diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..406df926d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories
+id: 023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Anomaly
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known
+  cron table directories. This event is commonly abuse by malware, adversaries and
+  red teamers to persist on the target or compromised host. crontab or cronjob is
+  like a schedule task in windows environment where you can create an executable or
+  script on the known crontab directories to run it base on its schedule. This Anomaly
+  query is a good indicator to look further what file is added and who added the file
+  if to consider it legitimate file.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/cron*",
+  "*/var/spool/cron/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name
+  Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints.
+  If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab
+  folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/detecting-cronrat-malware-on-linux-instantly/
+- https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/how-do-i-add-jobs-to-cron-under-linux-or-unix-oses/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.003
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Filesystem.dest
+  - Filesystem.file_create_time
+  - Filesystem.file_name
+  - Filesystem.process_guid
+  - Filesystem.file_path
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 50
+  confidence: 50
+  risk_score: 25
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: a file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bed66afb4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Linux At Allow Config File Creation
+id: 977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Anomaly
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow
+  or /etc/at.deny. These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red
+  teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. These config files can restrict or allow
+  user to execute "at" application (another schedule task application in
+  linux). attacker can create a user or add the compromised username to that config
+  file to execute "at" to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection can be
+  a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who
+  created it to verify if it is a false positive.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/at.allow",
+  "*/etc/at.deny") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name
+  Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints.
+  If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can create this file for
+  automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.003
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Filesystem.dest
+  - Filesystem.file_create_time
+  - Filesystem.file_name
+  - Filesystem.process_guid
+  - Filesystem.file_path
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 50
+  confidence: 50
+  risk_score: 25
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f5560bcf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+name: Linux At Application Execution
+id: bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Anomaly
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At
+  application. This process can be used by malware, adversaries and red teamers to
+  create persistence entry to the targeted or compromised host with their malicious
+  code. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator to investigate the event before
+  and after this process execution, when it was executed and what schedule task it
+  will execute.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  where  Processes.process_name = at OR Processes.parent_process_name = at by Processes.dest
+  Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process
+  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this application
+  for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/
+- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.001
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 30
+  confidence: 30
+  risk_score: 9
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: At application was executed in $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65a0b12b9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter
+id: 0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using crontab edit parameter.
+  This commandline parameter can be abuse by malware author, adversaries, and red
+  red teamers to add cronjob entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule
+  they want. This event can also be executed by administrator or normal user for automation
+  purposes so filter is needed.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab
+  Processes.process = "*crontab *" Processes.process = "* -e*" by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
+  Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this application
+  for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.003
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 30
+  confidence: 30
+  risk_score: 9
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: A possible crontab edit command $process$ executed on $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0afcfd2950
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+name: Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File
+id: 7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Anomaly
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry to /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny.
+  These 2 files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries or red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host. 
+  These config file can restrict user that can only execute at application (another schedule task application in linux). attacker can 
+  create a user or add the compromised username to that config file to execute at to schedule it malicious code. This anomaly detection 
+  can be a good indicator to investigate further the entry in created config file and who created it to verify if it is a false positive.   
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes 
+  where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny")
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+-  https://linuxize.com/post/at-command-in-linux/
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.001
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest 
+  - Processes.user 
+  - Processes.parent_process_name 
+  - Processes.process_name 
+  - Processes.process 
+  - Processes.process_id 
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 30
+  confidence: 30 
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 9
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: A commandline $process$ that may modify at allow config file in $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d13faae1b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File
+id: b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a code to any existing cronjob files 
+  for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique is commonly abused by malware, adversaries and red teamers to automatically execute their code 
+  within a existing or sometimes in normal cronjob script file. 
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes 
+  where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*")
+  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
+  | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+- https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability
+- https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.003
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest 
+  - Processes.user 
+  - Processes.parent_process_name 
+  - Processes.process_name 
+  - Processes.process 
+  - Processes.process_id 
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 70
+  confidence: 70 
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 49
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file in $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc9603aca2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+name: Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor
+id: dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+type: Hunting
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using
+  editor. This event is can be seen in normal user but can also be a good hunting
+  indicator for unwanted user modifying cronjobs for possible persistence or privilege
+  escalation.
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN("nano","vim.basic")
+  OR Processes.process IN ("*nano *", "*vi *", "*vim *")) AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*",
+  "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name
+  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+  logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
+  endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
+known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this commandline
+  for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Linux Privilege Escalation
+  - Linux Persistence Techniques
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Privilege Escalation
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1053.003
+  - T1053
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 20
+  confidence: 30
+  risk_score: 6
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Privilege Escalation
+  - Stage:Persistence
+  message: A commandline $process$ that may modify cronjob file using editor in $dest$
+  observable:
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  nist:
+  - DE.CM
+  cis20:
+  - CIS 3
+  - CIS 5
+  - CIS 16
+  automated_detection_testing: passed
diff --git a/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml b/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a1cbdfea75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stories/linux_persistence_techniques.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: Linux Persistence Techniques
+id: e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence
+  on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
+narrative: Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after
+  the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to
+  ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This
+  Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by
+  attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
+- https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/
+- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/
+- https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf
+
+tags:
+  analytic_story: Linux Persistence Techniques
+  category:
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml b/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..006f5c2ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stories/linux_privilege_escalation.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: Linux Privilege Escalation
+id: b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848
+version: 1
+date: '2021-12-17'
+author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
+description: Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a
+  Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints,
+  schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.
+narrative: 'Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary
+  gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase
+  his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such
+  as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker
+  initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the
+  control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches
+  to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges
+  in your environment.'
+references:
+- https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
+tags:
+  analytic_story: Linux Privilege Escalation
+  category:
+  - Adversary Tactics
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  usecase: Advanced Threat Detection
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0d0767e9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories
+  file: endpoint/linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2f3ba2a95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux At Allow Config File Creation Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux At Allow Config File Creation
+  file: endpoint/linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea3b48dbd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux At Application Execution Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux At Application Execution
+  file: endpoint/linux_at_application_execution.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2dd65af9e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter
+  file: endpoint/linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/crontab_edit_parameter/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3ff049444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File
+  file: endpoint/linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-30d'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.001/at_execution/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef57ab1fea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File
+  file: endpoint/linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-30d'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83dca42143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor
+  file: endpoint/linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: sysmon_linux.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.003/cronjobs_entry/sysmon_linux.log
+    source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: sysmon_linux
\ No newline at end of file