From 24c1d452ce7c401df7b13bb5c6932db138dcb5c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 16:12:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] updating mitre id and adding response tasks for securityhub events --- ...d_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml | 2 ++ ...rovisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml | 2 ++ ...provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml | 2 ++ ...stance_started_in_previously_unused_region.yml | 2 ++ ...stigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+) create mode 100644 response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml diff --git a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml index a128e3fb3b..3957b21928 100644 --- a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml +++ b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city.yml @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: diff --git a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml index 2aba2f4827..af6e8dde55 100644 --- a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml +++ b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country.yml @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: diff --git a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml index 4ae3c4aa77..3ea3a788df 100644 --- a/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ known_false_positives: "This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define \"fal tags: analytics_story: - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: diff --git a/detections/cloud_compute_instance_started_in_previously_unused_region.yml b/detections/cloud_compute_instance_started_in_previously_unused_region.yml index f1e972da8a..af26d3c450 100644 --- a/detections/cloud_compute_instance_started_in_previously_unused_region.yml +++ b/detections/cloud_compute_instance_started_in_previously_unused_region.yml @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ tags: - Cloud Cryptomining kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 12 nist: diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b8a866831 --- /dev/null +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by instance_id +id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822 +version: 1 +date: '2020-06-08' +description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific instance_id +how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) + and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail + inputs. +author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk +inputs: +- dest +search: 'sourcetype=aws:securityhub Resources{}.Id = "*$dest$" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Types{}) values(ProductFields.*) by Title Description Resources{}.Id' +tags: + analytics_story: + - Cloud Compute Instance From 27c181287d1188cf4e46027867607e293c09ac81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 16:44:39 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] adding draft reponses --- ...s_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml} | 5 +++-- ...c2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) rename response_tasks/{aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml => aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml} (82%) create mode 100644 response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml similarity index 82% rename from response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml rename to response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml index 8b8a866831..bd7a77214e 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_instance_id.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by instance_id +name: AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest id: b0d2e6a8-75fa-4b1b-9486-3d32acadf822 version: 1 date: '2020-06-08' -description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific instance_id +description: This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ search: 'sourcetype=aws:securityhub Resources{}.Id = "*$dest$" | stats count mi tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Compute Instance + - Cloud Cryptomining diff --git a/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml b/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7d64650f7b --- /dev/null +++ b/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +name: EC2 Instance Investigation and Notification +id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d83722212 +version: 1 +date: '2020-06-10' +description: Investigate an AWS Security Hub finding related to an exposed EC2 instance which is being probed by potentially malicious traffic. Gather information about the EC2 configuration, the activity on the server, and any remote IP addresses that are directing traffic at the server. Notify and assign the appropriate people using a Jira ticket and a Slack message, then initiate a prompt to ask a responder whether or not the EC2 instance should be moved to an isolated EC2 Security Group using another playbook called "EC2 Instance Isolation". +how_to_implement: Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open + the playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment. +author: Philip Royer, Splunk +playbook: + name: ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification + url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.8/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.json + url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.8/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.py +tags: + analytics_story: + - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities \ No newline at end of file From d8c3ded0daa88657d078124eb197d1d7020f4a4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 16:52:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] adding T1525 to mitre --- detections/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml | 2 ++ detections/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/detections/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml b/detections/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml index 40c531d147..2c4b21a42d 100644 --- a/detections/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml +++ b/detections/gcp_gcr_container_uploaded.yml @@ -25,3 +25,5 @@ tags: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation security_domain: threat asset_type: GCP GCR Container + mitre_attack_id: + - T1525 diff --git a/detections/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml b/detections/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml index 78800dfcdf..8dbb7808cf 100644 --- a/detections/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml +++ b/detections/new_container_uploaded_to_aws_ecr.yml @@ -24,3 +24,5 @@ tags: - Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation security_domain: threat asset_type: AWS ECR container + mitre_attack_id: + - T1525 From c1ccd745a2580c7d69b5f048343aa5c5650e88f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 13:34:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] updated search --- .../aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml index bd7a77214e..9d4425c5dc 100644 --- a/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml +++ b/response_tasks/aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.yml @@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ how_to_implement: You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or late author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk inputs: - dest -search: 'sourcetype=aws:securityhub Resources{}.Id = "*$dest$" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Types{}) values(ProductFields.*) by Title Description Resources{}.Id' +search: 'sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance +| rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*) | search instance = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table instance Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation' tags: analytics_story: - Cloud Compute Instance - Cloud Cryptomining + - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities + - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities From 047680d82ef083726e46c16e9a0c91d0ca534dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 16:59:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] untested playbook- remove for now --- ...c2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml | 15 --------------- 1 file changed, 15 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml diff --git a/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml b/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 7d64650f7b..0000000000 --- a/response_tasks/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -name: EC2 Instance Investigation and Notification -id: 3096f721-8842-42ce-2fc7-742d83722212 -version: 1 -date: '2020-06-10' -description: Investigate an AWS Security Hub finding related to an exposed EC2 instance which is being probed by potentially malicious traffic. Gather information about the EC2 configuration, the activity on the server, and any remote IP addresses that are directing traffic at the server. Notify and assign the appropriate people using a Jira ticket and a Slack message, then initiate a prompt to ask a responder whether or not the EC2 instance should be moved to an isolated EC2 Security Group using another playbook called "EC2 Instance Isolation". -how_to_implement: Synchronize the community playbook repository in Phantom, then open - the playbook and follow the deployment notes to configure it for your environment. -author: Philip Royer, Splunk -playbook: - name: ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification - url_json: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.8/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.json - url_python: https://github.com/phantomcyber/playbooks/blob/4.8/ec2_instance_investigation_and_notification.py -tags: - analytics_story: - - AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities \ No newline at end of file From f955708bfc8cc7aba67c87002c2330dc9b71bbfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 17:09:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] adding mitre id --- detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 3 +++ .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 ++ .../abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml | 2 ++ ...abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml | 2 ++ ...s_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml | 2 ++ ...loud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 ++ .../detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml | 2 ++ .../detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml | 2 ++ .../detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml | 2 ++ .../ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 ++ .../ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml | 3 +++ .../ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml | 2 ++ 17 files changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index c53af3d951..2e78b07fc9 100644 --- a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 + - T1496 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: diff --git a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml index 41a777f6b4..be65d9b894 100644 --- a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: diff --git a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml index bac36b30da..1da461f261 100644 --- a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user.yml @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: diff --git a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml index 94c4b059e3..f98cd8c857 100644 --- a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml +++ b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk.yml @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: diff --git a/detections/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml b/detections/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml index 0856164363..1540a3dc64 100644 --- a/detections/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml +++ b/detections/aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account.yml @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ tags: - AWS Cross Account Activity kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml index 07dbaa29f6..b8353f7744 100644 --- a/detections/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ tags: - Cloud Cryptomining cis20: - CIS 1 + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 nist: - ID.AM security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/detections/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml b/detections/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml index 6539c00e6e..6b5d0f1902 100644 --- a/detections/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml +++ b/detections/detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.yml @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ tags: - Actions on Objectives cis20: - CIS 16 + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 nist: - DE.DP - DE.CM diff --git a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml index a3797cc46e..63ab5474a1 100644 --- a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml +++ b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city.yml @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml index 60fccc3b0a..b7d7713507 100644 --- a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml +++ b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country.yml @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml index 47ac42c4f2..ad7cbada7b 100644 --- a/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml +++ b/detections/detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region.yml @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index ccba53241e..898e93db3b 100644 --- a/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ known_false_positives: It is possible that there are legitimate user roles makin tags: analytics_story: - AWS User Monitoring + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml b/detections/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml index 18071951e4..33f7c81de0 100644 --- a/detections/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml +++ b/detections/detect_new_user_aws_console_login.yml @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS Login Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml b/detections/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml index 297e860092..aaa5ccb783 100644 --- a/detections/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml +++ b/detections/detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity.yml @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ tags: - AWS User Monitoring kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml b/detections/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml index 92c2cc49ae..ea9f1d25dd 100644 --- a/detections/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml +++ b/detections/detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.yml @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ tags: - AWS User Monitoring kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 16 nist: diff --git a/detections/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 88e2e4f956..f6c67ea26c 100644 --- a/detections/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ known_false_positives: It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 in tags: analytics_story: - Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: diff --git a/detections/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml b/detections/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml index ab52ff8feb..e2a2d6f12d 100644 --- a/detections/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml +++ b/detections/ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.yml @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 + - T1535 cis20: - CIS 12 nist: diff --git a/detections/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml b/detections/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml index 2eb9eec2d6..b2f4bdce6a 100644 --- a/detections/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml +++ b/detections/ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.yml @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ tags: analytics_story: - AWS Cryptomining - Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities + mitre_attack_id: + - T1078 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: From 3c1d9cb4166668a8e284be6690cad3f31898faf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 17:11:33 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] adding T1098 --- detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml b/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml index 898e93db3b..c0a1bf5067 100644 --- a/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml +++ b/detections/detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.yml @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ tags: - AWS User Monitoring mitre_attack_id: - T1078 + - T1098 cis20: - CIS 1 nist: From c812c56d87bcb03fed90fc7b42c6bbf0323a4ab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bpatel Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2020 17:21:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] updates with T1530 --- detections/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml | 2 ++ detections/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/detections/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml b/detections/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml index 889947bac6..bce49e3cf9 100644 --- a/detections/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml +++ b/detections/detect_new_open_s3_buckets.yml @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1530 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: diff --git a/detections/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml b/detections/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml index 0230e522c9..9d9367c70c 100644 --- a/detections/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml +++ b/detections/detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.yml @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ tags: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives + mitre_attack_id: + - T1530 cis20: - CIS 13 - CIS 14 diff --git a/detections/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml b/detections/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml index ddfd7e1b94..6bed383c97 100644 --- a/detections/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml +++ b/detections/detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion.yml @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ known_false_positives: Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviation tags: analytics_story: - Suspicious AWS S3 Activities + mitre_attack_id: + - T1530 kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives cis20: From 6ea36044817ca79deb740645c42e8f88882a90d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rod Soto Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 14:36:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] fixedaddedcondition --- detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml b/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml index b24ed7a2b2..95b86696f1 100644 --- a/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml +++ b/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ id: 1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8 known_false_positives: "Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection." name: "Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access detection" references: [] -search: "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json index=azure_test category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access`" +search: "sourcetype=mscs:storage:blob:json category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access`" tags: analytics_story: - "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity" From e432a4ab5010b6100e48b00d74a4a9f5a8408b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rod Soto Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 14:52:41 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] fixedservaccounatct --- ...ure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml b/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml index 5354724a71..c750867252 100644 --- a/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml +++ b/detections/kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace.yml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ id: 55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72 known_false_positives: "Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness." name: "Azure AKS Kubernetes detect most active service accounts by pod and namespaces" references: [] -search: "sourcetype:mscs:storage:blob:json category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace`" +search: "sourcetype:mscs:storage:blob:json category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace`" tags: analytics_story: - "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity" From 836c123569703e72fa221742d40de035cdde2969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bhavin Patel Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 13:57:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] Update abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml --- detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml index 2e78b07fc9..5a496f8565 100644 --- a/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml +++ b/detections/abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user.yml @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ tags: - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1078 - - T1496 cis20: - CIS 13 nist: From 8f57b5362fbbef3efacbbc83570e0ae40b1d6ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: research bot Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 22:40:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] updating docs and package bits [ci skip] --- docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki | 22 ++ docs/stories_categories.md | 22 ++ package/app.manifest | 2 +- package/default/analytic_stories.conf | 184 +++++----- package/default/analyticstories.conf | 256 +++++++++----- package/default/app.conf | 4 +- package/default/collections.conf | 2 +- package/default/content-version.conf | 2 +- ...nvestigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml | 9 + package/default/es_investigations.conf | 138 ++++---- package/default/macros.conf | 26 +- package/default/savedsearches.conf | 323 ++++++++++++++++-- package/default/transforms.conf | 2 +- package/default/use_case_library.conf | 258 ++++++++------ package/default/workflow_actions.conf | 9 + package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv | 126 +++---- 16 files changed, 940 insertions(+), 445 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml diff --git a/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki b/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki index e46d12a94e..52e0034ea4 100644 --- a/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki +++ b/docs/splunk_docs_categories.wiki @@ -1937,6 +1937,7 @@ This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudT ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -1982,6 +1983,8 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2075,6 +2078,7 @@ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precisio ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== @@ -2119,6 +2123,8 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover A ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 +* T1098 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2170,6 +2176,8 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your clo ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2213,6 +2221,7 @@ Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1525 =====Kill Chain Phases===== @@ -2281,6 +2290,9 @@ This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes clu Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. ====Detections==== +* AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access +* Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access +* Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls * Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access * Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access * Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls @@ -2319,6 +2331,9 @@ This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities ====Detections==== +* Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account +* Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod +* Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access * Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account * Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace * Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access @@ -2369,6 +2384,8 @@ AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, a ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2414,6 +2431,8 @@ It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2457,6 +2476,7 @@ Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfa ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1530 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2546,6 +2566,7 @@ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authent ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1535 =====Kill Chain Phases===== * Actions on Objectives @@ -2587,6 +2608,7 @@ A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modificatio ====Tags==== =====ATT&CK===== +* T1078 =====Kill Chain Phases===== diff --git a/docs/stories_categories.md b/docs/stories_categories.md index 83290d9ce0..fd64b747e6 100644 --- a/docs/stories_categories.md +++ b/docs/stories_categories.md @@ -1835,6 +1835,7 @@ This Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudT #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -1874,6 +1875,8 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -1955,6 +1958,7 @@ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precisio #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases @@ -1993,6 +1997,8 @@ The detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover A #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 +* T1098 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2038,6 +2044,8 @@ This Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your clo #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2075,6 +2083,7 @@ Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1525 ##### Kill Chain Phases @@ -2131,6 +2140,9 @@ This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes clu Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. #### Detections +* AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access +* Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access +* Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls * Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access * Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access * Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls @@ -2163,6 +2175,9 @@ This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities #### Detections +* Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account +* Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod +* Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access * Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account * Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace * Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access @@ -2207,6 +2222,8 @@ AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, a #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2246,6 +2263,8 @@ It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2283,6 +2302,7 @@ Among things to look out for are S3 access from unfamiliar locations and by unfa #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1530 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2360,6 +2380,7 @@ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authent #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1535 ##### Kill Chain Phases * Actions on Objectives @@ -2395,6 +2416,7 @@ A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modificatio #### Mappings ##### ATT&CK +* T1078 ##### Kill Chain Phases diff --git a/package/app.manifest b/package/app.manifest index cf6ddf15ed..d0f392cc90 100644 --- a/package/app.manifest +++ b/package/app.manifest @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ "id": { "group": null, "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", - "version": "3.0.2" + "version": "3.0.3" }, "author": [ { diff --git a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf index d9ac8f7a54..f4d030bb56 100644 --- a/package/default/analytic_stories.conf +++ b/package/default/analytic_stories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ id = 2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a version = 1 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ id = ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750 version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. @@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ id = 3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3 version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ version = 1 reference = [] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Change"] providing_technologies = none @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"] data_models = ["Network_Sessions"] providing_technologies = none @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -183,9 +183,9 @@ id = 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types"] data_models = ["Cloud_Infrastructure"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1074", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048", "T1095"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ id = aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246 version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP GCR container uploaded - Rule", "ESCU - New container uploaded to AWS ECR - Rule"] -mappings = {} +mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS ECR container listing activity"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 3 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1064", "T1086"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1050", "T1053", "T1059", "T1064", "T1078", "T1086", "T1089", "T1103", "T1112", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1059", "T1089", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1059", "T1072", "T1087", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1059", "T1064", "T1076"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-05-20 id = 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ea version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"] +detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ modification_date = 2020-05-20 id = 2574e6d9-7254-4751-8925-0447deeec8ew version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] -detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule"] +detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule"] mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1075", "T1076", "T1208"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ version = 4 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1064", "T1086"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -591,8 +591,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Updates"] providing_technologies = none @@ -642,8 +642,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1089"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. @@ -659,8 +659,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1059", "T1064"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. @@ -702,8 +702,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1064", "T1086", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1043", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053", "T1070", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Authentication"] providing_technologies = none @@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1076", "T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security"] data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"] providing_technologies = none @@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"] data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"] providing_technologies = none @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -891,9 +891,9 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3 version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. @@ -907,9 +907,9 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3 version = 1 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. @@ -923,8 +923,8 @@ id = 2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50w3168af3 version = 2 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP", "ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "nist": ["PR.AC"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -960,9 +960,9 @@ id = 6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c version = 1 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]} investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail - DM"] data_models = ["Authentication"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. @@ -978,8 +978,8 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1059", "T1064"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. @@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1043", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Network_Resolution"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"] data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1030,8 +1030,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1103", "T1131"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. @@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1084"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1042", "T1103", "T1112", "T1131", "T1138"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1102,8 +1102,8 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"] -support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity"] +support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. @@ -1118,8 +1118,8 @@ id = 73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0 version = 1 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"] -mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1036", "T1085"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Network_Traffic"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] support_searches = [] data_models = [] providing_technologies = none @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1089", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ version = 1 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1042"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1053", "T1058", "T1103", "T1131", "T1138"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ version = 2 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1015", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = [] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ version = 3 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"] mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1050", "T1058"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]} -investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services"] data_models = ["Endpoint"] providing_technologies = none diff --git a/package/default/analyticstories.conf b/package/default/analyticstories.conf index 7d623c1499..5a94fdc3db 100644 --- a/package/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/package/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-18T19:50:40 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ version = 1 references = [] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts. narrative = Monitoring user accounts within your enterprise is a critical analytic function that helps ensure that credential and access policies/procedures are properly implemented and are being enforced. Proactive ad-hoc hunting, as well as routine monitoring, can ensure user or system accounts are not being abused by unauthorized individuals or processes. In the event of a network event or breach, user-authentication logs are a key resource in determining if or how an account might have been compromised or co-opted, leading to suspicious or malicious activity. @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"] +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"] +searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"] description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] +searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running). @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications. @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"] description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ version = 4 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\ The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint. @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\ It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched. @@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. narrative = This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ \ @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\ Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\ @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\ @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"] +searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"] description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ @@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \ The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\ @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity"] description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \ Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior. @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. @@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\ These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\ @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. @@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. @@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -992,10 +992,20 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity` support search only once to create the baseline of previously seen cross account activity. Thanks to Pablo Vega at Recurly for suggesting improvements to the search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance @@ -1022,7 +1032,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1032,7 +1042,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1042,7 +1052,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1052,7 +1062,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1164,7 +1174,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1194,7 +1204,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types\" support search to create a baseline of previously seen regions. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1267,7 +1277,7 @@ type = detection asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. -how_to_implement = You must enable Powershell scriptblock logging in order to detect this attack.This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. +how_to_implement = none annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1380,7 +1390,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not ye 1. \ 1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1390,7 +1400,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1400,7 +1410,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1410,7 +1420,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1544,7 +1554,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), and then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1614,7 +1624,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour providing_technologies = [] @@ -1630,7 +1640,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) 1. \ 1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -1650,7 +1660,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1660,7 +1670,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1756,7 +1766,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1098"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1766,7 +1776,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1848,7 +1858,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1858,7 +1868,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1888,7 +1898,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2010,7 +2020,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GCR Container confidence = medium explanation = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {} +annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2064,6 +2074,56 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on O known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster @@ -2118,7 +2178,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information on Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +explanation = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets @@ -2270,7 +2330,7 @@ asset_type = AWS ECR container confidence = medium explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {} +annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3013,6 +3073,14 @@ providing_technologies = [] ### RESPONSE TASKS ### +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN] type = investigation explanation = none diff --git a/package/default/app.conf b/package/default/app.conf index f043eae170..da8305adad 100644 --- a/package/default/app.conf +++ b/package/default/app.conf @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ is_configured = false state = enabled state_change_requires_restart = false -build = 6257 +build = 6430 [triggers] reload.analytic_stories = simple @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple [launcher] author = Splunk -version = 3.0.2 +version = 3.0.3 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates. [ui] diff --git a/package/default/collections.conf b/package/default/collections.conf index cfb8d7deba..b42380c5f4 100644 --- a/package/default/collections.conf +++ b/package/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/package/default/content-version.conf b/package/default/content-version.conf index 9fd8d76467..130dcdfca6 100644 --- a/package/default/content-version.conf +++ b/package/default/content-version.conf @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ [content-version] -version = 3.0.2 +version = 3.0.3 diff --git a/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2ed2eb4181 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest.xml @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + + + + sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*) | search instance = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table instance Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation + + + +
+ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/package/default/es_investigations.conf b/package/default/es_investigations.conf index d78e251e8c..143860a340 100644 --- a/package/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/package/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -3,79 +3,79 @@ label = AWS Cross Account Activity description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_cryptomining] label = AWS Cryptomining description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_network_acl_activity] label = AWS Network ACL Activity description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities] label = AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_aws_user_monitoring] label = AWS User Monitoring description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_account_monitoring_and_controls] label = Account Monitoring and Controls description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_apache_struts_vulnerability] label = Apache Struts Vulnerability description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_asset_tracking] label = Asset Tracking description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_brand_monitoring] label = Brand Monitoring description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_cloud_cryptomining] label = Cloud Cryptomining description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_coldroot_macos_rat] label = ColdRoot MacOS RAT description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_collection_and_staging] label = Collection and Staging description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_command_and_control] label = Command and Control description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_common_phishing_frameworks] label = Common Phishing Frameworks @@ -93,19 +93,19 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activit label = Credential Dumping description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dhs_report_ta18_074a] label = DHS Report TA18-074A description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_amplification_attacks] label = DNS Amplification Attacks description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dns_hijacking] label = DNS Hijacking @@ -117,49 +117,49 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] label = Data Protection description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_disabling_security_tools] label = Disabling Security Tools description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_dynamic_dns] label = Dynamic DNS description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18_201a_] label = Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_hidden_cobra_malware] label = Hidden Cobra Malware description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_host_redirection] label = Host Redirection description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_jboss_vulnerability] label = JBoss Vulnerability description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_scanning_activity] label = Kubernetes Scanning Activity description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_kubernetes_sensitive_object_access_activity] label = Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity @@ -177,43 +177,43 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] label = Lateral Movement description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_malicious_powershell] label = Malicious PowerShell description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_backup_solution] label = Monitor Backup Solution description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_unauthorized_software] label = Monitor for Unauthorized Software description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_monitor_for_updates] label = Monitor for Updates description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_netsh_abuse] label = Netsh Abuse description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_orangeworm_attack_group] label = Orangeworm Attack Group description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_phishing_payloads] label = Phishing Payloads @@ -225,61 +225,61 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info"] label = Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_prohibited_traffic_allowed_or_protocol_mismatch] label = Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_ransomware] label = Ransomware description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_router_and_infrastructure_security] label = Router and Infrastructure Security description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_sql_injection] label = SQL Injection description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_samsam_ransomware] label = SamSam Ransomware description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerabilities] label = Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability] label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_splunk_enterprise_vulnerability_cve_2018_11409] label = Splunk Enterprise Vulnerability CVE-2018-11409 description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_ec2_activities] label = Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_login_activities] label = Suspicious AWS Login Activities @@ -291,13 +291,13 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] label = Suspicious AWS S3 Activities description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_aws_traffic] label = Suspicious AWS Traffic description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_cloud_authentication_activities] label = Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities @@ -309,112 +309,128 @@ panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_pane label = Suspicious Command-Line Executions description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_dns_traffic] label = Suspicious DNS Traffic description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio", "panel://workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_emails] label = Suspicious Emails description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_email_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_mshta_activity] label = Suspicious MSHTA Activity description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_okta_activity] label = Suspicious Okta Activity description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_wmi_use] label = Suspicious WMI Use description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_windows_registry_activities] label = Suspicious Windows Registry Activities description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_suspicious_zoom_child_processes] label = Suspicious Zoom Child Processes description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_aws_ec2_modifications] label = Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid", "panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_unusual_processes] label = Unusual Processes description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_use_of_cleartext_protocols] label = Use of Cleartext Protocols description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_web_fraud_detection] label = Web Fraud Detection description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id", "panel://workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_defense_evasion_tactics] label = Windows Defense Evasion Tactics description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_file_extension_and_association_abuse] label = Windows File Extension and Association Abuse description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_log_manipulation] label = Windows Log Manipulation description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_persistence_techniques] label = Windows Persistence Techniques description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_privilege_escalation] label = Windows Privilege Escalation description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_registry_activities", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] [panel_group://workbench_panel_group_windows_service_abuse] label = Windows Service Abuse description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. disabled = 0 -panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint"] +panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history", "panel://workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint", "panel://workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info", "panel://workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user"] +[panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest] +label = AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +disabled = 0 +tokens = {\ + "dest": {\ + "valuePrefix": "",\ + "valueSuffix": "",\ + "delimiter": " OR ",\ + "valueType": "primitive",\ + "value": "asset",\ + "default": "_1!=1"\ + }\ +}\ + + [panel://workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn] label = AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information. diff --git a/package/default/macros.conf b/package/default/macros.conf index 8883a84a5c..df1b423602 100644 --- a/package/default/macros.conf +++ b/package/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -279,6 +279,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -683,6 +687,26 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. diff --git a/package/default/savedsearches.conf b/package/default/savedsearches.conf index fa869268a4..449b91f0bd 100644 --- a/package/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/package/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceI action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity` support search only once to create the baseline of previously seen cross account activity. Thanks to Pablo Vega at Recurly for suggesting improvements to the search. @@ -211,6 +211,45 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId != requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | multireport [| stats min(eval(coalesce(firstTime, _time))) as firstTime max(eval(coalesce(lastTime, _time))) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | where fact=fiction] [| eventstats min(eval(coalesce(firstTime, _time))) as firstTime, max(eval(coalesce(lastTime, _time))) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | where firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m") AND isnotnull(_time) | spath output=accessKeyId path=responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId | spath output=requestingARN path=resources{}.ARN | stats values(awsRegion) as awsRegion values(firstTime) as firstTime values(lastTime) as lastTime values(sharedEventID) as sharedEventID, values(requestingARN) as src_user, values(responseElements.assumedRoleUser.arn) as dest_user by _time, requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, accessKeyId] | table _time, firstTime, lastTime, src_user, requestingAccountId, dest_user, requestedAccountId, awsRegion, accessKeyId, sharedEventID | `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter` +[ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.notable.param.rule_title = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter` + [ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -295,7 +334,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. @@ -334,7 +373,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. @@ -374,7 +413,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. @@ -413,7 +452,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket sp action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. @@ -853,7 +892,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS de action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Cloud_Infrastructure"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. @@ -973,7 +1012,7 @@ search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Cloud_Infrastructure"] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types\" support search to create a baseline of previously seen regions. @@ -1632,7 +1671,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=fa action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for successful CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also populate the `identity_lookup_expanded` lookup shipped with the Asset and Identity framework to be able to look up users in your identity table in Enterprise Security (ES). Leverage the support search called "Create a list of approved AWS service accounts": run it once every 30 days to create and validate a list of service accounts.\ @@ -1678,7 +1717,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search N action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. @@ -1718,7 +1757,7 @@ search = | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firs action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. @@ -1758,7 +1797,7 @@ search = | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins.csv | stats min(firs action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. @@ -2250,7 +2289,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earl action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), and then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. @@ -2529,7 +2568,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. @@ -2568,7 +2607,7 @@ search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_s action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.\ @@ -2654,7 +2693,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_eve action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. @@ -2694,7 +2733,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=Dele action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. @@ -3057,7 +3096,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1098"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. @@ -3097,7 +3136,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. @@ -3419,7 +3458,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. @@ -3459,7 +3498,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_mod action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. @@ -3577,7 +3616,7 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunI action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. -action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. @@ -4055,7 +4094,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_ action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. -action.escu.mappings = {} +action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. @@ -4287,6 +4326,203 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `wineventlog_security` EventID=4769 TicketOptions=0x40810000 TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ServiceName) values(TargetUserName) values(user) by TargetDomainName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter` +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts objectRef.resource=pods | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} src_user userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter` + +[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"] +cron_schedule = 1 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user'] +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls +action.notable.param.security_domain = threat +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI | stats count by src_ip src_user verb userAgent requestURI |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` + [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -4363,7 +4599,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = sourcetype:mscs:storage:blob:json category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter` [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4402,7 +4638,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter` [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -4485,10 +4721,10 @@ search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | s [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 -description = This search provides information on Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +description = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} action.escu.data_models = [] -action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.escu.eli5 = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26 @@ -4505,7 +4741,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +action.notable.param.rule_description = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context action.notable.param.rule_title = Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls action.notable.param.security_domain = threat action.notable.param.severity = high @@ -4519,7 +4755,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` +search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI|`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter` [ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -5079,7 +5315,7 @@ search = `okta` outcome.reason=INVALID_CREDENTIALS | rename client.geographicalC action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. -action.escu.mappings = {} +action.escu.mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} action.escu.data_models = [] action.escu.eli5 = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. @@ -8936,6 +9172,27 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FRO ### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ### +[ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +action.escu.search_type = investigative +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08 +action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08 +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Cloud Compute Instance", "Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"] +action.escu.earliest_time_offset = 3600 +action.escu.latest_time_offset = 86400 +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id). +action.escu.how_to_implement = none +action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time +disabled = true +schedule_window = auto +is_visible = false +search = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?.*) | search instance = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation | table instance Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation + [ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 diff --git a/package/default/transforms.conf b/package/default/transforms.conf index 7301d3e964..f795792ed0 100644 --- a/package/default/transforms.conf +++ b/package/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/package/default/use_case_library.conf b/package/default/use_case_library.conf index 2ac89ebe3e..5a94fdc3db 100644 --- a/package/default/use_case_library.conf +++ b/package/default/use_case_library.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content -# On Date: 2020-06-25T07:52:12 UTC +# On Date: 2020-06-25T22:36:57 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By Source User", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId"] description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity. narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\ Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\ @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls. @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region"] +searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network. narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\ This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further. @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment. narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\ In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage. \ @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ version = 1 references = [] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = A common attack technique is to leverage user accounts to gain unauthorized access to the target's network. This Analytic Story minimizes opportunities for attack by helping you actively manage creation/use/dormancy/deletion--the lifecycle of system and application accounts. narrative = Monitoring user accounts within your enterprise is a critical analytic function that helps ensure that credential and access policies/procedures are properly implemented and are being enforced. Proactive ad-hoc hunting, as well as routine monitoring, can ensure user or system accounts are not being abused by unauthorized individuals or processes. In the event of a network event or breach, user-authentication logs are a key resource in determining if or how an account might have been compromised or co-opted, leading to suspicious or malicious activity. @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities. narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's 5th largest data breach. The target, credit giant Equifax, told investigators that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack. \ The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\ @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further. narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets. @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name. narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible3phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\ You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\ @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] +searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Started In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Investigate Cloud Compute Instance Activities", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In All Cloud Regions", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Single Cloud Region", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior. narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority. \ Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN. \ @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more. narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before—a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\ This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\ @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\ Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence. \ @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators. narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\ Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists. @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations"] +searches = ["ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"] description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping. narrative = Credential dumping—gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted—is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\ Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\ @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Name Used by Dragonfly Threat Actors - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more. narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity. \ There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic dataѿall of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure. \ @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims. narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\ The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims. @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] +searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records. narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\ The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well. \ @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration. narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point. @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others. narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running). @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists. narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified. @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment. narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/). For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants. \ According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\ @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A. narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\ These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\ @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website. narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications. @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others. narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\ It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\ @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip"] description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster. @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects. @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces. narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts. narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\ Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\ @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ version = 4 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent. narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\ The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \ @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - All backup logs for host"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints. narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations. Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint. @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\ It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches. narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\ Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\ @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\ To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`. @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry. narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\ Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\ @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"] description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack. narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email. \ As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack. \ @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group. narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\ iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\ @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers. narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts. @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others. narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware. @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers. narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\ This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure— effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data. @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters. narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\ This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment. @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Update Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint"] description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more. narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\ Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\ @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched. @@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Keeping your Splunk deployment up to date is critical and may help you reduce the risk of CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirection vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise. The detection search will help ensure that users are being properly authenticated and not being redirected to malicious domains. narrative = This Analytic Story is associated with CVE-2016-4859, an open-redirect vulnerability in the following versions of Splunk Enterprise:\ \ @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From src ip", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Reduce the risk of CVE-2018-11409, an information disclosure vulnerability within some older versions of Splunk Enterprise, with searches designed to help ensure that your Splunk system does not leak information to authenticated users. narrative = Although there have been no reports of it being exploited, Splunk Enterprise versions through 7.0.1 reportedly have a vulnerability that may expose information through a REST endpoint (read more here: https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings). NIST has included it in its vulnerability database (read more here: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409). The REST endpoint that exposes system information is also necessary for the proper operation of Splunk clustering and instrumentation. Customers should upgrade to the latest version to reduce the risk of this vulnerability.\ Splunk Enterprise exposes partial information about the host operating system, hardware, and Splunk license. Splunk Enterprise before 6.6.0 exposes this information without authentication. Splunk Enterprise 6.6.0 and later exposes this information only to authenticated Splunk users. Based on the information exposure, Splunk characterizes this issue as a low severity impact.\ @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it. narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities. @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker. @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required. narrative = As cloud computing has exploded, so has the number of creative attacks on virtual environments. And as the number-two cloud-service provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has certainly had its share.\ Amazon's "shared responsibility" model dictates that the company has responsibility for the environment outside of the VM and the customer is responsible for the security inside of the S3 container. As such, it's important to stay vigilant for activities that may belie suspicious behavior inside of your environment.\ @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"] description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC). narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network. \ Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\ @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - DM - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"] description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\ This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS. @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems. narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation. @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host"] description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses. narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness). However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses. @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story. narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\ Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions: \ @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code. narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\ One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\ @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app"] +searches = ["ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address"] description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors. narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom. \ While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important. \ @@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred. narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \ The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\ @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system. narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\ The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\ @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Registry Activity"] description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection. narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\ Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation. @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History"] +searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"] description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation. narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised. \ Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior. @@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation. narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\ This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\ @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted. narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems. @@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"] +searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable Info"] description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets. narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\ These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\ @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms. @@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques. narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications. \ Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe. \ @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint"] description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense. narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\ The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified). @@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment. narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment. @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Web Activity From Host", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Registry Activities", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more. narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment. @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ version = 3 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint"] +searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get User Information from Identity Table", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable Info", "ESCU - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Risk Modifiers For User"] description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner. narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection. @@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching over plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources" support search once to create a history of previously seen locations that have provisioned AWS resources. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "false positive" slightly differently. Every time this fires, it will accurately reflect the first occurrence in the time period you're searching within, plus what is stored in the cache feature. But while there are really no "false positives" in a traditional sense, there is definitely lots of noise.\ This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you. providing_technologies = [] @@ -992,10 +992,20 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the `Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity` support search only once to create the baseline of previously seen cross account activity. Thanks to Pablo Vega at Recurly for suggesting improvements to the search. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.DS", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule] type = detection asset_type = AWS Instance @@ -1022,7 +1032,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1032,7 +1042,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1042,7 +1052,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1052,7 +1062,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1164,7 +1174,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the "Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User" support search to create of baseline of previously seen users. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1194,7 +1204,7 @@ asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. how_to_implement = You must be ingesting the appropriate cloud-infrastructure logs and have the Security Research cloud data model (https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research/) installed. Run the \"Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types\" support search to create a baseline of previously seen regions. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1380,7 +1390,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`firstTime`,`lastTime`) that are not ye 1. \ 1. **Label:** Last Time, **Field:** lastTime\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1390,7 +1400,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1400,7 +1410,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1410,7 +1420,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1544,7 +1554,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), and then configure your CloudTrail inputs. The threshold value should be tuned to your environment. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1614,7 +1624,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your S3 access logs' inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen S3 Bucket Access by Remote IP" support search once to create a history of previously seen remote IPs and bucket names. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.AC", "DE.CM"]} known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour providing_technologies = [] @@ -1630,7 +1640,7 @@ This search produces fields (`eventName`,`numberOfApiCalls`,`uniqueApisCalled`) 1. \ 1. **Label:** Unique API Calls, **Field:** uniqueApisCalled\ Detailed documentation on how to create a new field within Incident Review may be found here: `https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.3.0/Admin/Customizenotables#Add_a_field_to_the_notable_event_details` -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = providing_technologies = [] @@ -1650,7 +1660,7 @@ asset_type = S3 Bucket confidence = medium explanation = This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike. This search works best when you run the "Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN" support search once to create a baseline of previously seen S3 bucket-deletion activity. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1660,7 +1670,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You can modify `dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold` to better fit your environment. The `dataPointThreshold` variable is the minimum number of data points required to have a statistically significant amount of data to determine. The `deviationThreshold` variable is the number of standard deviations away from the mean that the value must be to be considered a spike.This search works best when you run the "Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN" support search once to create a history of previously seen Security Group Activity. To add or remove API event names for security groups, edit the macro `security_group_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]} known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1756,7 +1766,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail" support search once to create a history of previously seen user roles. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1098"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1766,7 +1776,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1848,7 +1858,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. To add or remove APIs that modify an EC2 instance, edit the macro `ec2_modification_api_calls`. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1858,7 +1868,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen AWS Regions" support search only once to create of baseline of previously seen regions. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1888,7 +1898,7 @@ asset_type = AWS Instance confidence = medium explanation = This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. This search works best when you run the "Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User" support search once to create a history of previously seen ARNs. -annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]} known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2010,7 +2020,7 @@ asset_type = GCP GCR Container confidence = medium explanation = This search show information on uploaded containers including source user, account, action, bucket name event name, http user agent, message and destination path. how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a subpub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_gcp_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {} +annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. GCP GCR registers container upload as a Storage event, this search must be considered under the context of CONTAINER upload creation which automatically generates a bucket entry for destination path. providing_technologies = [] @@ -2064,6 +2074,56 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on O known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default NetApp may generate false positives providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster +confidence = medium +explanation = This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +how_to_implement = You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with cloudwatch logs. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} +known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster @@ -2118,7 +2178,7 @@ providing_technologies = [] type = detection asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster confidence = medium -explanation = This search provides information on Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context +explanation = This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context how_to_implement = You must install the Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services and Configure Kube-Audit data diagnostics annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]} known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets @@ -2270,7 +2330,7 @@ asset_type = AWS ECR container confidence = medium explanation = This searches show information on uploaded containers including source user, image id, source IP user type, http user agent, region, first time, last time of operation (PutImage). These searches are based on Cloud Infrastructure Data Model. how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model. Please also customize the `container_implant_aws_detection_filter` macro to filter out the false positives. -annotations = {} +annotations = {"mitre_attack": ["T1525"]} known_false_positives = Uploading container is a normal behavior from developers or users with access to container registry. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3013,6 +3073,14 @@ providing_technologies = [] ### RESPONSE TASKS ### +[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest] +type = investigation +explanation = none +how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. +known_false_positives = not defined +earliest_time_offset = 14400 +latest_time_offset = 0 + [savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN] type = investigation explanation = none diff --git a/package/default/workflow_actions.conf b/package/default/workflow_actions.conf index e18c065b73..10b27179de 100644 --- a/package/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/package/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1,4 +1,13 @@ +[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest]] +label = Workbench - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest +type = link +fields = *dest* +display_location = field_menu +link.uri = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true +link.target = blank +link.method = get + [workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn]] label = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN type = link diff --git a/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv index 38dfbe4c46..fecfaed157 100644 --- a/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv +++ b/package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,no T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,APT33|Equation T1223,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion|Execution,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion|Execution,Cobalt Group T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus +T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion|Execution,Cobalt Group T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Leviathan T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no T1191,CMSTP,Defense Evasion|Execution,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater @@ -53,85 +53,85 @@ T1196,Control Panel Items,Defense Evasion|Execution,no T1214,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,Soft Cell T1207,DCShadow,Defense Evasion,no T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28 -T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|APT32|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM -T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no -T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Leviathan|APT29|Patchwork|TA459|Elderwood T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 +T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,no -T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|APT32|Elderwood|Patchwork|APT37|PLATINUM +T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT29|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459 T1208,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no T1215,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence,no -T1198,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1194,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound -T1192,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Turla|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|FIN8 -T1206,Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation,no -T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,APT41|Elderwood +T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,OilRig T1205,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1198,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion|Execution,TA505|Rancor|Cobalt Group +T1194,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound T1219,Remote Access Tools,Command And Control,Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion|Execution,APT32 -T1193,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|Lazarus Group|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT29|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT37|menuPass|Leviathan|Magic Hound|PLATINUM -T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass +T1193,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT19|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Elderwood|APT29|menuPass|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Magic Hound|PLATINUM +T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,APT41|Elderwood T1209,Time Providers,Persistence,no -T1204,User Execution,Execution,Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT33|APT19|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Dark Caracal|DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Turla|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|APT32|OilRig|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Rancor|APT37|APT29|FIN8|APT28|menuPass|TA459|Magic Hound|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM +T1204,User Execution,Execution,Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Turla|OilRig|DarkHydrus|MuddyWater|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|Rancor|Lazarus Group|APT32|APT37|APT28|APT29|FIN8|menuPass|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|Magic Hound|PLATINUM +T1192,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|Turla|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Magic Hound|FIN8|Patchwork +T1206,Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation,no +T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass T1182,AppCert DLLs,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Honeybee T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,MuddyWater T1172,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29 T1173,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 T1181,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 T1179,Hooking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Credential Access,PLATINUM -T1183,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistence|Defense Evasion,TEMP.Veles -T1171,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay,Credential Access,no +T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 T1177,LSASS Driver,Execution|Persistence,no -T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no -T1170,Mshta,Defense Evasion|Execution,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 +T1171,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay,Credential Access,no T1188,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,FIN4|APT29 -T1180,Screensaver,Persistence,no +T1170,Mshta,Defense Evasion|Execution,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 +T1183,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistence|Defense Evasion,TEMP.Veles +T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no T1174,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access,no +T1184,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no +T1180,Screensaver,Persistence,no T1186,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion,no T1178,SID-History Injection,Privilege Escalation,no -T1184,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no T1156,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Persistence,no T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1155,AppleScript,Execution|Lateral Movement,no T1138,Application Shimming,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,FIN7 -T1139,Bash History,Credential Access,no T1146,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41 -T1136,Create Account,Persistence,APT41|Soft Cell|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 -T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER +T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER T1157,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1144,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no -T1148,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no -T1158,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group -T1147,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no T1143,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound +T1139,Bash History,Credential Access,no +T1148,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no +T1147,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no +T1136,Create Account,Persistence,APT41|Soft Cell|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 T1141,Input Prompt,Credential Access,FIN4 -T1161,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Persistence,no +T1144,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no +T1158,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no +T1152,Launchctl,Defense Evasion|Execution|Persistence,no +T1162,Login Item,Persistence,no +T1168,Local Job Scheduling,Persistence|Execution,no +T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,APT32|APT28 T1142,Keychain,Credential Access,no T1159,Launch Agent,Persistence,no -T1152,Launchctl,Defense Evasion|Execution|Persistence,no -T1160,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1168,Local Job Scheduling,Persistence|Execution,no -T1162,Login Item,Persistence,no T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug +T1161,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Persistence,no +T1160,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1150,Plist Modification,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1145,Private Keys,Credential Access,no +T1163,Rc.common,Persistence,no +T1151,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion|Execution,no +T1153,Source,Execution,no +T1164,Re-opened Applications,Persistence,no +T1169,Sudo,Privilege Escalation,no +T1154,Trap,Execution|Persistence,no T1167,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no T1166,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1165,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,APT32|APT28 -T1163,Rc.common,Persistence,no -T1153,Source,Execution,no -T1164,Re-opened Applications,Persistence,no -T1151,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion|Execution,no -T1169,Sudo,Privilege Escalation,no -T1154,Trap,Execution|Persistence,no T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork T1131,Authentication Package,Persistence,no @@ -151,19 +151,19 @@ T1118,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion|Execution,no T1117,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion|Execution,WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda T1116,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|APT37|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT38 -T1114,Email Collection,Collection,FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Magic Hound|Leafminer|APT1 +T1114,Email Collection,Collection,FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Ke3chang|Leafminer|APT1 T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|Dark Caracal|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 -T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8 +T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT41|APT33|Leafminer|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group|Turla T1109,Component Firmware,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Equation T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|Threat Group-3390 -T1107,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 +T1107,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 T1106,Execution through API,Execution,Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group -T1105,Remote File Copy,Command And Control|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|FIN8|APT37|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1105,Remote File Copy,Command And Control|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|FIN10|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,MuddyWater|APT3 T1103,AppInit DLLs,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1102,Web Service,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|APT12|FIN6|Turla|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Leviathan|Magic Hound|RTM|Patchwork|Carbanak +T1102,Web Service,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|APT12|FIN6|Turla|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Leviathan|APT37|Magic Hound|RTM|Patchwork|Carbanak T1101,Security Support Provider,Persistence,no T1100,Web Shell,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda T1099,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 @@ -176,50 +176,50 @@ T1093,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion,menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Darkhotel|APT28 T1090,Connection Proxy,Command And Control|Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|APT39|MuddyWater|APT3|Lazarus Group|menuPass|Strider|APT28 -T1089,Disabling Security Tools,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|Carbanak -T1088,Bypass User Account Control,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 -T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang -T1086,PowerShell,Execution,APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus|Thrip|Cobalt Group|APT19|Gorgon Group|APT28|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|CopyKittens|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN10|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda +T1089,Disabling Security Tools,Defense Evasion,Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|Carbanak +T1088,Bypass User Account Control,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 +T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang +T1086,PowerShell,Execution,APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|APT19|Gorgon Group|Thrip|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|MuddyWater|TA459|FIN8|CopyKittens|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT32|FIN10|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda T1085,Rundll32,Defense Evasion|Execution,TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 T1084,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Persistence,Turla|Leviathan|APT29 -T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|Honeybee|APT3|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1081,Credentials in Files,Credential Access,OilRig|Kimsuky|Turla|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Darkhotel T1079,Multilayer Encryption,Command And Control,no -T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|APT28|APT32|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-1314|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak +T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|APT3|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|APT28|APT32|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-1314|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak T1077,Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang T1076,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom T1075,Pass the Hash,Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1073,DLL Side-Loading,Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 T1072,Third-party Software,Execution|Lateral Movement,Threat Group-1314 -T1071,Standard Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT41|Machete|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|SilverTerrier|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Orangeworm|Honeybee|Ke3chang|Rancor|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|APT32|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT28 +T1071,Standard Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT41|Machete|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|SilverTerrier|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Ke3chang|Turla|Rancor|Honeybee|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT28 T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT29|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT3|admin@338|Ke3chang T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 T1067,Bootkit,Persistence,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1066,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda T1065,Uncommonly Used Port,Command And Control,TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT32|Gorgon Group|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT3 -T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,Machete|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|APT19|menuPass|Leafminer|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT37|Ke3chang|Patchwork|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|APT1 +T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,Machete|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT19|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|Leafminer|Rancor|FIN7|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|APT37|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|Leviathan|FIN8|TA459|APT28|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|APT1 T1063,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,APT3 -T1060,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence,APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel -T1059,Command-Line Interface,Execution,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Cobalt Group|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Gorgon Group|FIN7|Honeybee|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Suckfly|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1|Ke3chang +T1060,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence,APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|MuddyWater|APT37|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel +T1059,Command-Line Interface,Execution,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Cobalt Group|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|APT28|FIN7|Rancor|Honeybee|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Suckfly|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1|Ke3chang T1058,Service Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Turla|Threat Group-3390|APT37|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Lazarus Group|PLATINUM|Putter Panda +T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Lazarus Group|PLATINUM|Putter Panda T1054,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no -T1053,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Rancor|Patchwork|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|APT3|APT29 +T1053,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|APT3|APT29 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no -T1050,New Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT32|Ke3chang|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak +T1050,New Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT32|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,Turla|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda -T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 +T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 T1045,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Group5|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon T1044,File System Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT32|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 @@ -232,13 +232,13 @@ T1037,Logon Scripts,Lateral Movement|Persistence,Cobalt Group|APT28 T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT41|Soft Cell|PLATINUM|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic|menuPass|FIN6|TEMP.Veles|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|FIN7|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 T1035,Service Execution,Execution,Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT37|APT32|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 +T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 T1032,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,Command And Control,Machete|APT33|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Taidoor T1031,Modify Existing Service,Persistence,APT41|APT32|Honeybee|APT19 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no T1028,Windows Remote Management,Execution|Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390 -T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Patchwork|Leafminer|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|APT3|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 +T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|APT3|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 T1024,Custom Cryptographic Protocol,Command And Control,APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ T1022,Data Encrypted,Exfiltration,Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|APT32|Patchwo T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Honeybee T1019,System Firmware,Persistence,no -T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Soft Cell|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla +T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Soft Cell|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla T1017,Application Deployment Software,Lateral Movement,APT32 T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,APT41|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1015,Accessibility Features,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ T1009,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moa T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1006,File System Logical Offsets,Defense Evasion,no -T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang +T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang T1004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Turla T1003,Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|APT37|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|OilRig|menuPass|Strider|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Suckfly|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Molerats|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver|Axiom T1002,Data Compressed,Exfiltration,APT41|Soft Cell|Gallmaker|APT33|APT32|APT39|MuddyWater|Honeybee|APT28|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang