From aafee44783b2806f0ef7dbce7be37dfb003410df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: pyth0n1c <87383215+pyth0n1c@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 14:23:49 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Temporary fix to outstanding, known issue with field naming

---
 detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
index 10ec4eb2d1..5cb397de90 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.yml
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll in
   malicious document will load ActiveX, which activates the MSHTML component. The
   vulnerability resides in the MSHTML component. During triage, identify parallel
   processes and capture any file modifications for analysis.
-search: '`sysmon` EventID=7  process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
+search: '`sysmon` EventID=7  parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe")
   ImageLoaded IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll")
   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, process_name,
   ImageLoaded, OriginalFileName, ProcessGuid | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`