ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24671,7 +24693,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC
+search = `aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId| search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC
[ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24692,7 +24714,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName
+search = `cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName
[ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24755,7 +24777,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
[ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24797,7 +24819,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
+search = `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
[ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24818,7 +24840,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
+search = `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
[ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24881,7 +24903,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
[ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24923,7 +24945,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
[ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -24986,7 +25008,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
+search = `sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
[ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25007,7 +25029,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=stream:http session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status
+search = `stream_http` session_id = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status
[ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25028,7 +25050,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType
+search = `cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType
[ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25049,7 +25071,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region
+search = `cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region
[ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25112,7 +25134,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
+search = `okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
[ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25133,7 +25155,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
+search = `okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
[ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25238,7 +25260,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = | search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url
+search = `stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False") | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url
[ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25259,7 +25281,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
disabled = true
schedule_window = auto
is_visible = false
-search = eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
+search = `okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
[ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task]
action.escu = 0
@@ -25356,4 +25378,4 @@ search = index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \
| rex field=search "\"(?.*)\""\
| table savedsearch_name count(search) usage user | join savedsearch_name max=0 type=left [search sourcetype="manifests" | spath searches{} | mvexpand searches{} | spath input=searches{} | table category search_name | rename search_name as savedsearch_name | dedup savedsearch_name] | search category=*
-### END OF USAGE DASHBOARD CONFIGURATIONS ###
\ No newline at end of file
+### END OF USAGE DASHBOARD CONFIGURATIONS ###
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf
index f91770ac72..584915d1ee 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf
+++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-08-12T18:21:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-08-16T22:57:30 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf b/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf
index 8ac1fdfdb7..d1218588f1 100644
--- a/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf
+++ b/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#############
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
-# On Date: 2021-08-12T18:21:16 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-08-16T22:57:30 UTC
# Author: Splunk Security Research
# Contact: research@splunk.com
#############
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \
The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \
Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data.
narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Extract SAM from Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Extract SAM from Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \
There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.
narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\
The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = The stealing of data by an adversary.
narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \
According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.
narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ version = 5
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.
narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\
Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\
Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \
Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity.
narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -929,10 +929,24 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
+[analytic_story://Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-02-11
+version = 1
+references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"]
+description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
+narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \
+HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \
+During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \
+Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.
+
[analytic_story://Suspicious DNS Traffic]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2017-09-18
@@ -940,7 +954,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
@@ -951,7 +965,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \
@@ -966,7 +980,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.
@@ -977,7 +991,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
@@ -1000,12 +1014,23 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \
While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \
With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.
+[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity]
+category = Adversary Tactics
+last_updated = 2021-02-11
+version = 1
+references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"]
+maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
+spec_version = 3
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
+narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
+
[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity]
category = Adversary Tactics
last_updated = 2021-01-29
@@ -1035,7 +1060,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
@@ -1046,7 +1071,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -1059,7 +1084,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -1118,7 +1143,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -1131,7 +1156,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
@@ -1142,7 +1167,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
@@ -1153,7 +1178,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others
narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
@@ -1164,7 +1189,7 @@ version = 1
references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \
Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \
@@ -1179,7 +1204,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -1191,7 +1216,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
@@ -1202,7 +1227,7 @@ version = 2
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
@@ -1213,7 +1238,7 @@ version = 3
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
@@ -6721,32 +6746,6 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
earliest_time_offset = 14400
latest_time_offset = 0
-[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task]
-type = investigation
-explanation = none
-how_to_implement = If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \
-(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\
-
-known_false_positives = not defined
-earliest_time_offset = 14400
-latest_time_offset = 0
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task]
-type = investigation
-explanation = none
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this phantom playbook, you must integrate Enterprise Security with Phantom. Configure this playbook in the correlation search `Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2` ,as an adaptive response action.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-earliest_time_offset = 14400
-latest_time_offset = 0
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response - Response Task]
-type = investigation
-explanation = none
-how_to_implement = Import playbook into phantom
-known_false_positives = not defined
-earliest_time_offset = 14400
-latest_time_offset = 0
-
[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
type = investigation
explanation = none
@@ -7060,439 +7059,3 @@ earliest_time_offset = 14400
latest_time_offset = 0
### END RESPONSE TASKS ###
-
-### BASELINES ###
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
-how_to_implement = You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.
-how_to_implement = You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
-More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
-how_to_implement = You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
-More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
-how_to_implement = You must have Enterprise Security 6.0 or later, if not you will need to verify that the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or later is installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 90 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN]
-type = support
-explanation = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\
-In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
-More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.\
-In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. Depending on the number of users in your environment, you may also need to adjust the value for max_inputs in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data.\
-More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN]
-type = support
-explanation = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN]
-type = support
-explanation = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. In addition, you must have the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version >= 4.2 installed, along with any required dependencies. To improve your results, you may consider adding "src" to the by clause, which will build the model for each unique source in your enviornment. However, if you have a large number of hosts in your environment, this search may be very resource intensive. In this case, you may need to raise the value of max_inputs and/or max_groups in the MLTK settings for the DensityFunction algorithm, then ensure that the search completes in a reasonable timeframe. By default, the search builds the model using the past 30 days of data. You can modify the search window to build the model over a longer period of time, which may give you better results. You may also want to periodically re-run this search to rebuild the model with the latest data. More information on the algorithm used in the search can be found at `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/4.2.0/User/Algorithms#DensityFunction`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN]
-type = support
-explanation = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS]
-type = support
-explanation = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your `VPC flow logs.`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports]
-type = support
-explanation = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Count of assets by category]
-type = support
-explanation = This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must first leverage the Assets and Identity framework in Enterprise Security to populate your assets_by_str.csv file which should then be mapped to the Identity_Management data model. The Identity_Management data model will contain a list of known authorized company assets. Ensure that all inventoried systems are constantly vetted and updated.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the service account entires in `aws_service_accounts.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search. Please remove the entries of service accounts that are not legitimate.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names]
-type = support
-explanation = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to update the file called domains.csv in the DA-ESS-SOC/lookup directory. Or `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv` and `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv` from **Splunk\_SA\_CIM**.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Discover DNS records]
-type = support
-explanation = The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting DNS logs, and populating the Network_Resolution data model. Also make sure that the cim_corporate_web_domains and cim_corporate_email_domains lookups are populated with the domains owned by your corporation
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic]
-type = support
-explanation = This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic]
-type = support
-explanation = This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest network traffic and populate the Network_Traffic data model. If a system receives a lot of remote desktop traffic, you can apply the category common_rdp_destination to it.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop]
-type = support
-explanation = This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that records process activity.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
-how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your backup logs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
-how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later)and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
-how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity.csv`, a lookup file created by this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the proper TAs installed.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the latest Change Datamodel accelerated.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model installed.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User]
-type = support
-explanation = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS version (4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.
-how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows security-event logs for it to execute successfully. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
-how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
-how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created by this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
-type = support
-explanation = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update]
-type = support
-explanation = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user role entries in `previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200"
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access-logs inputs. You must validate the remote IP and bucket name entries in `previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip.csv`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
-type = support
-explanation = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
-how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail]
-type = support
-explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
-how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes]
-type = support
-explanation = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
-how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your Windows Update Logs
-known_false_positives = not defined
-providing_technologies = none
-
-### END ESCU BASELINES ###
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
index 0717cbc6ba..b7c4ecb5a6 100644
--- a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
+++ b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv
@@ -1,59 +1,182 @@
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
-T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
+T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no
+T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no
+T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,no
+T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,no
+T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
+T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,no
+T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
+T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,APT32|Threat Group-3390
+T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
+T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
+T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,APT32
+T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla
+T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
+T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
+T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452
+T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
+T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
+T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
+T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
+T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
+T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
+T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
+T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
+T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
+T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
+T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
+T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
+T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
+T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
+T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
+T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
+T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
+T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
+T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
+T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
+T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
+T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
+T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,APT32
+T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
+T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
+T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
+T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
+T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
+T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
+T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
+T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Kimsuky
+T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
+T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
+T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
+T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
+T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|UNC2452|APT1
+T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
+T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
+T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
+T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
+T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
+T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
+T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
+T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
-T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
-T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
+T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein
-T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
-T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
+T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
+T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
-T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
-T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
-T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
-T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
+T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
+T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
+T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Turla|APT37|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT29|UNC2452
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
+T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
-T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
+T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
-T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
-T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
-T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
+T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
+T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
+T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
-T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
-T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
-T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
+T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
+T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
+T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
-T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
-T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
+T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
+T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
+T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -61,174 +184,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio
T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
-T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
+T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
+T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|MuddyWater|DarkHydrus|OilRig|APT32|Rancor|Lazarus Group|APT29|APT28|APT37|FIN8|Elderwood|menuPass|PLATINUM|TA459|Leviathan
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
-T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
-T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
-T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
+T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
+T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
+T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
-T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
-T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
+T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
+T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,APT29|UNC2452
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
-T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
+T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Rancor|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
-T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
+T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
+T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
-T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
+T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|Elderwood|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Lazarus Group|OilRig|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|TA459|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|APT37|menuPass|PLATINUM
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
-T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
+T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
+T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
-T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
+T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
-T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
-T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
-T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
+T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
+T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
-T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
+T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
-T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
+T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
-T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
-T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
-T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
+T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
+T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang
+T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
-T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
+T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
-T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
+T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
-T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
-T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
-T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
-T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
-T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
+T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
+T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
+T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
+T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
-T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
-T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
+T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao
+T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
-T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
-T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
-T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
-T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
-T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
+T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
+T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
+T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|GCMAN
+T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
-T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
-T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
-T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
-T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
+T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
+T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
+T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
-T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
+T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
-T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
-T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
+T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
-T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
-T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
+T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
+T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
-T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
+T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
-T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
+T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
-T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
-T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
-T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
+T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
+T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
-T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
+T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
+T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
+T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -236,38 +359,38 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc
T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7
T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
+T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39
T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee
-T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor
-T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
+T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor
+T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
-T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
+T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
+T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|MuddyWater|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
+T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
-T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
+T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
-T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
+T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
-T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
-T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
+T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound
+T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
+T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +400,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
-T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -285,13 +408,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -301,140 +424,141 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
-T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no
+T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
-T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
+T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
+T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
-T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no
+T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no
-T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no
+T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten
T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no
T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no
T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
-T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
-T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
+T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team
+T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel
+T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
-T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
-T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
+T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
+T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
-T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
+T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
+T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
-T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
-T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
+T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
-T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|APT29|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
+T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
-T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
-T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
+T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
T1153,Source,Execution,no
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
-T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
+T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
-T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
-T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
-T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
-T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
-T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
-T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
+T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
+T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Silent Librarian
+T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|FIN8
+T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
+T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1106,Native API,Execution,Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Turla|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
-T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
+T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
-T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
-T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
+T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|APT19|Honeybee|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|FIN10|APT28|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
-T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
-T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
+T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452
+T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3
+T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
-T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
-T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
-T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
-T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
-T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
+T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
+T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
-T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
-T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|menuPass|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|MuddyWater|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
+T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
-T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
-T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
+T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
-T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
-T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
-T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
diff --git a/macros/aws_config.yml b/macros/aws_config.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c709c1e0a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/aws_config.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+definition: sourcetype=aws:config
+description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
+ Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+name: aws_config
diff --git a/macros/aws_description.yml b/macros/aws_description.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..223e3effaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/aws_description.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+definition: sourcetype="aws:description"
+description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
+ Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+name: aws_description
diff --git a/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml b/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b362424495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/aws_securityhub_firehose.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+definition: sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose"
+description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
+ Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+name: aws_securityhub_firehose
diff --git a/macros/notable.yml b/macros/notable.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96322dc8a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/notable.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+definition: index=notable
+description: customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype).
+ Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
+name: notable
diff --git a/spec/detections.spec.json b/spec/detections.spec.json
index 14b619fcf2..14e2026fcf 100644
--- a/spec/detections.spec.json
+++ b/spec/detections.spec.json
@@ -127,12 +127,16 @@
"default": "",
"description": "type of detection",
"examples": [
- "streaming"
+ "Anomaly"
],
"items": {
"enum": [
- "batch",
- "streaming"
+ "TTP",
+ "Anomaly",
+ "Hunting",
+ "Baseline",
+ "Investigation",
+ "Correlation"
],
"type": "string"
},
@@ -181,6 +185,7 @@
"id",
"version",
"date",
+ "datamodel",
"description",
"type",
"author",
diff --git a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml b/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml
index 0b96099ec6..43d0084537 100644
--- a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml
+++ b/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-04-07'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.
narrative: In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials.
Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts.
diff --git a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
index 844472655f..a3b40c39bc 100644
--- a/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/apache_struts_vulnerability.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e
version: 1
date: '2018-12-06'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type`
length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent
with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
diff --git a/stories/asset_tracking.yml b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
index 29b5fa430d..a1c83ccb7e 100644
--- a/stories/asset_tracking.yml
+++ b/stories/asset_tracking.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77
version: 1
date: '2017-09-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier
to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of
malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
diff --git a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
index 330ee1e9d3..4bddf3c277 100644
--- a/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a
version: 1
date: '2018-06-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain
cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
could be an indication of malicious activity.
diff --git a/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml
index 7e12542750..0be124c6d0 100644
--- a/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_iam_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750
version: 1
date: '2021-03-08'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
narrative: 'Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\
diff --git a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
index 80e0343e19..265d4a8b84 100644
--- a/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_network_acl_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4
version: 2
date: '2018-05-21'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious
activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
narrative: AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance,
diff --git a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
index 02117cda41..5637e16115 100644
--- a/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_security_hub_alerts.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a
version: 1
date: '2020-08-04'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated
from AWS
narrative: AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services
diff --git a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
index b5ca874a7a..8476972f79 100644
--- a/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/aws_user_monitoring.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3
version: 1
date: '2018-03-12'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment
that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack
targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
diff --git a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
index d66edc4d0e..496b8c342d 100644
--- a/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
+++ b/stories/baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe
version: 1
date: '2021-01-27'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys
Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple
Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and
diff --git a/stories/bits_jobs.yml b/stories/bits_jobs.yml
index 655efdd27e..fc9465367c 100644
--- a/stories/bits_jobs.yml
+++ b/stories/bits_jobs.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-26'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
narrative: Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool.
Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).
diff --git a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
index e6554d0edf..2793a473cb 100644
--- a/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
+++ b/stories/brand_monitoring.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78
version: 1
date: '2017-12-19'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is
using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure.
Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
diff --git a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
index f8b6cc70a8..493f847df1 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_cryptomining.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
version: 1
date: '2019-10-02'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining.
New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally
high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users
diff --git a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
index 8f00c68e79..2ad5467a3d 100644
--- a/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d
version: 1
date: '2021-01-26'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated
credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers
specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active
diff --git a/stories/cobalt_strike.yml b/stories/cobalt_strike.yml
index bb4cc786aa..ef1fd824fe 100644
--- a/stories/cobalt_strike.yml
+++ b/stories/cobalt_strike.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c
version: 1
date: '2021-02-16'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more.
diff --git a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
index b1ea322c59..9c6b50cc02 100644
--- a/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
+++ b/stories/coldroot_macos_rat.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390
version: 1
date: '2019-01-09'
author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example
of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system,
diff --git a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
index 3557fd8bb6..12b1951c01 100644
--- a/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
+++ b/stories/collection_and_staging.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a
version: 1
date: '2020-02-03'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: 'Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to
the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific
hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating
diff --git a/stories/command_and_control.yml b/stories/command_and_control.yml
index cf7241d118..5e40aceb19 100644
--- a/stories/command_and_control.yml
+++ b/stories/command_and_control.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8
version: 1
date: '2018-06-01'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged
by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed
by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions
diff --git a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
index 23abd5d6ae..30543b29c3 100644
--- a/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
+++ b/stories/container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246
version: 1
date: '2020-02-20'
author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories
for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers.
These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container
diff --git a/stories/credential_dumping.yml b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
index a78c4523b4..c1d1950113 100644
--- a/stories/credential_dumping.yml
+++ b/stories/credential_dumping.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a
version: 3
date: '2020-02-04'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein
attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The
threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and
diff --git a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
index e97d584d9f..0990885754 100644
--- a/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
+++ b/stories/data_exfiltration.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
version: 1
date: '2020-10-21'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: batch
description: The stealing of data by an adversary.
narrative: Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over
encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels
diff --git a/stories/data_protection.yml b/stories/data_protection.yml
index fdac1f2174..7b9fe695fa 100644
--- a/stories/data_protection.yml
+++ b/stories/data_protection.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
version: 1
date: '2017-09-14'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data
confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate
possible signs of data exfiltration.
diff --git a/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml b/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml
index 3b88f611bd..983760790f 100644
--- a/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml
+++ b/stories/deobfuscate_decode_files_or_information.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-24'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
narrative: An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks.
Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.
diff --git a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
index 0d4c72e47b..9ac0ed54e9 100644
--- a/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
+++ b/stories/detect_zerologon_attack.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4
version: 1
date: '2020-09-18'
author: Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk
-type: batch
description: Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472,
a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset
its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now
diff --git a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
index 012190d978..6388122732 100644
--- a/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
+++ b/stories/dhs_report_ta18_074a.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef
version: 2
date: '2020-01-22'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert
US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises
included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
diff --git a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
index aebcad8523..830260235f 100644
--- a/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
+++ b/stories/disabling_security_tools.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1
version: 2
date: '2020-02-04'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of
security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes
launching netsh, and many others.
diff --git a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
index 23bdb70021..9426f1b102 100644
--- a/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_amplification_attacks.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700
version: 1
date: '2016-09-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if
it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers
who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks,
diff --git a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
index f40dcee71c..9e697bd6c9 100644
--- a/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
+++ b/stories/dns_hijacking.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221
version: 1
date: '2020-02-04'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you
detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
narrative: 'Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613),
diff --git a/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml b/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml
index 23ac481d24..6831e4a759 100644
--- a/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml
+++ b/stories/domain_trust_discovery.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-25'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.
narrative: Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
references:
diff --git a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
index f8e0211fda..1b1e648a9c 100644
--- a/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
+++ b/stories/dynamic_dns.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221
version: 2
date: '2018-09-06'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating
with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them
avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
diff --git a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
index 48163971c5..1c29dbd0d7 100644
--- a/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
+++ b/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52
version: 1
date: '2020-01-27'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer
malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch
script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has
diff --git a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
index 3aa77c4f47..24793d3383 100644
--- a/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
+++ b/stories/f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version: 1
date: '2020-08-02'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive
Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix
SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows
diff --git a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
index 7e18c2dea7..6dc5c9c4e8 100644
--- a/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/gcp_cross_account_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6
version: 1
date: '2020-09-01'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain
cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles
could be an indication of malicious activity.
diff --git a/stories/hafnium_group.yml b/stories/hafnium_group.yml
index f6647be9e5..dcd0e241d0 100644
--- a/stories/hafnium_group.yml
+++ b/stories/hafnium_group.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-03'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
narrative: 'On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
diff --git a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
index 89c203de60..0c62805bc0 100644
--- a/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
+++ b/stories/hidden_cobra_malware.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
version: 2
date: '2020-01-22'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion
of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North
Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported
diff --git a/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml b/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml
index 53441130b2..e9aa1d1dfa 100644
--- a/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml
+++ b/stories/ingress_tool_transfer.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-24'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
narrative: Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\
During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
diff --git a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
index e68a18c5cb..fb33969d18 100644
--- a/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
+++ b/stories/jboss_vulnerability.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd
version: 1
date: '2017-09-14'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source
utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches
help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
index 0476024cf5..0d89c48de8 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_scanning_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09
version: 1
date: '2020-04-15'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint
scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent,
cluster names.
diff --git a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
index 911a57fa06..c44e439e03 100644
--- a/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea
version: 1
date: '2020-05-20'
author: Rod Soto, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes
cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on
items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
diff --git a/stories/lateral_movement.yml b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
index 2cc361ff75..f5ac2aa14b 100644
--- a/stories/lateral_movement.yml
+++ b/stories/lateral_movement.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad
version: 2
date: '2020-02-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how
attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose
the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
diff --git a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
index c1bcf4a50e..21d087f8cd 100644
--- a/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
+++ b/stories/malicious_powershell.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc
version: 5
date: '2017-08-23'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities
and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their
goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate
diff --git a/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml b/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml
index 631f9ee4c3..4826f8b119 100644
--- a/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml
+++ b/stories/masquerading___rename_system_utilities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-04-26'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.
narrative: 'Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing.
It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe).
diff --git a/stories/meterpreter.yml b/stories/meterpreter.yml
index 8e51ee26cf..67d0613073 100644
--- a/stories/meterpreter.yml
+++ b/stories/meterpreter.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-06-08'
author: Michael Hart
-type: batch
description: Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.
narrative: 'This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter.
Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software
diff --git a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
index ba145b98e1..7cf230ba33 100644
--- a/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
+++ b/stories/monitor_for_updates.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8
version: 1
date: '2017-09-15'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched
and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be
mitigated by applying routine security patches.
diff --git a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
index 316cb9eb52..83a715d79a 100644
--- a/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/netsh_abuse.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65
version: 1
date: '2017-01-05'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of
`netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection
to a host from an infected system.
diff --git a/stories/nobelium_group.yml b/stories/nobelium_group.yml
index 4f953ee032..17309b5480 100644
--- a/stories/nobelium_group.yml
+++ b/stories/nobelium_group.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2
version: 2
date: '2020-12-14'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and
management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind
this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around
diff --git a/stories/office_365_detections.yml b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
index 26524e3c60..a88ebbccf8 100644
--- a/stories/office_365_detections.yml
+++ b/stories/office_365_detections.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9
version: 1
date: '2020-12-16'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
-type: batch
description: This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks.
narrative: More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering.
Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides
diff --git a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
index 2caa4a5fa2..5d27d3d8d7 100644
--- a/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
+++ b/stories/orangeworm_attack_group.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52
version: 2
date: '2020-01-22'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm
Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
narrative: 'In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing
diff --git a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
index fc38055e4b..b7b632d07c 100644
--- a/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
+++ b/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E
version: 1
date: '2020-01-22'
author: iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense
-type: batch
description: Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques
employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
narrative: 'This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
diff --git a/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml b/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml
index b9b52925ef..b5101c06e7 100644
--- a/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml
+++ b/stories/printnightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-07-01'
author: Splunk Threat Research Team
-type: batch
description: The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.
narrative: 'This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \
diff --git a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
index 88c140a3ba..7fed5adc91 100644
--- a/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
+++ b/stories/prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218
version: 1
date: '2017-09-11'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment,
as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors
typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
diff --git a/stories/ransomware.yml b/stories/ransomware.yml
index d2d5ad8bb4..1835219ce4 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756
version: 1
date: '2020-02-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage,
the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_clop.yml b/stories/ransomware_clop.yml
index 8177d02ac9..6138f515ab 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_clop.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_clop.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6
version: 1
date: '2021-03-17'
author: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification,
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
index 728c9805b5..5cc4ea4f92 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_cloud.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2
version: 1
date: '2020-10-27'
author: Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that
may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml b/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml
index 734c881cbc..f2e6d8bfd9 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_darkside.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35
version: 1
date: '2021-05-12'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware
narrative: 'This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.'
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_revil.yml b/stories/ransomware_revil.yml
index f9ce340b48..33cab06420 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_revil.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_revil.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e
version: 1
date: '2021-06-04'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification,
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
index 5fe0d2eb11..bfd0ff7438 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_ryuk.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35
version: 1
date: '2020-11-06'
author: Jose Hernandez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification,
diff --git a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
index bd3542f193..1d905c3bf0 100644
--- a/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
+++ b/stories/ransomware_samsam.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604
version: 1
date: '2018-12-13'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated
with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware
diff --git a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
index 346b45a98f..1d6f3a161c 100644
--- a/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
+++ b/stories/router_and_infrastructure_security.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77
version: 1
date: '2017-09-12'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify
that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing
and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
diff --git a/stories/silver_sparrow.yml b/stories/silver_sparrow.yml
index 2c9ea4f838..bee529af8c 100644
--- a/stories/silver_sparrow.yml
+++ b/stories/silver_sparrow.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-02-24'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
narrative: 'Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture.
To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour.
diff --git a/stories/spearphishing_attachments.yml b/stories/spearphishing_attachments.yml
index ee7ef3b1bc..803a28a2b5 100644
--- a/stories/spearphishing_attachments.yml
+++ b/stories/spearphishing_attachments.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27
version: 1
date: '2019-04-29'
author: Splunk Research Team, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment
has been breached via a phishing attack.
narrative: 'Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous
diff --git a/stories/sql_injection.yml b/stories/sql_injection.yml
index 25b2df4022..13a2a1ad46 100644
--- a/stories/sql_injection.yml
+++ b/stories/sql_injection.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3
version: 1
date: '2017-09-19'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured
query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain
malicious parameters.
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
index 4f230b72c7..247ee0e473 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_login_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3
version: 1
date: '2019-05-01'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: 'Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches
within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious
logins. '
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
index a02dbf536b..cff8756af5 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_s3_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3
version: 2
date: '2018-07-24'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets
for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
index d415be8ab2..f53703a296 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_aws_traffic.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3
version: 1
date: '2018-05-07'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence
of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound
traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
index f9e9a62fa2..7b7a386b11 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c
version: 1
date: '2020-06-04'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: 'Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic
Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help
you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. '
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
index 68fae232e4..9d39f01564 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_instance_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce
version: 1
date: '2020-08-25'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
index fecd3548cb..d994844215 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_provisioning_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86
version: 1
date: '2018-08-20'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors
originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that
malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
index 7270c9d8d9..a9629973c4 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_cloud_user_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39
version: 1
date: '2020-09-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your
cloud environments.
narrative: 'It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
index 1cd363a106..4d9f231b56 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_command_line_executions.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7
version: 2
date: '2020-02-03'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most
common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml
index 852ae02ef1..f9a6b1b98c 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity.yml
@@ -29,5 +29,4 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
index 487bc98f77..7fa15d73c4 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_dns_traffic.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56
version: 1
date: '2017-09-18'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain
name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol
by monitoring for these types of abuses.
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
index e8dc840e5c..c39649799d 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_emails.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55
version: 1
date: '2020-01-27'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial
foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails
in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
index ab82ae33e8..3964d460bb 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_gcp_storage_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version: 1
date: '2020-08-05'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets
for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open
storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
index 71e73efbbf..13fbcab635 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55
version: 2
date: '2021-01-20'
author: Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe
process to execute malicious code.
narrative: 'One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
index 5e255e2fe3..d2d088ab3b 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_okta_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b
version: 1
date: '2020-04-02'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid
outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more.
Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml
index d497be18ff..ba560e9176 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvcs_regasm_activity.yml
@@ -20,5 +20,4 @@ tags:
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
-type: ESCU
version: 1
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
index fb1a5987fe..57e97a3d32 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_regsvr32_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 1
date: '2021-01-29'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe
process to execute malicious code.
narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
index 3834c54dd1..7ef59791b7 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694
version: 1
date: '2021-02-03'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe
to execute arbitrary malicious code.
narrative: One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
index ebc24e9a20..f754a8d85a 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55
version: 1
date: '2018-05-31'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations,
which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
narrative: "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking\
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
index 08c48f624f..ba2fdc5918 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_wmi_use.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5
version: 2
date: '2018-10-23'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation
(WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating
systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it
diff --git a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
index fae67cd19b..f914b8fae1 100644
--- a/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/suspicious_zoom_child_processes.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258
version: 1
date: '2020-04-13'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems.
This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions
for this detection.
diff --git a/stories/trickbot.yml b/stories/trickbot.yml
index 13f988bd86..00017136e8 100644
--- a/stories/trickbot.yml
+++ b/stories/trickbot.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e
version: 1
date: '2021-04-20'
author: Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated
with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
index 6a16527344..afba77ef00 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 1
date: '2021-01-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer
utilities to execute malicious code.
narrative: 'Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy
diff --git a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
index 7e7ba69a53..6539b84b12 100644
--- a/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
+++ b/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 1
date: '2021-01-21'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe
process to execute malicious code.
narrative: 'Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted
diff --git a/stories/unusual_processes.yml b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
index 128a66c667..d25056b6d0 100644
--- a/stories/unusual_processes.yml
+++ b/stories/unusual_processes.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6
version: 2
date: '2020-02-04'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment
that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations,
those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples
diff --git a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
index b6e205332f..7c5861f4b4 100644
--- a/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
+++ b/stories/use_of_cleartext_protocols.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21
version: 1
date: '2017-09-15'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak
credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
narrative: Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections
diff --git a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
index 3f9b2ca5f2..76c24c9309 100644
--- a/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064
version: 1
date: '2018-05-31'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: 'Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints.
A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe`
and disabling user-account control, among many others '
diff --git a/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml
index 5b0a190e53..47dc3978dc 100644
--- a/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_discovery_techniques.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-03-04'
author: Michael Hart, Splunk
-type: streaming
description: Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the
environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.
narrative: Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment
diff --git a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
index 8a4296c821..9737f6b304 100644
--- a/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_dns_sigred_cve_2020_1350.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
version: 1
date: '2020-07-28'
author: Shannon Davis, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered
by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and
is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker
diff --git a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
index f1436b70df..ff0f6acb37 100644
--- a/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d
version: 1
date: '2018-01-26'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows
file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting
spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different
diff --git a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
index 1fe8857921..a2fb2c0205 100644
--- a/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_log_manipulation.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835
version: 2
date: '2017-09-12'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs.
Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an
essential component of an effective defense.
diff --git a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
index 43d49de5d5..99c1a9088a 100644
--- a/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9
version: 2
date: '2018-05-31'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence
on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
narrative: Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after
diff --git a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
index ebc3787d94..667e7ba4ee 100644
--- a/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5
version: 2
date: '2020-02-04'
author: David Dorsey, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a
Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints,
modified registry keys, and more.
diff --git a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
index 1baa5e434c..118852aeee 100644
--- a/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
+++ b/stories/windows_service_abuse.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2
version: 3
date: '2017-11-02'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
-type: batch
description: Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the
ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic
Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are
diff --git a/stories/xmrig.yml b/stories/xmrig.yml
index 2c5f1b30eb..2ee5eb1781 100644
--- a/stories/xmrig.yml
+++ b/stories/xmrig.yml
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ id: 06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628
version: 1
date: '2021-05-07'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk
-type: batch
description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities
that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated
with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner)