diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_folder.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_dir.yml similarity index 99% rename from detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_folder.yml rename to detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_dir.yml index deaea7b647..021801cb2d 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_folder.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_dir.yml @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -name: Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Folder +name: Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Dir id: 4d14c86d-fdee-4393-94da-238d2706902f version: 1 date: '2024-09-24' @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` - | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_folder_filter`' + | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_dir_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access.yml index d9a83ab345..dba6ed09c9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access.yml @@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ type: Anomaly data_source: - Windows Event Log Security 4663 description: The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes attempting to access the Chrome extensions file. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit this file to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to stored credentials and other sensitive data, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and broader network. -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\*" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`' +search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 + object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\*" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." known_false_positives: Uninstall chrome browser extension application may access this file and folder path to removed chrome installation in the target host. Filter is needed. references: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access.yml index 91717a9408..76602204fb 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access.yml @@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ type: Anomaly data_source: - Windows Event Log Security 4663 description: The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome "Local State" file, which contains critical settings and information. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because threat actors can exploit this file to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting saved passwords in Chrome. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, posing a severe security risk. Monitoring this anomaly helps identify potential threats and safeguard browser-stored data. -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Local State" NOT (process_name IN ("*\\chrome.exe","*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access_filter`' +search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 + object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Local State" NOT (process_name IN ("*\\chrome.exe","*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe")) + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." known_false_positives: Uninstall chrome application may access this file and folder path to removed chrome installation in target host. Filter is needed. references: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access.yml b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access.yml index e7aa933b8b..773c6db7ec 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access.yml @@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ type: Anomaly data_source: - Windows Event Log Security 4663 description: The following analytic identifies non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome user data file "login data." This file is an SQLite database containing sensitive information, including saved passwords. The detection leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts by threat actors to extract and decrypt stored passwords, posing a risk to user credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and escalate their privileges within the environment. -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access_filter`' +search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 + object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access_filter`' how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." known_false_positives: Uninstall application may access this registry to remove the entry of the target application. filter is needed. references: