diff --git a/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml b/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml index 9943233b53..dfa719e870 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/build-and-validate.yml @@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ jobs: python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product ESCU --output dist/escu python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product SAAWS --output dist/saaws python3 contentctl.py --path . --verbose generate --product DevSecOps --output dist/devsecops - #make a copy of use_case_lib in order to have ES work :-( - cp dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf - cp dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf dist/saaws/default/analyticstories.conf - cp dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf dist/devsecops/default/analyticstories.conf + # make a copy of use_case_lib in order to have ES work :-( + # cp dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf + # cp dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf dist/saaws/default/analyticstories.conf + # cp dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf dist/devsecops/default/analyticstories.conf - name: Copy lookups .csv files run: | @@ -474,11 +474,6 @@ jobs: source venv/bin/activate python3 bin/pretty_yaml.py --path . -v - - name: Run generate-actors-map - run: | - source venv/bin/activate - python3 bin/generate-actors-map.py --projects_path . --output docs/mitre-map/ - - name: Run generate-coverage-map run: | source venv/bin/activate diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ec482f35c0..a51b983a1d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -80,11 +80,6 @@ To view an up-to-date detection coverage map for all the content tagged with MIT ![](docs/mitre-map/coverage.png) -### Detection Priority by Threat Actors -If curious about how the Threat Research team prioritizes what content to build refer to our **Detection Priority by Threat Actors** layer in [https://mitremap.splunkresearch.com/](https://mitremap.splunkresearch.com/). Using the actor data from [MITRE CTI](https://github.com/mitre/cti) we add a point for every threat actor that uses a particular technique, and then subtract a point of every detection we have mapped to that technique. The resulting map below is how we prioritize what techniques and detections to focus on next. This map is automatically updated on every release and is generated by the [generate-actors-map.py](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/bin/generate-actors-map.py) script. - -![](docs/mitre-map/priority.png) - # Customize to your Environment 🏗 Customize your content to change how [often detections run](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Customize-to-Your-Environment#customizing-scheduling-and-alert-actions-with-deployments), or what the right source type for [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Customize-to-Your-Environment#customizing-source-types-with-macros) in your environment is please follow this [guide](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Customize-to-Your-Environment). diff --git a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt index 5de98d57b4..d1125dd1fe 100644 --- a/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt +++ b/automated_detection_testing/requirements.txt @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ splunk-sdk==1.6.16 tabulate==0.8.9 termcolor==1.1.0 toml==0.10.2 -urllib3<=1.26.6 +urllib3<1.26.8 virtualenv==20.4.6 wcwidth==0.2.5 wget==3.2 diff --git a/bin/generate-actors-map.py b/bin/generate-actors-map.py deleted file mode 100644 index 943894ac9d..0000000000 --- a/bin/generate-actors-map.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,251 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/python - -import sys -import argparse -import json -import glob -import yaml -import os -import csv -from os import path -from stix2 import FileSystemSource -from stix2 import Filter - -VERSION = "4.2" -NAME = "Detection Priority by Threat Actors" -DESCRIPTION = "security_content detection priorty by common techniques used from threat actors" -DOMAIN = "mitre-enterprise" - -def main(argv): - - # parse input variables - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Detection Priority based on APT groups') - parser.add_argument('-p', '--projects_path', default='.', action='store', metavar='N', help='folder containing the projects Mitre Cyber Threat Intelligence Repository, Security Content and Sigma') - parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', default='output', action='store', help='result output directory, defaults to output') - cmdargs = parser.parse_args() - - print("get all techniques for group") - techniques, all_techniques = get_all_techniques_for_groups(cmdargs.projects_path) - - print("count techniques") - counted_techniques, max_count = count_techniques(techniques, all_techniques) - - print("load detections techniques") - detections = [] - detections = load_objects(path.join(cmdargs.projects_path),'detections/*/*.yml') - - print("get matched techniques") - matched_techniques = get_matched_techniques(counted_techniques, detections) - - print("generate navigator layer") - generate_navigator_layer(matched_techniques, max_count, cmdargs.output) - - print("generate csv file") - generate_csv_file(matched_techniques, cmdargs.output) - - -def count_techniques(techniques, all_techniques): - counted_techniques = [] - final_counted_techniques = [] - - max_count = 0 - actors = [] - for all_technique in all_techniques: - count_technique = sum(t['name'] == all_technique['name'] for t in techniques) - if count_technique > 0: - counted_techniques.append({'name': all_technique['name'], 'object': all_technique, 'count': count_technique}) - max_count = count_technique if count_technique > max_count else max_count - - for all_technique in all_techniques: - if "." in all_technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"]: - parent_id = all_technique["external_references"][0]["external_id"].split(".")[0] - for counted in counted_techniques: - if parent_id == counted["object"]["external_references"][0]["external_id"]: - counted['count'] += 1 - final_counted_techniques.append(counted) - - counted_techniques = sorted(final_counted_techniques, key = lambda i: i['count'], reverse=True) - - return counted_techniques, max_count - -def get_all_techniques_for_groups(projects_path): - path_cti = path.join(projects_path,'cti/enterprise-attack') - fs = FileSystemSource(path_cti) - all_techniques = get_all_techniques(fs) - - techniques = [] - - groups = get_all_groups(fs) - for group_obj in groups: - techniques.extend(get_technique_by_group(fs, group_obj)) - - # ONLY FOR TESTING - #if len(techniques) > 50 : - # return techniques, all_techniques - - return techniques, all_techniques - - -def get_all_techniques(src): - filt = [Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern')] - return src.query(filt) - - -def get_all_groups(src): - filt = [Filter('type', '=', 'intrusion-set')] - return src.query(filt) - - -def get_technique_by_group(src, stix_id): - relations = src.relationships(stix_id, 'uses', source_only=True) - return src.query([ - Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), - Filter('id', 'in', [r.target_ref for r in relations]) - ]) - - -def get_matched_techniques(counted_techniques, detections): - matched_techniques = [] - - for technique in counted_techniques: - matched_splunk_detections = [] - - # find detections from Splunks security content - # https://github.com/splunk/security_content - for detection in detections: - if 'mitre_attack_id' in detection['object']['tags']: - for mitreid in detection['object']['tags']['mitre_attack_id']: - if mitreid == technique["object"]["external_references"][0]["external_id"]: - matched_splunk_detections.append(detection) - - matched_techniques.append({ - "ID": technique["object"]["external_references"][0]["external_id"], - # substract the amount of detections we have from the score - "score": technique["count"] - len(matched_splunk_detections), - "splunk_rules": matched_splunk_detections, - }) - return matched_techniques - - -def generate_navigator_layer(matched_techniques, max_count, output): - - # Base ATT&CK Navigator layer - layer_json = { - "version": VERSION, - "name": NAME, - "description": DESCRIPTION, - "domain": DOMAIN, - "techniques": [] - } - - for technique in matched_techniques: - comments = [] - - layer_technique = { - "techniqueID": technique["ID"], - "score" : technique["score"], - "showSubtechniques": False - } - - - if len(technique["splunk_rules"]) > 0: - for splunk_rule in technique["splunk_rules"]: - comments.append("https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/" + splunk_rule['filename']) - - if len(comments) > 0: - layer_technique["comment"] = "\n\n".join(comments) - - layer_json["techniques"].append(layer_technique) - - # add a color gradient (white -> red) to layer - # ranging from zero (white) to the maximum score in the file (red) - layer_json["gradient"] = { - "colors": [ - "#66b1ff", - "#ff66f4", - "#ff6666" - ], - "minValue": 0, - "maxValue": max_count - } - - layer_json["filters"] = { - "platforms": - ["Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "AWS", - "GCP", - "Azure", - "Office 365", - "SaaS" - ] - } - - layer_json["legendItems"] = [ - { - "label": "Low Priority", - "color": "#66b1ff" - }, - { - "label": "Medium Priority", - "color": "#ff66f4" - }, - { - "label": "High Priority", - "color": "#ff6666" - } - ] - - layer_json['showTacticRowBackground'] = True - layer_json['tacticRowBackground'] = "#dddddd" - - # output JSON - with open(output + '/detections.json', 'w') as f: - json.dump(layer_json, f, indent=4) - -# print("Mitre ATT&CK Navigator overlay was successfully written to output/detections.json") - - -def generate_csv_file(matched_techniques, output): - - security_content_url = 'https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/' - - with open(output + '/detections.csv', 'w') as f: - writer = csv.writer(f, quoting=csv.QUOTE_ALL) - writer.writerow(['Technique ID', 'Detection Available', 'Link', 'score']) - for technique in matched_techniques: - if len(technique['splunk_rules']) > 0: - for splunk_rule in technique["splunk_rules"]: - writer.writerow([technique["ID"], "Yes", \ - security_content_url + splunk_rule["filename"], technique['score']]) - else: - writer.writerow([technique["ID"], "No", \ - "-", technique['score']]) -# print("Recommended detections were successfully written to output/detections.csv") - - -def load_objects(security_content_path, file_path): - files = [] - detection_files = path.join(path.expanduser(security_content_path), file_path) - - for file in glob.glob(detection_files): - file_name = file.replace('./detections/', '') - files.append({ - "filename": file_name, - "object": load_file(file) - }) - - return files - - -def load_file(file_path): - with open(file_path, 'r') as stream: - try: - file = list(yaml.safe_load_all(stream))[0] - except yaml.YAMLError as exc: - sys.exit("ERROR: reading {0}".format(file_path)) - return file - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main(sys.argv) diff --git a/bin/generate.py b/bin/generate.py index 14ec90d38f..53d93f182d 100644 --- a/bin/generate.py +++ b/bin/generate.py @@ -113,26 +113,26 @@ def generate_savedsearches_conf(detections, deployments, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_P return output_path -def generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): - utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() +# def generate_analytic_story_conf(stories, detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): +# utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() - j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep - trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('analytic_stories.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/analytic_stories.conf') - output = template.render(stories=stories, time=utc_time) - with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: - f.write(output) +# j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep +# trim_blocks=True) +# template = j2_env.get_template('analytic_stories.j2') +# output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/analytic_stories.conf') +# output = template.render(stories=stories, time=utc_time) +# with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: +# f.write(output) - return output_path +# return output_path def generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH): utc_time = datetime.datetime.utcnow().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH), # nosemgrep trim_blocks=True) - template = j2_env.get_template('use_case_library.j2') - output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/use_case_library.conf') + template = j2_env.get_template('analyticstories.j2') + output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, 'default/analyticstories.conf') output = template.render(stories=stories, detections=detections, time=utc_time) with open(output_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as f: @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ def prepare_stories(stories, detections, playbooks): sto_to_nists = {} sto_to_det = {} - preface = " The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: " + preface = " /n**SOAR:** The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: " baselines = [object for object in detections if 'Baseline' in object['type']] for detection in detections: @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ def main(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE): detection_path = generate_savedsearches_conf(objects["detections"], objects["deployments"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) - story_path = generate_analytic_story_conf(objects["stories"], objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) + # story_path = generate_analytic_story_conf(objects["stories"], objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) use_case_lib_path = generate_use_case_library_conf(objects["stories"], objects["detections"], TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH) @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ def main(REPO_PATH, OUTPUT_PATH, PRODUCT, VERBOSE): deprecated.append(d) if VERBOSE: - print("{0} stories have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["stories"]), story_path)) + print("{0} stories have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["stories"]), use_case_lib_path)) print("{0} detections have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["detections"]), detection_path)) print("{0} detections have been marked deprecated on {1}".format(len(deprecated), detection_path)) print("{0} macros have been successfully written to {1}".format(len(objects["macros"]), macros_path)) diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/analytic_stories.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/analytic_stories.j2 deleted file mode 100644 index ba45f92e02..0000000000 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/analytic_stories.j2 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: {{ time }} UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -{% for story in stories %} -[{{ story.name }}] -category = {{ story.tags.category[0] }} -creation_date = {{ story.date }} -modification_date = {{ story.date }} -id = {{ story.id }} -version = {{ story.version }} -reference = {{ story.references | tojson }} -detection_searches = {{ story.detections | tojson }} -{% if story.mappings is defined %} -mappings = {{ story.mappings | tojson }} -{% endif %} -{% if story.response_tasks is defined %} -investigative_searches = {{ story.response_tasks | tojson }} -{% else %} -investigative_searches = [] -{% endif %} -{% if story.baselines is defined %} -support_searches = {{ story.baselines | tojson }} -{% else %} -support_searches = [] -{% endif %} -{% if story.data_models is defined %} -data_models = {{ story.data_models | tojson }} -{% else %} -data_models = [] -{% endif %} -providing_technologies = none -description = {{ story.description }} -{% if story.narrative is defined %} -narrative = {{ story.narrative }} -{% endif %} -product = {{ story.tags.product}} - -{% endfor %} -#### END STORIES #### diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/use_case_library.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/analyticstories.j2 similarity index 100% rename from bin/jinja2_templates/use_case_library.j2 rename to bin/jinja2_templates/analyticstories.j2 diff --git a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 index be9dadd282..77359896c7 100644 --- a/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 +++ b/bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2 @@ -210,76 +210,3 @@ search = {{ detection.search }} ### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### - -### USAGE DASHBOARD CONFIGURATIONS ### - -[escu-metrics-usage] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -dispatchAs = user -search = index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \ -"ESCU - "\ -| stats count(search) by search savedsearch_name user\ -| eval usage=(if(savedsearch_name=="","Adhoc","Scheduled")) \ -| rex field=search "\"(?.*)\""\ -| table savedsearch_name count(search) usage user | join savedsearch_name max=0 type=left [search sourcetype="manifests" | spath searches{} | mvexpand searches{} | spath input=searches{} | table category search_name | rename search_name as savedsearch_name | dedup savedsearch_name] | search category=* - -[escu-metrics-search] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -enableSched = 1 -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = index=_audit action=search | transaction search_id maxspan=3m | search ESCU | stats sum(total_run_time) avg(total_run_time) max(total_run_time) sum(result_count) - -[escu-metrics-search-events] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -enableSched = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = [search index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \"ESCU NOT "index=_audit" | where search !="" | dedup search_id | rex field=search "\"(?.*)\"" | rex field=_raw "user=(?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+)" | eval usage=if(savedsearch_name!="", "scheduled", "adhoc") | eval savedsearch_name=if(savedsearch_name != "", savedsearch_name, search_name) | table savedsearch_name search_id user _time usage | outputlookup escu_search_id.csv | table search_id] index=_audit total_run_time event_count result_count NOT "index=_audit" | lookup escu_search_id.csv search_id | stats count(savedsearch_name) AS search_count avg(total_run_time) AS search_avg_run_time sum(total_run_time) AS search_total_run_time sum(result_count) AS search_total_results earliest(_time) AS firsts latest(_time) AS lasts by savedsearch_name user usage| eval first_run=strftime(firsts, "%B %d %Y") | eval last_run=strftime(lasts, "%B %d %Y") - -[escu-metrics-search-longest-runtime] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -enableSched = 1 -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -disabled = 1 -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -search = index=_* ESCU [search index=_* action=search latest=-2h earliest=-1d| transaction search_id maxspan=3m | search ESCU | stats values(total_run_time) AS run by search_id | sort -run | head 1| table search_id] | table search search_id - -[escu-metrics-usage-search] -action.email.useNSSubject = 1 -alert.digest_mode = True -alert.suppress = 0 -alert.track = 0 -auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h -cron_schedule = 0 0 * * * -dispatch.earliest_time = -4h@h -dispatch.latest_time = -1h@h -enableSched = 1 -dispatchAs = user -search = index=_audit sourcetype="audittrail" \ -"ESCU - "\ -| stats count(search) by search savedsearch_name user\ -| eval usage=(if(savedsearch_name=="","Adhoc","Scheduled")) \ -| rex field=search "\"(?.*)\""\ -| table savedsearch_name count(search) usage user | join savedsearch_name max=0 type=left [search sourcetype="manifests" | spath searches{} | mvexpand searches{} | spath input=searches{} | table category search_name | rename search_name as savedsearch_name | dedup savedsearch_name] | search category=* - -### END OF USAGE DASHBOARD CONFIGURATIONS ### - diff --git a/bin/validate.py b/bin/validate.py index 987cae2ed9..c26c3f65b5 100644 --- a/bin/validate.py +++ b/bin/validate.py @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def validate_objects(REPO_PATH, objects, verbose): for lookup in objects['lookups']: errors = errors + validate_lookups_content(REPO_PATH, "lookups/%s", lookup) - objects_array = objects['stories'] + objects['detections'] + objects['response_tasks'] + objects['responses'] + objects_array = objects['stories'] + objects['detections'] for object in objects_array: validation_errors, uuids = validate_standard_fields(object, uuids) errors = errors + validation_errors @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ def validate_tests(REPO_PATH, object): def main(REPO_PATH, verbose): - validation_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','response_tasks','responses','deployments', 'tests'] + validation_objects = ['macros','lookups','stories','detections','deployments', 'tests'] objects = {} schema_error = False @@ -272,8 +272,7 @@ def main(REPO_PATH, verbose): if __name__ == "__main__": # grab arguments parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="validates security content manifest files", epilog=""" - Validates security manifest for correctness, adhering to spec and other common items. - VALIDATE DOES NOT PROCESS RESPONSES SPEC for the moment.""") + Validates security manifest for correctness, adhering to spec and other common items.""") parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", required=True, help="path to security-security content repo") parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", required=False, action='store_true', help="prints verbose output") # parse them diff --git a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml index 5233a18e33..2e5c421b97 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/excessive_number_of_distinct_processes_created_in_windows_temp_folder.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/ tags: analytic_story: - - meterpreter + - Meterpreter automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 100 context: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml b/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml index 62c3f810dd..808d5a3886 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.yml @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ tags: automated_detection_testing: passed confidence: 50 context: - - source:endpoint - - stage:Discovery + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Discovery dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.002/blackmatter_schcache/windows-sysmon.log impact: 50 diff --git a/dist/devsecops/default/analytic_stories.conf b/dist/devsecops/default/analytic_stories.conf index bcfe161f92..c359c71381 100644 --- a/dist/devsecops/default/analytic_stories.conf +++ b/dist/devsecops/default/analytic_stories.conf @@ -1,27 +1,3 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-13T10:57:27 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use -### STORIES ### - -[Dev Sec Ops] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-08-18 -modification_date = 2021-08-18 -id = 0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1204.003", "T1212", "T1526", "T1554"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud', 'Dev Sec Ops Analytics'] - -#### END STORIES #### \ No newline at end of file +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf b/dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf index 41ab53b675..c359c71381 100644 --- a/dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf +++ b/dist/devsecops/default/use_case_library.conf @@ -1,249 +1,3 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-13T10:57:27 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use -### STORIES ### - -[analytic_story://Dev Sec Ops] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-08-18 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. - -### END STORIES ### - -### DETECTIONS ### - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = CircleCI -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = CircleCI -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GitHub -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GitHub -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002"]} -known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -### END DETECTIONS ### - -### RESPONSE TASKS ### - -### END RESPONSE TASKS ### +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analytic_stories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analytic_stories.conf index ae201353a2..0cfdca344c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analytic_stories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analytic_stories.conf @@ -1,1969 +1,2 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:05 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -[AWS Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-06-04 -modification_date = 2018-06-04 -id = 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-03-08 -modification_date = 2021-03-08 -id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1078.004", "T1098", "T1110", "T1136.003", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS Network ACL Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-05-21 -modification_date = 2018-05-21 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS Security Hub Alerts] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-08-04 -modification_date = 2020-08-04 -id = 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS User Monitoring] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-03-12 -modification_date = 2018-03-12 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ -Fortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Active Directory Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-08-20 -modification_date = 2021-08-20 -id = 8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1033", "T1049", "T1069.001", "T1069.002", "T1087.001", "T1087.002", "T1201", "T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. -narrative = Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\ -Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Active Directory Password Spraying] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-04-07 -modification_date = 2021-04-07 -id = 3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -narrative = In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ -Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ -Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Apache Struts Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -creation_date = 2018-12-06 -modification_date = 2018-12-06 -id = 2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e -version = 1 -reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. -narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ -The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ -This Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\ -The second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\ -First, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\ -Looking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of "who," in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\ -Gathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -hen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -In the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Asset Tracking] -category = Best Practices -creation_date = 2017-09-13 -modification_date = 2017-09-13 -id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"] -data_models = ["Network_Sessions"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. -narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[BITS Jobs] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-03-26 -modification_date = 2021-03-26 -id = dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1197"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. -narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-01-27 -modification_date = 2021-01-27 -id = 817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe -version = 1 -reference = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. -narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[BlackMatter Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-09-06 -modification_date = 2021-09-06 -id = 0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee -version = 1 -reference = ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486", "T1490", "T1491", "T1552.002"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative = blackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Brand Monitoring] -category = Abuse -creation_date = 2017-12-19 -modification_date = 2017-12-19 -id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. -narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ -You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ -Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Clop Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-03-17 -modification_date = 2021-03-17 -id = 5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Obfuscation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1204", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490", "T1543", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Cloud Cryptomining] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2019-10-02 -modification_date = 2019-10-02 -id = 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ -Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ -When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ -This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-01-26 -modification_date = 2021-01-26 -id = cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1078", "T1136.003", "T1546.012", "T1556"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Cobalt Strike] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-02-16 -modification_date = 2021-02-16 -id = bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1055", "T1059.003", "T1127", "T1127.001", "T1218.010", "T1218.011", "T1543.003", "T1548", "T1560.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ -Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ -`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ -Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ -With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ -- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ -- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ -While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[ColdRoot MacOS RAT] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2019-01-09 -modification_date = 2019-01-09 -id = bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. -narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ -This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ -Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Collection and Staging] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-03 -modification_date = 2020-02-03 -id = 8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002", "T1560.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. -narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ - Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ -Use the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Command and Control] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2018-06-01 -modification_date = 2018-06-01 -id = 943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. -narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ -Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-02-20 -modification_date = 2020-02-20 -id = aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] -mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. -narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Credential Dumping] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = 854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a -version = 3 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Authentication", "Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. -narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ -Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[DHS Report TA18-074A] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-01-22 -modification_date = 2020-01-22 -id = 0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Execution", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. -narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ -There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ -One joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\ -Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[DNS Amplification Attacks] -category = Abuse -creation_date = 2016-09-13 -modification_date = 2016-09-13 -id = e8afd39e-3294-11e6-b39d-a45e60c6700 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -providing_technologies = none -description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. -narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ -The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[DNS Hijacking] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"] -data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. -narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ -The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ -On January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \ -1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\ -1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\ -1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\ -1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \ -In DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[DarkSide Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-05-12 -modification_date = 2021-05-12 -id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1020", "T1021.002", "T1055", "T1105", "T1197", "T1218.003", "T1486", "T1490", "T1548.002", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware -narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Data Exfiltration] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-10-21 -modification_date = 2020-10-21 -id = 66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041", "T1048", "T1048.003", "T1114", "T1114.001", "T1114.003", "T1537"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = The stealing of data by an adversary. -narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Data Protection] -category = Abuse -creation_date = 2017-09-14 -modification_date = 2017-09-14 -id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. -narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-03-24 -modification_date = 2021-03-24 -id = 0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. -narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Detect Zerologon Attack] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-09-18 -modification_date = 2020-09-18 -id = 5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1190", "T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. -narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Dev Sec Ops] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-08-18 -modification_date = 2021-08-18 -id = 0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1204.003", "T1212", "T1526", "T1554"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud', 'Dev Sec Ops Analytics'] - -[Disabling Security Tools] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Domain Trust Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-03-25 -modification_date = 2021-03-25 -id = e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. -narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Dynamic DNS] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2018-09-06 -modification_date = 2018-09-06 -id = 8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. -narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-01-27 -modification_date = 2020-01-27 -id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. -narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ -According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-08-02 -modification_date = 2020-08-02 -id = 7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. -narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/) -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[FIN7] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-09-14 -modification_date = 2021-09-14 -id = df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033", "T1059.007", "T1220", "T1555.003", "T1566.001"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution. -narrative = FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[GCP Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-09-01 -modification_date = 2020-09-01 -id = 0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[HAFNIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-03-03 -modification_date = 2021-03-03 -id = beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Execution", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.003", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1114.002", "T1136.001", "T1190", "T1505.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. -narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\ -While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\ -The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Hidden Cobra Malware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-01-22 -modification_date = 2020-01-22 -id = baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Authentication", "Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. -narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ -These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ -In June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed "Joanap," is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, "Brambul," is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\ -Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, "adnim$," which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[IcedID] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-07-29 -modification_date = 2021-07-29 -id = 1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005", "T1053", "T1053.005", "T1055", "T1059", "T1087.002", "T1112", "T1204.002", "T1218.005", "T1218.010", "T1218.011", "T1482", "T1547.001", "T1548.002", "T1560.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. -narrative = IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Ingress Tool Transfer] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-03-24 -modification_date = 2021-03-24 -id = b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1105", "T1197"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. -narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[JBoss Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -creation_date = 2017-09-14 -modification_date = 2017-09-14 -id = 1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd -version = 1 -reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. -narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ -It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin\ -1. Responsible party\ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\ -Gathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -If you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -If a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \ -It can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Kubernetes Scanning Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-04-15 -modification_date = 2020-04-15 -id = a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-05-20 -modification_date = 2020-05-20 -id = 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Lateral Movement] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = 399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Execution", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Authentication", "Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. -narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ -Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ -An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\ -If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \ - It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Malicious PowerShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2017-08-23 -modification_date = 2017-08-23 -id = 2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc -version = 5 -reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1027", "T1027.005", "T1055", "T1059.001", "T1140", "T1546.015", "T1562", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. -narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin \ -1. Responsible party \ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \ -Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \ -Gathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \ -Often, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \ -In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \ -Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Masquerading - Rename System Utilities] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-04-26 -modification_date = 2021-04-26 -id = f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1127", "T1127.001", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. -narrative = Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\ -The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ -There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Meterpreter] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-06-08 -modification_date = 2021-06-08 -id = d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ -Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ -While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-09-08 -modification_date = 2021-09-08 -id = 4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.002", "T1218.011", "T1566.001"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. -narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it’s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \ At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ -1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \ -1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Monitor for Updates] -category = Best Practices -creation_date = 2017-09-15 -modification_date = 2017-09-15 -id = 9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Updates"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. -narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ -Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ -Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[NOBELIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-12-14 -modification_date = 2020-12-14 -id = 758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1218.005", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1560.001", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Netsh Abuse] -category = Abuse -creation_date = 2017-01-05 -modification_date = 2017-01-05 -id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ -To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Office 365 Detections] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-12-16 -modification_date = 2020-12-16 -id = 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001", "T1114", "T1114.002", "T1114.003", "T1136.003", "T1556", "T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Orangeworm Attack Group] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-01-22 -modification_date = 2020-01-22 -id = bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. -narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ -Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ -Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ -This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-08-31 -modification_date = 2021-08-31 -id = 97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1187"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. -narrative = In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-01-22 -modification_date = 2020-01-22 -id = 988C59C5-0A1C-45B6-A555-0C62276E327E -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. -narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ -iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ -The MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]'help'='c:\\windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\programdata\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\ -This Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\ -If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\ -\ -1. www.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. chemscalere[.]com\ -1. about.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. db.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. news.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. update.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\ -\ -1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\ -1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\ -1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\ -1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\ -1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527] -category = Lateral Movement -creation_date = 2021-07-01 -modification_date = 2021-07-01 -id = fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1218.011", "T1547.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. -narrative = This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ -The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \ -1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \ -1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \ -1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \ -In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch] -category = Best Practices -creation_date = 2017-09-11 -modification_date = 2017-09-11 -id = 6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218 -version = 1 -reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.001", "T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. -narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[ProxyShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-08-24 -modification_date = 2021-08-24 -id = 413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1190", "T1505.003"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. -narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \ -1. CVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) \ -Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020", "T1021.002", "T1027.005", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1059.005", "T1069.001", "T1069.002", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1070.004", "T1071.001", "T1087.001", "T1087.002", "T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1218.007", "T1218.011", "T1222", "T1482", "T1485", "T1489", "T1490", "T1491", "T1531", "T1546.015", "T1547.001", "T1548", "T1560.001", "T1562.001", "T1562.007", "T1569.002", "T1574.002", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] -data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Ransomware Investigate and Contain' -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Ransomware Cloud] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-10-27 -modification_date = 2020-10-27 -id = f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Remcos] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-09-23 -modification_date = 2021-09-23 -id = 2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c -version = 1 -reference = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.\u0026text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1070", "T1113", "T1543", "T1547.001", "T1548.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. -narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Revil Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-06-04 -modification_date = 2021-06-04 -id = 817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e -version = 1 -reference = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1204", "T1218.003", "T1490", "T1491", "T1562.001", "T1562.007", "T1574.002"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Router and Infrastructure Security] -category = Best Practices -creation_date = 2017-09-12 -modification_date = 2017-09-12 -id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020.001", "T1200", "T1498", "T1542.005", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Authentication", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. -narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ -This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Ryuk Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-11-06 -modification_date = 2020-11-06 -id = 507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1482", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[SQL Injection] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2017-09-19 -modification_date = 2017-09-19 -id = 4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. -narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ -This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[SamSam Ransomware] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2018-12-13 -modification_date = 2018-12-13 -id = c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Execution", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Lateral Movement", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1036.005", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490", "T1569.002", "T1595"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"] -data_models = ["Authentication", "Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ -Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ -SamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\ -In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\ -According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Silver Sparrow] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-02-24 -modification_date = 2021-02-24 -id = cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074", "T1105", "T1543.001"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. -narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Spearphishing Attachments] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2019-04-29 -modification_date = 2019-04-29 -id = 57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. -narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ -As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ -While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \ -Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\ -1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\ -1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\ -1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\ -This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious AWS Login Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2019-05-01 -modification_date = 2019-05-01 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"] -data_models = ["Authentication"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-07-24 -modification_date = 2018-07-24 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ -Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ -Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious AWS Traffic] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-05-07 -modification_date = 2018-05-07 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). -narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ -Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ - Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-06-04 -modification_date = 2020-06-04 -id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c -version = 1 -reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"] -data_models = ["Authentication"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ -This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-08-25 -modification_date = 2020-08-25 -id = 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1537"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-08-20 -modification_date = 2018-08-20 -id = 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ -This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud User Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-09-04 -modification_date = 2020-09-04 -id = 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Command-Line Executions] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-03 -modification_date = 2020-02-03 -id = f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. -narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-02-11 -modification_date = 2021-02-11 -id = a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ -HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \ -During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \ -Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious DNS Traffic] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2017-09-18 -modification_date = 2017-09-18 -id = 3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56 -version = 1 -reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. -narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Emails] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-01-27 -modification_date = 2020-01-27 -id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] -data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ -Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ -1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\ -1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\ -1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious GCP Storage Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-08-05 -modification_date = 2020-08-05 -id = 4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious MSHTA Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-01-20 -modification_date = 2021-01-20 -id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf13w1q5d55 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution \ -1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Okta Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-04-02 -modification_date = 2020-04-02 -id = 9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. -narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ -While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ -With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-02-11 -modification_date = 2021-02-11 -id = 2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-01-29 -modification_date = 2021-01-29 -id = b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Rundll32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-02-03 -modification_date = 2021-02-03 -id = 80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1036.003", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious WMI Use] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2018-10-23 -modification_date = 2018-10-23 -id = c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Windows Registry Activities] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2018-05-31 -modification_date = 2018-05-31 -id = 2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. -narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ - The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ - The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Zoom Child Processes] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-04-13 -modification_date = 2020-04-13 -id = aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. -narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ -Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Trickbot] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-04-20 -modification_date = 2021-04-20 -id = 16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e -version = 1 -reference = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ESCU - Write Executable in SMB Share - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Lateral Movement", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1027", "T1053", "T1055", "T1059", "T1087.002", "T1218.005", "T1218.011", "T1562.001", "T1566.001", "T1590.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. -narrative = trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-01-12 -modification_date = 2021-01-12 -id = 270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1127"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2021-01-21 -modification_date = 2021-01-21 -id = be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\ -The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution\ -1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Unusual Processes] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Denial of Service", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1016", "T1036.003", "T1036.005", "T1190", "T1204.002", "T1218.011", "T1595"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. -narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ -This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ -In the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Use of Cleartext Protocols] -category = Best Practices -creation_date = 2017-09-15 -modification_date = 2017-09-15 -id = 826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. -narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-07-28 -modification_date = 2020-07-28 -id = 36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. -narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB). -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows Defense Evasion Tactics] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2018-05-31 -modification_date = 2018-05-31 -id = 56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1562.001", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others -narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows File Extension and Association Abuse] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2018-01-26 -modification_date = 2018-01-26 -id = 30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d -version = 1 -reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. -narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ - Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ - Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to "hide extensions for known file types." In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\ -Changing the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\ -Run the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows Log Manipulation] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2017-09-12 -modification_date = 2017-09-12 -id = b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. -narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ -The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows Persistence Techniques] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2018-05-31 -modification_date = 2018-05-31 -id = 30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9 -version = 2 -reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows Privilege Escalation] -category = Adversary Tactics -creation_date = 2020-02-04 -modification_date = 2020-02-04 -id = 644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. -narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Windows Service Abuse] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2017-11-02 -modification_date = 2017-11-02 -id = 6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2 -version = 3 -reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. -narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[XMRig] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2021-05-07 -modification_date = 2021-05-07 -id = 06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1036", "T1036.005", "T1053", "T1087", "T1105", "T1222", "T1489", "T1531", "T1543", "T1543.003", "T1562.001", "T1595"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Endpoint"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. -narrative = XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017. -product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -#### END STORIES #### \ No newline at end of file +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf index b9cb8e38e5..d74243965c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:05 UTC +# On Date: 2021-09-30T19:01:48 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras" spec_version = 3 searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative = blackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. +narrative = BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. [analytic_story://Brand Monitoring] category = Abuse @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"] maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ @@ -1358,7 +1358,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources providing_technologies = [] @@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "requestingAccountId", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "requestedAccountId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1462,7 +1462,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest_file", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File"}]} known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption providing_technologies = [] @@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repositoryName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1492,7 +1492,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1532,7 +1532,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Blocked", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userIdentity.arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1552,7 +1552,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Stage:Credential Access", "Other:Policy Violation"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Other:Policy Violation"], "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "group_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). providing_technologies = [] @@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner. how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "group_deleted", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). providing_technologies = [] @@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "requestParameters.cidrBlock", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Federated Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "recipientAccountId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Federated Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "sourceIPAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "userIdentity.principalId", "role": ["Victim", "Target"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources providing_technologies = [] @@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1682,7 +1682,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1692,7 +1692,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -1702,7 +1702,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1712,7 +1712,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:Inbound", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1752,7 +1752,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1772,7 +1772,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1822,7 +1822,7 @@ asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1842,7 +1842,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "NOBELIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1852,7 +1852,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1862,7 +1862,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1872,7 +1872,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1595", "T1003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "XMRig", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1595", "T1003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1882,7 +1882,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1892,7 +1892,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1902,7 +1902,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1962,7 +1962,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -1972,7 +1972,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others providing_technologies = [] @@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1543.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1992,7 +1992,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2002,7 +2002,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2012,7 +2012,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2032,7 +2032,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ asset_type = CircleCI confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ asset_type = CircleCI confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2092,7 +2092,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Impact"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage disk providing_technologies = [] @@ -2104,7 +2104,7 @@ explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk T how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2114,7 +2114,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2124,7 +2124,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for new commands from each user role. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = . providing_technologies = [] @@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2154,7 +2154,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "user"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2164,7 +2164,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2194,7 +2194,7 @@ asset_type = Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2204,7 +2204,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object_id", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2237,7 +2237,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "object", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2248,7 +2248,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious parent process execution of commandline tool not in shell commandline. This technique was seen in FIN7 JSSLoader .net compile payload where it run ipconfig.exe and systeminfo.exe using .net application. This event cause some good TTP since those tool are commonly run in commandline not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for application gather host information either an attacker or an automated tool made by admin. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network operator or admin may create this type of tool to gather host information providing_technologies = [] @@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet su 1. \ 1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2283,7 +2283,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Ransomware Investigate and Contain -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2313,7 +2313,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2333,7 +2333,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection is to identify a creation of "user mode service" where the service file path is located in non-common service folder in windows. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Service_File_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "Service_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2363,7 +2363,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2373,7 +2373,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2393,7 +2393,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2403,7 +2403,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "TargetFilename", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2413,7 +2413,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2423,7 +2423,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2433,7 +2433,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_image", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2443,7 +2443,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage providing_technologies = [] @@ -2459,7 +2459,7 @@ This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet su 1. \ 1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2469,7 +2469,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "query", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "dnsquery"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking", "Command and Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2528,7 +2528,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "SamSam Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2554,7 +2554,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) 1. \ 1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). providing_technologies = [] @@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not ye 1. \ 1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2590,7 +2590,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2600,7 +2600,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2610,7 +2610,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2630,7 +2630,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "EventCode", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2650,7 +2650,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2660,7 +2660,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2670,7 +2670,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2690,7 +2690,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "EventCode", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = None thus far found providing_technologies = [] @@ -2702,7 +2702,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2712,7 +2712,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "source_image", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2726,7 +2726,7 @@ how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Res If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ (Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2738,7 +2738,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2752,7 +2752,7 @@ how_to_implement = You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Chan If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2762,7 +2762,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. how_to_implement = ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 60, "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "result", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2772,7 +2772,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exploitation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2782,7 +2782,7 @@ asset_type = Network confidence = medium explanation = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2792,7 +2792,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2802,7 +2802,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2822,7 +2822,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2832,7 +2832,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2842,7 +2842,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = None currently known providing_technologies = [] @@ -2852,7 +2852,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2882,7 +2882,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "DarkSide Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2892,7 +2892,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2914,7 +2914,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives providing_technologies = [] @@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections providing_technologies = [] @@ -2934,7 +2934,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2944,7 +2944,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "userIdentity.userName", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2954,7 +2954,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "bucketName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2964,7 +2964,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2974,7 +2974,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2984,7 +2984,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -2994,7 +2994,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3004,7 +3004,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3014,7 +3014,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine providing_technologies = [] @@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = There is potential for false positives as these arguments may be used by other applications. Filter or tune the analytic as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3034,7 +3034,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Unusual Processes", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3044,7 +3044,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3054,7 +3054,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3064,7 +3064,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3074,7 +3074,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3084,7 +3084,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3094,7 +3094,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3105,7 +3105,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \ Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3115,7 +3115,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3125,7 +3125,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3135,7 +3135,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3145,7 +3145,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3155,7 +3155,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3165,7 +3165,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3175,7 +3175,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3195,7 +3195,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3205,7 +3205,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour providing_technologies = [] @@ -3215,7 +3215,7 @@ asset_type = Network confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3225,7 +3225,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3235,7 +3235,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3245,7 +3245,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3271,7 +3271,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) 1. \ 1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -3281,7 +3281,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "nist": ["DE.DP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = None providing_technologies = [] @@ -3291,7 +3291,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = None providing_technologies = [] @@ -3301,7 +3301,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3311,7 +3311,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3321,7 +3321,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3331,7 +3331,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3341,7 +3341,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3351,7 +3351,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3361,7 +3361,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3371,7 +3371,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3386,7 +3386,7 @@ All event subscriptions have three components \ 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3396,7 +3396,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3406,7 +3406,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3416,7 +3416,7 @@ asset_type = Network confidence = medium explanation = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3426,7 +3426,7 @@ asset_type = Web Server confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3442,7 +3442,7 @@ This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported 1. \ 1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "query", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "dnsquery"}]} known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3452,7 +3452,7 @@ asset_type = Web Server confidence = medium explanation = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3462,7 +3462,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3472,7 +3472,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3482,7 +3482,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3492,7 +3492,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3502,7 +3502,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3512,7 +3512,7 @@ asset_type = EC2 Snapshot confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user_arn", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3524,7 +3524,7 @@ explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk T how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dynamic DNS"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3534,7 +3534,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3544,7 +3544,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A "], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3554,7 +3554,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3564,7 +3564,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3574,7 +3574,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3584,7 +3584,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3594,7 +3594,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3614,7 +3614,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": [{"Source": "Endpoint"}, {"Stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3624,7 +3624,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3634,7 +3634,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3644,7 +3644,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3654,7 +3654,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3664,7 +3664,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3674,7 +3674,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3684,7 +3684,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3694,7 +3694,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3704,7 +3704,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3714,7 +3714,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3724,7 +3724,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3734,7 +3734,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3744,7 +3744,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3754,7 +3754,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3764,7 +3764,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3774,7 +3774,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3784,7 +3784,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3794,7 +3794,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3814,7 +3814,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network) providing_technologies = [] @@ -3824,7 +3824,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3834,7 +3834,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3856,7 +3856,7 @@ confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3866,7 +3866,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3876,7 +3876,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3896,7 +3896,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3906,7 +3906,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3916,7 +3916,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3926,7 +3926,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3936,7 +3936,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3948,7 +3948,7 @@ explanation = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None at this time providing_technologies = [] @@ -3958,7 +3958,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"]} known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3968,7 +3968,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3978,7 +3978,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3988,7 +3988,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -3998,7 +3998,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4008,7 +4008,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4018,7 +4018,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4028,7 +4028,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4038,7 +4038,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4048,7 +4048,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4058,7 +4058,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4068,7 +4068,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4078,7 +4078,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4088,7 +4088,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4098,7 +4098,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4108,7 +4108,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Scope:Local", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4118,7 +4118,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4128,7 +4128,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4138,7 +4138,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4152,7 +4152,7 @@ A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.j An event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \ Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles. how_to_implement = The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4165,7 +4165,7 @@ Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel pr Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG). how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ProxyShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4175,7 +4175,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4185,7 +4185,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4195,7 +4195,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4205,7 +4205,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4215,7 +4215,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -4225,7 +4225,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4235,7 +4235,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "file_name", "role": ["Other", "Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4245,7 +4245,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker", "Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4255,7 +4255,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4265,7 +4265,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name providing_technologies = [] @@ -4279,7 +4279,7 @@ explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for sp 1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4289,7 +4289,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4299,7 +4299,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization providing_technologies = [] @@ -4309,7 +4309,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects providing_technologies = [] @@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4329,7 +4329,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GCR Container confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4339,7 +4339,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4349,7 +4349,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4359,7 +4359,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "connection_to_CNC", "role": ["Other"], "type": "IP Address"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4369,7 +4369,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4379,7 +4379,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4389,7 +4389,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4399,7 +4399,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4409,7 +4409,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4419,7 +4419,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4429,7 +4429,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4439,7 +4439,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4449,7 +4449,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4459,7 +4459,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4469,7 +4469,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4479,7 +4479,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4491,7 +4491,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4501,7 +4501,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4513,7 +4513,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4523,7 +4523,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4535,7 +4535,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 40, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES providing_technologies = [] @@ -4545,7 +4545,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4555,7 +4555,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4565,7 +4565,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4575,7 +4575,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4585,7 +4585,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4595,7 +4595,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4605,7 +4605,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4615,7 +4615,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4625,7 +4625,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4635,7 +4635,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4645,7 +4645,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4655,7 +4655,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4665,7 +4665,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4675,7 +4675,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4685,7 +4685,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4695,7 +4695,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4705,7 +4705,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4715,7 +4715,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4725,7 +4725,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4735,7 +4735,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4745,7 +4745,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4755,7 +4755,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4765,7 +4765,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4775,7 +4775,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4785,7 +4785,7 @@ asset_type = GitHub confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4795,7 +4795,7 @@ asset_type = GitHub confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "repository", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "System"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4805,7 +4805,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch providing_technologies = [] @@ -4815,7 +4815,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "observable": [{"name": "commit.commit.author.email", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch providing_technologies = [] @@ -4825,7 +4825,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4835,7 +4835,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4845,7 +4845,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4855,7 +4855,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "observable": [{"name": "source.address", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "destination{}.address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4865,7 +4865,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DevSecOps"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "parameters.owner", "role": ["attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "email", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search providing_technologies = [] @@ -4875,7 +4875,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "registry_value_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Attacker", "Parent Process"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4895,7 +4895,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "deleted_files", "role": ["Target"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4905,7 +4905,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4915,7 +4915,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "proc_terminated", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4925,7 +4925,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4935,7 +4935,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4945,7 +4945,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4955,7 +4955,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4965,7 +4965,7 @@ asset_type = Domain Server confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. providing_technologies = [] @@ -4975,7 +4975,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -4985,7 +4985,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives providing_technologies = [] @@ -4995,7 +4995,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Message", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5005,7 +5005,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5015,7 +5015,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5025,7 +5025,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5035,7 +5035,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5045,7 +5045,7 @@ asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing_technologies = [] @@ -5055,7 +5055,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5065,7 +5065,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5075,7 +5075,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5085,7 +5085,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5095,7 +5095,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5105,7 +5105,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing_technologies = [] @@ -5115,7 +5115,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5125,7 +5125,7 @@ asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5135,7 +5135,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5145,7 +5145,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5155,7 +5155,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5165,7 +5165,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5175,7 +5175,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5185,7 +5185,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing_technologies = [] @@ -5195,7 +5195,7 @@ asset_type = Kubernetes confidence = medium explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5205,7 +5205,7 @@ asset_type = Kubernetes confidence = medium explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5215,7 +5215,7 @@ asset_type = Kubernetes confidence = medium explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "type": "Entity"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5225,7 +5225,7 @@ asset_type = DNS Servers confidence = medium explanation = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5235,7 +5235,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5245,7 +5245,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5255,7 +5255,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5265,7 +5265,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5275,7 +5275,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5295,7 +5295,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5305,7 +5305,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Deprecated becaue hidden is not needed when download file with System.Net.WebClient. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5315,7 +5315,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5325,7 +5325,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5335,7 +5335,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5345,7 +5345,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5355,7 +5355,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious Powershell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5365,7 +5365,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine providing_technologies = [] @@ -5375,7 +5375,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5385,7 +5385,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} known_false_positives = None at this time providing_technologies = [] @@ -5395,7 +5395,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None at this time providing_technologies = [] @@ -5405,7 +5405,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5415,7 +5415,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None at this time providing_technologies = [] @@ -5425,7 +5425,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5435,7 +5435,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]} known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5445,7 +5445,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "UriPath"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "formdata"}]} known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5458,7 +5458,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5471,7 +5471,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5484,7 +5484,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5494,7 +5494,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5507,7 +5507,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5520,7 +5520,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5533,7 +5533,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Source_Workstation", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5546,7 +5546,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5559,7 +5559,7 @@ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5569,7 +5569,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5579,7 +5579,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5589,7 +5589,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5599,7 +5599,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5609,7 +5609,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5619,7 +5619,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5629,7 +5629,7 @@ asset_type = AWS ECR container confidence = medium explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5639,7 +5639,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command and Control"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5649,7 +5649,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -5659,7 +5659,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5669,7 +5669,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5681,7 +5681,7 @@ explanation = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Di ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5691,7 +5691,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Actor.ID", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5701,7 +5701,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "Target.ID", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5711,7 +5711,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "observable": [{"name": "ip_addresses_new_added", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user_id", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5721,7 +5721,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication providing_technologies = [] @@ -5731,7 +5731,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5741,7 +5741,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "observable": [{"name": "ActorIpAddress", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5751,7 +5751,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "observable": [{"name": "OrganizationName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Other"}, {"name": "UserId", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5761,7 +5761,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"], "observable": [{"name": "Source", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5771,7 +5771,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Outcome:Allowed", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5781,7 +5781,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Service Accounts providing_technologies = [] @@ -5791,7 +5791,7 @@ asset_type = Office 365 confidence = medium explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Detections", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Cloud Data", "Scope:External", "Stage:Exfiltration", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ForwardingSmtpAddress", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Email Address"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5801,7 +5801,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:recon"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this behavior providing_technologies = [] @@ -5811,7 +5811,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5821,7 +5821,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5831,7 +5831,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -5841,7 +5841,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Normal Office Document macro use for automation providing_technologies = [] @@ -5851,7 +5851,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5861,7 +5861,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "executions"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5871,7 +5871,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5881,7 +5881,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5891,7 +5891,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "IcedID"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5901,7 +5901,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5911,7 +5911,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "FIN7"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process_name"}]} known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5921,7 +5921,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5931,7 +5931,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5941,7 +5941,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = Detect Okta user lockout events how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5951,7 +5951,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = Detect failed Okta SSO events how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5961,7 +5961,7 @@ asset_type = Infrastructure confidence = medium explanation = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5971,7 +5971,7 @@ asset_type = Splunk Server confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -5981,7 +5981,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -5991,7 +5991,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "privilege escalation"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "file_path"}]} known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6001,7 +6001,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Reconnaissance"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6011,7 +6011,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6024,7 +6024,7 @@ To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Window It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. how_to_implement = Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6034,7 +6034,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. how_to_implement = The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6044,7 +6044,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command and Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Exfiltration"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "observable": [{"name": "uri_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "UriPath"}, {"name": "form_data", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "formdata"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6054,7 +6054,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6066,7 +6066,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6076,7 +6076,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6088,7 +6088,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6098,7 +6098,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6108,7 +6108,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6118,7 +6118,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6128,7 +6128,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]} known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6138,7 +6138,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6151,7 +6151,7 @@ This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not norma In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "recon"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6164,7 +6164,7 @@ This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical m Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6176,7 +6176,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6186,7 +6186,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process compressed data. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6196,7 +6196,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6206,7 +6206,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6216,7 +6216,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6228,7 +6228,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load b Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6241,7 +6241,7 @@ Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print sp The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering may be required. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6251,7 +6251,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Initial Access"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6261,7 +6261,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6271,7 +6271,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6281,7 +6281,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6291,7 +6291,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6301,7 +6301,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6311,7 +6311,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6321,7 +6321,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -6331,7 +6331,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -6341,7 +6341,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -6351,7 +6351,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6361,7 +6361,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "BlackMatter Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6371,7 +6371,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes providing_technologies = [] @@ -6381,7 +6381,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Reconnaissance"}], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes providing_technologies = [] @@ -6391,7 +6391,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]} known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory providing_technologies = [] @@ -6401,7 +6401,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6411,7 +6411,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = None at the moment providing_technologies = [] @@ -6421,7 +6421,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "IcedID", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6431,7 +6431,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6441,7 +6441,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications providing_technologies = [] @@ -6451,7 +6451,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6461,7 +6461,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6471,7 +6471,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6481,7 +6481,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware", "Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6491,7 +6491,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6501,7 +6501,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6511,7 +6511,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6521,7 +6521,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6531,7 +6531,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6541,7 +6541,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6551,7 +6551,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6561,7 +6561,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6571,7 +6571,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6581,7 +6581,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. how_to_implement = to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6591,7 +6591,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process providing_technologies = [] @@ -6601,7 +6601,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6611,7 +6611,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Parent Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6621,7 +6621,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6631,7 +6631,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6641,7 +6641,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6651,7 +6651,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6661,7 +6661,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "processname"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6671,7 +6671,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6681,7 +6681,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6691,7 +6691,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "Object_Name", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6701,7 +6701,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6711,7 +6711,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6721,7 +6721,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6734,7 +6734,7 @@ how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensur This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ 1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results providing_technologies = [] @@ -6744,7 +6744,7 @@ asset_type = Database Server confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6754,7 +6754,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 20, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Impact"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6764,7 +6764,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Service Abuse", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6774,7 +6774,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6784,7 +6784,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Arguments"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6794,7 +6794,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Trickbot", "IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Arguments", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Arguments"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6804,7 +6804,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well providing_technologies = [] @@ -6814,7 +6814,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = No known false positives providing_technologies = [] @@ -6824,7 +6824,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6834,7 +6834,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Lateral Movement", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6844,7 +6844,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}, "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6854,7 +6854,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6864,7 +6864,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6874,7 +6874,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Defense Evasion"}, "Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "processname"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6884,7 +6884,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Credential Access"}], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6894,7 +6894,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "observable": [{"name": "Processes.dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "Processes.user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6904,7 +6904,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "registry_path", "role": ["Others"], "type": "RegistryPath"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6914,7 +6914,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Others"], "type": "file path"}]} known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6924,7 +6924,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -6934,7 +6934,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. how_to_implement = This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Account Monitoring and Controls"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Persistence"}], "impact": 70, "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6944,7 +6944,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -6954,7 +6954,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Execution"}], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "user"}]} known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6964,7 +6964,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6974,7 +6974,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6984,7 +6984,7 @@ asset_type = Splunk Server confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. providing_technologies = [] @@ -6994,7 +6994,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7004,7 +7004,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Parent Process", "Attacker"], "type": "Process Name"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7014,7 +7014,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ProcessID", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "TargetImage", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7024,7 +7024,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7034,7 +7034,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Local"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "process_id", "role": ["Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "File"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7044,7 +7044,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "SourceImage", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7054,7 +7054,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry providing_technologies = [] @@ -7064,7 +7064,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7074,7 +7074,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7084,7 +7084,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7094,7 +7094,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7104,7 +7104,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7114,7 +7114,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers providing_technologies = [] @@ -7124,7 +7124,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7136,7 +7136,7 @@ explanation = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -7146,7 +7146,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 30, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7166,7 +7166,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7176,7 +7176,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious regsvr32 commandline "-s" to execute a dll files. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial downloader dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7186,7 +7186,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7196,7 +7196,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7206,7 +7206,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7216,7 +7216,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7226,7 +7226,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7243,7 +7243,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utilit - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7260,7 +7260,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utilit - PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. how_to_implement = OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7270,7 +7270,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious softtware. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig", "Remcos"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7280,7 +7280,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Disabling Security Tools", "DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7290,7 +7290,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "Iceid"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7300,7 +7300,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7310,7 +7310,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7320,7 +7320,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7330,7 +7330,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_path.file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File Name"}]} known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7340,7 +7340,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Cobalt Strike", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7350,7 +7350,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7360,7 +7360,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7370,7 +7370,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cobalt Strike"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7380,7 +7380,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Collection"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7390,7 +7390,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7400,7 +7400,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7410,7 +7410,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7420,7 +7420,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "parent_process", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7430,7 +7430,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7440,7 +7440,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, or system event logs. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7450,7 +7450,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7460,7 +7460,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 40, "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7470,7 +7470,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers providing_technologies = [] @@ -7482,7 +7482,7 @@ explanation = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Ransomware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7492,7 +7492,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7502,7 +7502,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7512,7 +7512,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware", "Command and Control", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = None at this time providing_technologies = [] @@ -7522,7 +7522,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Image", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7532,7 +7532,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence,", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7542,7 +7542,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Other"}]} known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7552,7 +7552,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -7562,7 +7562,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -7572,7 +7572,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7582,7 +7582,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "process name"}]} known_false_positives = unknown. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7592,7 +7592,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -7604,7 +7604,7 @@ explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (E This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7614,7 +7614,7 @@ asset_type = Windows confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7624,7 +7624,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = None identified providing_technologies = [] @@ -7634,7 +7634,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Processes.process_name", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications start with long command lines. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7644,7 +7644,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7654,7 +7654,7 @@ asset_type = Web Server confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7664,7 +7664,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7674,7 +7674,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7684,7 +7684,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7694,7 +7694,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7704,7 +7704,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7719,7 +7719,7 @@ All event subscriptions have three components \ 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "host", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7729,7 +7729,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes providing_technologies = [] @@ -7739,7 +7739,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7749,7 +7749,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Scope:Incoming"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7759,7 +7759,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7769,7 +7769,7 @@ asset_type = Account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7779,7 +7779,7 @@ asset_type = account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7789,7 +7789,7 @@ asset_type = account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7799,7 +7799,7 @@ asset_type = Web Server confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7809,7 +7809,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590.005"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7819,7 +7819,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7829,7 +7829,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7843,7 +7843,7 @@ schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64 The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "IcedID"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Command"}]} known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7857,7 +7857,7 @@ schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64 The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Persistence", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "Command", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Command"}]} known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7867,7 +7867,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7877,7 +7877,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons providing_technologies = [] @@ -7887,7 +7887,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7897,7 +7897,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Log Manipulation", "Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7907,7 +7907,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7917,7 +7917,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection providing_technologies = [] @@ -7927,7 +7927,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7937,7 +7937,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7947,7 +7947,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7957,7 +7957,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachment"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Target"], "type": "Process"}]} known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7969,7 +7969,7 @@ explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` en Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7979,7 +7979,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect suspicious dropping or creating an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. This technique is commonly used for lateral movement like how trickbot try to infect other machine in the infected network. This detection catch the access event (FILE WRITE) access to a share. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -7989,7 +7989,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["source:endpoint", {"stage": "Privilege Escalation"}, "Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "ImageLoaded", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "ImageLoaded"}]} known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. providing_technologies = [] @@ -7999,7 +7999,7 @@ asset_type = confidence = medium explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} known_false_positives = unknown providing_technologies = [] @@ -8009,7 +8009,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8019,7 +8019,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8029,7 +8029,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8039,7 +8039,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8049,7 +8049,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Account confidence = medium explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. providing_technologies = [] @@ -8059,7 +8059,7 @@ asset_type = GCP Account confidence = medium explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} +annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. providing_technologies = [] diff --git a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf index 8d47d206a8..d27ac95a7e 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:04 UTC +# On Date: 2021-09-30T19:01:47 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/nav/default.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/nav/default.xml index 4a57b74606..a56d143e02 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/nav/default.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/nav/default.xml @@ -2,6 +2,5 @@ - Docs \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/analytic_story_details.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/analytic_story_details.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 4d6d8ceab6..0000000000 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/analytic_story_details.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -
- -
- - - - | rest /services/configs/conf-analytic_stories splunk_server=local count=0 | fields title | sort title - - title - title - -
- - - -
-
- - - -
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_summary.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_summary.xml index 93ca23d043..0af3fa774f 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_summary.xml +++ b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_summary.xml @@ -3,16 +3,11 @@ Splunk Security Content - - -

Explore the Analytic Stories included with Splunk Security via ES Use Case Library or Splunk Security Essentials.

- - | rest /services/saved/searches splunk_server=local count=0 | search title="ESCU - *" - | rest /services/configs/conf-analytic_stories splunk_server=local count=0 + | rest /services/configs/conf-analyticstories splunk_server=local count=0 |search eai:acl.app = "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate" * @@ -24,11 +19,11 @@
- + -
- +

Explore the Analytic Stories included with Splunk Security via ES Use Case Library or Splunk Security Essentials.

+ @@ -36,7 +31,7 @@ Total Analytic Stories - stats count + search title="analytic_story://*" |stats count @@ -58,7 +53,7 @@ Total Detections - stats count by action.correlationsearch.label| eventstats sum(count) as total_detection_count| fields total_detection_count + stats count by action.correlationsearch.label| eventstats sum(count) as total_detection_count| fields total_detection_count @@ -104,7 +99,7 @@ Story Categories - | rest /services/configs/conf-analytic_stories splunk_server=local count=0 | stats count by category + | rest /services/configs/conf-analyticstories splunk_server=local count=0 | search eai:acl.app = "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate"| search title="analytic_story://*"| stats count by category $click.value$ @@ -123,9 +118,10 @@ - | rest /services/configs/conf-analytic_stories splunk_server=local count=0 - | spath input=mappings path=mitre_attack{} output="MITRE Technique ID" - | stats dc(title) as "Analytic Stories" by "MITRE Technique ID" + | rest /services/saved/searches splunk_server=local count=0 | search title="ESCU - *" +| spath input=action.correlationsearch.annotations path=mitre_attack{} output="MITRE Technique ID" +| spath input=action.correlationsearch.annotations path=analytic_story{} output=story_name + | stats dc(story_name) as "Analytic Stories" by "MITRE Technique ID" @@ -138,92 +134,52 @@ - + All - + now - | dedup title | rename title as story | fields story + | rest /services/configs/conf-savedsearches splunk_server=local count=0 +| search action.escu.search_type = detection +| spath input=action.correlationsearch.annotations path=analytic_story{} output="story" +| mvexpand story +| dedup story | fields story story story * " " - - - - All - - now - rename action.correlationsearch.label as Detection | dedup Detection | fields Detection - - Detection - Detection - " - " - * - - - - All - - now - | dedup category | fields category - - category - category - * - " - " - - - - All - - now - | spath input=mappings path=mitre_attack{} output="MITRE Technique ID" | mvexpand "MITRE Technique ID"| dedup "MITRE Technique ID" | fields "MITRE Technique ID" - - MITRE Technique ID - MITRE Technique ID - " - " - * - - - - All - - now - | spath input=data_models path={} output=dm | mvexpand dm | dedup dm | fields dm - - dm - dm - * - " - " + * Analytic Story Details - - - spath input=data_models path={} output="Data Models" - | spath input=mappings path=kill_chain_phases{} output="Kill Chain Phases" - | spath input=detection_searches path={} output="Detections" - | spath input=mappings path=mitre_attack{} output="MITRE Technique ID" - | rename title as "Analytic Story" description as "Description" category as "Category" modification_date as "Last Updated" - | fillnull value="-" - | search "Analytic Story"=$as_story$ - | search "Data Models"=$as_data_models$ - | search "Category"=$as_category$ - | search "MITRE Technique ID"=$as_attack_id$ - | search "Detections"=$detection$ - | table "Analytic Story", Description, Category, "MITRE Technique ID", "Data Models", Detections, "Last Updated" - + + | rest /services/configs/conf-savedsearches splunk_server=local count=0 +| search action.escu.search_type = detection +| spath input=action.correlationsearch.annotations path=analytic_story{} output="analytic_story" +| spath input=action.correlationsearch.annotations path=mitre_attack{} output="mitre_attack" +| spath input=action.escu.data_models path={} output="Data Models" +| rename title as "Detections" +| join analytic_story + [| rest /services/configs/conf-analyticstories splunk_server=local count=0 + | search title="analytic_story://*" + | eval "analytic_story"=replace(title,"analytic_story://","" ) + ] +| search analytic_story= $story$ +|stats values(Detections) as Detections values(mitre_attack) as "MITRE Technique ID" values(last_updated) as "Last Updated" by analytic_story description| rename analytic_story as "Analytic Story"| rename description as Description| table "Analytic Story" Description Detections "MITRE Technique ID" "Last Updated" + $earliest$ + $latest$ + + + + + + - - - - -
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_usage.xml b/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_usage.xml deleted file mode 100644 index bfe5d7a189..0000000000 --- a/dist/escu/default/data/ui/views/escu_usage.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ -
- - - $field1.earliest$ - $field1.latest$ - -
- - - - -7d - now - - -
- - - - - | stats sum(search_count) - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats dc(savedsearch_name) - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats sum(search_count) by savedsearch_name | sort -sum(search_count) | head 1 | table savedsearch_name - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats sum(search_count) AS sum_search_count by usage| search usage=adhoc | table sum_search_count - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats sum(search_count) AS sum_search_count by usage| search usage=scheduled | table sum_search_count - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats sum(search_count) AS search_count by user | sort -search_count | head 1 | table user - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats dc(user) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats sum(search_total_run_time) - - - - - - - - - - - - | stats avg(search_total_run_time) - - - - - - - - - - - - |sort -search_total_run_time | head 1| table search_total_run_time - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | table savedsearch_name search_count last_run first_run search_avg_run_time search_total_run_time search_total_results - -
- - -
diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf index 313600a889..aeec603178 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:05 UTC +# On Date: 2021-09-30T19:01:48 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf index 590fdaee5e..7aa2f6c237 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:04 UTC +# On Date: 2021-09-30T19:01:47 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -11675,7 +11675,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes cre action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["meterpreter"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Meterpreter"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Multiple processes were executed out of windows\temp within a short amount of time on $dest$. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}] @@ -11685,7 +11685,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["meterpreter"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest'] @@ -23106,7 +23106,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["source:endpoint", "stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["blackMatter ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Computer", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf index 29310f3d09..3d368234c8 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:04 UTC +# On Date: 2021-09-30T19:01:47 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf b/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf index b9cb8e38e5..0cfdca344c 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/use_case_library.conf @@ -1,8454 +1,2 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:05 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -[analytic_story://AWS Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. - -[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-03-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ - -[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-05-21 -version = 2 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. - -[analytic_story://AWS Security Hub Alerts] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. - -[analytic_story://AWS User Monitoring] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-03-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ -Fortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments. -narrative = Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\ -Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc. - -[analytic_story://Active Directory Password Spraying] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-04-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -narrative = In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ -Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ -Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. - -[analytic_story://Apache Struts Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -last_updated = 2018-12-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. -narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ -The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ -This Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\ -The second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\ -First, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\ -Looking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of "who," in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\ -Gathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -hen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -In the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. - -[analytic_story://Asset Tracking] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. -narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. - -[analytic_story://BITS Jobs] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. -narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). - -[analytic_story://Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host. -narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection. - -[analytic_story://BlackMatter Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative = blackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Brand Monitoring] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-12-19 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. -narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ -You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ -Notable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches. - -[analytic_story://Clop Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-03-17 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-10-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ -Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ -When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ -This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-01-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"] -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Cobalt Strike] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-16 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\ -Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\ -`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\ -Pipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\ -With that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\ -- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\ -- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\ -- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\ -While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives. - -[analytic_story://ColdRoot MacOS RAT] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2019-01-09 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. -narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ -This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ -Searches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger. - -[analytic_story://Collection and Staging] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. -narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ - Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ -Use the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities. - -[analytic_story://Command and Control] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-06-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. -narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ -Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. - -[analytic_story://Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-02-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] -description = Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry. -narrative = Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry. - -[analytic_story://Credential Dumping] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 3 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. -narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ -Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ -The detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping. - -[analytic_story://DHS Report TA18-074A] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. -narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ -There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ -One joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\ -Suspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well. - -[analytic_story://DNS Amplification Attacks] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2016-09-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. -narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ -The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. - -[analytic_story://DNS Hijacking] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"] -description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. -narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ -The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ -On January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days: \ -1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\ -1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\ -1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\ -1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well. \ -In DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment. - -[analytic_story://DarkSide Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-05-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware -narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload. - -[analytic_story://Data Exfiltration] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-10-21 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = The stealing of data by an adversary. -narrative = Exfiltration comes in many flavors. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels. They can utilise Command and Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data. They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data. Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place. - -[analytic_story://Data Protection] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. -narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. - -[analytic_story://Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. -narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents. - -[analytic_story://Detect Zerologon Attack] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-09-18 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier. -narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload. - -[analytic_story://Dev Sec Ops] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-08-18 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor. -narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter. - -[analytic_story://Disabling Security Tools] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. -narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running). - -[analytic_story://Domain Trust Discovery] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-25 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. -narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts. - -[analytic_story://Dynamic DNS] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-09-06 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists. -narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. - -[analytic_story://Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. -narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ -According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. - -[analytic_story://F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-08-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. This vulnerability can result in full system compromise. -narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult. The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/) - -[analytic_story://FIN7] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution. -narrative = FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host. - -[analytic_story://GCP Cross Account Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-09-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. -narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ -In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity. For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply. - -[analytic_story://HAFNIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. -narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\ -While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\ -The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology. - -[analytic_story://Hidden Cobra Malware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. -narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ -These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ -In June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed "Joanap," is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, "Brambul," is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\ -Among other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, "adnim$," which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers. - -[analytic_story://IcedID] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-07-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection. -narrative = IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot. - -[analytic_story://Ingress Tool Transfer] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-03-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. -narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors. - -[analytic_story://JBoss Vulnerability] -category = Vulnerability -last_updated = 2017-09-14 -version = 1 -references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. -narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ -It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ -When looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\ -Various types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin\ -1. Responsible party\ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\ -Gathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\ -hen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\ -If you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\ -If a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\ -Often, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. \ -It can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script. - -[analytic_story://Kubernetes Scanning Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-04-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. - -[analytic_story://Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-05-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. -narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. - -[analytic_story://Lateral Movement] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. -narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ -Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ -An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\ -If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. \ - It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software. - -[analytic_story://Malicious PowerShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-08-23 -version = 5 -references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. -narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \ -The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ -1. Country of origin \ -1. Responsible party \ -1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address \ -1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address \ -Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal— that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope. \ -Gathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted. \ -Often, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\Windows\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited. \ -It can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well. \ -In the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites. \ -Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified. - -[analytic_story://Masquerading - Rename System Utilities] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-04-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule"] -description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. -narrative = Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\ -The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\ -There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection. - -[analytic_story://Meterpreter] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-06-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"] -description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect. Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection. It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\ -Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more. It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed. Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands. With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\ -While investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior. It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives. - -[analytic_story://Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-09-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"] -description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents. -narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it’s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. \ At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks. \ -1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. \ -1. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed. - -[analytic_story://Monitor for Updates] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. -narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ -Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ -Microsoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed. - -[analytic_story://NOBELIUM Group] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-12-14 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"] -description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. -narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the NOBELIUM Group. The threat actor behind sunburst compromised the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. The detections in this Analytic Story are focusing on the dll loading events, file create events and network events to detect This malware. - -[analytic_story://Netsh Abuse] -category = Abuse -last_updated = 2017-01-05 -version = 1 -references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ -To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. - -[analytic_story://Office 365 Detections] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-12-16 -version = 1 -references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. - -[analytic_story://Orangeworm Attack Group] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. -narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ -Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ -Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\ -This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised. - -[analytic_story://PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"] -description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances. -narrative = In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges. - -[analytic_story://Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-01-22 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. -narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ -iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ -The MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]'help'='c:\\windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\programdata\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\ -This Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\ -If behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\ -\ -1. www.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. chemscalere[.]com\ -1. about.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. db.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. news.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. update.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\ -1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. candlelightparty[.]org\ -1. newapp.freshasianews[.]comIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\ -\ -1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\ -1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\ -1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\ -1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\ -1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c - -[analytic_story://PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527] -category = Lateral Movement -last_updated = 2021-07-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"] -maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Threat Research Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. -narrative = This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation). \ -The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of: \ -1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system \ -1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained) \ -1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account. \ -In the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below. - -[analytic_story://Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-11 -version = 1 -references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. -narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. - -[analytic_story://ProxyShell] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-08-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"] -description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. -narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. \ -1. CVE-2021-34473 - Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) \ -1. CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) \ -Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have `SYSTEM` privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions. - -[analytic_story://Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. The following Splunk SOAR playbooks can be used in the response to this story's analytics: 'Ransomware Investigate and Contain' -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. - -[analytic_story://Ransomware Cloud] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-10-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] -maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. - -[analytic_story://Remcos] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-09-23 -version = 1 -references = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.\u0026text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection.. -narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors. - -[analytic_story://Revil Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more. -narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. - -[analytic_story://Router and Infrastructure Security] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. -narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ -This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. - -[analytic_story://Ryuk Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-11-06 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called “Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.” This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot. - -[analytic_story://SQL Injection] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-19 -version = 1 -references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. -narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ -This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. - -[analytic_story://SamSam Ransomware] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-12-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. -narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ -Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ -SamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\ -In a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\ -According to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\ -This Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP. - -[analytic_story://Silver Sparrow] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-24 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"] -description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence. -narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party “affiliates” or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references. - -[analytic_story://Spearphishing Attachments] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2019-04-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"] -description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. -narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ -As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ -While any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim—especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security. \ -Following is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\ -1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\ -1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\ -1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\ -This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Login Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-05-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-07-24 -version = 2 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ -Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ -Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Traffic] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-05-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). -narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ -Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ - Attackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\ -The searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ -This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-25 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-08-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ -This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud User Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-09-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Command-Line Executions] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-03 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. -narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-11 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \ -HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file. \ -During investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis. \ -Upon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious DNS Traffic] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-18 -version = 1 -references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"] -description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. -narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Emails] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-01-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. -narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ -Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ -1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\ -1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\ -1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious GCP Storage Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-05 -version = 1 -references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/product/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious MSHTA Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-20 -version = 2 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution \ -1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Okta Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-04-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. -narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ -While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ -With people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-11 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-29 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads. Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Rundll32 Activity] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-02-03 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code. -narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious WMI Use] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-10-23 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. -narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Windows Registry Activities] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. -narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ - The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ - The searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Zoom Child Processes] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-04-13 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"] -description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. -narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ -Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. - -[analytic_story://Trickbot] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-04-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ESCU - Write Executable in SMB Share - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment. -narrative = trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data. - -[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-12 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code. - -[analytic_story://Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2021-01-21 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule"] -description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code. -narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\ -The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\ -The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\ -Triage\ -Validate execution\ -1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\ -1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\ -Situational Awareness\ -The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\ -1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\ -1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\ -1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\ -Retrieval of script code\ -The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious. - -[analytic_story://Unusual Processes] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. -narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ -This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ -In the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity. - -[analytic_story://Use of Cleartext Protocols] -category = Best Practices -last_updated = 2017-09-15 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"] -description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. -narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. - -[analytic_story://Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-07-28 -version = 1 -references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"] -description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit. -narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s). If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB). This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included. The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json. These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB). - -[analytic_story://Windows Defense Evasion Tactics] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 1 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others -narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. - -[analytic_story://Windows File Extension and Association Abuse] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2018-01-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. -narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ - Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ - Attackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to "hide extensions for known file types." In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\ -Changing the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\ -Run the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations. - -[analytic_story://Windows Log Manipulation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2017-09-12 -version = 2 -references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. -narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ -The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). - -[analytic_story://Windows Persistence Techniques] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2018-05-31 -version = 2 -references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. -narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. - -[analytic_story://Windows Privilege Escalation] -category = Adversary Tactics -last_updated = 2020-02-04 -version = 2 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. -narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. - -[analytic_story://Windows Service Abuse] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2017-11-02 -version = 3 -references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"] -description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. -narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. - -[analytic_story://XMRig] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2021-05-07 -version = 1 -references = ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of command and control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. -narrative = XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017. - -### END STORIES ### - -### DETECTIONS ### - -[savedsearch://ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed 7z.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Federated Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Federated Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. -how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"]} -known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} -known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against Kubernetes' Pods API -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on forAWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudWatch EKS Logs.Please also customize the `kubernetes_pods_aws_scan_fingerprint_detection` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudWatch EKS Logs inputs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1595", "T1003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed chcp.com may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths.\ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]} -known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Update the `children_of_spoolsv_filter` macro to filter out legitimate child processes spawned by spoolsv.exe. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = CircleCI -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. -how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = CircleCI -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. -how_to_implement = You must index CircleCI logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]} -known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage disk -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. -how_to_implement = This search requires that DNS data is being ingested and populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This data can come from DNS logs or from solutions that parse network traffic for this data, such as Splunk Stream or Bro.\ -This search produces fields (`dest_count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Distinct DNS Connections, **Field:** dest_count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for new commands from each user role. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = . -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious parent process execution of commandline tool not in shell commandline. This technique was seen in FIN7 JSSLoader .net compile payload where it run ipconfig.exe and systeminfo.exe using .net application. This event cause some good TTP since those tool are commonly run in commandline not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for application gather host information either an attacker or an automated tool made by admin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = network operator or admin may create this type of tool to gather host information -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice. \ -Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe, It is possible it was injected into by another process. Review recent parallel processes to identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. A parallel process may have a network connection, review and follow the connection back to identify any file modifications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomware -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** Name, **Field:** Name\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** File Extension, **Field:** file_extension\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. The following Splunk SOAR playbook can be used to respond to this detection: Ransomware Investigate and Contain -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search correlations detections by repository and risk_score -how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search correlations detections by user and risk_score -how_to_implement = For Dev Sec Ops POC -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 8 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Service In Suspicious File Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify a creation of "user mode service" where the service file path is located in non-common service folder in windows. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe . -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp. -how_to_implement = This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} -known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces fields (`query`,`query_length`,`count`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Query Length, **Field:** query_length\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. It also requires that your DNS servers are identified correctly in the Assets and Identity table of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. It also requires that the `discover_dns_record` lookup table be populated by the included support search "Discover DNS record". \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ - -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\ -Within this detection, it is assumed `dsquery.exe` is not moved or renamed.\ -The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "dsquery.exe" and its parent process.\ -DSQuery.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64` and only on Server operating system.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when DSQuery.exe is launched `dsquery.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible dsquery is running within that process context in memory.\ -In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behaviors performed. Identify the parent process and capture any files (batch files, for example) being used. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} -known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Leverage the support search `Create a list of approved AWS service accounts`: run it once every 30 days to create a list of service accounts and validate them.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`userIdentity.type`,`userIdentity.arn`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User ARN, **Field:** userIdentity.arn\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** AWS User Type, **Field:** userIdentity.type\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and Dynamic ARP Inspection (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-2_2_e/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg/b_sec_1522e_2960x_cg_chapter_01111.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** First Time, **Field:** firstTime\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest your Windows Security Event logs and leverage the latest TA for Windows. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems, capturing logs from the /var/log directory. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = Splunk Universal Forwarder running on Linux systems (tested on Centos and Ubuntu), where segfaults are being logged. This also captures instances where the exploit has been compiled into a binary. The detection looks for greater than 5 instances of sudoedit combined with segfault over your search time period on a single host -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit -how_to_implement = OSQuery installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. The vulnerability is exposed when a non privledged user tries passing in a single \ character at the end of the command while using the shell and edit flags. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. -how_to_implement = This search requires audit computer account management to be enabled on the system in order to generate Event ID 4742. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Event Logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None thus far found -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `copy` or `[System.IO.File]::Copy` being used to capture the SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hives identified in script block. This will catch the most basic use cases for credentials being taken for offline cracking. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs in the Network_Resolution datamodel. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You will have to add legitimate domain names to the `legit_domains.csv` file shipped with the app. \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called `Lets Encrypt Domain Investigate` can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/lets-encrypt-domain-investigate/`).\ - -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the common PowerShell stager used by PowerShell-Empire. Each stager that may use PowerShell all uses the same pattern. The initial HTTP will be base64 encoded and use `system.net.webclient`. Note that some obfuscation may evade the analytic. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period. -how_to_implement = You must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. \ - **Splunk>Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment and Response" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. The Playbook executes the Contextual and Investigative searches in this Story, conducts additional information gathering on Windows endpoints, and takes a response action to shut down the affected endpoint. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook to active. \ -(Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.1/playbook/excessive-account-lockouts-enrichment-and-response/`).\ - -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period. -how_to_implement = ou must ingest your Windows security event logs in the `Change` datamodel under the nodename is `Account_Management`, for this search to execute successfully. Please consider updating the cron schedule and the count of lockouts you want to monitor, according to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]} -known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices -how_to_implement = To consistently detect exploit attempts on F5 devices using the vulnerabilities contained within CVE-2020-5902 it is recommended to ingest logs via syslog. As many BIG-IP devices will have SSL enabled on their management interfaces, detections via wire data may not pick anything up unless you are decrypting SSL traffic in order to inspect it. I am using a regex string from a Cloudflare mitigation technique to try and always catch the offending string (..;), along with the other exploit of using (hsqldb;). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). In order to capture public GCP Storage Bucket access logs, you must also enable storage bucket logging to your PubSub Topic as per https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-logs. These logs are deposited into the nominated Storage Bucket on an hourly basis and typically show up by 15 minutes past the hour. It is recommended to configure any saved searches or correlation searches in Enterprise Security to run on an hourly basis at 30 minutes past the hour (cron definition of 30 * * * *). A lookup table (previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip.csv) stores the previously seen access requests, and is used by this search to determine any newly seen IP addresses accessing the Storage Buckets. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with one or more First Hop Security measures such as RA Guard, DHCP Guard and/or device tracking. See References for more information. The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None currently known -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. -how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to ingest data from your DNS logs, or monitor DNS traffic using Stream, Bro or something similar. Specifically, this query requires that the DNS data model is populated with information regarding the DNS record type that is being returned as well as the data in the answer section of the protocol. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with powershell.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows Security logs. You must also enable the account change auditing here: http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.0.2/Data/MonitorWindowseventlogdata. Additionally, this search requires you to enable your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and to be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/. Finally, please make sure that the local administrator group name is "Administrators" to be able to look for the right group membership changes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies common Mimikatz functions that may be identified in the script block, including `mimikatz`. This will catch the most basic use cases for Pass the Ticket, Pass the Hash and `-DumprCreds`. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local administrators. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Windows event logs using the Splunk Windows TA and collecting event code 4720 and 4732 -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ensure the network router devices are categorized as "router" in the Assets and identity table. You must also populate the Authentication data model with logs related to users authenticating to routing infrastructure. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. -how_to_implement = This search relies on the Splunk Add-on for Google Cloud Platform, setting up a Cloud Pub/Sub input, along with the relevant GCP PubSub topics and logging sink to capture GCP Storage Bucket events (https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview). -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network to the Internet. SMB traffic is used for Windows file-sharing activity. One of the techniques often used by attackers involves retrieving the credential hash using an SMB request made to a compromised server controlled by the threat actor. -how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have good understanding of how your network segments are designed, and be able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the companys assets in `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with Port Security and Error Disable for this to work (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst4500/12-2/25ew/configuration/guide/conf/port_sec.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populates the Endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. This search includes a lookup file, `prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.csv`, that contains a list of processes that should not be spawning cmd.exe. You can modify this lookup to better suit your environment. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} -known_false_positives = There is potential for false positives as these arguments may be used by other applications. Filter or tune the analytic as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes. These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.009"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack. \ -Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Be cautious to modify the query to look for "scrobj.dll", the ".dll" is not required to load scrobj. "scrobj.dll" will be loaded by "regsvr32.exe" upon execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement", "Execution"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must be configured with DHCP Snooping enabled (see https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960x/software/15-0_2_EX/security/configuration_guide/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg/b_sec_152ex_2960-x_cg_chapter_01101.html) and log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek SSL data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when any of the predefined SNICat commands are found within the server_name (SNI) field. These commands are LIST, LS, SIZE, LD, CB, EX, ALIVE, EXIT, WHERE, and finito. You can go further once this has been detected, and run other searches to decode the SNI data to prove or disprove if any data exfiltration has taken place. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on file modifications that include the name of the process, and file, responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087.001", "T1482", "T1069.002", "T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -how_to_implement = This search looks for Network Traffic events to TFTP, FTP or SSH/SCP ports from network devices. Make sure to tag any network devices as network, router or switch in order for this detection to work. If the TFTP traffic doesn't traverse a firewall nor packet inspection, these events will not be logged. This is typically an issue if the TFTP server is on the same subnet as the network device. There is also a chance of the network device loading software using a DHCP assigned IP address (netboot) which is not in the Asset inventory. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ -This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** AWS Event Name, **Field:** eventName\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Number of API Calls, **Field:** numberOfApiCalls\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = None -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = None -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN" support search once to create a lookup file of previously seen Network ACL Activity. To add or remove API event names related to network ACLs, edit the macro `network_acl_events`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your VPC Flow logs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the number of data points required to meet the definition of "spike." The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Blocked Outbound Connection" support search once to create a history of previously seen blocked outbound connections. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. -how_to_implement = This search uses a standard SPL query on logs from Cisco Network devices. The network devices must log with a severity level of minimum "5 - notification". The search also requires that the Cisco Networks Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1467) is used to parse the logs from the Cisco network devices and that the devices have been configured according to the documentation of the Cisco Networks Add-on. Also note that an attacker may disable logging from the device prior to enabling traffic mirroring. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663 and 4656. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the result_id field in the Change_Analysis data model. To minimize the alert volume, this search leverages the Assets and Identity framework to filter out events from those assets not marked high priority in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. -how_to_implement = This search uses the Network_Sessions data model shipped with Enterprise Security. It leverages the Assets and Identity framework to populate the assets_by_str.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement, which will contain a list of known authorized organizational assets including their MAC addresses. Ensure that all inventoried systems have their MAC address populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Splunk Stream DNS and Splunk Stream TCP. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via stream:dns and TCP payload over 65KB in size via stream:tcp. Replace the macro definitions ('stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp') with configurations for your Splunk environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects SIGRed via Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting SIG and KEY records via bro:dns:json and TCP payload over 65KB in size via bro:conn:json. The Network Resolution and Network Traffic datamodels are in use for this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Network -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects attempts to run exploits for the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability via Zeek RPC -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Zeek DCE-RPC data into Splunk. Zeek data should also be getting ingested in JSON format. We are detecting when all three RPC operations (NetrServerReqChallenge, NetrServerAuthenticate3, NetrServerPasswordSet2) are splunk_security_essentials_app via bro:rpc:json. These three operations are then correlated on the Zeek UID field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from the web server or network traffic that contains web specific information, and populating the Web data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains. -how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\ -This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** DNS Answer, **Field:** answer\ -1. \ -1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. -how_to_implement = You must ingest data from the web server or capture network data that contains web specific information with solutions such as Bro or Splunk Stream, and populating the Web data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in AWS CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in AWS CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry or that are populated via Windows event logs, after enabling process tracking in your Windows audit settings. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = EC2 Snapshot -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting web-traffic logs. You can obtain these logs from indexing data from a web proxy or by using a network-traffic-analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. The web data model must contain the URL being requested, the IP address of the host initiating the request, and the destination IP. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of dynamic DNS providers. Consider periodically updating this local lookup file with new domains.\ -This search produces fields (`isDynDNS`) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** IsDynamicDNS, **Field:** isDynDNS\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` Deprecated because duplicate. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, we must ensure that DNS data is being ingested and mapped to the appropriate fields in the Network_Resolution data model. Fields like src_category are automatically provided by the Assets and Identity Framework shipped with Splunk Enterprise Security. You will need to ensure you are using the Assets and Identity Framework and populating the src_category field. You will also need to enable the `cim_corporate_web_domain_search()` macro which will essentially filter out the DNS queries made to the corporate web domains to reduce alert fatigue. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"]} -known_false_positives = network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine difficult and keep their infection on the box. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and TargetFilename from your endpoints or Events that monitor filestream events which is happened when process download something. (EventCode 15) If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network) -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\ -During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a Sysinternals utility has been ran, it is possible there will be a -accepteula on the command line. Review other endpoint data sources for cross process (injection) into lsass.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 AMIs" support search once to create a history of previously seen AMIs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types" support search once to create a history of previously seen instance types. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. The threshold ratio is set to 10%, but this value can be configured to suit each environment. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/` and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Task Schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4798) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of process like logonUI used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of nslookup.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of distinct processes created in Windows Temp folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective. This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed sc.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine. This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag. It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory. We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.). It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting events related to processes on the endpoints that include the name of the process and process id into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. \ -Modification of this analytic is requried to ensure fields are mapped accordingly. \ -A suspicious event will have `PowerShell`, the method `POST` and `autodiscover.json`. This is indicative of accessing PowerShell on the back end of Exchange with SSRF. \ -An event will look similar to `POST /autodiscover/autodiscover.json a=dsxvu@fnsso.flq/powershell/?X-Rps-CAT=VgEAVAdXaW5kb3d...` (abbreviated) \ -Review the source attempting to perform this activity against your environment. In addition, review PowerShell logs and access recently granted to Exchange roles. -how_to_implement = The following analytic requires on-premise Exchange to be logging to Splunk using the TA - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3225. Ensure logs are parsed correctly, or tune the analytic for your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Currently, there is no active data shared or data we could re-produce relate to this part of the ProxyShell chain of exploits. \ -Inherently, the usage of the modules is not malicious, but reviewing parallel processes, and user, of the session will assist with determining the intent. \ -Module - New-MailboxExportRequest will begin the process of exporting contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. \ -Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a management role group, management role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG). -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensions) in list of suspicious file path in Windows. This technique is used by adversaries to evade detection. The suspicious file path are known paths used in the wild and are not common to have executable or scripts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to first obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your hosts, or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your backup solution. Depending on how often you backup your systems, you may want to modify how far in the past to look for a successful backup, other than the default of seven days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old child processes. Please update the `previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window` macro to adjust the time window. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. -how_to_implement = While this search does not require you to adhere to Splunk CIM, you must be ingesting your Windows system event logs in order for this search to execute successfully. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial` to build the initial table of child processes and hostnames for this search to work. You should also schedule at the same interval as this search the second baseline search `Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old Windows Services. Please update the `previously_seen_windows_services_window` macro to adjust the time window. Please ensure that the Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Windows is version 8.0.0 or above. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The complete process name with command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Please make sure you run the support search "Previously seen command line arguments,"—which creates a lookup file called `previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments.csv`—a historical baseline of all command-line arguments. You must also validate this list. For the search to do accurate calculation, ensure the search scheduling is the same value as the `relative_time` evaluation function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege. \ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute`\ -1. `HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(default)`\ -Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur on the registry keys. Isolate the endpoint and review parallel processes for additional behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GCR Container -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the usage of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group`, which is typically used as a way to identify groups on the endpoint. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"]} -known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = he following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.002"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GitHub -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GitHub -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. -how_to_implement = You must index GitHub logs. You can follow the url in reference to onboard GitHub logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to master branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to github logs having the fork, commit, push metadata that can be use to monitor the changes in a github project. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"]} -known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002"]} -known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} -known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs related to gsuite having the file attachment metadata like file type, file extension, source email, destination email, num of attachment and etc. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - High File Deletion Frequency - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id. These events usually happen when the ransomware tries to encrypt the files with the ransomware file extensions and sysmon treat the original files to be deleted as soon it was replace as encrypted data. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the deleted target file name, process name and process id from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"]} -known_false_positives = user may delete bunch of pictures or files in a folder. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. -how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination on a machine which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image (process full path of terminated process) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model. Your email servers must be categorized as "email_server" for the search to work, as well. You may need to adjust the deviation_threshold and minimum_data_samples values based on the network traffic in your environment. The "deviation_threshold" field is a multiplying factor to control how much variation you're willing to tolerate. The "minimum_data_samples" field is the minimum number of connections of data samples required for the statistic to be valid. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft and coinminer scripts to evade detections and restrict access to their component files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permission of a specific file or directory. This technique is commonly seen in APT tradecraft or coinminer scripts. This behavior is meant to evade detection and prevent access to their component files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed icacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Domain Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be populating the Enterprise Security Identity_Management data model in the assets and identity framework. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects a potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, and include the windows security event logs that contain kerberos -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the 7036 EventCode ScManager in System audit Logs from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure -how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]} -known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add on. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP . This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging servicelogs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging service logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context -how_to_implement = You must install splunk add on for GCP. This search works with pubsub messaging logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} -known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Kubernetes -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner. -how_to_implement = You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = DNS Servers -confidence = medium -explanation = The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.007"]} -known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office product. This behavior has been related to CVE-2021-40444, whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel processes and capture any file modifications for analysis. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process names and image loads from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it's overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Deprecated becaue hidden is not needed when download file with System.Net.WebClient. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes that have encoded the script within the command-line. Malware has been seen using this parameter, as it obfuscates the code and makes it relatively easy to pass a script on the command-line. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]} -known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"]} -known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed cacls.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your DNS logs. Specifically you must ingest the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request. Ideally, you should also be ingesting the answer to the query and the query type. This approach allows you to also create your own localized passive DNS capability which can aid you in future investigations. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest email header data. Specifically the sender's address (src_user) must be populated. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from your web traffic. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or using a network traffic analysis tool, such as Bro or Splunk Stream. You also need to have run the search "ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names", which creates the permutations of the domain that will be checked for. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"]} -known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]} -known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled in stream http configuration. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} -known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects Okta login failures due to bad credentials for multiple users originating from the same ip address. -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\ -The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ -This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ -The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"]} -known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS ECR container -confidence = medium -explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} -known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote command and control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, it requires that the 'Update' data model is being populated. This can be accomplished by ingesting Windows events or the Windows Update log via a universal forwarder on the Windows endpoints you wish to monitor. The Windows add-on should be also be installed and configured to properly parse Windows events in Splunk. There may be other data sources which can populate this data model, including vulnerability management systems. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.MA"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"]} -known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the files in profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder a noise coming from firefox need to be filter and also sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003"]} -known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit \ -ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full C:\Temp" q q \ -This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the Active Directory database. A successful export of the Active Directory database will yield a file modification named ntds.dit to the destination. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} -known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} -known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Service Accounts -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drop or create executables or script in the host. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this behavior -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule task entry through macro VBA api or through loading taskschd.dll. This technique was seen in so many malicious macro malware that create persistence , beaconing using task schedule malware entry The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it's possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using macro code. Macro code is known to be one of the prevalent weaponization or attack vector of threat actor. This malicious macro code is embed to a office document as an attachment that may execute malicious payload, download malware payload or other malware component. It is really good practice to disable macro by default to avoid automatically execute macro code while opening or closing a office document files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded (Like sysmon EventCode 7) from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Also be sure to include those monitored dll to your own sysmon config. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = Normal Office Document macro use for automation -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances office application and browser may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"]} -known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect Okta user lockout events -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect failed Okta SSO events -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Infrastructure -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects logins from the same user from different cities in a 24 hour period. -how_to_implement = This search is specific to Okta and requires Okta logs are being ingested in your Splunk deployment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Users in your enviornment may legitmately be travelling and loggin in from different locations. This search is useful for those users that should *not* be travelling for some reason, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The search also relies on the geographical information being populated in the Okta logs. It is also possible that a connection from another region may be attributed to a login from a remote VPN endpoint. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Splunk Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. -how_to_implement = No extra steps needed to implement this search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"]} -known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values. \ -To enable 5145 events via Group Policy - Computer Configuration->Polices->Windows Settings->Security Settings->Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Expand this node, go to Object Access (Audit Polices->Object Access), then select the Setting Audit Detailed File Share Audit \ -It is possible this is not enabled by default and may need to be reviewed and enabled. \ -During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious activity. -how_to_implement = Windows Event Code 5145 is required to utilize this analytic and it may not be enabled in most environments. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"]} -known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment. -how_to_implement = The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team. -how_to_implement = The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies specific PowerShell modules typically used to enumerate an organizations domain or users. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell loading .net assembly via reflection. This is commonly found in malicious PowerShell usage, including Empire and Cobalt Strike. In addition, the `load(` value may be modifed by removing `(` and it will identify more events to review. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation? -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]} -known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]} -known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015"]} -known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `GetProcAddress` in the script block. This is not normal to be used by most PowerShell scripts and is typically unsafe/malicious. Many attack toolkits use GetProcAddress to obtain code execution. \ -In use, `$var_gpa = $var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod(GetProcAddress` and later referenced/executed elsewhere. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies `FromBase64String` within the script block. A typical malicious instance will include additional code. \ -Command example - `[Byte[]]$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(38uqIyMjQ6rG....` \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies PowerShell cmdlet - `get-localgroup` being ran. Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"]} -known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process compressed data. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, Create Remote thread from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of create remote thread may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"]} -known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed bcdedit.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following event will occur - "Printer driver 1234 for Windows x64 Version-3 was added or updated. Files:- UNIDRV.DLL, kernelbase.dll, evil.dll. No user action is required." \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events and review the source of where the exploitation began. -how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. \ -Within the proof of concept code, the following error will occur - "The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module C:\Windows\system32\spool\DRIVERS\x64\3\meterpreter.dll, error code 0x45A. See the event user data for context information." \ -The analytic is based on file path and failure to load the plug-in. \ -During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -how_to_implement = You will need to ensure PrintService Admin and Operational logs are being logged to Splunk from critical or all systems. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering may be required. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your osquery deployed agents with the [osx-attacks.conf](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/blob/experimental/packs/osx-attacks.conf#L599) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/d1vious/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the Alerts data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting logs with the process name, command-line arguments, and parent processes from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protocol in the Enterprise Security lookup table "lookup_interesting_ports", that is marked as prohibited, and has an associated 'allow' action in the Network_Traffic data model. This could be indicative of a misconfigured network device. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is usually generated via logs that report process tracking in your Windows audit settings. In addition, you must also have only the `process_name` (not the entire process path) marked as "prohibited" in the Enterprise Security `interesting processes` table. To include the process names marked as "prohibited", which is included with ES Content Updates, run the included search Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. -how_to_implement = Running this search properly requires a technology that can inspect network traffic and identify common protocols. Technologies such as Bro and Palo Alto Networks firewalls are two examples that will identify protocols via inspection, and not just assume a specific protocol based on the transport protocol and ports. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic, and populating the Network_Traffic data model. For more accurate result it's better to limit destination to organization private and public IP range, like All_Traffic.dest IN(192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8, x.x.x.x/22) -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Obfuscation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]} -known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None at the moment -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to launch an application or service at system startup. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. -how_to_implement = You must ensure that your network traffic data is populating the Network_Traffic data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. The search requires you to identify systems that do not commonly use remote desktop. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop" to identify these systems. After identifying them, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" category to that system using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework. This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in `SA-IdentityManagement/lookups`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must populate the `Endpoint` data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. Deprecated because duplicate of Remote Process Instantiation via WMI. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"]} -known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"]} -known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host. -how_to_implement = to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for executing scripts with rundll32. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While not common, loading a DLL under %AppData% and calling a function by ordinal is possible by a legitimate process -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to cmd.exe process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information the the compromised host. browser process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the SourceImage, TargetImage, and EventCode executions from your endpoints related to create remote thread or injecting codes. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. this behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `port` node. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Filesystem data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"]} -known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"]} -known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to be ingesting your network traffic logs and populating the `Network_Traffic` data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. In addition, the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) version 4.2 or greater must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, because it builds a machine-learning (ML) model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment.\ -This search produces a field (Number of events,count) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. This field contributes additional context to the notable. To see the additional metadata, add the following field, if not already present, to Incident Review - Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry): \ -1. **Label:** Number of events, **Field:** count\ -Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review is found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Database Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for long URLs that have several SQL commands visible within them. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring network communications to your web servers or ingesting your HTTP logs and populating the Web data model. You must also identify your web servers in the Enterprise Security assets table. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data-model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002"]} -known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with an arguments "HTTP" string that are unique entry of malware or attack that uses lolbin to download other file or payload to the infected machine. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a Rundll32. This technique is common in new trickbot that uses rundll32 to load is trickbot downloader. The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not. schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory. Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source.' -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a task was created via command like. This has been associated with the Dragonfly threat actor, and the SUNBURST attack against Solarwinds. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Tasks should not be manually created via CLI, this is rarely done by admins as well -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = No known false positives -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through shell or command-line. This technique has been used by adversaries that force to run their created Schedule Task as their persistence mechanism or for lateral movement as part of their malicious attack to the compromised machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed schtasks.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may use to debug Schedule Task entries. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate a job is being scheduled on a remote system. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that a forced reboot of system is scheduled. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may create jobs on systems forcing reboots to perform updates, maintenance, etc. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `ports` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you will need to ensure that DNS data is populating the Network_Resolution data model. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Registry node. You must also be ingesting logs with the fields registry_path, registry_key_name, and registry_value_name from your endpoints. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time period. -how_to_implement = This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs. More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/ -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. -how_to_implement = The search requires that you are ingesting your vulnerability-scanner data and that it reports the CVE of the vulnerability identified. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the file system. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Splunk Server -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. -how_to_implement = The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Whitelisting your Splunk systems will reduce false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with process access event where SourceImage, TargetImage, GrantedAccess and CallTrace executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of spoolsv.exe. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique was seen in some ransomware to automatically execute its code upon a safe mode boot. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001"]} -known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. -how_to_implement = This detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 7, Driver loaded. Please tune your sysmon config that you DriverLoad event for SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is captured by Sysmon. Additionally, you need sysmon logs for Event ID 22, DNS Query. We suggest to run this detection at least once a day over the last 14 days. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search aims to detect the Supernova webshell used in the SUNBURST attack. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be monitoring web traffic to your Solarwinds Orion. The logs should be ingested into splunk and populating/mapped to the Web data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 13", "CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "ID.RA", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to command and control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensions. -how_to_implement = You need to ingest data from emails. Specifically, the sender's address and the file names of any attachments must be mapped to the Email data model. \ - **Splunk Phantom Playbook Integration**\ -If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete" can be configured to run when any results are found by this detection search. To use this integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, and add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response Actions when configuring this detection search. The notable event will be sent to Phantom and the playbook will gather further information about the file attachment and its network behaviors. If Phantom finds malicious behavior and an analyst approves of the results, the email will be deleted from the user's inbox. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the filesystem activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint file-system data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file system reads and writes. In addition, this search leverages an included lookup file that contains the names of the files to watch for, as well as a note to communicate why that file name is being monitored. This lookup file can be edited to add or remove file the file names you want to monitor. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Regsvr32 Cmdline - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect a suspicious regsvr32 commandline "-s" to execute a dll files. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial downloader dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"]} -known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from your web-traffic appliances that serve or sit in the path of your Struts application servers. This can be accomplished by indexing data from a web proxy, or by using network traffic-analysis tools, such as Splunk Stream or Bro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = There are no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :Label string init_verx" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :RunAtLoad bool true" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :StartInterval integer 3600" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments array" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:0 string /bin/sh" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -- PlistBuddy -c "Add :ProgramArguments:1 string -c" ~/Library/Launchagents/init_verx.plist \ -Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for further indicators. Contain the endpoint and triage further. -how_to_implement = OSQuery must be installed and configured to pick up process events (info at https://osquery.io) as well as using the Splunk OSQuery Add-on https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4402. Modify the macro and validate fields are correct. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path where a process is not commonly seen and is most commonly used by malicious softtware. This behavior has been used by adversaries where they drop and run an exe in a path that is accessible without admin privileges. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load malciious DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints, to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Tune the query by filtering additional extensions found to be used by legitimate processes. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IceID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"]} -known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.011"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new task) a binary or script to run from a public directory which includes users\public, \programdata\ and \windows\temp. Upon triage, review the binary or script in the command line for legitimacy, whether an approved binary/script or not. In addition, capture the binary or script in question and analyze for further behaviors. Identify the source and contain the endpoint. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed by parent process or command line argument. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, file_name, file_path and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, or system event logs. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. -how_to_implement = You need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command-line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects writes to the recycle bin by a process other than explorer.exe. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on filesystem and process logs responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` nodes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\ -This detection utilizes a lookup that is deduped `system32` and `syswow64` directories from Server 2016 and Windows 10.\ -During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Windows binary? identify any artifacts on disk and review. If a remote destination is contacted, what is the reputation? -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. -how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest data from firewalls or other network control devices that mediate the traffic allowed into an environment. This is necessary so that the search can identify an 'action' taken on the traffic of interest. The search requires the Network_Traffic data model be populated. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = None at this time -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. . -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search uses a lookup file `uncommon_processes_default.csv` to track various features of process names that are usually uncommon in most environments. Please consider updating `uncommon_processes_local.csv` to hunt for processes that are uncommon in your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services, umworkerprocess.exe and umservice.exe, spawning a child process, indicating possible exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability. The query filters out werfault.exe and wermgr.exe mostly due to potential false positives, however, if there is an excessive amount of "wermgr.exe" or "WerFault.exe" failures, it may be due to the active exploitation. During triage, identify any additional suspicious parallel processes. Identify any recent out of place file modifications. Review Exchange logs following Microsofts guide. To contain, perform egress filtering or restrict public access to Exchange. In final, patch the vulnerablity and monitor. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Tune out child processes as needed to limit volume of false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"]} -known_false_positives = unknown. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. This search is also shipped with `unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter` macro, update this macro to filter out false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all. \ -This analytic identifies the behavior of AMSI being tampered with. Implemented natively in many frameworks, the command will look similar to `SEtValuE($Null,(New-OBJEct COLlECtionS.GenerIC.HAshSEt{[StrINg]))}$ReF=[ReF].AsSeMbLY.GeTTyPe("System.Management.Automation.Amsi"+"Utils")` taken from Powershell-Empire. \ -During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity. Review the entire logged PowerShell script block. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"]} -known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Windows -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. -how_to_implement = This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to obtain data from your backup solution, either from the backup logs on your endpoints or from a central server responsible for performing the backups. If you do not use Netbackup, you can modify this search for your specific backup solution. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = None identified -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships, from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the process field in the Endpoint data model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications start with long command lines. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that monitors command lines and populates the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, MLTK version >= 4.2 must be installed on your search heads, along with any required dependencies. Finally, the support search "Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK" must be executed before this detection search, as it builds an ML model over the historical data used by this search. It is important that this search is run in the same app context as the associated support search, so that the model created by the support search is available for use. You should periodically re-run the support search to rebuild the model with the latest data available in your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. -how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 18", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["ID.RA", "RS.MI", "PR.PT", "PR.IP", "DE.AE", "PR.MA", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003"]} -known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. Tune based on parent process names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\ -All event subscriptions have three components \ -1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \ -1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \ -1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \ -Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate alerts for WMI activity (eventID= 19, 20, 21). In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"]} -known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational]. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object to wbemprox.dll, -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.003"]} -known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. -how_to_implement = We start with a dataset that provides visibility into the email address used for the account creation. In this example, we are narrowing our search down to the single web page that hosts the Magento2 e-commerce platform (via URI) used for account creation, the single http content-type to grab only the user's clicks, and the http field that provides the username (form_data), for performance reasons. After we have the username and email domain, we look for numerous account creations per email domain. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs or Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment—improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important. Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search. You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. -how_to_implement = Start with a dataset that allows you to see clickstream data for each user click on the website. That data must have a time stamp and must contain a reference to the session identifier being used by the website. This ties the clicks together into clickstreams. This value is usually found in the http cookie. With a bit of tuning, a version of this search could be used in high-volume scenarios, such as scraping, crawling, application DDOS, credit-card testing, account takeover, etc. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. -how_to_implement = We need to start with a dataset that allows us to see the values of usernames and passwords that users are submitting to the website hosting the Magento2 e-commerce platform (commonly found in the HTTP form_data field). A tokenized or hashed value of a password is acceptable and certainly preferable to a clear-text password. Common data sources used for this detection are customized Apache logs, customized IIS, and Splunk Stream. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Web Server -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. In addition, web servers will need to be identified in the Assets and Identity Framework of Enterprise Security. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, dns query name process path , and query ststus from your endpoints like EventCode 22. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 12 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590.005"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed from a user writeable file path.\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it via TaskService. Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with a command to be executed with a native Windows shell (PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, Cscript).\ -The search will return the first time and last time the task was registered, as well as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled`, and whether it is `Hidden` or not.\ -schtasks.exe is natively found in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`.\ -The following DLL(s) are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is launched -`taskschd.dll`. If found loaded by another process, it is possible a scheduled task is being registered within that process context in memory.\ -Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the Command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk and review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to identify source. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"]} -known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Privilege Escalation", "Denial of Service"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} -known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default. Specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. This has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST. AdFind.exe is usually used a recon tool to enumare a domain controller. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = administrators rarely use adfind, usually not used for legitimate reasons -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows event logs from your hosts. In addition, the Splunk Windows TA is needed. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.IP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records the process-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint Processes data-model object. If you are using Sysmon, you will need a Splunk Universal Forwarder on each endpoint from which you want to collect data. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Endpoint -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records the file-system activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint.Filesystem data model node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or by other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report file-system reads and writes. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.IP", "PR.PT", "PR.AC", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"]} -known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint. \ -Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ -During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"]} -known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Write Executable in SMB Share - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect suspicious dropping or creating an executable file in known sensitive SMB share. This technique is commonly used for lateral movement like how trickbot try to infect other machine in the infected network. This detection catch the access event (FILE WRITE) access to a share. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 5145 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Also enable the object Audit access success/failure in your group policy. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"]} -known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique. -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add-on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} -known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = GCP Account -confidence = medium -explanation = WARNING, this detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team, this means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk GCP add-on. This search works with gcp:pubsub:message logs -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs. -providing_technologies = [] - -### END DETECTIONS ### - -### RESPONSE TASKS ### - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your backup logs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your network traffic -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -### END RESPONSE TASKS ### +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv index 0717cbc6ba..fee94d3941 100644 --- a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv +++ b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -1,440 +1,564 @@ -mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups -T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no -T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no -T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation -T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird -T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no -T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no -T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation -T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer -T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no -T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no -T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no -T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no -T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein -T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda -T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no -T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6 -T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group -T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper -T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater -T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28 -T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 -T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 -T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee -T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon -T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 -T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group -T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group -T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom -T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28 -T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no -T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork -T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29 -T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29 -T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 -T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider -T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan -T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak -T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork -T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 -T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 -T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 -T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33 -T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound -T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 -T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 -T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no -T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no -T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke -T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 -T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass -T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338 -T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10 -T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12 -T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM -T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla -T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no -T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41 -T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no -T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505 -T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper -T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang -T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no -T1569,System Services,Execution,no -T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41 -T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no -T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no -T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla -T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no -T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete -T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound -T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41 -T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 -T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no -T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda -T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no -T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no -T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7 -T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein -T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no -T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no -T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal -T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 -T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass -T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no -T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 -T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 -T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38 -T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no -T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group -T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no -T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no -T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no -T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no -T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon -T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no -T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang -T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no -T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505 -T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang -T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 -T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no -T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak -T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no -T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda -T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no -T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 -T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33 -T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 -T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group -T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no -T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 -T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang -T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang -T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no -T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no -T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no -T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no -T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no -T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group -T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no -T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer -T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1 -T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group -T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28 -T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28 -T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no -T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats -T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no -T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no -T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 -T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater -T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no -T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no -T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang -T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no -T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no -T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no -T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider -T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no -T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no -T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM -T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no -T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4 -T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon -T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no -T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no -T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no -T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no -T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no -T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33 -T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass -T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver -T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no -T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group -T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 -T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no -T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390 -T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN -T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN -T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no -T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom -T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no -T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no -T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 -T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 -T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM -T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic -T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift -T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel -T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no -T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no -T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 -T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon -T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee -T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32 -T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no -T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke -T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no -T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32 -T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 -T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no -T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 -T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 -T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41 -T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no -T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28 -T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29 -T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 -T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no -T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 -T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no -T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke -T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 -T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell -T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 -T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group -T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla -T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla -T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,TEMP.Veles -T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group -T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7 -T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee -T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor -T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom -T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 -T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky -T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel -T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda -T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 -T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig -T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater -T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 -T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no -T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound -T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no -T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak -T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke -T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork -T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer -T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.009,Proc Memory,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.008,Ptrace System Calls,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group -T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda -T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|APT28 -T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28 -T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation -T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no -T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda -T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no -T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no -T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke -T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 -T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18 -T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater -T1137.004,Outlook Home Page,Persistence,OilRig -T1137.003,Outlook Forms,Persistence,no -T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no -T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon -T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28 -T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no -T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no -T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 -T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception -T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group -T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28 -T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no -T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no -T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no -T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no -T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no -T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no -T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no -T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no -T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no -T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no -T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no -T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group -T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no -T1491,Defacement,Impact,no -T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no -T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group -T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38 -T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 -T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider -T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no -T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no -T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus -T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group -T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan -T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no -T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla -T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM -T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29 -T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no -T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 -T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom -T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28 -T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya -T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig -T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak -T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no -T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass -T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1204,User Execution,Execution,no -T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood -T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no -T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil -T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no -T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no -T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird -T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no -T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER -T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug -T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32 -T1153,Source,Execution,no -T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 -T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no -T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no -T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7 -T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla -T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37 -T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28 -T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 -T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38 -T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no -T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 -T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 -T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no -T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla -T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 -T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 -T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 -T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 -T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group -T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 -T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 -T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla -T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no -T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel -T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak -T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider -T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314 -T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no -T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3 -T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 -T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no -T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no -T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no -T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang -T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no -T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM -T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no -T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no -T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda -T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 -T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang -T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 -T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass -T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke -T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 -T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390 -T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no -T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 -T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group -T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 -T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no -T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee -T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla -T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group -T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla -T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no -T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group -T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group -T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no -T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang -T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom -T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom +"mitre_id","technique","tactics","groups" +"T1553.006","Code Signing Policy Modification","Defense Evasion","Turla|APT39" +"T1614","System Location Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1613","Container and Resource Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1552.007","Container API","Credential Access","no" +"T1612","Build Image on Host","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1611","Escape to Host","Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1204.003","Malicious Image","Execution","no" +"T1053.007","Container Orchestration Job","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1610","Deploy Container","Defense Evasion|Execution","no" +"T1609","Container Administration Command","Execution","no" +"T1608.005","Link Target","Resource Development","Silent Librarian" +"T1608.004","Drive-by Target","Resource Development","APT32|Threat Group-3390" +"T1608.003","Install Digital Certificate","Resource Development","no" +"T1608.002","Upload Tool","Resource Development","Threat Group-3390" +"T1608.001","Upload Malware","Resource Development","APT32" +"T1608","Stage Capabilities","Resource Development","no" +"T1016.001","Internet Connection Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452|Turla" +"T1553.005","Mark-of-the-Web Bypass","Defense Evasion","TA505" +"T1555.005","Password Managers","Credential Access","Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao" +"T1484.002","Domain Trust Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1484.001","Group Policy Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Indrik Spider" +"T1547.014","Active Setup","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1606.002","SAML Tokens","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1606.001","Web Cookies","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1606","Forge Web Credentials","Credential Access","no" +"T1555.004","Windows Credential Manager","Credential Access","Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla" +"T1059.008","Network Device CLI","Execution","no" +"T1602.002","Network Device Configuration Dump","Collection","no" +"T1542.005","TFTP Boot","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1542.004","ROMMONkit","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1602.001","SNMP (MIB Dump)","Collection","no" +"T1602","Data from Configuration Repository","Collection","no" +"T1601.002","Downgrade System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1601.001","Patch System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1601","Modify System Image","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600.002","Disable Crypto Hardware","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600.001","Reduce Key Space","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1600","Weaken Encryption","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1556.004","Network Device Authentication","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1599.001","Network Address Translation Traversal","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1599","Network Boundary Bridging","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1020.001","Traffic Duplication","Exfiltration","no" +"T1557.002","ARP Cache Poisoning","Credential Access|Collection","Cleaver" +"T1588.006","Vulnerabilities","Resource Development","Sandworm Team" +"T1053.006","Systemd Timers","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1562.008","Disable Cloud Logs","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1547.012","Print Processors","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1598.003","Spearphishing Link","Reconnaissance","Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky" +"T1598.002","Spearphishing Attachment","Reconnaissance","Sidewinder" +"T1598.001","Spearphishing Service","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1598","Phishing for Information","Reconnaissance","ZIRCONIUM|APT28" +"T1597.002","Purchase Technical Data","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1597.001","Threat Intel Vendors","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1597","Search Closed Sources","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.005","Scan Databases","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.004","CDNs","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.003","Digital Certificates","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.001","DNS/Passive DNS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596.002","WHOIS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1596","Search Open Technical Databases","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1595.002","Vulnerability Scanning","Reconnaissance","Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team" +"T1595.001","Scanning IP Blocks","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1595","Active Scanning","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1594","Search Victim-Owned Websites","Reconnaissance","Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1593.002","Search Engines","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1593.001","Social Media","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1593","Search Open Websites/Domains","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1592.004","Client Configurations","Reconnaissance","HAFNIUM" +"T1592.003","Firmware","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1592.002","Software","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1592.001","Hardware","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1592","Gather Victim Host Information","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.004","Identify Roles","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.003","Identify Business Tempo","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.001","Determine Physical Locations","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1591.002","Business Relationships","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1591","Gather Victim Org Information","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.006","Network Security Appliances","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.005","IP Addresses","Reconnaissance","HAFNIUM" +"T1590.004","Network Topology","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.003","Network Trust Dependencies","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.002","DNS","Reconnaissance","no" +"T1590.001","Domain Properties","Reconnaissance","Sandworm Team" +"T1590","Gather Victim Network Information","Reconnaissance","HAFNIUM" +"T1589.003","Employee Names","Reconnaissance","Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1589.002","Email Addresses","Reconnaissance","TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team" +"T1589.001","Credentials","Reconnaissance","APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera" +"T1589","Gather Victim Identity Information","Reconnaissance","APT32" +"T1588.005","Exploits","Resource Development","no" +"T1588.004","Digital Certificates","Resource Development","Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian" +"T1588.003","Code Signing Certificates","Resource Development","Wizard Spider" +"T1588.002","Tool","Resource Development","MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team" +"T1588.001","Malware","Resource Development","Turla|APT1" +"T1588","Obtain Capabilities","Resource Development","no" +"T1587.004","Exploits","Resource Development","no" +"T1587.003","Digital Certificates","Resource Development","APT29|PROMETHIUM" +"T1587.002","Code Signing Certificates","Resource Development","PROMETHIUM|Patchwork" +"T1587.001","Malware","Resource Development","APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver" +"T1587","Develop Capabilities","Resource Development","Kimsuky" +"T1586.002","Email Accounts","Resource Development","Magic Hound|Kimsuky" +"T1586.001","Social Media Accounts","Resource Development","no" +"T1586","Compromise Accounts","Resource Development","no" +"T1585.002","Email Accounts","Resource Development","Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1" +"T1585.001","Social Media Accounts","Resource Development","Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver" +"T1585","Establish Accounts","Resource Development","Fox Kitten|APT17" +"T1584.006","Web Services","Resource Development","Turla" +"T1584.005","Botnet","Resource Development","no" +"T1584.004","Server","Resource Development","Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16" +"T1584.003","Virtual Private Server","Resource Development","Turla" +"T1584.002","DNS Server","Resource Development","no" +"T1584.001","Domains","Resource Development","APT29|UNC2452|APT1" +"T1583.006","Web Services","Resource Development","ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29" +"T1583.005","Botnet","Resource Development","no" +"T1583.004","Server","Resource Development","GALLIUM|Sandworm Team" +"T1583.003","Virtual Private Server","Resource Development","HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles" +"T1583.002","DNS Server","Resource Development","no" +"T1584","Compromise Infrastructure","Resource Development","no" +"T1583.001","Domains","Resource Development","APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28" +"T1583","Acquire Infrastructure","Resource Development","no" +"T1564.007","VBA Stomping","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1558.004","AS-REP Roasting","Credential Access","no" +"T1580","Cloud Infrastructure Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1218.012","Verclsid","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1205.001","Port Knocking","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control","PROMETHIUM" +"T1564.006","Run Virtual Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1564.005","Hidden File System","Defense Evasion","Strider|Equation" +"T1556.003","Pluggable Authentication Modules","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1574.012","COR_PROFILER","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Blue Mockingbird" +"T1562.007","Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1098.004","SSH Authorized Keys","Persistence","no" +"T1480.001","Environmental Keying","Defense Evasion","APT41|Equation" +"T1059.007","JavaScript","Execution","MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer" +"T1578.004","Revert Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.003","Delete Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.001","Create Snapshot","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1578.002","Create Cloud Instance","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1127.001","MSBuild","Defense Evasion","Frankenstein" +"T1027.005","Indicator Removal from Tools","Defense Evasion","Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda" +"T1562.006","Indicator Blocking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1573.002","Asymmetric Cryptography","Command And Control","Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6" +"T1573.001","Symmetric Cryptography","Command And Control","Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group" +"T1573","Encrypted Channel","Command And Control","Tropic Trooper" +"T1027.004","Compile After Delivery","Defense Evasion","Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater" +"T1574.004","Dylib Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1546.015","Component Object Model Hijacking","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","APT28" +"T1071.004","DNS","Command And Control","Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7" +"T1071.003","Mail Protocols","Command And Control","Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28" +"T1071.002","File Transfer Protocols","Command And Control","Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee" +"T1071.001","Web Protocols","Command And Control","APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Turla|APT37|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon" +"T1572","Protocol Tunneling","Command And Control","Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6" +"T1048.003","Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group" +"T1048.002","Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1048.001","Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol","Exfiltration","no" +"T1001.003","Protocol Impersonation","Command And Control","Higaisa|Lazarus Group" +"T1001.002","Steganography","Command And Control","APT29|Axiom" +"T1001.001","Junk Data","Command And Control","APT28" +"T1132.002","Non-Standard Encoding","Command And Control","no" +"T1132.001","Standard Encoding","Command And Control","HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork" +"T1090.004","Domain Fronting","Command And Control","APT29" +"T1090.003","Multi-hop Proxy","Command And Control","APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29" +"T1090.002","External Proxy","Command And Control","APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28" +"T1090.001","Internal Proxy","Command And Control","APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider" +"T1102.003","One-Way Communication","Command And Control","Leviathan" +"T1102.002","Bidirectional Communication","Command And Control","ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak" +"T1102.001","Dead Drop Resolver","Command And Control","Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork" +"T1571","Non-Standard Port","Command And Control","Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7" +"T1074.002","Remote Data Staging","Collection","APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8" +"T1074.001","Local Data Staging","Collection","Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1078.004","Cloud Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","APT33" +"T1564.004","NTFS File Attributes","Defense Evasion","APT32" +"T1564.003","Hidden Window","Defense Evasion","Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound" +"T1078.003","Local Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32" +"T1078.002","Domain Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314" +"T1078.001","Default Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","no" +"T1564.002","Hidden Users","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.006","Dynamic Linker Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","APT41|Rocke" +"T1574.002","DLL Side-Loading","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390" +"T1574.001","DLL Search Order Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass" +"T1574.008","Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.007","Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.009","Path Interception by Unquoted Path","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.011","Services Registry Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.005","Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574.010","Services File Permissions Weakness","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1574","Hijack Execution Flow","Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1069.001","Local Groups","Discovery","Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338" +"T1570","Lateral Tool Transfer","Lateral Movement","Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10" +"T1568.003","DNS Calculation","Command And Control","APT12" +"T1204.002","Malicious File","Execution","Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|MuddyWater|DarkHydrus|OilRig|APT32|Rancor|Lazarus Group|APT29|APT28|APT37|FIN8|Elderwood|menuPass|PLATINUM|TA459|Leviathan" +"T1204.001","Malicious Link","Execution","APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla" +"T1195.003","Compromise Hardware Supply Chain","Initial Access","no" +"T1195.002","Compromise Software Supply Chain","Initial Access","APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41" +"T1195.001","Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools","Initial Access","no" +"T1568.001","Fast Flux DNS","Command And Control","menuPass|TA505" +"T1052.001","Exfiltration over USB","Exfiltration","Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper" +"T1569.002","Service Execution","Execution","Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang" +"T1569.001","Launchctl","Execution","no" +"T1569","System Services","Execution","no" +"T1568.002","Domain Generation Algorithms","Command And Control","TA551|APT41" +"T1568","Dynamic Resolution","Command And Control","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1011.001","Exfiltration Over Bluetooth","Exfiltration","no" +"T1567.002","Exfiltration to Cloud Storage","Exfiltration","ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla" +"T1567.001","Exfiltration to Code Repository","Exfiltration","no" +"T1059.006","Python","Execution","ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete" +"T1059.005","Visual Basic","Execution","Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound" +"T1059.004","Unix Shell","Execution","Rocke|APT41" +"T1059.003","Windows Command Shell","Execution","APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Rancor|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1" +"T1059.002","AppleScript","Execution","no" +"T1059.001","PowerShell","Execution","Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda" +"T1567","Exfiltration Over Web Service","Exfiltration","APT28" +"T1497.003","Time Based Evasion","Defense Evasion|Discovery","no" +"T1497.002","User Activity Based Checks","Defense Evasion|Discovery","Darkhotel|FIN7" +"T1497.001","System Checks","Defense Evasion|Discovery","Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein" +"T1498.002","Reflection Amplification","Impact","no" +"T1498.001","Direct Network Flood","Impact","no" +"T1566.003","Spearphishing via Service","Initial Access","Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal" +"T1566.002","Spearphishing Link","Initial Access","Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|Elderwood|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound" +"T1566.001","Spearphishing Attachment","Initial Access","Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Lazarus Group|OilRig|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|TA459|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|APT37|menuPass|PLATINUM" +"T1566","Phishing","Initial Access","GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly" +"T1565.003","Runtime Data Manipulation","Impact","APT38" +"T1565.002","Transmitted Data Manipulation","Impact","APT38" +"T1565.001","Stored Data Manipulation","Impact","FIN4|APT38" +"T1565","Data Manipulation","Impact","no" +"T1564.001","Hidden Files and Directories","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28" +"T1564","Hide Artifacts","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1563.002","RDP Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1563.001","SSH Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1563","Remote Service Session Hijacking","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1518.001","Security Software Discovery","Discovery","Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon" +"T1069.003","Cloud Groups","Discovery","no" +"T1069.002","Domain Groups","Discovery","Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang" +"T1087.004","Cloud Account","Discovery","no" +"T1087.003","Email Account","Discovery","Sandworm Team|TA505" +"T1087.002","Domain Account","Discovery","MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang" +"T1087.001","Local Account","Discovery","Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338" +"T1553.004","Install Root Certificate","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1562.004","Disable or Modify System Firewall","Defense Evasion","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak" +"T1562.003","Impair Command History Logging","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1562.002","Disable Windows Event Logging","Defense Evasion","APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390" +"T1562.001","Disable or Modify Tools","Defense Evasion","APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda" +"T1562","Impair Defenses","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1003.004","LSA Secrets","Credential Access","OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390" +"T1003.005","Cached Domain Credentials","Credential Access","OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33" +"T1561.002","Disk Structure Wipe","Impact","Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37" +"T1561.001","Disk Content Wipe","Impact","Lazarus Group" +"T1561","Disk Wipe","Impact","no" +"T1560.003","Archive via Custom Method","Collection","Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6" +"T1560.002","Archive via Library","Collection","Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390" +"T1560.001","Archive via Utility","Collection","APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang" +"T1560","Archive Collected Data","Collection","menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang" +"T1499.004","Application or System Exploitation","Impact","no" +"T1499.003","Application Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1499.002","Service Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1499.001","OS Exhaustion Flood","Impact","no" +"T1491.002","External Defacement","Impact","Sandworm Team" +"T1491.001","Internal Defacement","Impact","Lazarus Group" +"T1114.003","Email Forwarding Rule","Collection","Silent Librarian|Kimsuky" +"T1114.002","Remote Email Collection","Collection","APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang" +"T1114.001","Local Email Collection","Collection","Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1" +"T1134.005","SID-History Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.004","Parent PID Spoofing","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.003","Make and Impersonate Token","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1134.002","Create Process with Token","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Turla|Lazarus Group" +"T1134.001","Token Impersonation/Theft","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","APT28" +"T1213.002","Sharepoint","Collection","Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28" +"T1213.001","Confluence","Collection","no" +"T1555.003","Credentials from Web Browsers","Credential Access","Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats" +"T1555.002","Securityd Memory","Credential Access","no" +"T1555.001","Keychain","Credential Access","no" +"T1559.002","Dynamic Data Exchange","Execution","Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7" +"T1559.001","Component Object Model","Execution","Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater" +"T1559","Inter-Process Communication","Execution","no" +"T1558.002","Silver Ticket","Credential Access","no" +"T1558.001","Golden Ticket","Credential Access","Ke3chang" +"T1558","Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets","Credential Access","no" +"T1557.001","LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay","Credential Access|Collection","Wizard Spider" +"T1557","Man-in-the-Middle","Credential Access|Collection","Kimsuky" +"T1556.002","Password Filter DLL","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","Strider" +"T1556.001","Domain Controller Authentication","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","Chimera" +"T1556","Modify Authentication Process","Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1056.004","Credential API Hooking","Collection|Credential Access","PLATINUM" +"T1056.003","Web Portal Capture","Collection|Credential Access","no" +"T1056.002","GUI Input Capture","Collection|Credential Access","FIN4" +"T1056.001","Keylogging","Collection|Credential Access","Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28" +"T1555","Credentials from Password Stores","Credential Access","APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon" +"T1552.005","Cloud Instance Metadata API","Credential Access","no" +"T1003.008","/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow","Credential Access","no" +"T1003.007","Proc Filesystem","Credential Access","no" +"T1003.006","DCSync","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao" +"T1558.003","Kerberoasting","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider" +"T1552.006","Group Policy Preferences","Credential Access","APT33" +"T1003.003","NTDS","Credential Access","Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1003.002","Security Account Manager","Credential Access","Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass" +"T1003.001","LSASS Memory","Credential Access","HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver" +"T1110.004","Credential Stuffing","Credential Access","Chimera" +"T1110.003","Password Spraying","Credential Access","Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group" +"T1110.002","Password Cracking","Credential Access","FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3" +"T1110.001","Password Guessing","Credential Access","APT28" +"T1021.006","Windows Remote Management","Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390" +"T1021.005","VNC","Lateral Movement","Fox Kitten|GCMAN" +"T1021.004","SSH","Lateral Movement","Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN" +"T1021.003","Distributed Component Object Model","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1021.002","SMB/Windows Admin Shares","Lateral Movement","Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang" +"T1021.001","Remote Desktop Protocol","Lateral Movement","Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom" +"T1554","Compromise Client Software Binary","Persistence","no" +"T1036.006","Space after Filename","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1036.005","Match Legitimate Name or Location","Defense Evasion","APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1" +"T1036.004","Masquerade Task or Service","Defense Evasion","ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7" +"T1036.003","Rename System Utilities","Defense Evasion","menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM" +"T1036.002","Right-to-Left Override","Defense Evasion","BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic" +"T1036.001","Invalid Code Signature","Defense Evasion","Windshift|APT37" +"T1553.003","SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1553.002","Code Signing","Defense Evasion","APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel" +"T1553.001","Gatekeeper Bypass","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1553","Subvert Trust Controls","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1027.003","Steganography","Defense Evasion","TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37" +"T1027.002","Software Packing","Defense Evasion","ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon" +"T1027.001","Binary Padding","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee" +"T1222.002","Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","Rocke|APT32" +"T1222.001","Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","Wizard Spider" +"T1552.004","Private Keys","Credential Access","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke" +"T1552.003","Bash History","Credential Access","no" +"T1552.002","Credentials in Registry","Credential Access","APT32" +"T1552.001","Credentials In Files","Credential Access","Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3" +"T1552","Unsecured Credentials","Credential Access","no" +"T1216.001","PubPrn","Defense Evasion","APT32" +"T1070.006","Timestomp","Defense Evasion","APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28" +"T1070.005","Network Share Connection Removal","Defense Evasion","Threat Group-3390" +"T1070.004","File Deletion","Defense Evasion","APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29" +"T1070.003","Clear Command History","Defense Evasion","APT41" +"T1550.004","Web Session Cookie","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1550.001","Application Access Token","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT28" +"T1550.003","Pass the Ticket","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29" +"T1550.002","Pass the Hash","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1" +"T1550","Use Alternate Authentication Material","Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1548.004","Elevated Execution with Prompt","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548.003","Sudo and Sudo Caching","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548.002","Bypass User Account Control","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29" +"T1548.001","Setuid and Setgid","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1548","Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism","Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1136.003","Cloud Account","Persistence","no" +"T1070.002","Clear Linux or Mac System Logs","Defense Evasion","Rocke" +"T1070.001","Clear Windows Event Logs","Defense Evasion","Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28" +"T1136.002","Domain Account","Persistence","HAFNIUM|GALLIUM" +"T1136.001","Local Account","Persistence","Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3" +"T1547.011","Plist Modification","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.010","Port Monitors","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.009","Shortcut Modification","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan" +"T1547.008","LSASS Driver","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.007","Re-opened Applications","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.006","Kernel Modules and Extensions","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1547.005","Security Support Provider","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Lazarus Group" +"T1547.004","Winlogon Helper DLL","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla" +"T1547.003","Time Providers","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546.014","Emond","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.013","PowerShell Profile","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Turla" +"T1546.012","Image File Execution Options Injection","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","TEMP.Veles" +"T1218.008","Odbcconf","Defense Evasion","Cobalt Group" +"T1546.011","Application Shimming","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","FIN7" +"T1547.002","Authentication Package","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546.010","AppInit DLLs","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","APT39" +"T1546.009","AppCert DLLs","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Honeybee" +"T1218.007","Msiexec","Defense Evasion","ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor" +"T1546.008","Accessibility Features","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom" +"T1546.007","Netsh Helper DLL","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.006","LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.005","Trap","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.004","Unix Shell Configuration Modification","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.003","Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29" +"T1546.002","Screensaver","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1546.001","Change Default File Association","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","Kimsuky" +"T1547.001","Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|MuddyWater|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel" +"T1218.002","Control Panel","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1218.010","Regsvr32","Defense Evasion","TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda" +"T1218.009","Regsvcs/Regasm","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1218.005","Mshta","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7" +"T1218.004","InstallUtil","Defense Evasion","Mustang Panda|menuPass" +"T1218.001","Compiled HTML File","Defense Evasion","APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig" +"T1218.003","CMSTP","Defense Evasion","Cobalt Group|MuddyWater" +"T1218.011","Rundll32","Defense Evasion","HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28" +"T1547","Boot or Logon Autostart Execution","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1546","Event Triggered Execution","Privilege Escalation|Persistence","no" +"T1098.003","Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role","Persistence","no" +"T1098.002","Exchange Email Delegate Permissions","Persistence","APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound" +"T1098.001","Additional Cloud Credentials","Persistence","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1543.004","Launch Daemon","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1543.003","Windows Service","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak" +"T1543.002","Systemd Service","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Rocke" +"T1543.001","Launch Agent","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.005","Startup Items","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.004","RC Scripts","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.012","Process Hollowing","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork" +"T1055.013","Process Doppelgänging","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Leafminer" +"T1055.011","Extra Window Memory Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.014","VDSO Hijacking","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.009","Proc Memory","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.008","Ptrace System Calls","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.005","Thread Local Storage","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.004","Asynchronous Procedure Call","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.003","Thread Execution Hijacking","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1055.002","Portable Executable Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Rocke|Gorgon Group" +"T1055.001","Dynamic-link Library Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda" +"T1037.003","Network Logon Script","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1543","Create or Modify System Process","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.002","Logon Script (Mac)","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1037.001","Logon Script (Windows)","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Cobalt Group|APT28" +"T1542.003","Bootkit","Persistence|Defense Evasion","APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28" +"T1542.002","Component Firmware","Persistence|Defense Evasion","Equation" +"T1542.001","System Firmware","Persistence|Defense Evasion","no" +"T1505.003","Web Shell","Persistence","Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda" +"T1505.002","Transport Agent","Persistence","no" +"T1505.001","SQL Stored Procedures","Persistence","no" +"T1053.003","Cron","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Rocke" +"T1053.004","Launchd","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1053.001","At (Linux)","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1053.005","Scheduled Task","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29" +"T1053.002","At (Windows)","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18" +"T1542","Pre-OS Boot","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1137.001","Office Template Macros","Persistence","MuddyWater" +"T1137.004","Outlook Home Page","Persistence","OilRig" +"T1137.003","Outlook Forms","Persistence","no" +"T1137.005","Outlook Rules","Persistence","no" +"T1137.006","Add-ins","Persistence","Naikon" +"T1137.002","Office Test","Persistence","APT28" +"T1531","Account Access Removal","Impact","no" +"T1539","Steal Web Session Cookie","Credential Access","Evilnum" +"T1529","System Shutdown/Reboot","Impact","Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37" +"T1518","Software Discovery","Discovery","Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception" +"T1547.013","XDG Autostart Entries","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1534","Internal Spearphishing","Lateral Movement","Gamaredon Group" +"T1528","Steal Application Access Token","Credential Access","APT28" +"T1535","Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1525","Implant Internal Image","Persistence","no" +"T1538","Cloud Service Dashboard","Discovery","no" +"T1530","Data from Cloud Storage Object","Collection","Fox Kitten" +"T1578","Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1537","Transfer Data to Cloud Account","Exfiltration","no" +"T1526","Cloud Service Discovery","Discovery","no" +"T1505","Server Software Component","Persistence","no" +"T1499","Endpoint Denial of Service","Impact","Sandworm Team" +"T1497","Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion","Defense Evasion|Discovery","Darkhotel" +"T1498","Network Denial of Service","Impact","APT28" +"T1496","Resource Hijacking","Impact","Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group" +"T1495","Firmware Corruption","Impact","no" +"T1491","Defacement","Impact","no" +"T1490","Inhibit System Recovery","Impact","no" +"T1489","Service Stop","Impact","Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group" +"T1486","Data Encrypted for Impact","Impact","Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38" +"T1485","Data Destruction","Impact","Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38" +"T1484","Domain Policy Modification","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1482","Domain Trust Discovery","Discovery","APT29|Chimera|UNC2452" +"T1480","Execution Guardrails","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1222","File and Directory Permissions Modification","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1220","XSL Script Processing","Defense Evasion","Higaisa|Cobalt Group" +"T1221","Template Injection","Defense Evasion","Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus" +"T1189","Drive-by Compromise","Initial Access","Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM" +"T1190","Exploit Public-Facing Application","Initial Access","Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom" +"T1210","Exploitation of Remote Services","Lateral Movement","Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1217","Browser Bookmark Discovery","Discovery","Chimera|Fox Kitten" +"T1213","Data from Information Repositories","Collection","Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla" +"T1197","BITS Jobs","Defense Evasion|Persistence","APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan" +"T1219","Remote Access Software","Command And Control","Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak" +"T1195","Supply Chain Compromise","Initial Access","no" +"T1204","User Execution","Execution","no" +"T1212","Exploitation for Credential Access","Credential Access","no" +"T1211","Exploitation for Defense Evasion","Defense Evasion","APT28" +"T1200","Hardware Additions","Initial Access","DarkVishnya" +"T1202","Indirect Command Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1201","Password Policy Discovery","Discovery","Chimera|Turla|OilRig" +"T1207","Rogue Domain Controller","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1203","Exploitation for Client Execution","Execution","Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|APT29|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood" +"T1216","Signed Script Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1199","Trusted Relationship","Initial Access","Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass" +"T1218","Signed Binary Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1205","Traffic Signaling","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control","no" +"T1176","Browser Extensions","Persistence","Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil" +"T1175","Component Object Model and Distributed COM","Lateral Movement|Execution","no" +"T1187","Forced Authentication","Credential Access","DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1185","Man in the Browser","Collection","no" +"T1149","LC_MAIN Hijacking","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1134","Access Token Manipulation","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","FIN6|Blue Mockingbird" +"T1136","Create Account","Persistence","no" +"T1137","Office Application Startup","Persistence","Gamaredon Group|APT32" +"T1140","Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information","Defense Evasion","APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER" +"T1135","Network Share Discovery","Discovery","Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug" +"T1153","Source","Execution","no" +"T1133","External Remote Services","Persistence|Initial Access","APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18" +"T1132","Data Encoding","Command And Control","no" +"T1129","Shared Modules","Execution","no" +"T1127","Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1125","Video Capture","Collection","Silence|FIN7" +"T1124","System Time Discovery","Discovery","Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla" +"T1123","Audio Capture","Collection","APT37" +"T1120","Peripheral Device Discovery","Discovery","Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28" +"T1119","Automated Collection","Collection","Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6" +"T1115","Clipboard Data","Collection","Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38" +"T1114","Email Collection","Collection","Silent Librarian" +"T1113","Screen Capture","Collection","GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28" +"T1112","Modify Registry","Defense Evasion","Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|FIN8" +"T1111","Two-Factor Authentication Interception","Credential Access","Chimera|Operation Wocao" +"T1110","Brute Force","Credential Access","APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla" +"T1108","Redundant Access","Defense Evasion|Persistence","no" +"T1106","Native API","Execution","Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group" +"T1105","Ingress Tool Transfer","Command And Control","HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Turla|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28" +"T1104","Multi-Stage Channels","Command And Control","APT41|MuddyWater|APT3" +"T1102","Web Service","Command And Control","Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6" +"T1098","Account Manipulation","Persistence","APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group" +"T1095","Non-Application Layer Protocol","Command And Control","HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3" +"T1092","Communication Through Removable Media","Command And Control","APT28" +"T1091","Replication Through Removable Media","Lateral Movement|Initial Access","Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28" +"T1090","Proxy","Command And Control","Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla" +"T1087","Account Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1083","File and Directory Discovery","Discovery","APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1082","System Information Discovery","Discovery","APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|APT19|Honeybee|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1080","Taint Shared Content","Lateral Movement","Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel" +"T1078","Valid Accounts","Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access","APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|FIN10|APT28|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak" +"T1074","Data Staged","Collection","Wizard Spider" +"T1072","Software Deployment Tools","Execution|Lateral Movement","Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314" +"T1071","Application Layer Protocol","Command And Control","Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1070","Indicator Removal on Host","Defense Evasion","APT29|UNC2452" +"T1069","Permission Groups Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3" +"T1068","Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","Privilege Escalation","ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28" +"T1064","Scripting","Defense Evasion|Execution","no" +"T1062","Hypervisor","Persistence","no" +"T1061","Graphical User Interface","Execution","no" +"T1059","Command and Scripting Interpreter","Execution","Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang" +"T1057","Process Discovery","Discovery","APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang" +"T1056","Input Capture","Collection|Credential Access","APT39" +"T1055","Process Injection","Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation","Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM" +"T1053","Scheduled Task/Job","Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1052","Exfiltration Over Physical Medium","Exfiltration","no" +"T1051","Shared Webroot","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1049","System Network Connections Discovery","Discovery","Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1048","Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol","Exfiltration","no" +"T1047","Windows Management Instrumentation","Execution","Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda" +"T1046","Network Service Scanning","Discovery","Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390" +"T1043","Commonly Used Port","Command And Control","OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390" +"T1041","Exfiltration Over C2 Channel","Exfiltration","ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang" +"T1040","Network Sniffing","Credential Access|Discovery","Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28" +"T1039","Data from Network Shared Drive","Collection","Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass" +"T1037","Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","Rocke" +"T1036","Masquerading","Defense Evasion","APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0" +"T1034","Path Interception","Persistence|Privilege Escalation","no" +"T1033","System Owner/User Discovery","Discovery","Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3" +"T1030","Data Transfer Size Limits","Exfiltration","Threat Group-3390" +"T1029","Scheduled Transfer","Exfiltration","Higaisa" +"T1027","Obfuscated Files or Information","Defense Evasion","APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|menuPass|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|MuddyWater|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28" +"T1026","Multiband Communication","Command And Control","Lazarus Group" +"T1025","Data from Removable Media","Collection","Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28" +"T1021","Remote Services","Lateral Movement","no" +"T1020","Automated Exfiltration","Exfiltration","Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee" +"T1018","Remote System Discovery","Discovery","APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla" +"T1016","System Network Configuration Discovery","Discovery","ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1014","Rootkit","Defense Evasion","Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group" +"T1012","Query Registry","Discovery","ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla" +"T1011","Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium","Exfiltration","no" +"T1010","Application Window Discovery","Discovery","Lazarus Group" +"T1008","Fallback Channels","Command And Control","Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group" +"T1007","System Service Discovery","Discovery","Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang" +"T1006","Direct Volume Access","Defense Evasion","no" +"T1005","Data from Local System","Collection","APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang" +"T1003","OS Credential Dumping","Credential Access","APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom" +"T1001","Data Obfuscation","Command And Control","Operation Wocao|Axiom" diff --git a/dist/saaws/default/analytic_stories.conf b/dist/saaws/default/analytic_stories.conf index f16b4fc489..0cfdca344c 100644 --- a/dist/saaws/default/analytic_stories.conf +++ b/dist/saaws/default/analytic_stories.conf @@ -1,240 +1,2 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:24 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -[AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-03-08 -modification_date = 2021-03-08 -id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1078.004", "T1098", "T1110", "T1136.003", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS Network ACL Activity] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-05-21 -modification_date = 2018-05-21 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[AWS Security Hub Alerts] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-08-04 -modification_date = 2020-08-04 -id = 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Cloud Cryptomining] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2019-10-02 -modification_date = 2019-10-02 -id = 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ -Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ -When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ -This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2021-01-26 -modification_date = 2021-01-26 -id = cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d -version = 1 -reference = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule"] -mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136.003", "T1556"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Office 365 Detections] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-12-16 -modification_date = 2020-12-16 -id = 1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective", "Actions on Objectives", "Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1114", "T1114.002", "T1114.003", "T1136.003", "T1556", "T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Ransomware Cloud] -category = Malware -creation_date = 2020-10-27 -modification_date = 2020-10-27 -id = f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"] -mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious AWS Login Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2019-05-01 -modification_date = 2019-05-01 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = ["Authentication"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-07-24 -modification_date = 2018-07-24 -id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 -version = 2 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -support_searches = [] -data_models = [] -providing_technologies = none -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ -Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ -Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-06-04 -modification_date = 2020-06-04 -id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c -version = 1 -reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"] -data_models = ["Authentication"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ -This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-08-25 -modification_date = 2020-08-25 -id = 8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1537"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2018-08-20 -modification_date = 2018-08-20 -id = 51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = [] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ -This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -[Suspicious Cloud User Activities] -category = Cloud Security -creation_date = 2020-09-04 -modification_date = 2020-09-04 -id = 1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39 -version = 1 -reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004", "T1580"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update"] -data_models = ["Change"] -providing_technologies = none -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. -product = ['Splunk Security Analytics for AWS', 'Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud'] - -#### END STORIES #### \ No newline at end of file +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf b/dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf index 7ac842ddca..0cfdca344c 100644 --- a/dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf +++ b/dist/saaws/default/use_case_library.conf @@ -1,804 +1,2 @@ -############# -# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2021-09-27T18:20:24 UTC -# Author: Splunk Security Research -# Contact: research@splunk.com -############# - -### STORIES ### - -[analytic_story://AWS IAM Privilege Escalation] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-03-08 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"] -description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation. -narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\ -However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunk’s research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. \ - -[analytic_story://AWS Network ACL Activity] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-05-21 -version = 2 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. -narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. - -[analytic_story://AWS Security Hub Alerts] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS -narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Cryptomining] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-10-02 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. -narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ -Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ -When malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated. \ -This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Cloud Federated Credential Abuse] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2021-01-26 -version = 1 -references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule"] -description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements. -narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches. - -[analytic_story://Office 365 Detections] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-12-16 -version = 1 -references = ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"] -description = This story is focused around detecting Office 365 Attacks. -narrative = More and more companies are using Microsofts Office 365 cloud offering. Therefore, we see more and more attacks against Office 365. This story provides various detections for Office 365 attacks. - -[analytic_story://Ransomware Cloud] -category = Malware -last_updated = 2020-10-27 -version = 1 -references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"] -maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"] -description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features. -narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS Login Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2019-05-01 -version = 1 -references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious AWS S3 Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-07-24 -version = 2 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"] -description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. -narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ -Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ -Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfamiliar users. Some of the searches in this Analytic Story help you detect suspicious behavior and others help you investigate more deeply, when the situation warrants. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-06-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. -narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ -This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-08-25 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2018-08-20 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"] -description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment. -narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\ -This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. - -[analytic_story://Suspicious Cloud User Activities] -category = Cloud Security -last_updated = 2020-09-04 -version = 1 -references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] -maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] -spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"] -description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments. -narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ -In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage. - -### END STORIES ### - -### DETECTIONS ### - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]} -known_false_positives = bucket with S3 encryption -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`. Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = -confidence = medium -explanation = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner. -how_to_implement = The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS Cloudtrail logs. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098"]} -known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege). -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS, version 4.4.0 or later, and configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your AWS CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Federated Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Federated Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1078"]} -known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Account -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched` to create the probability density function. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs. You also must run the baseline search `Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User` to create the probability density function model. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -known_false_positives = -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for new commands from each user role. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial` to build the initial table of user roles, commands, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = . -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances being created with previously unseen image IDs. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial` to build the initial table of images observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire. Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = Find EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial` to build the initial table of instance types observed and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -how_to_implement = This search has a dependency on other searches to create and update a baseline of users observed to be associated with this activity. The search "Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update" should be enabled for this detection to properly work. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something. -how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can adjust the time window for this search by updating the `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window` macro. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ - This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in AWS CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli. -how_to_implement = -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = S3 Bucket -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = AWS Instance -confidence = medium -explanation = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Security Hub inputs. The threshold_value should be tuned to your environment and schedule these searches according to the bucket span interval. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.DP"]} -known_false_positives = None -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect shared ec2 snapshot - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = EC2 Snapshot -confidence = medium -explanation = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} -known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about an specific event related to its creation. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trusted IPs to bypass multi factor authentication. Attackers are often known to use this technique so that they can bypass the MFA system. -how_to_implement = You must install Splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what entitiy performed the action and against what user -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Not Applicable"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"]} -known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"]} -known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"]} -known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objective"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"]} -known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mailbox. This is usually only assigned to a service account. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = Service Accounts -providing_technologies = [] - -[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule] -type = detection -asset_type = Office 365 -confidence = medium -explanation = This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same destination. -how_to_implement = You must install splunk Microsoft Office 365 add-on. This search works with o365:management:activity -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} -known_false_positives = unknown -providing_technologies = [] - -### END DETECTIONS ### - -### RESPONSE TASKS ### - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task] -type = investigation -explanation = none -how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -known_false_positives = not defined -earliest_time_offset = 14400 -latest_time_offset = 0 - -### END RESPONSE TASKS ### +### Deprecated since ESCU UI was deprecated and this conf file is no longer in use +### Using one single file analyticstories.conf that will be used both by ES and ESCU \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_pages/ooo.md b/docs/_pages/ooo.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..357fcce059 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_pages/ooo.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +--- +permalink: /ooo/ +title: "OOO" +author_profile: false +layout: single +--- + +![ooo](https://media.giphy.com/media/lPuW5AlR9AeWzSsIqi/giphy.gif) diff --git a/docs/_pages/tag-archive.md b/docs/_pages/tag-archive.md index 3f4e3f0df8..5ca11a1c55 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/tag-archive.md +++ b/docs/_pages/tag-archive.md @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ title: "Posts by Tag" permalink: /tags/ layout: tags -author_profile: true +author_profile: false --- diff --git a/docs/mitre-map/priority.png b/docs/mitre-map/priority.png deleted file mode 100644 index 6622f39206..0000000000 Binary files a/docs/mitre-map/priority.png and /dev/null differ diff --git a/docs/spec/baselines.md b/docs/spec/baselines.md deleted file mode 100644 index ca84a410ca..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/baselines.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,308 +0,0 @@ -# Baseline Schema Schema - -```txt -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for baselines - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | -| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [baselines.spec.json](../../spec/baselines.spec.json "open original schema") | - -## Baseline Schema Type - -`object` ([Baseline Schema](baselines.md)) - -# Baseline Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | -| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | -| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | -| [how_to_implement](#how_to_implement) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") | -| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | -| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | -| [search](#search) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | -| [datamodel](#datamodel) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-datamodel.md "#/properties/datamodel#/properties/datamodel") | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | -| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | - -## author - -Author of the baseline - -`author` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") - -### author Type - -`string` - -### author Examples - -```yaml -Bahvin Patel, Splunk - -``` - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") - -### date Type - -`string` - -### date Examples - -```yaml -'2019-12-06' - -``` - -## description - -A detailed description of the baseline - -`description` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") - -### description Type - -`string` - -### description Examples - -```yaml ->- - This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and - creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) - we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the - last 30 days - -``` - -## how_to_implement - -information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations. - -`how_to_implement` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-how_to_implement.md "#/properties/how_to_implement#/properties/how_to_implement") - -### how_to_implement Type - -`string` - -### how_to_implement Examples - -```yaml ->- - This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes - EventCode 10 for lsass.exe. - -``` - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") - -### id Type - -`string` - -### id Examples - -```yaml -fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63 - -``` - -## name - - - -`name` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") - -### name Type - -`string` ([Name of baseline](baselines-properties-name-of-baseline.md)) - -### name Examples - -```yaml -Previously Seen AWS Regions - -``` - -## search - -The Splunk search for the baseline - -`search` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-search.md "#/properties/search#/properties/search") - -### search Type - -`string` - -### search Examples - -```yaml ->- - cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as - latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv - -``` - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is required - -* Type: `object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") - -### tags Type - -`object` ([Details](baselines-properties-tags.md)) - -### tags Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. - -### tags Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### tags Examples - -```yaml -analytic_story: suspicious_aws_ec2_activities -custom_key: custom_value - -``` - -## datamodel - -datamodel used in the search - -`datamodel` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string[]` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-datamodel.md "#/properties/datamodel#/properties/datamodel") - -### datamodel Type - -`string[]` - -### datamodel Examples - -```yaml -Endpoint - -``` - -## version - -version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is required - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Baseline Schema](baselines-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") - -### version Type - -`integer` - -### version Examples - -```yaml -1 - -``` - -## Additional Properties - -Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md b/docs/spec/response_tasks.md deleted file mode 100644 index de3298f7e4..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/response_tasks.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,395 +0,0 @@ -# Response Schema Schema - -```txt -https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json -``` - -schema for response task - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | -| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [response_tasks.spec.json](../../spec/response_tasks.spec.json "open original schema") | - -## Response Schema Type - -`object` ([Response Schema](response_tasks.md)) - -## Response Schema Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -# Response Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -| :-------------------------- | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | -| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | -| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | -| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | -| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | -| [sla](#sla) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") | -| [sla_type](#sla_type) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") | -| [automation](#automation) | `object` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation") | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | -| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | -| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | - -## author - -Author of the response task - -`author` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") - -### author Type - -`string` - -### author Examples - -```yaml -ButterCup, Splunk - -``` - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") - -### date Type - -`string` - -### date Examples - -```yaml -'2019-12-06' - -``` - -## description - -Description of response task - -`description` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") - -### description Type - -`string` - -### description Examples - -```yaml -Response example. - -``` - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") - -### id Type - -`string` - -### id Examples - -```yaml -fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 - -``` - -## name - -Name of response task - -`name` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") - -### name Type - -`string` - -### name Examples - -```yaml -Response Example - -``` - -## sla - -Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase - -`sla` - -* is optional - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") - -### sla Type - -`integer` - -### sla Examples - -```yaml -5 - -``` - -```yaml -30 - -``` - -## sla_type - -Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc) - -`sla_type` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") - -### sla_type Type - -`string` - -### sla_type Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -"minutes" -``` - -### sla_type Examples - -```yaml -minutes - -``` - -```yaml -hours - -``` - -```yaml -days - -``` - -## automation - -An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks - -`automation` - -* is optional - -* Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-automation.md "#/properties/automation#/properties/automation") - -### automation Type - -`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-automation.md)) - -### automation Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. - -### automation Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{ - "is_note_required": false, - "sla_type": "minutes", - "sla": "", - "role": "", - "action": [], - "playbooks": [] -} -``` - -### automation Examples - -```yaml -is_note_required: false -sla_type: minutes -sla: 30 -action: - - run_query -playbooks: - - scm: local - playbook: automate something - - scm: local - playbook: automate something else - -``` - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is required - -* Type: `object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") - -### tags Type - -`object` ([Details](response_tasks-properties-tags.md)) - -### tags Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. - -### tags Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### tags Examples - -```yaml -analytic_story: credential_dumping - -``` - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is required - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") - -### version Type - -`integer` - -### version Examples - -```yaml -1 - -``` - -## references - -A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) - -`references` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](response_tasks-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") - -### references Type - -`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](response_tasks-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) - -### references Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -[] -``` - -### references Examples - -```yaml -- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148 -- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - -``` - -## Additional Properties - -Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/responses.md b/docs/spec/responses.md deleted file mode 100644 index 59068b91a7..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/responses.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,340 +0,0 @@ -# Response Schema Schema - -```txt -https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json -``` - -schema for response - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | -| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses.spec.json](../../spec/responses.spec.json "open original schema") | - -## Response Schema Type - -`object` ([Response Schema](responses.md)) - -## Response Schema Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -# Response Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -| :------------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | -| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | -| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | -| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | -| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | -| [response_phase](#response_phase) | `array` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase") | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | -| [is_note_required](#is_note_required) | `boolean` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required") | -| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | -| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | - -## author - -Author of the response - -`author` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") - -### author Type - -`string` - -### author Examples - -```yaml -Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk - -``` - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") - -### date Type - -`string` - -### date Examples - -```yaml -'2019-12-06' - -``` - -## description - -Description of response - -`description` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") - -### description Type - -`string` - -### description Examples - -```yaml -Response example. - -``` - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") - -### id Type - -`string` - -### id Examples - -```yaml -fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 - -``` - -## name - -Name of response - -`name` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") - -### name Type - -`string` - -### name Examples - -```yaml -Response Example - -``` - -## response_phase - -Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters - -`response_phase` - -* is required - -* Type: `array` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-response_phase.md "#/properties/response_phases#/properties/response_phase") - -### response_phase Type - -`array` - -### response_phase Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -### response_phase Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### response_phase Examples - -```yaml -preparation: - - id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b - name: Preparation NIST -identification: - - id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 - name: Detection and Analysis - - id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 - name: Analysis - -``` - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is required - -* Type: `object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") - -### tags Type - -`object` ([Details](responses-properties-tags.md)) - -### tags Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. - -### tags Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### tags Examples - -```yaml -analytic_story: credential_dumping - -``` - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is required - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") - -### version Type - -`integer` - -### version Examples - -```yaml -1 - -``` - -## is_note_required - -Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task - -`is_note_required` - -* is optional - -* Type: `boolean` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-is_note_required.md "#/properties/is_note_required#/properties/is_note_required") - -### is_note_required Type - -`boolean` - -### is_note_required Examples - -```yaml -true - -``` - -```yaml -false - -``` - -## references - -A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) - -`references` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") - -### references Type - -`string[]` ([Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon](responses-properties-references-blue-team-handbook-by-don-murdoch---amazon.md)) - -### references Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -[] -``` - -### references Examples - -```yaml -- Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148 -- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - -``` - -## Additional Properties - -Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md b/docs/spec/responses_phase.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0d98bfc963..0000000000 --- a/docs/spec/responses_phase.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,389 +0,0 @@ -# Response Schema Schema - -```txt -http://example.com/example.json -``` - -schema for phase - -| Abstract | Extensible | Status | Identifiable | Custom Properties | Additional Properties | Access Restrictions | Defined In | -| :------------------ | :--------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| Can be instantiated | No | Unknown status | No | Forbidden | Allowed | none | [responses_phase.spec.json](../../spec/responses_phase.spec.json "open original schema") | - -## Response Schema Type - -`object` ([Response Schema](responses_phase.md)) - -## Response Schema Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -# Response Schema Properties - -| Property | Type | Required | Nullable | Defined by | -| :------------------------------ | :-------- | :------- | :------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| [author](#author) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") | -| [date](#date) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") | -| [description](#description) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") | -| [id](#id) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") | -| [name](#name) | `string` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") | -| [response_task](#response_task) | `array` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task") | -| [tags](#tags) | `object` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") | -| [version](#version) | `integer` | Required | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") | -| [sla](#sla) | `integer` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") | -| [sla_type](#sla_type) | `string` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") | -| [references](#references) | `array` | Optional | cannot be null | [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") | -| Additional Properties | Any | Optional | can be null | | - -## author - -Author of the phase - -`author` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-author.md "#/properties/author#/properties/author") - -### author Type - -`string` - -### author Examples - -```yaml -Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk - -``` - -## date - -date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd - -`date` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-date.md "#/properties/date#/properties/date") - -### date Type - -`string` - -### date Examples - -```yaml -'2019-12-06' - -``` - -## description - -Description of phase - -`description` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-description.md "#/properties/description#/properties/description") - -### description Type - -`string` - -### description Examples - -```yaml -Response phase descripion. - -``` - -## id - -UUID as unique identifier - -`id` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-id.md "#/properties/id#/properties/id") - -### id Type - -`string` - -### id Examples - -```yaml -fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717 - -``` - -## name - -Name of phase - -`name` - -* is required - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-name.md "#/properties/name#/properties/name") - -### name Type - -`string` - -### name Examples - -```yaml -Preparation - -``` - -## response_task - -Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name. - -`response_task` - -* is required - -* Type: `array` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-response_task.md "#/properties/response_task#/properties/response_task") - -### response_task Type - -`array` - -### response_task Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -### response_task Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### response_task Examples - -```yaml -id: 7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b -name: Prepare for Incident Handling - -``` - -```yaml -id: c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892 -name: Preventing Incidents - -``` - -```yaml -id: 0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0 -name: Practice - -``` - -## tags - -An array of key value pairs for tagging - -`tags` - -* is required - -* Type: `object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-tags.md "#/properties/tags#/properties/tags") - -### tags Type - -`object` ([Details](responses_phase-properties-tags.md)) - -### tags Constraints - -**minimum number of items**: the minimum number of items for this array is: `1` - -**unique items**: all items in this array must be unique. Duplicates are not allowed. - -### tags Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -{} -``` - -### tags Examples - -```yaml -analytic_story: credential_dumping - -``` - -## version - -version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ... - -`version` - -* is required - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-version.md "#/properties/version#/properties/version") - -### version Type - -`integer` - -### version Examples - -```yaml -1 - -``` - -## sla - -Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase - -`sla` - -* is optional - -* Type: `integer` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla.md "#/properties/sla#/properties/sla") - -### sla Type - -`integer` - -### sla Examples - -```yaml -5 - -``` - -```yaml -30 - -``` - -## sla_type - -Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc) - -`sla_type` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string` - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-sla_type.md "#/properties/sla_type#/properties/sla_type") - -### sla_type Type - -`string` - -### sla_type Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -"minutes" -``` - -### sla_type Examples - -```yaml -minutes - -``` - -```yaml -hours - -``` - -```yaml -days - -``` - -## references - -A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation) - -`references` - -* is optional - -* Type: `string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md)) - -* cannot be null - -* defined in: [Response Schema](responses_phase-properties-references.md "#/properties/references#/properties/references") - -### references Type - -`string[]` ([3.1 Preparation](responses_phase-properties-references-31-preparation.md)) - -### references Default Value - -The default value is: - -```json -[] -``` - -### references Examples - -```yaml -https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - -``` - -## Additional Properties - -Additional properties are allowed and do not have to follow a specific schema diff --git a/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml b/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml index a8be2197b9..daea66234a 100644 --- a/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml +++ b/playbooks/ransomware_investigate_and_contain.yml @@ -21,9 +21,8 @@ tags: detections: - Conti Common Exec parameter platform_tags: - - tag1 - - tag2 - - tag3 + - Ransomware + - Response playbook_fields: - ComputerName - Username diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index a3a1089f22..f5c3904b15 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ toml==0.10.2 tomli==1.2.1 typing==3.7.4.3 tzlocal==3.0 -urllib3==1.26.6 +urllib3==1.26.7 virtualenv==20.7.2 wcwidth==0.2.5 webencodings==0.5.1 diff --git a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml b/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 26ef12572a..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/contain_eradicate_recover.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-07-30' -description: The containment, eradication and recovery phase is for the acquiring, - preserving, securing, and documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate - containment or mititgation of the incident. Eradication is focused on removing any - future threats from vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. - Recovery is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) and customers affected - by the incident. -id: 15442b70-49a1-4e4b-afea-bc1acd63f4bc -name: Containment, Eradication, Recovery -references: -- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c - name: identify_additional_affected_hosts -- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f - name: contain_incident -- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c - name: implement_additional_monitoring -- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 - name: identify_vunlerabilities -- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 - name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities -- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 - name: remove_malicious_content -- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 - name: validate_hosts_eradicated -- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 - name: restore_systems_to_operational_status -- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d - name: validate_restored_hosts -- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae - name: implement_monitoring -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_phases/containment.yml b/response_phases/containment.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 926130eb6f..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/containment.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -date: '2020-07-30' -description: The containment phase is for the acquiring, preserving, securing, and - documenting of evidence that leads to the appropriate containment or mititgation - of the incident. This phase will identify additional hosts and known vulnerabilities - and implememt monitoring of the containment. -id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c -name: Containment -references: -- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c - name: identify_additional_affected_hosts -- id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f - name: contain_incident -- id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c - name: implement_additional_monitoring -- id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 - name: identify_vunlerabilities -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml b/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d5a2f0c88a..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/detection_analysis.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared - violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase - is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing - incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step - instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process - is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. -id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d -name: Detection and Analysis -references: -- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 - name: Determine if an incident has occurred -- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 - name: Analyze precursors to the event -- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 - name: Confirm Incident -- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 - name: Determine incident prioritization -- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a - name: Document and Notify of Incident -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/eradication.yml b/response_phases/eradication.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e2589529d9..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/eradication.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-07-17' -description: The eradication phase is focused on removing any further exposure from - vulnerabiliies, malware or activities that produced the incident. -id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c -name: Eradication -references: -- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 - name: mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities -- id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 - name: remove_malicious_content -- id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 - name: validate_hosts_eradicated -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/identification.yml b/response_phases/identification.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2298d00598..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/identification.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Events are occurances of a systems or systems. Incidents are declared - violations and incidents can occur in countless ways. Detection and analysis phase - is about identifying an event as an incident and properly categorizing and prioritizing - incident notification and documentation. It is infeasible to develop step-by-step - instructions for handling every incident. This generic detection and analysis process - is a template to ensure the right process is being followed. -id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 -name: Identification -references: -- 3.2 Detection and Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 - name: Determine if an incident has occurred -- id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 - name: Analyze precursors to the event -- id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e - name: Analyze host indicator and reputation -- id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 - name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation -- id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 - name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation -- id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 - name: Analyze url indicator and reputation -- id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 - name: Analyze email indicator and reputation -- id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 - name: Confirm Incident -- id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 - name: Determine incident prioritization -- id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a - name: Document and Notify of Incident -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/preparation.yml b/response_phases/preparation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0e2f1fdaa9..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/preparation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Incident response methodologies typically emphasize preparation not only - for establishing an incident response capability so that the organization is ready - to respond to incidents, but also preventing incidents by ensuring that systems, - networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Incident response teams need - to know what they have available and what they need to prepare, aquire or configure - for success within the incident response process. -id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a -name: Preparation NIST -references: -- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 - name: Prepare for Incident Handling -- id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 - name: Preventing Incidents -- id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e - name: Practice Real World Events -- id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 - name: Conduct Training -- id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 - name: Raise Personnel Awareness -- id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 - name: Make Personnel Report Suspicious Activity -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_phases/recovery.yml b/response_phases/recovery.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e449bdf1d9..0000000000 --- a/response_phases/recovery.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-04-21' -description: The recovery phase is the restoration of normal operations for system(s) - and customers affected by the incident. -id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a -references: -- 3.3 Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_task: -- id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 - name: restore_systems_to_operational_status -- id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d - name: validate_restored_hosts -- id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae - name: implement_monitoring -sla: null -sla_type: minutes -tags: - analytic_story: NIST SP 800-61r2 Response Plan - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection -title: Recovery -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml deleted file mode 100644 index aaace4b79f..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/analyze_malicious_file.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Perform a static and dynamic malware analysis for the malicious file. - Use the findings for further response tasks. -id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e -name: Analyze Malicious File -tags: - analytic_story: - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 006d965516..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2018-06-08' -description: This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event - names, and the result of the event for specific ARNs. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs. -id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf891 -inputs: -- src_user -name: AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User -search: '| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath output=user - path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, - awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Cross Account Activity - - Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities - - Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6d1b37b112..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-11-01' -description: This search returns all users that have attempted to access a particular - endpoint. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication - logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model. -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd76 -inputs: -- dest -name: Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint -search: '| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=$dest$ - by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action - | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Account Monitoring and Controls - - Apache Struts Vulnerability - - Brand Monitoring - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - Dynamic DNS - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Host Redirection - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - Router and Infrastructure Security - - SQL Injection - - SamSam Ransomware - - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d0d68ca2e6..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_notable_info.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-09-20' -description: This search queries the notable index to retrieve detailed information - captured within the notable. Every notable has a unique ID associated with it, which - is used to point us directly to the notable event under investigation. -how_to_implement: If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating - notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary. -id: f3fb4d1b-5f33-4b01-b541-c7af9534c242 -inputs: -- event_id -name: Get Notable Info -search: '| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id, - dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Cryptomining - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - AWS User Monitoring - - Account Monitoring and Controls - - Apache Struts Vulnerability - - Asset Tracking - - Brand Monitoring - - Cloud Cryptomining - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - DNS Amplification Attacks - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - Dynamic DNS - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Host Redirection - - JBoss Vulnerability - - Kubernetes Scanning Activity - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Monitor for Updates - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - Router and Infrastructure Security - - SQL Injection - - SamSam Ransomware - - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities - - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability - - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 - - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Use of Cleartext Protocols - - Web Fraud Detection - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - - Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity - - Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity - - F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - - Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350 - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9db3ed5b4c..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_process_registry_activity.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2019-11-06' -description: This search returns the registry activity for a specific process on a - specific endpoint -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint - data and populating the Endpoint data model. -id: d8362a34-b78a-4364-9733-59b505f5b8d5 -inputs: -- process_id -- dest -name: Get Process Registry Activity -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_name) - as registry_key_name, values(Registry.dest) as dest, values(Registry.process_id) - as process_id from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.process_id=$process_id$ - AND Registry.dest=$dest$ by Registry.registry_path, Registry.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` - | sort _time | table _time, process_id, dest, action, registry_key_name, registry_path' -tags: - analytic_story: - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - Suspicious Zoom Child Processes - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e75efdd52f..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_registry_activities.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2019-03-01' -description: This search queries the Endpoint Datamodel to give you details of the - latest registry values for a specific destination computer. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information - on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes - from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` - nodes. -id: fecf2918-670d-4f1c-872b-3d7317a41xf9 -inputs: -- dest -name: Get Registry Activities -search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) - as registry_path values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name count FROM - datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.dest = "$dest$" by Registry.process_id - Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` - count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name - values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes - where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`]' -tags: - analytic_story: - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Ransomware - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml deleted file mode 100644 index f49c32d7c1..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-10-19' -description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk - Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk\_scores, names of the - correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific endpoint(machine\_name) ' -how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security - that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework -id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d65 -inputs: -- dest -name: Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint -search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_object=$dest$ - | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Account Monitoring and Controls - - Apache Struts Vulnerability - - Brand Monitoring - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - DNS Amplification Attacks - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - Dynamic DNS - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Host Redirection - - JBoss Vulnerability - - Kubernetes Scanning Activity - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor Backup Solution - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Monitor for Updates - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - Router and Infrastructure Security - - SQL Injection - - SamSam Ransomware - - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities - - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability - - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Use of Cleartext Protocols - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 79e8da9cde..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_risk_modifiers_for_user.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-10-19' -description: 'For the last 7 days, the search will query the Risk data model in Splunk - Enterprise Security and calculate the count, sum of the risk_scores, names of the - correlation searches that contributed to create a risk score for a specific user ' -how_to_implement: Enable the correlation searches included in Splunk Enterprise Security - that include Risk Analysis alert actions by leveraging the Risk Analysis Framework -id: fdcfb369-1725-4c24-824a-22972d7f0d55 -inputs: -- user -name: Get Risk Modifiers For User -search: '| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_object=$user$ - | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name) min(_time) as firstTime - max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` ' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Account Monitoring and Controls - - Apache Struts Vulnerability - - Brand Monitoring - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - DNS Amplification Attacks - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - Dynamic DNS - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Host Redirection - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor Backup Solution - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - Router and Infrastructure Security - - SamSam Ransomware - - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Use of Cleartext Protocols - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 031ee2d936..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_update_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2017-08-24' -description: This search will tell you give you the update logs for a specific endpoint - for the last week. -how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the update logs from your various systems. -id: d98675ed-da43-4a7e-96a7-eeca3232ba8e -inputs: -- dest -name: Get Update Logs For Endpoint -search: '| from datamodel Updates.Updates | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" - OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$' -tags: - analytic_story: - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml deleted file mode 100644 index f1e9a57e9d..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_user_information_from_identity_table.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-09-20' -description: Gather more information about the user identified in the Notable Event. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must have populated the - identity table with information about your users. -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd74 -inputs: -- user -name: Get User Information from Identity Table -search: '| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last, - email, category, watchlist' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Cryptomining - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Account Monitoring and Controls - - Apache Struts Vulnerability - - Brand Monitoring - - Cloud Cryptomining - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - Dynamic DNS - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Host Redirection - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - Router and Infrastructure Security - - SamSam Ransomware - - Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities - - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities - - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Use of Cleartext Protocols - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6809b901f3..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2017-09-10' -description: This search will show you any vulnerabilities noted for a specific endpoint - for the last week. -how_to_implement: You need to be ingesting the logs from your vulnerability scanner. -id: df7a7f50-30f2-4cde-8448-69d2d5f9b3c5 -inputs: -- dest -name: Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint -search: '| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$' -tags: - analytic_story: - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - JBoss Vulnerability - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware - - Windows Log Manipulation - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 34610db886..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -author: Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk -date: '2020-02-20' -description: This search lists all the users performing a list image operation on - AWS Elastic Container Registry. Listing source user, image id, source IP, user type, - http user agent. This search also gives counts of unique user agents per listing - source. -how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) - and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail - inputs.You must also install Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -id: 6027623f-7d10-4847-af3b-8d7e87970451 -inputs: -- Compute.event_name -name: Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity -search: '|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute - where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.event_name="ListImages" by Compute.image_id - Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.http_user_agent Compute.user_type | rename - "Compute.*" as * |stats values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent distinct_count(http_user_agent) - as unique_ua_count by src_user, image_id, src, user_type | where unique_ua_count - > 1' -tags: - analytic_story: - - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 170faf5739..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2018-03-12' -description: This search returns a logs of events that operated on the compute instance. -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: 33a95cf2-900c-4636-8fca-5c5f71474720 -inputs: -- dest -name: Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities -search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields - - _*' -tags: - analytic_story: - - Cloud Cryptomining - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0644c9022c..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2019-04-30' -description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a - specific cloud user -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: 2ef6310f-8e79-42af-b20b-b4eeaba9608a -inputs: -- region -- src_user -name: Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions -search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ | - fields - _*' -tags: - analytic_story: - - Cloud Cryptomining - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2797127b99..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2019-04-30' -description: This search lists all the logged cloud infrastructure activities by a - specific cloud user in a specific cloud region -how_to_implement: You must be ingesting the approrpiate cloud infrastructure logs - and have the Security Research cloud data model installed. -id: 3dc3a8e7-394b-44ae-8262-4ef8e90b723d -inputs: -- region -- src_user -name: Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region -search: '| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$ - | fields - _*' -tags: - analytic_story: - - Cloud Cryptomining - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 51d0afe0ab..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_host.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2017-11-09' -description: This search allows you to find all the web activity from a specific host. - During an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize - user or host activity. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your - web traffic and populating the Web data model. -id: bc91a8cf-35e7-4bb2-8140-e756cc06fd22 -inputs: -- dest -name: Investigate Web Activity From Host -search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$' -tags: - analytic_story: - - Brand Monitoring - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - Disabling Security Tools - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - JBoss Vulnerability - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious Emails - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1d24aadc57..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -author: David Dorsey, Splunk -date: '2018-06-15' -description: This search searches for all web activity from a specific host. During - an investigation, it is important to profile web activity to characterize user or - host activity. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your - web traffic and populating the web data model. -id: 2f5b960b-71df-49c0-affc-74992ce60e45 -inputs: -- src_ip -name: Investigate Web Activity From src ip -search: '| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$' -tags: - analytic_story: - - ColdRoot MacOS RAT - - Dynamic DNS - - Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 683b30aea7..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/process_chain_analysis.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Analyze the Process Chain and identify the malicious file. By analyzing - the parent process guid and searching for the process guid, the spawning process - chain can be identified. -id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 -inputs: -- process_guid -name: Process Chain Analysis -search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid - process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid - parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid - out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid - = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} - EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid - parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid - | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid - | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS - process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid - out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid - out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid - process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name - | head 1 | fields - count' -tags: - analytic_story: - - AWS Network ACL Activity - - Collection and Staging - - Command and Control - - DHS Report TA18-074A - - Data Protection - - Disabling Security Tools - - 'Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ' - - Hidden Cobra Malware - - Lateral Movement - - Malicious PowerShell - - Monitor for Unauthorized Software - - Netsh Abuse - - Orangeworm Attack Group - - Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns - - Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch - - Ransomware - - SamSam Ransomware - - Suspicious AWS Traffic - - Suspicious Command-Line Executions - - Suspicious DNS Traffic - - Suspicious MSHTA Activity - - Suspicious WMI Use - - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities - - Unusual Processes - - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics - - Windows File Extension and Association Abuse - - Windows Log Manipulation - - Windows Persistence Techniques - - Windows Privilege Escalation - - Windows Service Abuse - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml b/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c34e843dd7..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/deprecated/quarantaine_infected_host.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-04-29' -description: Quarantine the infected hosts in order to stop the malware from spreading - to further hosts. This is a short-term containment with the focus on limiting the - damage as soon as possible. -id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 -name: Quarantaine Infected Host -tags: - analytic_story: - - Ransomware - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml b/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8df22b836f..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/dns_hijack_enrichment.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2019-02-14' -description: 'This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called DNS Hijacking. - It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called "DNS Record - Changed" is used to identify DNS record changes for cloud and corporate domains - used in your environment. The detection search is dependent on a support searched - called "Discover DNS Records" which finds the common DNS responses for the last - 30 days of monitored corporate domains and cloud providers (located in lookups: - cim_corporate_email_domains.csv, cim_corporate_web_domains.csv, and cloud_domains.csv - from Splunk CIM App). These responses are stored under the lookup called discovered_dns_records.csv. - The playbook starts with the changed DNS records and uses MaxMind, whois, Censys, - Malware Domain List, and PassiveTotal to gather attributes of the DNS records for - comparison against expected values. The resulting enrichment is displayed in Mission - Control and posted back to the Notable Event in Splunk ES.' -how_to_implement: 'If Splunk>Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook - called "DNS Hijack Enrichment" can be configured to run when any results are found - by this detection search. The playbook takes in the DNS record changed and uses - Geoip, whois, Censys and PassiveTotal to detect if DNS issuers changed. To use this - integration, install the Phantom App for Splunk `https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3411/`, - add the correct hostname to the "Phantom Instance" field in the Adaptive Response - Actions when configuring this detection search, and set the corresponding Playbook - to active. \ - - (Playbook Link:`https://my.phantom.us/4.2/playbook/dns-hijack-enrichment/`).\ - - ' -id: c096f721-8842-42ce-bfc7-74bd9a72c712 -name: DNS Hijack Enrichment -playbook: - name: dns_hijack_enrichment - url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.json - url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/dns_hijack_enrichment.py -tags: - analytic_story: - - DNS Hijacking - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml b/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9800bdbde0..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/domain_certificate_investigation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -author: Philip Royer, Splunk -date: '2019-04-29' -description: Investigate domain names and URLs of a potentially malicious website. - These domain names and URLs could come from anywhere, but this Playbook was designed - to work with the Splunk Analytic Story focused on evilginx2 phishing techniques - that harvest credentials from fake login sites. The full investigation is only completed - if at least one of the TLS certificates of the domains matches the issuer distinguished - name of Let's Encrypt, which is a free service that provides automatically issued - TLS certificates. This Playbook gathers certificate information for the domains, - queries whois for the domains, takes a screenshot of each of the URLs, and does - a urlscan.io scan of each of the URLs. Finally, all the results are formatted together - and posted to the event comments. -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this phantom playbook, you must integrate - Enterprise Security with Phantom. Configure this playbook in the correlation search - `Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2` ,as an adaptive response - action. -id: c096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8272b712 -name: Domain Certificate Investigation -playbook: - name: lets_encrypt_domain_investigate - url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.json - url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/lets_encrypt_domain_investigate.py -tags: - analytic_story: - - Common Phishing Frameworks - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 diff --git a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml b/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6ee46e3900..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk -date: '2019-02-14' -description: This Playbook is part of the Splunk Analytic Story called Account Monitoring - and Controls. It is made to be run when the Detection Search within that story called - "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint" is used to identify a potential - attack in which multiple Active Directory user accounts are locked out from logging - in because an adversary attempted incorrect credentials repeatedly against many - user accounts. This Playbook runs the Context-gathering and Investigative searches - linked in the Splunk Analytic Story to enrich the event with a broad array of information - about the users and computers involved. Then the Playbook uses Windows Remote Management - to login to the source of the lockouts, gather more information, and allow Phantom - to shutdown the server after prompting an analyst or responder. -how_to_implement: Import playbook into phantom -id: ab62b5c1-95d4-4e71-8fd7-53a55db33da4 -name: Excessive Account Lockouts Enrichment And Response -playbook: - name: excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response - url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.json - url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.6/excessive_account_lockouts_enrichment_and_response.py -tags: - analytic_story: - - Account Monitoring and Controls - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 57228b7eff..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/accept_and_assign_event.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - actions: - - set status - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Accept event and assign owner - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Accepts the event and starts the response plan process by assigning - the event to the person executing the playbook and assigns them to this task and - closes this step as completed. - - ' -id: 667b8d15-2564-4994-929d-bda2532341bf -name: Accept and assign event -references: -- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: 'This task is a default accept task and allows the analyst to start the - response process and start the timer for mean time to detect (MTTD). This allows - measurement of analyst review and acceptance of the task at hand. This can be superceded - by assign other tasks to individuals (if the owner is coordinating processor). The - event owner can accept the event, and then retask other sub-phase and/or task to - other individuals or teams. This is considered a procedural or policy task. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1782b9fccb..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_domain_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - - whois domain - - domain reputation - - hunt domain - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playbook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if - Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? - - ' -id: 7744864c-5446-47ab-8118-4cbaa1649747 -name: Analyze domain indicator and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "These are domains that are not related to urls and should be separately\ - \ reviewed.\n1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\ - \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ - \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ - \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ - \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ - \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ - \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ - \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ - \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ - \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ - \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. hange container and artifact severity\ - \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 91aa34c7c3..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_email_indicators_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - actions: - - run query - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'Validate email indicators existence, reputation, detonation and determine - if Phish, Spam, Suspicious or Clean ? - - Analyst should be reviewing SPF, DKIM, DMARC along with To: and Reply to: fields - for non-matching data. Does the subject contain suspicious content. Is there a file - or url? Does the x-origin-ip come from the same location and the sending domains? - Does the email body seem too good to be true or create a sense of urgency? - - ' -id: 9e2d3e51-2e8f-4d49-8206-fb3e5fbf6620 -name: Analyze email indicators and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ - \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ - \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ - \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ - \ reputation, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a note\ - \ (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators\ - \ and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using search\ - \ engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT,\ - \ Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ - \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ - \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ - \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0bf45a844b..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_host_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - actions: null - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if - Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? - - ' -id: be7cce5c-29b9-405c-923a-d4565705da2e -name: Analyze host indicator and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ - \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ - \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ - \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ - \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ - \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ - \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ - \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ - \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ - \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ - \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ - \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8a1a5982a9..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_ip_address_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - - whois ip - - geolocate ip - - ip reputation - - ip intelligence - - hunt ip - - lookup ip - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Validate indicator existence, reputation, detonation and determine if - Known APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious? - - ' -id: a194130b-f5a8-4bfe-b09f-35f58f4397d5 -name: Analyze IP address indicator and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevalence\ - \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ - \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ - \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ - \ repetitional, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ - \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ - \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ - \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ - \ APT, Commodity, Suspicious or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ - \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ - \ Suspicious = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. Change container and artifact severity\ - \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b437a91635..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_network_indicators_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - - whois ip - - whois domain - - geolocate ip - - ip reputation - - domain reputation - - url reputation - - ip intelligence - - domain intelligence - - url intelligence - - hunt ip - - hunt domain - - hunt url - - detonate url - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if - Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? - - ' -id: 710b1249-88b4-4dfd-95cc-541cc688e1a3 -name: Analyze network indicators and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If Splunk present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence\ - \ in the environment. Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7\ - \ days, 1 month, six months increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor.\ - \ (make an artifact for each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather\ - \ reputational, intelligence and general information regarding indicator into a\ - \ note (a note for each indicator)\n1. Perform any additional research regarding\ - \ indicators and understanding what normal behaviour is or should be by using using\ - \ search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n1. Make a determination of indicator, Known\ - \ APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious and whether to tag to block indicator\n\ - \ a. This should align to a severity change (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med,\ - \ Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n a. hange container and artifact severity\ - \ and tag artifact & indicator(s) with blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6831054fb5..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_precursors_to_the_event.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: null - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed - is normal activity. This analysis is provided by reviewing additional logs and sources - to include ids''s, siem, network logs, host and host application event logs and - vulnerabiltiy information. This is not an exhaustive list, but a summary of the - data available. Data available should be aligned the type of event and resources - available to the customer. - - ' -id: ef9e7a25-73f0-4b63-b43b-2f4171518931 -name: Analyze precursors to the event -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Depending the attack vector, use your siem or logging collector to find - logs regarding the host, application and network connections surrounding the event - detected. - - 2. Identify evidence information that proves the incident occurred as detected or - corraborates the event(s). - - 3. Perform research regarding indicators and understanding what normal behaviour - is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 66015b94a6..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/analyze_url_indicator_and_reputation.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - whois domain - - domain reputation - - url reputation - - domain intelligence - - url intelligence - - hunt domain - - hunt url - - detonate url - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Validate indicator existance, reputation, detonation and determine if - Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious? - - ' -id: 65a23d95-7b5a-405c-b5bf-893983478d35 -name: Analyze url indicator and reputation -references: -- 3.2.3 Sources of Precursors and Indicators - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "This should be TLD domain and url combinations analysis.\n1. If Splunk\ - \ present, run Splunk Query on each indictor and prevelence in the environment.\ - \ Summarize # of times indicator seen in the last 24 hrs, 7 days, 1 month, six months\ - \ increments. Return the hosts that have used this indictor. (make an artifact for\ - \ each host?)\n a. search -> ```| stats ...```\n1. Gather reputational, intelligence\ - \ and general information regarding indicator into a note (a note for each indicator)\n\ - 1. Perform any additional research regarding indicators and understanding what normal\ - \ behaviour is or should be by using using search engines, knowledge bases etc.\n\ - 1. Make a determination of indicator, Known APT, Commodity, Suspicous or Not Malicious\ - \ and whether to tag to block indicator\n a. This should align to a severity change\ - \ (Known APT = High, Commodity = Med, Suspicous = Low, Not Malicious = Info)\n \ - \ a. Change container and artifact severity and tag artifact & indicator(s) with\ - \ blocked and determination tag\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 9f662b994b..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/conduct_training.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: '' - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Take training courses to gain relevant knowledge - Sharpen the saw. -id: df493538-e598-463b-8835-a109022c2968 -name: Conduct training -references: -- '' -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "We do not rise to the level of our expectations. We fall to the level of\ - \ our training. - @atc_project\n> \u201CThe more that you read, the more things\ - \ you will know. The more that you learn, the more places you\u2019ll go.\u201D\ - \ \u2015 Dr. Seuss\nWe assume that you already have a strong technical background\ - \ in fundamental disciplines \u2014 Networking, Operating Systems, and Programming.\n\ - Here are some relevant training courses that will help you in the Incident Response\ - \ activities:\n1. [Investigation Theory](https://chrissanders.org/training/investigationtheory/)\ - \ by Chris Sanders. We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every\ - \ member of your Incident Response team\n1. [SANS Digital Forensics & Incident Response](https://digital-forensics.sans.org/training/courses)\ - \ trainings\n * SEC450: Blue Team Fundamentals: Security Operations and Analysis\ - \ - https://www.sans.org/course/blue-team-fundamentals-security-operations-analysis.\ - \ We recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\ - \ Response team\n * SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling\ - \ - https://www.sans.org/course/hacker-techniques-exploits-incident-handling We\ - \ recommend you to have it as a mandatory training for every member of your Incident\ - \ Response team\n * FOR500: Windows Forensic Analysis - https://www.sans.org/course/windows-forensic-analysis\n\ - \ * FOR508: Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Forensics -\ - \ https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training\n\ - \ * SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - https://www.sans.org/course/intrusion-detection-in-depth\n\ - \ * FOR572: Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Incident\ - \ Response - https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-network-forensics-threat-hunting-incident-response\n\ - \ * SEC560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking - https://www.sans.org/course/network-penetration-testing-ethical-hacking\ - \ OR Offensive Security trainings mentioned below\n * SEC599: Defeating Advanced\ - \ Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses - https://www.sans.org/course/defeating-advanced-adversaries-kill-chain-defenses\n\ - 1. [Offensive Security](https://www.offensive-security.com/courses-and-certifications/)\ - \ trainings. We recommend [PWK](https://www.offensive-security.com/pwk-oscp/) by\ - \ Offensive Security trainings are in the list because to fight a threat, you need\ - \ to understand their motivation, tactics, and techniques.\nThe training above is\ - \ a recommendation and certainly the size of the organization will depend on the\ - \ amount of training possible.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e6229ae4c6..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/confirm_incident.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - actions: - - update event - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Upon analysis, determination of incident status is either confirmation, - suspicious, false positive or authorized exception. Update the event metadata and - process event as determined. - - ' -id: 994298f0-75fc-4c14-b044-9b81944d3a03 -name: Confirm incident -references: -- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -- 3.2.5 Incident Documentation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Determine if confirmed, suspicious, a false positive, or authorized - exception event - - 2. Update TLP, attack vector, disposition and category of event - - 3. Proceed on the next task of prioritizing incident or lessons learned or escalate - for additional investigation - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 57d2e605c5..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/contain_incident.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - block ip - - block domain - - block url - - block process - - terminate process - - quarantine host - - quarantine device - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: quarantine device and block external network access - scm: community - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Use atomic indicators to block and contain malicious activity. Use host - and network protection tools to block, pause, drop, or quarantine affected machines. - - ' -id: 735335a5-7ac0-4bdf-b1d3-6f4a6767d02f -name: Contain Incident -references: -- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Determine the appropriate containment technique either with soft block - (localized blocking of a specific indictors) or hard block (regionalized blocking, - quarantine whole hosts, net blocks, etc) techniques - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0fdd40eda1..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/create_follow-up_report.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - update ticket - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Build an after actions report that discusses about what happened and - a timeline. Provide what went well and what improvements can be made, information - timeliness, steps or actions that might have delayed recovery, what information - was shared or could have been shared, any corrective actions that would have prevent - the incident, identify precursors and indicators should be watched for in the future - or tools that could be used to mitigate future incidents. Conduct an Incident Review - Meeting. - - ' -id: 69d25415-408f-462a-899f-9bc8eef8c299 -name: Create follow-up report -references: -- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. Create a follow up report\n a. Exactly what happened, and at what times?\n\ - \ b. How well did staff and management perform in dealing with the incident?\n\ - \ c. Were the documented procedures followed? Were they adequate?\n d. What information\ - \ was needed sooner?\n e. Were any steps or actions taken that might have inhibited\ - \ the recovery?\n f. What would the staff and management do differently the next\ - \ time a similar incident occurs?\n g. How could information sharing with other\ - \ organizations have been improved?\n h. What corrective actions can prevent similar\ - \ incidents in the future?\n i. What precursors or indicators should be watched\ - \ for in the future to detect similar incidents?\n j. What additional tools or\ - \ resources are needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate future incidents?\n2. Schedule\ - \ and conduct a Incident Review Meeting with necessary leadership and incident response\ - \ team\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 697367d838..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_if_an_incident_has_occurred.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - set status - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Accept event and assign owner - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Review precursor and indicator data and try to prove the data observed - is normal activity. Knowledge of false positives detractors will support this assessment. - The object of this step is to remove confirmation bias and validate the detection - as a true positive and anomalous behavior. - - ' -id: 92ba5c50-717d-44e7-bb88-72bf6907ec83 -name: Determine if an incident has occurred -references: -- 3.2.2 Signs of an Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: 'Incident handlers are responsible for analyzing ambiguous, contradictory, - and incomplete symptoms to determine what has happened. - - The process here is to remove bias and support investigation based on indicators - that validate compromise or violdation for continued investigation - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 03a3f6361e..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/determine_incident_prioritization.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - update container - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Determine impact and effort - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. Incidents targeting IT - systems typically impact the business functionality that those systems provide, - resulting in some type of negative impact to the users of those systems. - - Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect the confidentiality, - integrity, and availability of the organizations information. - - Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size of the incident and the type - of resources it affects will determine the amount of time and resources that must - be spent on recovering from that incident. - - ' -id: 91f1c863-c080-4b3c-921c-e1ca1c0e7ae1 -name: Determine Incident Prioritization -references: -- 3.2.6 Incident Prioritization - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. Determine Functional Impact of the Incident. By determining,\n a.\ - \ None | No effect to the organization\u2019s ability to provide all services\ - \ to all users\n b. Low | Minimal effect; the organization can still provide\ - \ all critical services to all users but has lost efficiency\n c. Medium | Organization\ - \ has lost the ability to provide a critical service to a subset of system users\n\ - \ d. High | Organization is no longer able to provide some critical services\ - \ to any users\n2. Determine Information Impact of the Incident. Incidents may affect\ - \ the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the organization\u2019s information.\n\ - \ a. None | No information was exfiltrated, changed, deleted, or\ - \ otherwise compromised\n b. Privacy Breach | Sensitive personally identifiable\ - \ information (PII) of taxpayers, employees, beneficiaries, etc. was accessed or\ - \ exfiltrated\n c. Proprietary Breach | Unclassified proprietary information,\ - \ such as protected critical infrastructure information (PCII), was accessed or\ - \ exfiltrated\n d. Integrity Loss | Sensitive or proprietary information\ - \ was changed or deleted\n3. Determine Recoverability from the Incident. The size\ - \ of the incident and the type of resources it affects will determine the amount\ - \ of time and resources that must be spent on recovering from that incident.\n \ - \ a. Regular | Time to recovery is predictable with existing resources\n\ - \ b. Supplemented | Time to recovery is predictable with additional resources\n\ - \ c. Extended | Time to recovery is unpredictable; additional resources\ - \ and outside help are needed\n d. Not Recoverable | Recovery from the incident\ - \ is not possible (e.g., sensitive data exfiltrated and posted publicly); launch\ - \ investigation\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 7383cc660d..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/document_and_notify_of_incident.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - create ticket - - create incident - - create case - - send email - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Create case or merge with known case - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'At this point, incident responder should acquire, preserve, secure, - and document all evidence to the incident. This process will be continual through - the IR process. The incident responder should perform notification pursuant to the - organizational incident response policy and outlined procedures. - - ' -id: 3890e0b3-bb46-4b9b-8134-184dbe644a8a -name: Document and notify of incident -references: -- 3.2.5 Document Incident - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -- 3.2.7 Incident Notification - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: 'The reasond for reordering of the documentation of the incident was to - align documentation and incident notification into the same process flow. - - 1. The current status of the incident (new, in progress, forwarded for investigation, - resolved, etc.) - - 2. A summary of the incident - - 3. Indicators related to the incident - - 4. Other incidents related to this incident - - 5. Actions taken by all incident handlers on this incident - - 6. Chain of custody, if applicable - - 7. Impact assessments related to the incident - - 8. Contact information for other involved parties (e.g., system owners, system administrators) - - 9. list of evidence gathered during the incident investigation - - 10. Comments from incident handlers - - 11. Next steps to be taken (e.g., rebuild the host, upgrade an application). - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b39873f017..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_additional_affected_hosts.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - - merge event - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Merge event with case - scm: community - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Use indictors developed from the detection and analysis to find additional - hosts or potentially infected hosts. If found perform additional analysis to determine - root cause analysis and any additional indictors. If this is mass infection event, - immediate containment must be delayed until full understanding of the infection - is achieved. - - ' -id: 3d481dd1-4f30-4262-a846-78af6bdce11c -name: Identify additional affected hosts -references: -- 3.3.1 Choosing a Containment Strategy - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -- 3.3.2 Evidence Gathering and Handling - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -- NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, - for additional information on preserving evidence -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. For Host infections, use persistence mechanism, dropped filenames, paths, - hashs, accessed or collected files, links, network communications, network ports - and protocols, netwrok flow data points, etc - - 2. For phishing infections, use email addresses, domains, urls, file hashes, x-origin-ip - address, subject, etc - - 3. For Command and Control, use host communication, ports and protocols, application, - url patterns, dns queries, ping data, etc - - 4. Escalate to incident management team, if a massive incident to support incident - response. - - 5. Ensure all known event information and root cause of the event is known before - proceeding with containment - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c895361fb4..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/identify_vunlerabilities.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - scan host - - scan hosts - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Scan host(s) for vulnerabilities. Reverse engineer malware thru static - and dynamic means to determine any zero day vulnerabilities. - - ' -id: f28177ae-78de-43c9-8692-e972e8a0aa62 -name: Identify vunlerabilities -references: -- 3.3.3 Identifying the Attacking Hosts - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf - - NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, - for additional information on preserving evidence -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Scan host(s) with infection and determine any vulnerabilities that can - remediate infection. (e.g. finding a SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution - Vulnerability) - - 2. Identify any common vulnerabilities among the hosts infected - - 3. Reverse engineer malware for any zero day vulnerabilities. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 38eea56d8d..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_additional_monitoring.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: '' - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'Implement additional monitoring that reviews not only host/network containment - success. Monitor network blocks for additional hosts that might not have been identified. - Reassess containment as needed depending on any new information. If this is a mass - infection, it''s advised that a 24 no change process be implemented. - - ' -id: edb7867c-2e81-4356-a422-92781f4fa34c -name: Implement additional monitoring -references: -- 3.2.4 Incident Analysis - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Create additional monitoring for network and host detection for abnormal - activity to ensure containment is effective. - - 2. Re-investigate new hosts found but not on the containment list - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml deleted file mode 100644 index dbe078be18..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/implement_recovery_monitoring.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - - unblock ip - - unblock domain - - unblock url - - unblock hash - - unblock process - - unquarantine device - - unquarantine host - - remove tag - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Newly recovered systems should have additional monitoring for any anomalies - or newly created incidents. Adding single host to a previously infected list for - a specified period will allow the incident responder to quickly assess a re-infection - or subsequent new infection. At this stage in recovery, you should be unquarantining - devices and removing any host blocks. - - ' -id: ecf89e9b-106a-46d1-b236-a2716f71d7ae -name: Implement recovery monitoring -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Monitor restored systems for any new anomalies and ensure that operations - have been returned to normal - - 2. Begin to remove emergency blocks to permanent block and remediation alerts for - infected systems returning the network (e.g. laptops that were unreachable during - the incident) - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 5b02738b99..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/make_personnel_report_suspicious_activity.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-04-21' -description: 'c - - ' -id: f83abcae-3734-45ff-99ef-b17eb937c057 -name: Make personnel report suspicious activity -references: -- Organizational Acceptable Use Policy -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: 'Develop a simplified, company wide-known way to contact IR team in case - of suspicious activity on the user system. - - Make sure that the personnel is aware of it, can and will use it. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 954d9eb8c8..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/malware_hunt_and_contain.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - file reputation - - hunt file - - get file - - block hash - - disable user - - logoff user - - shutdown system - - create ticket - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: malware_hunt_and_contain - scm: community - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-08-05' -description: Uses any presented filehash artifact sent to phantom and conducts a reputation - check, hunts for additional systems, blocks file hash with <=10 positive detections - and creates a ticket for follow up. Any hashes found with >10 positive hits, automatically - blockes the hashes, disables user accounts, logs off the user, shuts down the system - and finally creates a urgent ticket. -id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f -name: Malware Hunt and Contain -references: -- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.json -- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.py -- https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.9/malware_hunt_and_contain.png -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 -workflow: "1. Gets file reputation for every hash presented and filters hashes with\ - \ >10 OR <=10 and >5 for positive hits\n2. Get the files that match and hunt the\ - \ file hashes and return the system(s)/user(s) that have these files present\n3.\ - \ If >10 then block hash, disable users, logoff user, shutdown system and create\ - \ a ticket\n4. IF <=10 but >5 block hash, and create a ticket\nTicket template:\n\ - \ Virus Detected on # devices\n Hashes submitted with detections: (list hashes)\n\ - \ File was found on # of devices (list devices)\n This impacts at least # users:\ - \ (list users)\n # of hashes were submitted for blocking: (list hashes)\n # of\ - \ users were forced to logoff: (list users)\n # of user accounts were disabled:\ - \ (list users)\n # of systems were shutdown: (list systems)\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 99987c19a5..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/mitigate_or_remediate_any_vulnerabilities.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - patch host - - deploy patch - - run job - - execute program - - run script - - execute action - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Apply mitigations or remediate any known affecting vulnerabilities that - linked to the incidents. (e.g. SMB MS17-010 - Windows SMB Remote Code Execution - Vulnerability). Mitigations are controls that block and lower the risk, but don''t - remove the vulnerability. Remediation is patching and removing the risk known vulnerability - from being exploited. - - ' -id: 70362de1-bfef-4a0f-893f-3e0d605ed9b7 -name: Mitigate or remediate any vulnerabilities -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Apply remediations (e.g. patches) to infected and not infected hosts - that pertain to the vulnerability found being used by the incident (remove the risk). - Identify and fix any systems not accepting or validating the patch (e.g. needing - reboots) as soon as possible. - - 2. This may require scheduling due to business needs. In a mass incident, emergency - change requests can be used to support patching. In single instance events, the - risk to outage vs the risk to mitigate may be acceptable. If acceptable, then move - remediations to lessons learned processing before closing out the request. Put - in place, mitigations for at least detections and if possible protection rules to - minimize impact while remediation is being scheduled. - - 3. Apply mitigations such as IPS and host based firewall rules to mitigate (reduce - the risk) of the vulnerability being exploited for at least detection to notify - when occurring and if containment and eradication has failed. - - 4. Monitor detections to ensure containment is working and determine when eradication - is beginning to be effective. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 67e8b52f6b..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/practice_real_world_events.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Practice in the real environment. Sharpen Response skills within your - organization by simulating real world with training exercises within your organization. -id: 97d00b14-dd01-47e4-b7eb-0a82f4998c4e -name: Practice Real World Events -references: -- 3.1 Preparation - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: Make sure that the response actions have been performed during an internal - exercise by your Incident Response Team. You need to make sure that when an Incident - happens, the team understands the how and this is not the first time they have seen - the tasks. This is best done by being able to execute the actual steps in **your - environment**, i.e. blocking an IP address or a domain name. diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4120e4926c..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/prepare_for_incident_handling.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: '' - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-17' -description: 'The lists in the workflow below provide examples of tools and resources - available that may be of value during incident handling. These lists are intended - to be a starting point for discussions about which tools and resources an organizations - incident handlers need. - - ' -id: 91d4566e-a292-4f0a-b894-dde23bde3f08 -name: Prepare for incident handling -references: -- 3.1.1 Preparing to Handle Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '## Incident Handler Communications and Facilities: - - * Contact information for team members and others within and outside the organization - (primary and backup contacts), such as law enforcement and other incident response - teams; information may include phone numbers, email addresses, public encryption - keys (in accordance with the encryption software described below), and instructions - for verifying the contacts identity - - * On-call information for other teams within the organization, including escalation - information - - * Incident reporting mechanisms, such as phone numbers, email addresses, online - forms, and secure instant messaging systems that users can use to report suspected - incidents; at least one mechanism should permit people to report incidents anonymously - - * Issue tracking system for tracking incident information, status, etc. - - * Smartphones to be carried by team members for off-hour support and onsite communications - - * Encryption software to be used for communications among team members, within the - organization and with external parties; for Federal agencies, software must use - a FIPS-validated encryption algorithm20 - - * War room for central communication and coordination; if a permanent war room is - not necessary or practical, the team should create a procedure for procuring a temporary - war room when needed - - * Secure storage facility for securing evidence and other sensitive materials - - ## Incident Analysis Hardware and Software - - * Digital forensic workstations21 and/or backup devices to create disk images, preserve - log files, and save other relevant incident data - - * Laptops for activities such as analyzing data, sniffing packets, and writing reports - - * Spare workstations, servers, and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalents, - which may be used for many purposes, such as restoring backups and trying out malware - - * Blank removable media - - * Portable printer to print copies of log files and other evidence from non-networked - systems - - * Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers to capture and analyze network traffic - - * Digital forensic software to analyze disk images - - * Removable media with trusted versions of programs to be used to gather evidence - from systems - - * Evidence gathering accessories, including hard-bound notebooks, digital cameras, - audio recorders, chain of custody forms, evidence storage bags and tags, and evidence - tape, to preserve evidence for possible legal actions - - ## Incident Analysis Resources: - - * Port lists, including commonly used ports and Trojan horse ports - - * Documentation for OSs, applications, protocols, and intrusion detection and antivirus - products Network diagrams and lists of critical assets, such as database servers - - * Current baselines of expected network, system, and application activity - - * Cryptographic hashes of critical files22 to speed incident analysis, verification, - and eradication - - ## Incident Mitigation Software: - - * Access to images of clean OS and application installations for restoration and - recovery purposes - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 6d2f2a32eb..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/preventing_incidents.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: '' - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Keeping the number of incidents reasonably low is very important to protect - the business processes of the organization. It is outside the scope of this document - to provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although - incident response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources, they - are advocates of sound security practices. An incident response team should identify - problems that the organization is otherwise not aware of and play a key role in - risk assessment and training by identifying gaps. -id: 5b7c5d18-6598-412b-a4f1-e66e92890503 -name: Preventing Incidents -references: -- 3.1.2 Prevent Incidents - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "The following:\n* Risk Assessments. Periodic risk assessments of systems\ - \ and applications should determine what allowing staff to emphasize monitoring\ - \ and response activities for those resources.\n* Host Security. All hosts should\ - \ be hardened appropriately using standard configurations. In addition to keeping\ - \ each host properly patched, hosts should be configured to follow the principle\ - \ of least privilege\u2014granting users only the privileges necessary for performing\ - \ their authorized tasks. Hosts should have auditing enabled and should log significant\ - \ security-related events. The security of hosts risks are posed by combinations\ - \ of threats and vulnerabilities.\n* Applicable threats, including organization-specific\ - \ threats. Each risk should be prioritized, and the risks can be mitigated, transferred,\ - \ or accepted until a reasonable overall level of risk is reached. Another benefit\ - \ of conducting risk assessments regularly is that critical resources are identified,\ - \ Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) expressed operating system and application\ - \ configuration and their configurations should be continuously monitored. checklists\ - \ to assist in securing hosts consistently and effectively.\n* Network Security.\ - \ The network perimeter should be configured to deny all activity that is not expressly\ - \ permitted. This includes securing all connection points, such as virtual private\ - \ networks (VPNs) and dedicated connections to other organizations.\n* Malware Prevention.\ - \ Software to detect and stop malware should be deployed throughout the organization.\ - \ Malware protection should be deployed at the host level (e.g., server and workstation\ - \ operating systems), the application server level (e.g., email server, web proxies),\ - \ and the application\n* User Awareness and Training. Users should be made aware\ - \ of policies and procedures regarding appropriate use of networks, systems, and\ - \ applications. Applicable lessons learned from previous incidents should also be\ - \ shared with users so they can see how their actions could affect the organization.\ - \ Improving user awareness regarding incidents should reduce the frequency of incidents.\ - \ IT staff should be trained so that they can maintain their networks, systems,\ - \ and applications in accordance with the organization\u2019s security standards.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4b5b0b72b0..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/provide_lessons_learned_tasks_or_changes.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - create ticket - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Create false-positve reduction service request - scm: local - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Create any tasks or service requests based on the recommendations of - the review of the incident or with the process flow from alert detection to provide - feedback from false positives. - - ' -id: 43fc5e87-d819-460a-a740-de2066b18a29 -name: Provide lessons learned tasks or changes -references: -- 3.4.1 Lessons Learned - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Create service requests or documentation updates from the results of - the review of the followup report and incident review meeting - - 2. Create service request for updating alert detection from feedback from false - positives - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml deleted file mode 100644 index f5723d6ffa..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/raise_personnel_awareness.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk, @atc_react -automation: - action: null - is_note_required: false - playbook: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-17' -description: Raise personnel awareness regarding phishing, ransomware, social engineering, - and other attacks that involve user interaction -id: 145a82b5-cafd-468e-b487-737fdf13d6a4 -name: Raise personnel awareness -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017/ -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary - to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques - that involve user interaction. diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c5397b59ff..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/remove_malicious_content.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - create ticket - - deploy patch - - run script - - add tag - - execute action - - execute program - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Remove malicious content. There are multiple ways to accomplish this. - Depending on the maturity and size of the incident, this can be as simple as re-imaging - a single system to full remediation via a deployable package from your antivirus - vendor or removal of offending file via your enterprise detection and response (EDR) - tool. Network attacks external to your environment will need to be managed with - the support of your ISP. Internal attacks should be segmented for containment and - then removing offending systems or malicious content from those offending systems. - - ' -id: 26cd22c6-4b67-4dc5-b8d1-f5ef9b5d8226 -name: Remove malicious content -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Determine the correct approach based on maturity and size of the incident - - 2. Employ eradication and monitor the process to ensure the system does not get - re-infected. Reinfection is an indication that your containment measures are inadequate - to stop the incident. - - 3. Apply any new gold image with up to date patches on re-imaged systems. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8c01b2ab6e..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/restore_systems_to_operational_status.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - create ticket - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: Create a service request for re-image - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Depending on the sized of the incident, reimaging systems maybe a viable - eradication and recovery process combined. Once restored to gold image (standardized - corporate image) with immediate patching and updating of all known vulnerabilities. - Create a service request for the Help Desk to re-image the host. Server or network - equipment should be baselined and restored by the owning team. - - ' -id: bb515cf6-40b5-4005-af04-6f63439df7b4 -name: Restore systems to operational status -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: '1. Create a request for re-imaging system for eradication and recovery. - Re-imaging will not be possible in a mass incident. - - 2. For mass incidents, provide immediate patching and reporting of non-compliant - patching or antivirus removal tools. Thorough forensic and reverse malware engineering - will provide the necessary details to minimize complete recovery processes. - - 3. Do not restore localized customer files (/home/user, or /User/), but - only on a case by case basis and thorough review of the files being restored. - - 4. If the eradication process isn''t reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication - is missing a persistence mechanism or containment has failed. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml deleted file mode 100644 index f7b6135117..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -author: Philip Royer, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - set status - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: suspicious_email_attachment_investigate_and_delete - scm: community - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2019-06-03' -description: 'Investigate an email with a suspicious file attachment detected by Splunk - Enterprise Security. Detonate the file attachment in a sandbox, gather network behavior - from the sandbox results, and pivot on those network indicators with both external - reputation queries and internal Splunk Common Information Model searches. After - confirming the results with an analyst prompt, delete the email from the user''s - inbox, hopefully before they have opened it. - - ' -id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d8372b712 -name: Suspicious Email Attachment Investigate and Delete -references: -- '' -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: 'Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open the - playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment. - - ' diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml deleted file mode 100644 index eddd244606..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_hosts_eradicated.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Confirm and acknowledge eradication steps are working as expected and - number of infected host(s) is dropping. Validation here will allow the incident - responder to move to recovery phase. If single instance, validate the reimage process - was completed by validating new image creation date. (win - ''systeminfo | find - Original'''', linux - ''ls -ld /var/log/installer'', macOS - /var/log/install.log.# - (oldest)) - - ' -id: b678705c-12a6-428b-a631-ed579332bc99 -name: Validate hosts eradicated -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -requirements: null -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\ - \ new image creation date.\n a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n b. linux\ - \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\ - 2. If this host has been reinfected more than once, conduct a formal forensic review\ - \ to ensure all malicious content has been removed.\n2. If mass incident follows\ - \ steps 2-5, determine if the number of infected host is reducing\n3. Determine\ - \ if the number of (re)infected host is increasing\n4. If the eradication process\ - \ isn't reducing the number of infected hosts, eradication is missing an persistence\ - \ mechanism or containment has failed\n5. If the eradication process shows new hosts\ - \ are being infected, your containment process is failing and/or the incident has\ - \ mutated. (e.g. polymorphic malware with a active vulnerability or actor changed\ - \ tactics and is now using ping for command and control and uploaded new malware).\ - \ If this occurs return to Detection and Analysis Phase and continue forensic analysis.\n" diff --git a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml b/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cf9b89a26a..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/playbooks/validate_restored_hosts.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -automation: - actions: - - run query - is_note_required: false - playbooks: - - playook: null - scm: null - role: null - sla: null - sla_type: minutes -date: '2020-07-30' -description: 'Validate each reimaged system was completed by validating new image - creation date. ** win: systeminfo | find Original ** linux: ls -ld /var/log/installer - ** macOS: /var/log/install.log.# (oldest date of entry). If more surgical, antivirus - package or enterprise detection and response removal process has successfully completed - and system is showing no signs of indicators of the incident. - - ' -id: 8218bcf6-739b-4f76-8952-eb133480ad8d -name: Validate restored hosts -references: -- 3.3.4 Eradication and Recovery - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -tags: - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: "1. If single instance, validate the reimage process was completed by validating\ - \ new image creation date\n a. win - 'systeminfo | find Original''\n b. linux\ - \ - 'ls -ld /var/log/installer'\n c. macOS - /var/log/install.log.# (oldest))\n\ - 2. Review existing monitoring to ensure host is working as expected and within normal\ - \ parameters\n" diff --git a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ab0bd59274..0000000000 --- a/responses/NIST_800-61r2_response_plan.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup -date: '2020-04-21' -description: Response plan built for the NIST framework described in NIST 800-61r2 - (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf) -id: b974f8bb-2999-4480-94ef-8a90029b8759 -is_note_required: false -name: NIST 800-61r2 Response Plan -references: -- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -response_phase: -- preparation_nist: - - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a - name: Preparation -- detection_analysis: - - id: a6eec2aa-3ec8-4f16-9c09-b8537873047d - name: Detection and Analysis -- contain_eradicate_recover: - - id: 838ad8e8-1701-4829-be89-51a997fd9852 - name: Contain Eradicate Recover -- post_incident: - - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 - name: Post Incident -tags: - analytics_story: all - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes - for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing - the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for - thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different - in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an - response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns - to the policy. > Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support - ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc). diff --git a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml b/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml deleted file mode 100644 index c1a4e69b75..0000000000 --- a/responses/NIST_PICERL_response_plan.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -author: ButterCup, Splunk -date: '2020-04-21' -description: NIST incident response process that follows PICERL (https://www.sans.org/media/score/504-incident-response-cycle.pdf) -id: 8a7ea67a-dd53-468e-aeef-b75aed0a877c -is_note_required: false -name: NIST PICERL Response Plan -references: -- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf -- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handlers-handbook-33901 -response_phase: -- preparation: - - id: d360707d-9214-4449-b15d-9d3cf134209a - name: Preparation -- identification: - - id: 6cdd56ba-5ffd-46a9-9dde-d25ce755c100 - name: Identification -- containment: - - id: 5d790fae-8ba6-4fc9-b288-78b67ef8370c - name: Containment -- eradication: - - id: d3b80e0e-4e85-4259-a13c-69ef20987e1c - name: Eradication -- recovery: - - id: cae4dcdb-f81b-45ec-b0d6-a00cec468e9a - name: Recovery -- lessons_learned: - - id: 001209bc-2f94-4dc7-b21e-9598c41eaa80 - name: Post-Incident Activities -tags: - analytics_story: - - Credential Dumping - - Ransomeware - nist: RS.RP - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 1 -workflow: Organizations should use this response plan as template to define the processes - for their security operations teams. With this as the template and then customizing - the response plan around attack vectors. Organizations can fashion a framework for - thier response procedures. Response plans and response procedures are different - in the setting that procedures should have the actual step-by-step actions vs an - response plan that discuses and deomonstrates actions without specifcs and aligns - to the policy. Preparation should not be imported into response tools that support - ingestion (hive, phantom, xsoar, etc). diff --git a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml b/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 74516d18e5..0000000000 --- a/responses/credential_dumping_attack.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ -author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk -date: '2020-07-16' -description: This response workflow guide you through the investigation of a credential - dumping attack. -id: 570dd98e-6cab-443c-bdd8-3dbb5fe4188d -name: Credential Dumping Attack -response_phase: -- identification: - - id: c5506139-ef86-4cd9-8535-0512aa732e79 - name: Process Chain Analysis - - id: 6ee5c067-8228-4926-abb2-54f2c59d726e - name: Analyze Malicious File - - id: 1d7b437a-5114-4b94-a585-04c3362ba08f - name: Malware Hunt and Contain -- containment: - - id: 60c4cfa5-81b7-44e2-9ad4-71524e4a3e78 - name: Quarantaine Infected Host -tags: - analytics_story: Credential Dumping - product: - - Splunk Phantom -type: response -version: 2 -workflow: This workbook provides you a guide on how to investigate credential dumping - with some automation to make data collection easier. diff --git a/spec/baselines.spec.json b/spec/baselines.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index d072456c6b..0000000000 --- a/spec/baselines.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "description": "schema for baselines", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the baseline", - "examples": [ - "Bahvin Patel, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "A detailed description of the baseline ", - "examples": [ - "This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "how_to_implement": { - "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement", - "default": "", - "description": "information about how to implement. Only needed for non standard implementations.", - "examples": [ - "This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fc0edc95-ff2b-48b0-9f6f-63da3789fd63" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "examples": [ - "Previously Seen AWS Regions" - ], - "title": "Name of baseline", - "type": "string" - }, - "search": { - "$id": "#/properties/search", - "default": "", - "description": "The Splunk search for the baseline", - "examples": [ - "cloudtrail StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytic_story": "suspicious_aws_ec2_activities", - "custom_key": "custom_value" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "datamodel": { - "$id": "#/properties/datamodel", - "default": "", - "description": "datamodel used in the search", - "examples": [ - "Endpoint" - ], - "items": { - "enum": [ - "Endpoint", - "Network_Traffic", - "Authentication", - "Change", - "Change_Analysis", - "Email", - "Endpoint", - "Network_Resolution", - "Network_Sessions", - "Network_Traffic", - "UEBA", - "Updates", - "Vulnerabilities", - "Web" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of baseline, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "search", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Baseline Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/spec/playbooks.spec.json b/spec/playbooks.spec.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23603b484c --- /dev/null +++ b/spec/playbooks.spec.json @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +{ + "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", + "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", + "additionalProperties": true, + "description": "schema for playbooks", + "properties": { + "author": { + "$id": "#/properties/author", + "default": "", + "description": "Author of the playbook", + "examples": [ + "Lou Stella, Splunk" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "date":{ + "$id": "#/properties/date", + "default": "", + "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", + "examples": [ + "2021-09-28" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "description": { + "$id": "#/properties/description", + "default": "", + "description": "A detailed description of the playbook", + "examples": [ + "This playbook investigates and contains ransomware detected on endpoints." + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "how_to_implement": { + "$id": "#/properties/how_to_implement", + "default": "", + "description": "information about how to implement the playbook in Splunk SOAR", + "examples": [ + "This playbook requires the Splunk SOAR apps for Palo Alto Networks Firewalls, Palo Alto Wildfire, LDAP, and Carbon Black Response." + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "references": { + "$id": "#/properties/references", + "additionalItems": true, + "default": [], + "description": "A list of references for this playbook", + "examples": [ + [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/splunk-soar-playbooks-gcp-unusual-service-account-usage.html" + ] + ], + "items": { + "$id": "#/properties/references/items", + "default": "", + "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", + "examples": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/splunk-soar-playbooks-gcp-unusual-service-account-usage.html" + ], + "title": "The Items Schema", + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "id": { + "$id": "#/properties/id", + "default": "", + "description": "UUID as unique identifier", + "examples":[ + "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "playbook":{ + "$id": "#/properties/playbook", + "default": "", + "description": "name of playbook file within same directory without suffix", + "examples":[ + "ransomware_investigate_and_contain" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "name": { + "$id": "#/properties/name", + "default": "", + "examples": [ + "Ransomware Investigate and Contain" + ], + "title": "name of playbook", + "type": "string" + }, + "app_list":{ + "$id": "#/properties/app_list", + "default": "", + "examples": [ + "LDAP" + ], + "type": "array" + }, + "tags": { + "$id": "#/properties/tags", + "additionalProperties": true, + "default": {}, + "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", + "examples":[ + { + "analytic_story": "Ransomware", + "detections": "Conti Common Exec parameter", + "platform_tags": "Investigate", + "playbook_fields": "Username", + "product": "Splunk SOAR" + } + ], + "minItems": 1, + "type": "object", + "uniqueItems": true + }, + "type":{ + "$id": "#/properties/type", + "default": "", + "description": "type of playbook", + "examples": [ + "Investigation" + ], + "items": { + "enum": [ + "Investigation", + "Response" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "$id": "#/properties/version", + "default": 0, + "description": "version of playbook, e.g. 1 or 2...", + "examples": [ + 2 + ], + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "name", + "id", + "version", + "date", + "description", + "type", + "author", + "playbook", + "tags" + ], + "title": "Playbook schema", + "type": "object" +} diff --git a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json b/spec/response_tasks.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index dfe84471cd..0000000000 --- a/spec/response_tasks.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,168 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response_tasks.spec.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for response task", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the response task", - "examples": [ - "ButterCup, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "Description of response task", - "examples": [ - "Response example." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of response task", - "examples": [ - "Response Example" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "sla": { - "$id": "#/properties/sla", - "default": 0, - "description": "Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase", - "examples": [ - 5, - 30 - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "sla_type": { - "$id": "#/properties/sla_type", - "default": "minutes", - "description": "Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)", - "examples": [ - "minutes", - "hours", - "days" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "automation": { - "$id": "#/properties/automation", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": { - "is_note_required": false, - "sla_type": "minutes", - "sla": "", - "role": "", - "action": [], - "playbooks": [] - }, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for defining actions and playbooks", - "examples": [ - { - "is_note_required": false, - "sla_type": "minutes", - "sla": 30, - "action": [ - "run_query" - ], - "playbooks": [ - { - "scm": "local", - "playbook": "automate something" - }, - { - "scm": "local", - "playbook": "automate something else" - } - ] - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "uniqueItems": true, - "type": "object" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "references": { - "$id": "#/properties/references", - "additionalItems": true, - "default": [], - "description": "A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)", - "examples": [ - [ - "Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148", - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - ] - ], - "items": { - "$id": "#/properties/references/items", - "default": "", - "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", - "examples": [ - "https://www.amazon.com/Blue-Team-Handbook-condensed-Responder/dp/1500734756" - ], - "title": "Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon", - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Response Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/spec/responses.spec.json b/spec/responses.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4beb6cf9a4..0000000000 --- a/spec/responses.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/splunk/security_content/develop/docs/spec/response.spec.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for response", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the response", - "examples": [ - "Rico Valdez, Patrick Barei\u00df, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "Description of response", - "examples": [ - "Response example." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of response", - "examples": [ - "Response Example" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "response_phase": { - "$id": "#/properties/response_phases", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "Response divided into phases. These will used to referenced known response_phase parameters", - "examples": [ - { - "preparation": [ - { - "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", - "name": "Preparation NIST" - } - ], - "identification": [ - { - "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", - "name": "Detection and Analysis" - }, - { - "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", - "name": "Analysis" - } - ] - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "array" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "is_note_required":{ - "$id": "#/properties/is_note_required", - "default": false, - "description": "Global assignment for notes being required for tasks, can be individually set in the task", - "examples": [ - true, - false - ], - "type": "boolean" - }, - "references": { - "$id": "#/properties/references", - "additionalItems": true, - "default": [], - "description": "A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)", - "examples": [ - [ - "Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Alarm Triage Overview pages 146-148", - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - ] - ], - "items": { - "$id": "#/properties/references/items", - "default": "", - "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", - "examples": [ - "https://www.amazon.com/Blue-Team-Handbook-condensed-Responder/dp/1500734756" - ], - "title": "Blue Team Handbook by Don Murdoch - Amazon", - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "response_phase", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Response Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json b/spec/responses_phase.spec.json deleted file mode 100644 index 4c46e46803..0000000000 --- a/spec/responses_phase.spec.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,152 +0,0 @@ -{ - "$id": "http://example.com/example.json", - "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "schema for phase", - "properties": { - "author": { - "$id": "#/properties/author", - "default": "", - "description": "Author of the phase", - "examples": [ - "Rico Valdez, Patrick Bareiß, Splunk" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "date": { - "$id": "#/properties/date", - "default": "", - "description": "date of creation or modification, format yyyy-mm-dd", - "examples": [ - "2019-12-06" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "description": { - "$id": "#/properties/description", - "default": "", - "description": "Description of phase", - "examples": [ - "Response phase descripion." - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "id": { - "$id": "#/properties/id", - "default": "", - "description": "UUID as unique identifier", - "examples": [ - "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "name": { - "$id": "#/properties/name", - "default": "", - "description": "Name of phase", - "examples": [ - "Preparation" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "response_task": { - "$id": "#/properties/response_task", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "Response phase is divided into task(s) to be completed. These will used to referenced known response_task parameters. Order is as positioned and with unique name.", - "examples": [ - { - "id": "7c72d944-3995-4485-8e57-67b4c353989b", - "name": "Prepare for Incident Handling" - }, - { - "id": "c36f3f48-e0bb-4c20-a62a-cdc8f6418892", - "name": "Preventing Incidents" - }, - { - "id": "0dc849b2-2eb4-4fd2-add1-b6cc475765f0", - "name": "Practice" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "array" - }, - "tags": { - "$id": "#/properties/tags", - "additionalProperties": true, - "default": {}, - "description": "An array of key value pairs for tagging", - "examples": [ - { - "analytic_story": "credential_dumping" - } - ], - "minItems": 1, - "type": "object", - "uniqueItems": true - }, - "version": { - "$id": "#/properties/version", - "default": 0, - "description": "version of detection, e.g. 1 or 2 ...", - "examples": [ - 1 - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "sla": { - "$id": "#/properties/sla", - "default": null, - "description": "Measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase", - "examples": [ - 5, - 30 - ], - "type": "integer" - }, - "sla_type": { - "$id": "#/properties/sla_type", - "default": "minutes", - "description": "Duration for measured integer for Service Level Agreement for completion of the phase (e.g. minutes, or hours, etc)", - "examples": [ - "minutes", - "hours", - "days" - ], - "type": "string" - }, - "references": { - "$id": "#/properties/references", - "additionalItems": true, - "default": [], - "description": "A list of references for this response, phase or task (e.g. web or printed citation)", - "examples": [ - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - ], - "items": { - "$id": "#/properties/references/items", - "default": "", - "description": "An explanation about the purpose of this instance.", - "examples": [ - "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf" - ], - "title": "3.1 Preparation", - "type": "string" - }, - "type": "array" - } - }, - "required": [ - "name", - "id", - "version", - "date", - "description", - "author", - "response_task", - "tags" - ], - "title": "Response Schema", - "type": "object" -} diff --git a/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml b/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml index 8280c80e75..78b9e97b6b 100644 --- a/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml +++ b/stories/ransomware_blackmatter.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more. -narrative: blackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of +narrative: BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data. references: @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/ tags: - analytic_story: blackMatter Ransomware + analytic_story: BlackMatter Ransomware category: - Malware product: diff --git a/tests/application/assertions.py b/tests/application/assertions.py deleted file mode 120000 index 5ed8963511..0000000000 --- a/tests/application/assertions.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -../../bin/modules/assertions/application/assertions.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/cloud/.gitkeep b/tests/cloud/.gitkeep deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2..0000000000 diff --git a/tests/cloud/assertions.py b/tests/cloud/assertions.py deleted file mode 120000 index c2de859169..0000000000 --- a/tests/cloud/assertions.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -../../bin/modules/assertions/cloud/assertions.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/assertions.py b/tests/endpoint/assertions.py deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2..0000000000 diff --git a/tests/global_assertions.py b/tests/global_assertions.py deleted file mode 120000 index 4f2d39bd2a..0000000000 --- a/tests/global_assertions.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -../bin/modules/assertions/global_assertions.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/network/.gitkeep b/tests/network/.gitkeep deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2..0000000000 diff --git a/tests/network/assertions.py b/tests/network/assertions.py deleted file mode 120000 index b3ebdf9e0b..0000000000 --- a/tests/network/assertions.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -../../bin/modules/assertions/network/assertions.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/web/.gitkeep b/tests/web/.gitkeep deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2..0000000000 diff --git a/tests/web/assertions.py b/tests/web/assertions.py deleted file mode 120000 index f7e69b51d6..0000000000 --- a/tests/web/assertions.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -../../bin/modules/assertions/web/assertions.py \ No newline at end of file