From 9a25da4387c3bd67b52196b963351bcbbe59bad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:36:34 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] T1218.007 - MSIExec --- .../windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ws_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ .../windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ ...indows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml | 80 ++++++++++++++++++ ...s_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml | 80 ++++++++++++++++++ ...ndows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml | 80 ++++++++++++++++++ macros/process_msiexec.yml | 3 + ..._system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec.yml | 18 +++++ ...windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.test.yml | 13 +++ ...iexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml | 14 ++++ .../windows_msiexec_remote_download.test.yml | 13 +++ ...s_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.test.yml | 13 +++ ...exec_unregister_dllregisterserver.test.yml | 14 ++++ ..._msiexec_with_network_connections.test.yml | 14 ++++ 14 files changed, 585 insertions(+) create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml create mode 100644 macros/process_msiexec.yml create mode 100644 stories/windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.test.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a928508c8f --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer +id: fdb59aef-d88f-4909-8369-ec2afbd2c398 +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-14' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. + Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` + Processes.process IN ("*/y*", "*-y*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +known_false_positives: This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 50 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to register a file. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name + - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name #process name + - Processes.process #process cmdline + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 35 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2dc681ede --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path +id: 42bb73c8-302c-45ce-9e87-2e81c2107725 +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-16' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe running from a non-standard location. This is a commonly used method by adversaries to evade detection logic. + During triage, capture any file modification artifacts and review parallel processes. +search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*system32*","*syswow64*","*winsxs*")) + by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives may be present as some legitimate applications may use a moved or renamed instance of MSIExec. Filter as needed. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to run from a non-standard path. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name + - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name #process name + - Processes.process #process cmdline + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 49 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..69ba719e45 --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Remote Download +id: 6aa49ff2-3c92-4586-83e0-d83eb693dfda +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-16' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. + During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") + by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_msiexec_remote_download_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter by destination or parent process as needed. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 50 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to download a remote file. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name + - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name #process name + - Processes.process #process cmdline + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 35 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d34188916 --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command +id: e9d05aa2-32f0-411b-930c-5b8ca5c4fcee +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-13' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe", "nltest.exe","ipconfig.exe","systeminfo.exe") + by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +known_false_positives: False positives will be present with MSIExec spawning Cmd or PowerShell. Filtering will be needed. In addition, add other known discovery processes to enhance query. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 50 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name + - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name #process name + - Processes.process #process cmdline + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 35 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..594212f96d --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer +id: a27db3c5-1a9a-46df-a577-765d3f1a3c24 +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-14' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. + Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) + as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` + Processes.process IN ("*/z*", "*-z*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name + Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +known_false_positives: This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 50 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to unregister a file. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name + - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline + - Processes.original_file_name + - Processes.process_name #process name + - Processes.process #process cmdline + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_path + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 35 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9541707b9c --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec With Network Connections +id: 827409a1-5393-4d8d-8da4-bbb297c262a7 +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-16' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + where `process_msiexec` by _time Processes.process_id + Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` + count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN ("80","443") by All_Traffic.process_id + All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] + | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port dest_ip + | `windows_msiexec_with_network_connections_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Add parent process as a filter, filter known good processes. This may be voluminous due to the join on process_id. All_Traffic does not have process_guid, yet. +known_false_positives: False positives will be present and filtering is required. +references: + - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ + - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md +tags: + analytic_story: + - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 50 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ contacting a remote destination. + mitre_attack_id: + - T1218.007 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: user + type: User + role: + - Victim + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + - name: parent_process_name + type: Process Name + role: + - Parent Process + - name: process_name + type: Process + role: + - Child Process + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.dest + - Processes.process_path + - Processes.process + - Processes.parent_process_name + - All_Traffic.process_id + - All_Traffic.dest + - All_Traffic.dest_port + - All_Traffic.dest_ip + risk_score: 35 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/macros/process_msiexec.yml b/macros/process_msiexec.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d7889dbc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/macros/process_msiexec.yml @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +definition: (Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=msiexec.exe) +description: Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/ +name: process_msiexec \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/stories/windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec.yml b/stories/windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9de4be3abe --- /dev/null +++ b/stories/windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_msiexec.yml @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +name: Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec +id: bea2e16b-4599-46ad-a95b-116078726c68 +version: 1 +date: '2022-06-16' +author: Michael Haag, Splunk +description: Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). +narrative: Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled. +references: + - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/ +tags: + analytic_story: Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec + category: + - Adversary Tactics + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..77b83217ec --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer Unit Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f887e3599 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path Unit + Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..892e22af74 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Remote Download Unit Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec Remote Download + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_remote_download.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..017eba6a12 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command Unit Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fcf3c441ad --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer Unit + Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd4f8047b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +name: Windows MSIExec With Network Connections Unit + Test +tests: +- name: Windows MSIExec With Network Connections + file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_with_network_connections.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: windows-sysmon.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + update_timestamp: true From 2788e8e63c2024aacc231197a4c536d4e0c66e8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 10:22:24 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] path fix --- .../windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml | 2 +- .../windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml index d2dc681ede..48f9e0e66a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ tags: - Source:Endpoint - Stage:Defense Evasion dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml index 1f887e3599..50ab188259 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ tests: earliest_time: -24h latest_time: now attack_data: - - file_name: windows-sysmon.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog + - file_name: windows-security.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log + source: WinEventLog:Security + sourcetype: WinEventLog update_timestamp: true From 56394444ceab729d664b625e66a930fcb8c65cb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 13:09:37 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] fix --- ...ndows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml index 50ab188259..7a3b9dba3e 100644 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml +++ b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ -name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path Unit - Test +name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path Unit Test tests: - name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml @@ -7,8 +6,8 @@ tests: earliest_time: -24h latest_time: now attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog + - file_name: msiexec_moved.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/msiexec_moved.log + source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: xmlwineventlog update_timestamp: true From 7ef25a98ec32eee7a5f0179db2e3d0aa21dee579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: research bot Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:56:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] updating docs and package bits [ci skip] --- dist/escu/app.manifest | 2 +- dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf | 74 ++++-- dist/escu/default/app.conf | 4 +- dist/escu/default/collections.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/content-version.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/macros.conf | 26 +- dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf | 243 +++++++++++++++--- dist/escu/default/transforms.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf | 2 +- ...ows_lolbin_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml | 3 +- docs/_pages/detections.md | 5 + docs/_pages/stories.md | 6 +- ...tect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md | 4 +- .../2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md | 2 +- ...detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md | 2 +- ...21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md | 2 +- ...18-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md | 2 +- ...-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md | 2 +- ...-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md | 2 +- .../2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md | 2 +- .../2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md | 2 +- ...credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md | 2 +- ...-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md | 2 +- ...6-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md | 2 +- ...9-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md | 2 +- ...19-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md | 2 +- 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...-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md | 2 +- ...-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md | 2 +- .../2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md | 2 +- ...2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md | 2 +- ..._connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md | 2 +- ..._hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md | 2 +- ...dows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md | 2 +- ...-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md | 2 +- ...us_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md | 2 +- ...cess_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md | 2 +- ...dows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md | 2 +- ...indows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md | 2 +- ...ive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md | 2 +- .../2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md | 2 +- ...-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md | 2 +- ...nload_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md | 2 +- ...load_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md | 2 +- ...2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md | 2 +- ...22-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md | 2 +- ..._ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md | 2 +- ...dows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md | 2 +- ...7-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md | 2 +- ...022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md | 2 +- ..._raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md | 2 +- ...8-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md | 2 +- ...-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md | 2 +- ...excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md | 2 +- ...-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md | 2 +- ...ndows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md | 2 +- ...ows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md | 2 +- .../2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md | 2 +- ...t_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ..._regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ..._no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md | 2 +- ...cious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...ious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...ious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...s_installutil_remote_network_connection.md | 2 +- ...stallutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md | 2 +- ...03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md | 2 +- ...-30-windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature.md | 2 +- ...ithub_actions_disable_security_workflow.md | 2 +- ...4-windows_driver_load_non-standard_path.md | 2 +- ...4-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md | 2 +- ..._spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md | 2 +- .../2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md | 2 +- ...022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md | 2 +- ...022-04-18-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md | 2 +- ...rocesses_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.md | 2 +- ...-02-windows_krbrelayup_service_creation.md | 2 +- ...22-05-11-potential_password_in_username.md | 182 +++++++++++++ .../2022-05-16-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md | 2 +- ...nd_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.md | 4 +- ...rsonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.md | 4 +- ...-splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.md | 8 +- ...rsonation_weak_encryption_configuration.md | 4 +- ...tal_certificates_infrastructure_version.md | 4 +- ...digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.md | 4 +- ...ss_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.md | 6 +- ...mpersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.md | 4 +- ..._and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.md | 4 +- ...nd_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.md | 4 +- ...01-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md | 2 +- ...spicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md | 2 +- ...ess_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md | 2 +- ...01-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md | 2 +- ...ed_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134.md | 2 +- ...2-06-03-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md | 2 +- ...efense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.md | 170 ++++++++++++ ...se_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.md | 170 ++++++++++++ ...enses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.md | 170 ++++++++++++ ...ws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md | 174 +++++++++++++ docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md | 5 +- docs/_stories/insider_threat.md | 5 +- docs/_stories/ransomware.md | 1 + docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md | 1 + .../windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md | 3 + docs/_stories/windows_registry_abuse.md | 3 + docs/mitre-map/coverage.json | 27 +- 277 files changed, 1660 insertions(+), 361 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2021-08-09-rundll32_lockworkstation.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-05-11-potential_password_in_username.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-06-21-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md diff --git a/dist/escu/app.manifest b/dist/escu/app.manifest index beca1e0b1d..ea7d43a12a 100644 --- a/dist/escu/app.manifest +++ b/dist/escu/app.manifest @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ "id": { "group": null, "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", - "version": "3.43.0" + "version": "3.43.1" }, "author": [ { diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf index 20055617d0..c307e21baa 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -5352,6 +5352,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search identifies users who have entered their passwords in username fields. This is done by looking for failed authentication attempts using usernames with a length longer than 7 characters and a high Shannon entropy, and looks for the next successful authentication attempt from the same source system to the same destination system as the failed attempt. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to have relevant authentication logs mapped to the Authentication data model. You also need to have the Splunk TA URL Toolbox (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/) installed. The detection must run with a time interval shorter than endtime+1000. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003", "T1552.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Valid usernames with high entropy or source/destination system pairs with multiple authenticating users will make it difficult to identify the real user authenticating. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -6009,6 +6019,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +known_false_positives = unknown +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7415,6 +7435,36 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [ known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender context menu within the registry. This is consistent behavior with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender main profile within the registry. This was used by RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. This is consistent with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -9620,7 +9670,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] +searches = ["ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ @@ -10073,7 +10123,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insider-threats/", "https://www.cisa.gov/defining-insider-threats", "https://www.code42.com/glossary/types-of-insider-threats/", "https://github.com/Insider-Threat/Insider-Threat", "https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/insider-ttp-kb/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule"] description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment. narrative = Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: "Insider threat incidents are possible in any sector or organization. An insider threat is typically a current or former employee, third-party contractor, or business partner. In their present or former role, the person has or had access to an organization's network systems, data, or premises, and uses their access (sometimes unwittingly). To combat the insider threat, organizations can implement a proactive, prevention-focused mitigation program to detect and identify threats, assess risk, and manage that risk - before an incident occurs." An insider is any person who has or had authorized access to or knowledge of an organization's resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems. These are the common insiders that create insider threats: Departing Employees, Security Evaders, Malicious Insiders, and Negligent Employees. This story aims at detecting the malicious insider. @@ -10427,7 +10477,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"] +searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. @@ -10569,7 +10619,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule"] description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ @@ -10587,7 +10637,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"] description = Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product. narrative = This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly. @@ -10972,7 +11022,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] +searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. @@ -11065,7 +11115,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"] description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. narrative = Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability, most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. @@ -11471,13 +11521,5 @@ known_false_positives = not defined earliest_time_offset = 14400 latest_time_offset = 0 -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - ### END RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/app.conf b/dist/escu/default/app.conf index 9e5df9e53a..36ea55ab53 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/app.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/app.conf @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ is_configured = false state = enabled state_change_requires_restart = false -build = 8305 +build = 8439 [triggers] reload.analytic_stories = simple @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reload.es_investigations = simple [launcher] author = Splunk -version = 3.43.0 +version = 3.43.1 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates. [ui] diff --git a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf index 57d68c71fa..5f5354ff5d 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf b/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf index 0be9e35fe9..a4215830fa 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ [content-version] -version = 3.43.0 +version = 3.43.1 diff --git a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf index 3c88f0a809..3df334d530 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf index b63225caef..1e2b90b132 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -2097,6 +2097,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[potential_password_in_username_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2353,6 +2357,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[rundll32_lockworkstation_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2905,6 +2913,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -3834,6 +3854,10 @@ description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcet definition = index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent. +[potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction] +definition = search * +description = Add customer specific known false positives to the map command used in detection - Potential password in username + [potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score] definition = eval orig_process=process, process=replace(lower(process), "`", "") | makemv tokenizer="([\w\d\-]+)" process | eval unusual_cmdline_feature_for=if(match(process, "^for$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^for$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_netsh=if(match(process, "^netsh$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^netsh$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_readbytes=if(match(process, "^readbytes$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^readbytes$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set=if(match(process, "^set$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^set$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_unrestricted=if(match(process, "^unrestricted$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^unrestricted$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_winstations=if(match(process, "^winstations$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^winstations$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-value=if(match(process, "^-value$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^-value$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_compression=if(match(process, "^compression$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^compression$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_server=if(match(process, "^server$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^server$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_set-mppreference=if(match(process, "^set-mppreference$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^set-mppreference$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_terminal=if(match(process, "^terminal$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^terminal$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_-name=if(match(process, "^-name$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^-name$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_catch=if(match(process, "^catch$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^catch$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_get-wmiobject=if(match(process, "^get-wmiobject$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^get-wmiobject$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_hklm=if(match(process, "^hklm$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^hklm$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_streamreader=if(match(process, "^streamreader$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^streamreader$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system32=if(match(process, "^system32$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^system32$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_username=if(match(process, "^username$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^username$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webrequest=if(match(process, "^webrequest$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^webrequest$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_count=if(match(process, "^count$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^count$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_webclient=if(match(process, "^webclient$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^webclient$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_writeallbytes=if(match(process, "^writeallbytes$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^writeallbytes$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_convert=if(match(process, "^convert$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^convert$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_create=if(match(process, "^create$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^create$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_function=if(match(process, "^function$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^function$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_net=if(match(process, "^net$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^net$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_com=if(match(process, "^com$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^com$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_http=if(match(process, "^http$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^http$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_io=if(match(process, "^io$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^io$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_system=if(match(process, "^system$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^system$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_new-object=if(match(process, "^new-object$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^new-object$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_if=if(match(process, "^if$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^if$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_threading=if(match(process, "^threading$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^threading$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_mutex=if(match(process, "^mutex$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^mutex$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_cryptography=if(match(process, "^cryptography$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^cryptography$"))), 0), unusual_cmdline_feature_computehash=if(match(process, "^computehash$"), mvcount(mvfilter(match(process, "^computehash$"))), 0) description = Performs the tokenization and application of the malicious commandline classifier diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf index 68584dab81..dc3c8df742 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilites"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = $peer$ downloaded apps from $host$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "host", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilites"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32157", "CVE-2022-32158"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-32157"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -897,8 +897,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-21 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-21 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter` [ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="medium" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter` +search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="medium" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter` [ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -22056,7 +22056,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter` +search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter` [ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -22877,6 +22877,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter` +[ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search identifies users who have entered their passwords in username fields. This is done by looking for failed authentication attempts using usernames with a length longer than 7 characters and a high Shannon entropy, and looks for the next successful authentication attempt from the same source system to the same destination system as the failed attempt. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003", "T1552.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search identifies users who have entered their passwords in username fields. This is done by looking for failed authentication attempts using usernames with a length longer than 7 characters and a high Shannon entropy, and looks for the next successful authentication attempt from the same source system to the same destination system as the failed attempt. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to have relevant authentication logs mapped to the Authentication data model. You also need to have the Splunk TA URL Toolbox (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/) installed. The detection must run with a time interval shorter than endtime+1000. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Valid usernames with high entropy or source/destination system pairs with multiple authenticating users will make it difficult to identify the real user authenticating. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-11 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-11 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Credential Dumping", "Insider Threat"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential password in username ($user$) with Shannon entropy ($ut_shannon$) +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 21}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 21}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Insider Threat"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Source:AD", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003", "T1552.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication BY "Authentication.user" | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word AS user | where ut_shannon>3 AND len(user)>=8 AND mvcount(src) == 1 | sort count, - ut_shannon | eval incorrect_password=user | eval endtime=endtime+1000 | map maxsearches=70 search="| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication Authentication.src=\"$src$\" Authentication.dest=\"$dest$\" sourcetype IN (\"$sourcetype$\") earliest=\"$starttime$\" latest=\"$endtime$\" BY \"Authentication.user\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction` | eval incorrect_password=\"$incorrect_password$\" | eval ut_shannon=\"$ut_shannon$\" | sort count" | where user!=incorrect_password | outlier action=RM count | `potential_password_in_username_filter` + [ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -25792,6 +25832,46 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="rundll32.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter` +[ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown +action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "SourceImage", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter` + [ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -32040,6 +32120,126 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` +[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender context menu within the registry. This is consistent behavior with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender context menu within the registry. This is consistent behavior with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows Defender context menu registry key deleted on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\shellex\\ContextMenuHandlers\\EPP" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender main profile within the registry. This was used by RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender main profile within the registry. This was used by RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The search looks for the Registry Key DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. This is consistent with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The search looks for the Registry Key DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. This is consistent with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. +action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-07 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderApiLogger\\Start" OR Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderAuditLogger\\Start") Registry.registry_value_data ="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter` + [ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -34377,7 +34577,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rul action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachment"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spearphishing Attachments"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = User $user$ on $dest$ spawned Windows Script Host from Winword.exe action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 70}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 70}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -34388,7 +34588,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = user,dest @@ -38377,7 +38577,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.tag=dhcp by All_Sessions.dest_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter` [ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -42433,27 +42633,6 @@ schedule_window = auto is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web by Web.src,Web.http_user_agent,Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| search http_method, "POST" | search src=$src$ -[ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task] -action.escu = 0 -action.escu.enabled = 1 -action.escu.search_type = investigative -action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task -description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09 -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware"] -action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 -action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 -action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] -action.escu.eli5 = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. -action.escu.how_to_implement = none -action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time -disabled = true -schedule_window = auto -is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter` - ### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf index 0d34ae2dc9..d02177ff3a 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf index 6e310d4fdc..c4a4d48377 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-06-14T13:52:57 UTC +# On Date: 2022-06-22T17:37:56 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_lolbin_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_lolbin_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml index 85fe88d28f..6c73973dd8 100644 --- a/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_lolbin_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml +++ b/dist/ssa/srs/ssa___windows_lolbin_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ name: Windows LOLBin Binary in Non Standard Path id: 25689101-012a-324a-94d3-08301e6c065a -version: 1 +version: 2 description: The following analytic identifies native living off the land binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The list of binaries was derived from the https://lolbas-project.github.io @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ search: ' $ssa_input = | from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval device=ucast(map /(?i)\\windows\\adws/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\windows\\networkcontroller/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\windows\\systemapps/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\winsxs/)=false AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\microsoft.net/)=false + AND match_regex(process_path, /(?i)\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform/)=false | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(device, user), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "process_path", process_path, "process_name", process_name]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' diff --git a/docs/_pages/detections.md b/docs/_pages/detections.md index e72b9fbb63..043d6c613a 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/detections.md +++ b/docs/_pages/detections.md @@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ sidebar: | [Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data](/network/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Possible Browser Pass View Parameter](/endpoint/possible_browser_pass_view_parameter/) | [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Potential password in username](/endpoint/potential_password_in_username/) | [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts), [Credentials In Files](/tags/#credentials-in-files) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Potentially malicious code on commandline](/endpoint/potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [PowerShell 4104 Hunting](/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -650,6 +651,7 @@ sidebar: | [Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process](/endpoint/rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser](/endpoint/rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Rundll32 DNSQuery](/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Rundll32 LockWorkStation](/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files](/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Rundll32 Shimcache Flush](/endpoint/rundll32_shimcache_flush/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network](/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -851,6 +853,9 @@ sidebar: | [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows ISO LNK File Creation](/endpoint/windows_iso_lnk_file_creation/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Malicious Link](/tags/#malicious-link), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging](/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | diff --git a/docs/_pages/stories.md b/docs/_pages/stories.md index abecdac106..8b235e458a 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/stories.md +++ b/docs/_pages/stories.md @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ sidebar: | [Command and Control](command_and_control) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Non-Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#non-application-layer-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Common Phishing Frameworks](common_phishing_frameworks) | [Spearphishing via Service](/tags/#spearphishing-via-service) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation](container_implantation_monitoring_and_investigation) | [Implant Internal Image](/tags/#implant-internal-image) | [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Credential Dumping](credential_dumping) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution) | +| [Credential Dumping](credential_dumping) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts), [Credentials In Files](/tags/#credentials-in-files), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [CyclopsBLink](cyclopsblink) | [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Masquerade Task or Service](/tags/#masquerade-task-or-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | | [DHS Report TA18-074A](dhs_report_ta18-074a) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [DNS Amplification Attacks](dns_amplification_attacks) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service), [Reflection Amplification](/tags/#reflection-amplification) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ sidebar: | [Industroyer2](industroyer2) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Disable or Modify System Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-system-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Information Sabotage](information_sabotage) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | | [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Insider Threat](insider_threat) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | +| [Insider Threat](insider_threat) | [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](/tags/#exfiltration-to-cloud-storage), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](/tags/#exfiltration-over-web-service), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts), [Credentials In Files](/tags/#credentials-in-files) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [JBoss Vulnerability](jboss_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](kubernetes_scanning_activity) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity](kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity) | None | None | @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ sidebar: | [PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527](printnightmare_cve-2021-34527) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch](prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols), [Drive-by Compromise](/tags/#drive-by-compromise) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | | [ProxyShell](proxyshell) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) | +| [Ransomware](ransomware) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Automated Exfiltration](/tags/#automated-exfiltration), [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs), [Service Stop](/tags/#service-stop), [Account Access Removal](/tags/#account-access-removal), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Tool](/tags/#tool), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [Web Protocols](/tags/#web-protocols) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance), [Resource Development](/tags/#resource-development) | | [Ransomware Cloud](ransomware_cloud) | [Data Encrypted for Impact](/tags/#data-encrypted-for-impact) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | | [Remcos](remcos) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Component Object Model](/tags/#component-object-model), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Screen Capture](/tags/#screen-capture), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Revil Ransomware](revil_ransomware) | [Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall](/tags/#disable-or-modify-cloud-firewall), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Defacement](/tags/#defacement), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [CMSTP](/tags/#cmstp) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md index bb944d4ef6..c9e73bfaa9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-13-detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.md @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be ``` -| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.tag=dhcp by All_Sessions.dest_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")` |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` @@ -150,4 +150,4 @@ Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://gith -[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/experimental/network/detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md index 5860da8991..351df8d65f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md index ba87d130b6..bbb21c3187 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md index 7e2378e968..c5f5fd575e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md index f4a348e37c..473271fdc1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md index 5604b56488..7ddc9ec68b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md index 71d6f444e4..02ca8ce578 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md index 6fa26f2d66..3e1d527e90 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md index aed242ad09..dd9f2854a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md index 875ff5b43e..be75b3546b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md index 445b0aa8ec..3de046b373 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md index 6228d32f4a..ade57132a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md index 01a8bca88b..be36a668be 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md index 6ce1a2e91d..f7818c9cf6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md index e89e183dd1..d877cebd94 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md index 9f92f7ce49..6a0338fdad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md index 7b015eb774..11c14b9a07 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md index ada1ed7f59..6314c7448b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md index 3f3ed50d37..57187c0ff4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md index 58dbbdc38f..e63eaaca93 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md index 46dae84eb1..165273c4b2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md @@ -124,13 +124,13 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md index 9a0b7389ef..499553bcaf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md index 7706e0d302..6a92d69fb0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md index 97977c0cfd..3f454963e2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) > :information_source: > **first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md index 9372642573..5f60fe9322 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md index ca52418ecb..85c2cd05e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple user #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md index 6df573f907..caa4fab851 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_failed_sso_attempts.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Detect failed Okta SSO events #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md index b931e0738d..212ff4ee2b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [okta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/okta.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md index 7032505da1..4118197c48 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md index 9b0f587725..2ba8eb08fa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by somethin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md index d5664f0705..490d46bae2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) > :information_source: > **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md index d979e3ae58..659299bc48 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_arp_poisoning.md @@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiza #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_arp_poisoning_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md index 8b78997c54..d6ee9b17f7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-11-detect_rogue_dhcp_server.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's ne #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md index 16df731e66..8b02b31f89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md index c7023ed7fd..0ffc3ca3a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats.md @@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organiz #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md index f4b280451b..4c082ef9f0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_port_security_violation.md @@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interfa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_port_security_violation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md index 5275e8e08a..e0ca235128 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_traffic_mirroring.md @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltratio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [cisco_networks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cisco_networks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_traffic_mirroring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md index 5ef412da61..dc37dca253 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [ransomware_extensions](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_extensions.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [ransomware_extensions](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_extensions.yml) > :information_source: > **common_ransomware_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md index 02e4d5a45d..9aa515ac82 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [ransomware_notes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_notes.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md index c0b41eca2c..f3728f515c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network config #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [system_network_configuration_discovery_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/system_network_configuration_discovery_tools.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md index 40a0588ba7..fe972a76d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md index fd49f87ac7..7e4aa6a628 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md index 8857789a74..ee30a723f2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mai #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md index 972953b60e..4037093153 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_pst_export_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md index 15bbb80cd2..24a14ff406 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mail #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md index a6fd025871..46ed9198f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md index 3fb78bf21f..c825107497 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md index d264511cc0..c82dde054d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have cha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md index 76b85517e1..9dd8f0fe7a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md index 80f40c2548..7c5c6ff72c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md index b7e7dfbb01..d743ca3df3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md index 27ebda9129..d5a0cd0982 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon erro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md index 789547b9a3..5c5fd9416e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md index bf8e91a006..6c37af2788 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (interna #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md index 67902820ae..f9cf1a3efd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md index f790f144d3..beea6f235b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md index 735dd33b8a..5a903ef10e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md index c1f594b00a..e305c8b68c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md index 4f41ad6e86..d8c9000127 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md index 01e838de9a..63ee241b2a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md index be4d30aed2..bc208c5e86 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md index 082d8597ae..130f7c6dcd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md index ab18079b5d..3eca1c53ab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md @@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **w3wp_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md index 18070e75e0..620ce0a918 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md index d4cf37746f..db41bf7dfa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **high_process_termination_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md index b73da35928..5ac8414b89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md index 20649a78c8..0b7fdfe081 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md index b7495a6ba1..e492729dbd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and scrip #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) > :information_source: > **certutil_with_decode_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md index 5583fced4f..69da9eb447 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **powershell_start-bitstransfer_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md index 9484c6a320..f0359f53c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh applicati #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md index ebd16db17c..ab261f4d7d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md index a7a8420e93..20d0073cd2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typicall #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **excel_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md index 89a771922f..501c9660d5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **winword_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md index e7b23e671b..1b841987af 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on pr There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. #### Associated Analytic story -* [Spearphishing Attachment](/stories/spearphishing_attachment) +* [Spearphishing Attachments](/stories/spearphishing_attachments) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md index 395cc1b89a..75a6897250 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md index bef8758516..56c059af2a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md index eeb3ab4fee..e3e263aa54 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using #### Search ``` -`sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") +`sysmon` EventCode=7 parent_process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as AllImageLoaded count by Computer EventCode Image process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **office_document_executing_macro_code_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md index 000c69e486..85a2c57319 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md index caf4fa1b8e..a3a7e05749 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that dr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md index 42583c9bdf..4cdbd433e0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md @@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md index ec93fceb92..f787b8f414 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltrat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) > :information_source: > **multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md index c40ab2bb31..e0ae691ef6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md index 8b9810d35a..2f4662d6e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) > :information_source: > **plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md index fb37b43389..cd8bc91dff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **winword_spawning_cmd_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md index 83ac9784e0..50ceecec7c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) > :information_source: > **office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md index aee81a0e17..a6c6750967 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) > :information_source: > **office_product_spawning_certutil_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md index e1e4038175..23dc5d2084 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **office_product_spawning_mshta_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md index cc29fc4eab..895a6c51d5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **trickbot_named_pipe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md index ff1e142ac3..43c3a38d63 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is comm #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md index 7046351428..aea92238c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **xmrig_driver_loaded_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md index bc7dfa7f87..2d513333bd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **deleting_of_net_users_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md index 535a631c2c..5d3c6378ba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user accou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **disabling_net_user_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md index 7e62bef14e..3dec5b2e36 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md index 43eaa37a0b..e75d99cd23 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram appli #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **download_files_using_telegram_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md index 9cbb027826..2b90be4869 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a buc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md index 64ff8b9995..869bea7299 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLU #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md index 1ed5f0e08d..c32f863108 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md @@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md index bb4baa84c7..5286c0105c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **modification_of_wallpaper_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md index aa6d560171..f095875738 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md index e87879902a..3c01acc3b9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md index 72713207b3..d2bde70c61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md index a11edd86b5..eb65981ea1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or di #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md index 8c3d97cd67..bfc3e0d66e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md index 901c9a4e51..f6419290a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow netw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md index 849bccd29b..f3fa23324d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md index 2ce03df914..a0f829606a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Captu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md index 081961e406..d5094a4a8e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Captu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md index 1972abccfb..57fa4e8b70 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md index bbc1985d5b..c3db511f1e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md index a22067412c..406084fcfc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md index 72cefff943..20678262d5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md index 324bc9edb8..b7f5ee265e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows d #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md index c9f070f3ec..6f9d39c5bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md index 18015756a1..251e2c5e25 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md index 1038195192..1a8abd0c7d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd chil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md index 7ee60a9e83..ef3e261bdf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md index 2fee621286..2612bc03e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md index e574e6f691..fa9fa4b335 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md index 2c4448604c..14846a2e0e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit param #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md index 27cbb5c585..a70a85e8c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to lo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md index fdf4ec8c06..57dd88fc58 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md index 35acb6bef9..229fecc735 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **drop_icedid_license_dat_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md index 7ee2b55ee4..1f2de9c0c4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md index ae7b48391d..d478b8a1dc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md index e3ec1efb85..24da952f26 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% fol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md index bf0db94672..2d8501f31d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This tec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-rundll32_lockworkstation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-rundll32_lockworkstation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5058d1066c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-rundll32_lockworkstation.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +--- +title: "Rundll32 LockWorkStation" +excerpt: "System Binary Proxy Execution +, Rundll32 +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2021-08-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - System Binary Proxy Execution + - Rundll32 + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2021-08-09 +- **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +- **ID**: fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | System Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1218.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **rundll32_lockworkstation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. + +#### Known False Positives +unknown + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$ | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html](https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/conti/conti_leak/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml) \| *version*: **2** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md index 65a9387f53..3fb4417f2a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md index 3c41a25ed8..9503d402ab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md index 627b13cfc4..096fcc5bea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="medium" -| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, user, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity +| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter` diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md index a5d581a73a..c869495b9b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to ext #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md index fcb09a3843..119d3124c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to c #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_esentutl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_esentutl.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md index c53734cb79..cc02548366 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) > :information_source: > **aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md index dee1311390..6aefa7a7eb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md index 0db42eec42..b176886222 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **github_commit_changes_in_master_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md index d467a3d42a..ac0fc91be6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md index b9eae53195..97395a0a7b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abuse #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md index d62060e513..ab149bc49c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [kubernetes_container_controller](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/kubernetes_container_controller.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md index ed38bcefb7..68b6e25aab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md index a4109f88e7..27495bc909 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [exchange](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/exchange.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [exchange](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/exchange.yml) > :information_source: > **exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md index e2886e38e9..2eef99dca3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **github_commit_in_develop_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md index 8e071247fe..fd2a212384 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **github_dependabot_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md index 5472ee8db6..986599f6e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github_known_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github_known_users.yml) -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) > :information_source: > **github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md index 5f1e7fe3f7..64cb7c7e3c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md index 134b9a1a46..a6cbdb54f1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md index 9e7b8b4572..d74d500fcd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md index 3b0d396361..397b2fde50 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md index d0dc7976de..9b34319ea7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 7eede94a27..aebb4338a1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md index 54672494fe..fb65fae26a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) > :information_source: > **attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md index 03592ce7d2..43ce2e7a48 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md index 1de2af652c..2973716561 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) > :information_source: > **bits_job_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md index d2c8c7bf2d..1719e88830 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) > :information_source: > **bitsadmin_download_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md index 7b9f556da7..abb3e468f1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md @@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md index f6f060195b..dcf5dcfcc6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md index d6a564ecf3..07f3c1ee10 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md index a314652ee7..2b0c206d92 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md index f7fe599fd1..7adebd9f38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md index 778d8b6ff4..917308ab5f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol han #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md index 7ec5743895..6d3b9fd3f3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utilit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md index 792de3fc4f..ffec5424f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` fla #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md index 71034b077f..cbd7f74e6d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md index b1aa6cdf31..f4b3227e0b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) > :information_source: > **local_account_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md index 0969ffa570..25121ac6e9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md index be4fd3f7ba..5ed0df7318 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious fil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **verclsid_clsid_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md index 26d9c2b9b0..324b00134c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) > :information_source: > **msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md index 9014907709..9a0aea5cea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with sile #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md index a3863a8678..f51ec23ad7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md index e139502ae5..2de92d79aa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_copy](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_copy.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_copy](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_copy.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md index 28feffa6ea..14fed43740 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_setspn](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_setspn.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_setspn](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_setspn.yml) > :information_source: > **serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md index 4320088985..0285716fab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, iden #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md index 1aa535fe1c..ab3efa98b0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md @@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md index 971dd3bbde..1f87ace6f7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adver #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_route](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_route.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md index 8a8ef5efad..44ab86c0bc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user opt #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md index 1eb00cabc5..215c786252 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md @@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md index 528f6b0294..dfc676e66c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md index 37b92ca050..73a0c311f5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md index 133e5e5ae1..f50a85740c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md index d611b7f432..458e515aef 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md index ab844da06b..1c834b88c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md index 8a5c2e0826..7616892f0b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line executio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_dxdiag](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dxdiag.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md index b547469c0b..44e6b12703 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md index ddf621fad7..1c40def6e4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md index 625fff80eb..c91245a56f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.ex #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md index d94c2cff62..180db1a279 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being load #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md index 9c3749457a..a36466edd5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat sp #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [linux_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/linux_shells.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [linux_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/linux_shells.yml) > :information_source: > **linux_java_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md index 4a076c35c3..130435c879 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spaw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_java_spawning_shells_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md index a7e3a6be4d..5b55936c2f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md @@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md index 58ff38a98a..ee9b513261 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into L #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md index c48ad067c4..cc2eb7766c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md index 70436ece37..65de741ab3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) > :information_source: > **cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md index f58ff3f639..383cc57008 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md @@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md index b4a40a14d5..02fb93e350 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md index 12c713a123..d77807e154 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md index 921bf0c555..58e4d0e11d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running fro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md index f0282edf5f..837ffae589 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defend #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md index 548baa0f37..24d910afbf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) > :information_source: > **ping_sleep_batch_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md index e89c702ca3..7799ba7e41 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md index d092e269dc..b0dc4c81af 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) > :information_source: > **certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md index b4a4ddd812..9d1509047e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) > :information_source: > **certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md index af277a65bb..675f3abf1c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_added_service_principal_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md index 250614bfde..861cd2db17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trus #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md index 7dc316494e..c8571f10e9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what ent #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_disable_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md index df18dc6ceb..7e85cb86f9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md index e5645065c1..250e164d6a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md index be25d49dfa..7722585244 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_schtasks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_schtasks.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md index 64239bc1a7..1ca1e1d4f7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ord #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md index 39f2b80d72..12bd46fc7a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the maste #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md index 51d1e73d56..b8e76acd2d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a publ #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md index 663285a202..6c6367c37c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md index 37dfa77e2e..9552bd6766 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md index fe11db54f8..d2e44a1965 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md index 75b9319c65..d2f3c5bda6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **rundll32_dnsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md index 46b18ec802..0fa7e197b5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of serv #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md index 8585a4f9e0..539abbfa7f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md index cdc1d04670..dc2e9a91c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md @@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_msbuild_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 166aa0dead..b442efd626 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_regasm](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regasm.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regasm](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regasm.yml) > :information_source: > **detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index a4972826ff..2a33a397b7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index 61890d3fea..4c780c3d97 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments an #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index e9b550679a..c5fb8b3ffa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_dllhost](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dllhost.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_dllhost](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dllhost.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md index 8b4e61d37a..f1df36b2c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_gpupdate](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_gpupdate.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md index 1124eaa96f..3805e9254b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md index 02546a0eed..a695f6e7b7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md index 4eba7529a2..e7ffbdeb55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md index 424eff1d3a..42ee8d7ce7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-30-windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-30-windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature.md index f5be1cf051..c503983391 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-30-windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-30-windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic assists with viewing all drivers being loaded by using Sy #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md index cb85c01f90..008e97ef0a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects a disabled security workflow in GitHub Actions. An attacker #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_driver_load_non-standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_driver_load_non-standard_path.md index e8bf097fdc..a49622fd78 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_driver_load_non-standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_driver_load_non-standard_path.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic uses Windows EventCode 7045 to identify new Kernel Mode D #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_driver_load_non-standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md index 5d7224b035..ba8933f81a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modifie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md index aa65234c4a..d73eeffe74 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022- #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) > :information_source: > **web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md index 329d185ff5..65e39d055c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **any_powershell_downloadfile_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md index 4ed02b76f5..d7ba5d5cc3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) > :information_source: > **any_powershell_downloadstring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-18-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-18-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md index 4502ff62f6..7192ee4b40 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-18-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-18-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_nltest](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_nltest.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) > :information_source: > **nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-22-windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-22-windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.md index b10e220124..7249744d4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-22-windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-22-windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic is to look for known processes killed by industroyer2 mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-02-windows_krbrelayup_service_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-02-windows_krbrelayup_service_creation.md index 197ec18a1a..50bd382f02 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-02-windows_krbrelayup_service_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-02-windows_krbrelayup_service_creation.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the default service name created by KrbRelayUp #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_krbrelayup_service_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-11-potential_password_in_username.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-11-potential_password_in_username.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1cc277a682 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-11-potential_password_in_username.md @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +--- +title: "Potential password in username" +excerpt: "Local Accounts +, Credentials In Files +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-05-11 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Local Accounts + - Credentials In Files + - Defense Evasion + - Initial Access + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Authentication +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search identifies users who have entered their passwords in username fields. This is done by looking for failed authentication attempts using usernames with a length longer than 7 characters and a high Shannon entropy, and looks for the next successful authentication attempt from the same source system to the same destination system as the failed attempt. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-05-11 +- **Author**: Mikael Bjerkeland, Splunk +- **ID**: 5ced34b4-ab32-4bb0-8f22-3b8f186f0a38 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1078.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/) | Local Accounts | Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +| [T1552.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/) | Credentials In Files | Credential Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication BY "Authentication.user" +| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` +| lookup ut_shannon_lookup word AS user +| where ut_shannon>3 AND len(user)>=8 AND mvcount(src) == 1 +| sort count, - ut_shannon +| eval incorrect_password=user +| eval endtime=endtime+1000 +| map maxsearches=70 search=" +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication Authentication.src=\"$src$\" Authentication.dest=\"$dest$\" sourcetype IN (\"$sourcetype$\") earliest=\"$starttime$\" latest=\"$endtime$\" BY \"Authentication.user\" +| `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` +| `potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction` +| eval incorrect_password=\"$incorrect_password$\" +| eval ut_shannon=\"$ut_shannon$\" +| sort count" +| where user!=incorrect_password +| outlier action=RM count +| `potential_password_in_username_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **potential_password_in_username_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* Authentication.user +* Authentication.src +* Authentication.dest +* sourcetype + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to have relevant authentication logs mapped to the Authentication data model. You also need to have the Splunk TA URL Toolbox (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/2734/) installed. The detection must run with a time interval shorter than endtime+1000. + +#### Known False Positives +Valid usernames with high entropy or source/destination system pairs with multiple authenticating users will make it difficult to identify the real user authenticating. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) +* [Insider Threat](/stories/insider_threat) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 21.0 | 30 | 70 | Potential password in username ($user$) with Shannon entropy ($ut_shannon$) | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://medium.com/@markmotig/search-for-passwords-accidentally-typed-into-the-username-field-975f1a389928](https://medium.com/@markmotig/search-for-passwords-accidentally-typed-into-the-username-field-975f1a389928) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.001/password_in_username/linux_secure.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1552.001/password_in_username/linux_secure.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/potential_password_in_username.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-16-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-16-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md index 484b31b7fd..562a6beea7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-16-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-16-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-23-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-23-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.md index a4e1df1b24..b15cf016bd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-23-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-23-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32154 - Splunk_Audit --- @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguard
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32154](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32154) | Dashboards in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 might let an attacker inject risky search commands into a form token when the token is used in a query in a cross-origin request. The result bypasses SPL safeguards for risky commands. See New capabilities can limit access to some custom and potentially risky commands (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/SPLsafeguards#New_capabilities_can_limit_access_to_some_custom_and_potentially_risky_commands) for more information. Note that the attack is browser-based and an attacker cannot exploit it at will. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-24-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-24-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.md index 2592448e3b..473cb379cb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-24-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-24-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32152 --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by de
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32152](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32152) | Splunk Enterprise peers in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203 did not validate the TLS certificates during Splunk-to-Splunk communications by default. Splunk peer communications configured properly with valid certificates were not vulnerable. However, an attacker with administrator credentials could add a peer without a valid certificate and connections from misconfigured nodes without valid certificates did not fail by default. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.md index 6a235a7499..6fc1f15216 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates.md @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - - - + - CVE-2022-32151 + - CVE-2022-32152 --- @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usa
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32151](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32151) | The httplib and urllib Python libraries that Splunk shipped with Splunk Enterprise did not validate certificates using the certificate authority (CA) certificate stores by default in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203. Python 3 client libraries now verify server certificates by default and use the appropriate CA certificate stores for each library. Apps and add-ons that include their own HTTP libraries are not affected. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | +| [CVE-2022-32152](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32152) | Splunk Enterprise peers in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203 did not validate the TLS certificates during Splunk-to-Splunk communications by default. Splunk peer communications configured properly with valid certificates were not vulnerable. However, an attacker with administrator credentials could add a peer without a valid certificate and connections from misconfigured nodes without valid certificates did not fail by default. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration.md index 45bacf61e1..e62aa4efc2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-25-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32151 --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validati
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32151](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32151) | The httplib and urllib Python libraries that Splunk shipped with Splunk Enterprise did not validate certificates using the certificate authority (CA) certificate stores by default in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203. Python 3 client libraries now verify server certificates by default and use the appropriate CA certificate stores for each library. Apps and add-ons that include their own HTTP libraries are not affected. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version.md index f983cabd38..857f9d725a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32153 --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search h
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32153](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32153) | Splunk Enterprise peers in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203 did not validate the TLS certificates during Splunk-to-Splunk communications by default. Splunk peer communications configured properly with valid certificates were not vulnerable. However, an attacker with administrator credentials could add a peer without a valid certificate and connections from misconfigured nodes without valid certificates did not fail by default. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.md index cd8a5b7f2b..357fe03ed7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32151 --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authenti
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32151](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32151) | The httplib and urllib Python libraries that Splunk shipped with Splunk Enterprise did not validate certificates using the certificate authority (CA) certificate stores by default in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203. Python 3 client libraries now verify server certificates by default and use the appropriate CA certificate stores for each library. Apps and add-ons that include their own HTTP libraries are not affected. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.md index 7476b0ef44..908e4e5892 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads.md @@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - - - + - CVE-2022-32157 --- @@ -94,8 +93,7 @@ On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authenti
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32157](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32157) | Splunk Enterprise deployment servers in versions before 9.0 allow unauthenticated downloading of forwarder bundles. Remediation requires you to update the deployment server to version 9.0 and Configure authentication for deployment servers and clients (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/ConfigDSDCAuthEnhancements#Configure_authentication_for_deployment_servers_and_clients). Once enabled, deployment servers can manage only Universal Forwarder versions 9.0 and higher. Though the vulnerability does not directly affect Universal Forwarders, remediation requires updating all Universal Forwarders that the deployment server manages to version 9.0 or higher prior to enabling the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.md index 88cca6ad70..9daf2c5338 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-26-splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32152 --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS v
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32152](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32152) | Splunk Enterprise peers in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 and Splunk Cloud Platform versions before 8.2.2203 did not validate the TLS certificates during Splunk-to-Splunk communications by default. Splunk peer communications configured properly with valid certificates were not vulnerable. However, an attacker with administrator credentials could add a peer without a valid certificate and connections from misconfigured nodes without valid certificates did not fail by default. For Splunk Enterprise, update to Splunk Enterprise version 9.0 and Configure TLS host name validation for Splunk-to-Splunk communications (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/EnableTLSCertHostnameValidation) to enable the remediation. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.md index 1f47edb329..dbf85e9f4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32154 - Splunk_Audit --- @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that m
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32154](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32154) | Dashboards in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 might let an attacker inject risky search commands into a form token when the token is used in a query in a cross-origin request. The result bypasses SPL safeguards for risky commands. See New capabilities can limit access to some custom and potentially risky commands (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/SPLsafeguards#New_capabilities_can_limit_access_to_some_custom_and_potentially_risky_commands) for more information. Note that the attack is browser-based and an attacker cannot exploit it at will. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.md index e6e8cc21a6..009c6a2753 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-05-27-splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - - + - CVE-2022-32154 - Splunk_Audit --- @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" train
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/) | | | +| [CVE-2022-32154](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32154) | Dashboards in Splunk Enterprise versions before 9.0 might let an attacker inject risky search commands into a form token when the token is used in a query in a cross-origin request. The result bypasses SPL safeguards for risky commands. See New capabilities can limit access to some custom and potentially risky commands (https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.0/Security/SPLsafeguards#New_capabilities_can_limit_access_to_some_custom_and_potentially_risky_commands) for more information. Note that the attack is browser-based and an attacker cannot exploit it at will. | None | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md index b18ce4fe3e..174eac3cf3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md index d62428fbc2..a841bd35e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known i #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md index cdc455112a..8cc453ba00 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md index 41f5193809..08612d4668 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-01-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134.md index de3e2d1ab2..8efa8efaee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve-2022-26134.md @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitatio
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2022-26134](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134) | In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, from 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and from 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. | None | +| [CVE-2022-26134](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134) | In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, from 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, from 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, from 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, from 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, from 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and from 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. | 7.5 | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md index 93e889596e..0acdbed77f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-03-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) > :information_source: > **excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..055066a576 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.md @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-06-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Disable or Modify Tools + - Impair Defenses + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender context menu within the registry. This is consistent behavior with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-06-07 +- **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +- **ID**: 395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/) | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1562](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/) | Impair Defenses | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Delivery + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\shellex\\ContextMenuHandlers\\EPP" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Registry.registry_key_name +* Registry.registry_value_name +* Registry.dest +* Registry.user +* Registry.registry_path +* Registry.action + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. + +#### Known False Positives +It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) +* [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | Windows Defender context menu registry key deleted on $dest$. | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/) +* [https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/](https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/delete_win_defender_context_menu/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/delete_win_defender_context_menu/sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13f5c42b38 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.md @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-06-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Disable or Modify Tools + - Impair Defenses + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender main profile within the registry. This was used by RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-06-07 +- **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +- **ID**: 65d4b105-ec52-48ec-ac46-289d0fbf7d96 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/) | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1562](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/) | Impair Defenses | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Delivery + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender" Registry.action = deleted by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest +| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Registry.registry_key_name +* Registry.registry_value_name +* Registry.dest +* Registry.user +* Registry.registry_path +* Registry.action + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. + +#### Known False Positives +It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) +* [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 64.0 | 80 | 80 | Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$. | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/) +* [https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/](https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/delete_win_defender_context_menu/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/delete_win_defender_context_menu/sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1dc2c0cb10 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-07-windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.md @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging" +excerpt: "Disable or Modify Tools +, Impair Defenses +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-06-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Disable or Modify Tools + - Impair Defenses + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The search looks for the Registry Key DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. This is consistent with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-06-07 +- **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +- **ID**: 76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/) | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1562](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/) | Impair Defenses | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Delivery + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderApiLogger\\Start" OR Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderAuditLogger\\Start") Registry.registry_value_data ="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Registry.registry_key_name +* Registry.registry_value_name +* Registry.dest +* Registry.user +* Registry.registry_path +* Registry.action + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. + +#### Known False Positives +It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Windows Defense Evasion Tactics](/stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics) +* [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Windows Defender Logger registry key set to 'disabled' on $dest$. | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/) +* [https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/](https://app.any.run/tasks/45f5d114-91ea-486c-ab01-41c4093d2861/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable_defender_logging/sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/disable_defender_logging/sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-06-21-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md b/docs/_posts/2022-06-21-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68334536f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-06-21-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +--- +title: "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High" +excerpt: "Malicious Image +, User Execution +" +categories: + - Cloud +last_modified_at: 2022-06-21 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Malicious Image + - User Execution + - Execution + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/products/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-06-21 +- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +- **ID**: 62721bd2-1d82-4623-b6e6-aac170014423 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1204.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003/) | Malicious Image | Execution | + +| [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/) | User Execution | Execution | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Actions on Objectives + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.DS +* PR.AC +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 13 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` +`cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings +| spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings +| mvexpand findings +| spath input=findings +| search severity=HIGH +| rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as image +| eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description +| eval phase="release" +| eval severity="high" +| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, image, userName, src_ip, finding, phase, severity +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) + +> :information_source: +> **aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* eventSource +* eventName +* responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} +* awsRegion +* requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest +* requestParameters.repositoryName +* user +* userName +* src_ip + + +#### How To Implement +You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. + +#### Known False Positives +unknown + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Dev Sec Ops](/stories/dev_sec_ops) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 70.0 | 70 | 100 | Vulnerabilities with severity high found in image $image$ | + + +> :information_source: +> The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. + +#### Reference + +* [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECR/latest/userguide/image-scanning.html) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/cloud/aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md b/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md index 6c33f6adf1..6061c3fe08 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_stories/credential_dumping.md @@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Authentication - Endpoint - Actions on Objectives - Exploitation - Installation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ tags: Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication), [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2020-02-04 - **Author**: Rico Valdez, Splunk - **ID**: 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a @@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Securi | [Esentutl SAM Copy](/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | | [Extraction of Registry Hives](/endpoint/extraction_of_registry_hives/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | | [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [Potential password in username](/endpoint/potential_password_in_username/) | [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts), [Credentials In Files](/tags/#credentials-in-files)| Hunting | | [SAM Database File Access Attempt](/endpoint/sam_database_file_access_attempt/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | | [SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool](/endpoint/secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | | [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/insider_threat.md b/docs/_stories/insider_threat.md index 172fea6b8f..4ee44b4807 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/insider_threat.md +++ b/docs/_stories/insider_threat.md @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Splunk Behavioral Analytics + - Authentication - Endpoint - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ tags: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud, Splunk Behavioral Analytics -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Datamodel**: [Authentication](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Authentication), [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-05-19 - **Author**: Jose Hernandez, Splunk - **ID**: c633df29-a950-4c4c-a0f8-02be6730797c @@ -36,6 +38,7 @@ Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: "Insider threat incidents are possible | [Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain](/cloud/gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain/) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol)| Anomaly | | [High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share](/endpoint/high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share/) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account)| Anomaly | | [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Potential password in username](/endpoint/potential_password_in_username/) | [Local Accounts](/tags/#local-accounts), [Credentials In Files](/tags/#credentials-in-files)| Hunting | | [Windows Users Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials](/endpoint/windows_users_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ransomware.md b/docs/_stories/ransomware.md index 5f9dbd9469..6980ae4bf9 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ransomware.md @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host e | [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](/endpoint/remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi/) | [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation)| TTP | | [Revil Common Exec Parameter](/endpoint/revil_common_exec_parameter/) | [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution)| TTP | | [Revil Registry Entry](/endpoint/revil_registry_entry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | +| [Rundll32 LockWorkStation](/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation/) | [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| Anomaly | | [Schtasks used for forcing a reboot](/endpoint/schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| TTP | | [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](/endpoint/suspicious_event_log_service_behavior/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs)| TTP | | [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | diff --git a/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md b/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md index 0e17c33da9..a3e95a82cb 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md +++ b/docs/_stories/spearphishing_attachments.md @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been | [Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT](/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawning_msdt/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | | [Winword Spawning Cmd](/endpoint/winword_spawning_cmd/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | | [Winword Spawning PowerShell](/endpoint/winword_spawning_powershell/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | +| [Winword Spawning Windows Script Host](/endpoint/winword_spawning_windows_script_host/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | | [Gdrive suspicious file sharing](/cloud/gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Hunting | | [Gsuite suspicious calendar invite](/cloud/gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Hunting | | [Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file](/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file/) | [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md b/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md index b396c3b240..c9cdd4b3f0 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_defense_evasion_tactics.md @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adve | [Windows Event For Service Disabled](/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Hunting | | [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | | [Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry](/endpoint/windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Hunting | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging](/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | | [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | | [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| Anomaly | | [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [System Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#system-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/windows_registry_abuse.md b/docs/_stories/windows_registry_abuse.md index 26ee941b36..ba064f4e83 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/windows_registry_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_stories/windows_registry_abuse.md @@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows feature | [Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry](/endpoint/windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| Anomaly | | [Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry](/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | | [Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry](/endpoint/windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Hunting | +| [Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry](/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging](/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| Anomaly | | [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | | [Windows Registry Certificate Added](/endpoint/windows_registry_certificate_added/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls)| TTP | | [Windows Registry Delete Task SD](/endpoint/windows_registry_delete_task_sd/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json index 6512d1e53b..30eb69a7a6 100644 --- a/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json +++ b/docs/mitre-map/coverage.json @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ }, { "techniqueID": "T1562", - "score": 50, - "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_registry_delete_task_sd.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml" + "score": 53, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/cloud/o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/firewall_allowed_program_enable.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/processes_launching_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_registry_delete_task_sd.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml" }, { "techniqueID": "T1554", @@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ }, { "techniqueID": "T1218", - "score": 53, - "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml" + "score": 54, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/office_product_spawn_cmd_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/verclsid_clsid_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wbemprox_com_object_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution.yml" }, { "techniqueID": "T1036", @@ -291,8 +291,8 @@ }, { "techniqueID": "T1218.011", - "score": 15, - "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.yml" + "score": 16, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_dnsquery.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_lockworkstation.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.yml" }, { "techniqueID": "T1204.002", @@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ }, { "techniqueID": "T1562.001", - "score": 39, - "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml" + "score": 42, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_amsi_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_antivirus_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_enhanced_notification.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_mpengine_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_spynet_reporting.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_etw_through_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_registry_tool.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_schedule_task.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_show_hidden_files.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_app_hotkeys.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_behavior_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disable_windows_smartscreen_protection.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_cmd_application.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_controlpanel.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_defender_services.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_firewall_with_netsh.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_norun_windows_app.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/disabling_task_manager.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/excessive_usage_of_taskkill.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_disable_security_monitoring.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/process_kill_base_on_file_path.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_disableantispyware_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_dism_remove_defender.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_event_for_service_disabled.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_terminating_lsass_process.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.yml" }, { "techniqueID": "T1021.001", @@ -521,8 +521,8 @@ }, { "techniqueID": "T1078.003", - "score": 1, - "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml" + "score": 2, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.yml\n\nhttps://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/potential_password_in_username.yml" }, { "techniqueID": "T1505", @@ -879,6 +879,11 @@ "score": 1, "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/ping_sleep_batch_command.yml" }, + { + "techniqueID": "T1552.001", + "score": 1, + "comment": "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/potential_password_in_username.yml" + }, { "techniqueID": "T1027.005", "score": 2, @@ -1132,7 +1137,7 @@ "#096ed7" ], "minValue": 0, - "maxValue": 53 + "maxValue": 54 }, "filters": { "platforms": [ From 056b07a686e8f86e1931d7f699e291539057f5c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:09:07 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] remove detection --- ...ws_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml | 81 ------------------- ...iexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml | 13 --- 2 files changed, 94 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml delete mode 100644 tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 48f9e0e66a..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ -name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path -id: 42bb73c8-302c-45ce-9e87-2e81c2107725 -version: 1 -date: '2022-06-16' -author: Michael Haag, Splunk -type: TTP -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe running from a non-standard location. This is a commonly used method by adversaries to evade detection logic. - During triage, capture any file modification artifacts and review parallel processes. -search: ' | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) - as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*system32*","*syswow64*","*winsxs*")) - by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path - Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id - | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` - | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` - | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path_filter`' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -known_false_positives: False positives may be present as some legitimate applications may use a moved or renamed instance of MSIExec. Filter as needed. -references: - - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/ - - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md -tags: - analytic_story: - - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec - asset_type: Endpoint - cis20: - - CIS 3 - - CIS 5 - - CIS 16 - confidence: 70 - context: - - Source:Endpoint - - Stage:Defense Evasion - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-security.log - impact: 70 - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to run from a non-standard path. - mitre_attack_id: - - T1218.007 - nist: - - DE.CM - observable: - - name: user - type: User - role: - - Victim - - name: dest - type: Hostname - role: - - Victim - - name: parent_process_name - type: Process Name - role: - - Parent Process - - name: process_name - type: Process - role: - - Child Process - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - Processes.dest - - Processes.user - - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name - - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline - - Processes.original_file_name - - Processes.process_name #process name - - Processes.process #process cmdline - - Processes.process_id - - Processes.parent_process_path - - Processes.process_path - - Processes.parent_process_id - risk_score: 49 - security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 7a3b9dba3e..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path Unit Test -tests: -- name: Windows MSIExec Load from Non-Standard Path - file: endpoint/windows_msiexec_load_from_non_standard_path.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: -24h - latest_time: now - attack_data: - - file_name: msiexec_moved.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/msiexec_moved.log - source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - sourcetype: xmlwineventlog - update_timestamp: true