From 9cf8199444ff91c0c8cdad93f75025f0aebbd588 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lou Stella Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 18:18:40 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] update again --- detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml index 612b865c32..af4089645e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/ssa___windows_eventvwr_uac_bypass.yml @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ type: Anomaly datamodel: - Endpoint_Registry description: The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. -search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Registry" IN (_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), registry_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_path"), "string", null)), registry_hive=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_hive"), "string", null)), registry_value_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_name"), "string", null)), registry_key_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), registry_value_type=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_type"), "string", null)), registry_value_data=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_data"), "string", null)), process_guid=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_guid"), "string", null)) | where registry_path IS NOT NULL AND (like (registry_path, "%mscfile\\shell\\open\\command%")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "registry_path", registry_path, "registry_hive", registry_hive, "registry_value_name", registry_value_name, "registry_key_name", registry_key_name, "registry_value_type", registry_value_type, "registry_value_data", registry_value_data, "process_guid", process_guid]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' +search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | where "Endpoint_Registry" IN (_datamodels) | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), registry_path=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_path"), "string", null)), registry_hive=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_hive"), "string", null)), registry_value_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_name"), "string", null)), registry_key_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)), registry_value_type=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_type"), "string", null)), registry_value_data=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "registry_value_data"), "string", null)), process_guid=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_guid"), "string", null)) | where registry_path IS NOT NULL AND (like (registry_path, "%command%")) | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)) | eval body=create_map(["registry_path", registry_path, "registry_hive", registry_hive, "registry_value_name", registry_value_name, "registry_key_name", registry_key_name, "registry_value_type", registry_value_type, "registry_value_data", registry_value_data, "process_guid", process_guid]) | into write_ssa_detected_events();' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint_Registry` datamodel. known_false_positives: UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES references: