From c1035681a27f4b32ff914cff29e54522e8fc9f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 14:53:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] cyclopsblink --- .../linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml | 71 +++++++++++++++++++ .../linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml | 71 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml | 70 ++++++++++++++++++ stories/cyclops_blink.yml | 26 +++++++ ...ux_iptables_firewall_modification.test.yml | 12 ++++ ...linux_kworker_process_commandline.test.yml | 12 ++++ ...dout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.test.yml | 12 ++++ 7 files changed, 274 insertions(+) create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml create mode 100644 stories/cyclops_blink.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.test.yml create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.test.yml diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4908360f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +name: Linux Iptables Firewall Modification +id: 309d59dc-1e1b-49b2-9800-7cf18d12f7b7 +version: 1 +date: '2022-04-05' +author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +type: Anomaly +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that modify the iptables firewall setting of a linux machine. + This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware where it modifies the firewall setting of the compromised machine to allow + traffic to its tcp port that will be used to communicate with its C2 server. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + where Processes.process = "*iptables *" AND Processes.process = "* --dport *" AND Processes.process = "* ACCEPT*" + by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from + Splunkbase. +known_false_positives: administrator may do this commandline for auditing and testing purposes. + In this scenario filter is needed. +references: +- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf +- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html +tags: + analytic_story: + - CyclopsBLink + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 70 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + impact: 70 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: UPDATE message + mitre_attack_id: + - T1562.004 + - T1562 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 49 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a740ab9db5 --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +name: Linux Kworker Process CommandLine +id: 1cefb270-74a5-4e27-aa0c-2b6fa7c5b4ed +version: 1 +date: '2022-04-05' +author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +type: TTP +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This analytic looks for suspicious process kworker commandline in a linux machine. + kworker process name or thread are common name of kernel thread in linux process. So it is really a suspicious event a normal user process + contain this process commandline. This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware to blend its core and other of its child process as normal + kworker on the compromised machine. This detection might be a good pivot to look for other IOC related to cyclopsblink malware or attacks. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + where Processes.process = "*[kworker/*" OR Processes.parent_process = "*[kworker/*" + by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `linux_kworker_process_commandline_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from + Splunkbase. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf +- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html +tags: + analytic_story: + - CyclopsBLink + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 80 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + impact: 80 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: UPDATE message + mitre_attack_id: + - T1562.004 + - T1562 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 64 + security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f0e6fbb3e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +name: Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File +id: de62b809-a04d-46b5-9a15-8298d330f0c8 +version: 1 +date: '2022-04-05' +author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +type: Anomaly +datamodel: +- Endpoint +description: This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that redirect the stdout or possible stderror to dev/null file. + This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware where it redirect the possible output or error while modify the iptables firewall setting of the + compromised machine to hide its action from the user. This Anomaly detection is a good pivot to look further why process or user use this un common approach. +search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes + where Processes.process = "*&>/dev/null*" + by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id + Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name + | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file_filter`' +how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting + logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your + endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from + Splunkbase. +known_false_positives: unknown +references: +- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf +- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html +tags: + analytic_story: + - CyclopsBLink + asset_type: Endpoint + cis20: + - CIS 3 + - CIS 5 + - CIS 16 + confidence: 60 + context: + - Source:Endpoint + - Stage:Defense Evasion + dataset: + - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + impact: 60 + kill_chain_phases: + - Exploitation + message: UPDATE message + mitre_attack_id: + - T1562.004 + - T1562 + nist: + - DE.CM + observable: + - name: dest + type: Hostname + role: + - Victim + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + required_fields: + - _time + - Processes.dest + - Processes.user + - Processes.parent_process_name + - Processes.process_name + - Processes.process + - Processes.process_id + - Processes.parent_process_id + risk_score: 12 + security_domain: endpoint diff --git a/stories/cyclops_blink.yml b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..829fb20db8 --- /dev/null +++ b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +name: CyclopsBLink +id: 7c75b1c8-dfff-46f1-8250-e58df91b6fd9 +version: 1 +date: '2022-04-07' +author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk +description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities + that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. + Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. + The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. + The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. + At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. + Additional modules can be downloaded and executed from the command and control (C2) server. +narrative: Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption + is the goal. +references: +- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf +- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html +tags: + analytic_story: CyclopsBLink + category: + - Malware + product: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58768b43d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: Linux Iptables Firewall Modification Unit Test +tests: +- name: Linux Iptables Firewall Modification + file: endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: sysmon_linux.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dac30017f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: Linux Kworker Process CommandLine Unit Test +tests: +- name: Linux Kworker Process CommandLine + file: endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: sysmon_linux.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: sysmon_linux diff --git a/tests/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.test.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3caddae70a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.test.yml @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +name: Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File Unit Test +tests: +- name: Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File + file: endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml + pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' + earliest_time: -24h + latest_time: now + attack_data: + - file_name: sysmon_linux.log + data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/cyclopsblink/sysmon_linux.log + source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational + sourcetype: sysmon_linux From fcba8c27316dfe5a7b55d4fca53f4cfb611f1839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 14:58:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] cyclopsblink --- detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml | 2 +- detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml | 2 +- .../endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml index 4908360f6b..2bc48352c3 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: impact: 70 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: UPDATE message + message: A commandline $process$ that may modify iptables firewall on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1562.004 - T1562 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml index a740ab9db5..bf3df63a7f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: impact: 80 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: UPDATE message + message: a $process_name$ with kworker commandline in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1562.004 - T1562 diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml index f0e6fbb3e0..71e3ba183a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ tags: impact: 60 kill_chain_phases: - Exploitation - message: UPDATE message + message: a commandline $process$ that redirect stdout to dev/null in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1562.004 - T1562 From 8b6970f5c71917583bde5c169e848a64cb22adae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 15:01:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] Update linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml --- detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml index bf3df63a7f..cfd453165e 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml @@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ tags: - Exploitation message: a $process_name$ with kworker commandline in $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - - T1562.004 - - T1562 + - T1036.004 + - T1036 nist: - DE.CM observable: @@ -68,4 +68,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 64 - security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file + security_domain: endpoint From 1470c6713c1d5d9fcd8fb2201aac7710bd89f540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 15:10:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] Update linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml --- .../endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml index 71e3ba183a..ba535c341f 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml @@ -66,5 +66,5 @@ tags: - Processes.process - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id - risk_score: 12 + risk_score: 36 security_domain: endpoint From 6ec5e586085ccd405e0ef7db2cd20c8022edcd2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 09:49:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] Update cyclops_blink.yml --- stories/cyclops_blink.yml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/stories/cyclops_blink.yml b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml index 829fb20db8..eeecaf6bc0 100644 --- a/stories/cyclops_blink.yml +++ b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ date: '2022-04-07' author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk description: Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. - Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. + Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit x86 and PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. @@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file + usecase: Advanced Threat Detection From ef9b64c96808985f3357d9eba31cd27a6f45ff73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: pyth0n1c <87383215+pyth0n1c@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 06:34:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] Updated detection-testing.yml to the same as the version in develop so that testing can proceed. Since there is a PR open, why didn't this auto update? --- .github/workflows/detection-testing.yml | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/detection-testing.yml b/.github/workflows/detection-testing.yml index ef6af6d8fd..a2bba1b154 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/detection-testing.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/detection-testing.yml @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ jobs: config_tests_8.json.results config_tests_9.json.results - - name: Upload S3 Badge and Summary Artifacts for Nightly Scheduled Run + - name: Log in to S3 for Artifact Uploads if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v1 with: @@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ jobs: aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }} aws-region: us-west-2 + + - name: Upload S3 Badge and Summary Artifacts for Nightly Scheduled Run + if: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' }} run: | cd bin/docker_detection_tester python generate_detection_coverage_badge.py --input_summary_file summary_test_results.json --output_badge_file detection_coverage.svg --badge_string "Pass Rate" @@ -337,4 +340,4 @@ jobs: - + \ No newline at end of file From 0d71323325e12d9c2a60b804df48901a2ab90d9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: research bot Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 22:55:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] updating docs and package bits [ci skip] --- dist/escu/app.manifest | 2 +- dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf | 179 +++- dist/escu/default/app.conf | 4 +- dist/escu/default/collections.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/content-version.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/macros.conf | 62 +- dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf | 924 +++++++++++++++--- dist/escu/default/transforms.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf | 2 +- docs/_pages/detections.md | 21 +- docs/_pages/stories.md | 15 +- ...spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md | 2 +- ...12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md | 2 +- ...od_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md | 2 +- ...17-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md | 2 +- ...9-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md | 2 +- ...9-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md | 3 +- ...s_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md | 2 +- ...cious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md | 2 +- .../2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md | 2 +- ...-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md | 4 +- .../2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md | 2 +- ...018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md | 2 +- ...detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md | 2 +- ...21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md | 2 +- ...6-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md | 2 +- ...18-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md | 2 +- ...-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md | 2 +- ...-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md | 2 +- ...8-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md | 2 +- .../2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md | 4 +- .../_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md | 2 +- .../2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md | 2 +- .../2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md | 2 +- .../2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md | 2 +- ...ikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md | 2 +- ...ide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md | 2 +- ..._servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md | 2 +- .../2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md | 4 +- ...5-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md | 2 +- ...9-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md | 4 +- ...credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md | 2 +- ...-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md | 2 +- ...6-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md | 2 +- ...9-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md | 2 +- ...19-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md | 2 +- .../2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md | 2 +- ...-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md | 2 +- ...-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md | 2 +- ...20-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md | 2 +- .../2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md | 4 +- ...03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md | 2 +- ...20-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md | 3 +- .../2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md | 2 +- .../2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md | 2 +- .../2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md | 2 +- ...n_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md | 2 +- ...mazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md | 2 +- ...0-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md | 2 +- ...interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md | 2 +- ...2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md | 2 +- .../2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md | 2 +- ...20-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md | 2 +- ...20-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md | 2 +- ...-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md | 2 +- ..._to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md | 14 +- ...-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md | 2 +- ...-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md | 2 +- .../2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md | 2 +- ...1-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md | 2 +- 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docs/_posts/2022-03-29-macos_plutil.md | 163 +++ ...erview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md | 161 +++ .../2022-04-05-java_writing_jsp_file.md | 183 ++++ ...-04-05-spring4shell_payload_url_request.md | 176 ++++ .../2022-04-05-web_jsp_request_via_url.md | 176 ++++ ...eb_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.md | 165 ++++ ...indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.md | 165 ++++ ...s_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.md | 165 ++++ ..._spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md | 166 ++++ .../2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md | 180 ++++ ...022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md | 175 ++++ .../2022-04-07-detect_html_help_renamed.md | 172 ++++ .../_posts/2022-04-07-detect_mshta_renamed.md | 171 ++++ .../2022-04-07-detect_renamed_psexec.md | 169 ++++ ...ious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md | 178 ++++ .../2022-04-07-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md | 184 ++++ .../2022-04-07-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md | 182 ++++ .../active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md | 15 +- docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md | 2 +- docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md | 2 +- docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md | 49 +- docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md | 4 +- docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md | 5 +- docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md | 2 +- docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md | 4 +- .../masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md | 2 +- docs/_stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.md | 54 + ...loper_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md | 2 +- 628 files changed, 5789 insertions(+), 821 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-04-kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-09-unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-10-kerberos_user_enumeration.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-29-macos_plutil.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-java_writing_jsp_file.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-spring4shell_payload_url_request.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_jsp_request_via_url.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_html_help_renamed.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_mshta_renamed.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_renamed_psexec.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md create mode 100644 docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md create mode 100644 docs/_stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.md diff --git a/dist/escu/app.manifest b/dist/escu/app.manifest index 1dabe83f02..8689aea631 100644 --- a/dist/escu/app.manifest +++ b/dist/escu/app.manifest @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ "id": { "group": null, "name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate", - "version": "3.37.1" + "version": "3.38.0" }, "author": [ { diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf index da60229bfe..2f9d54bed2 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -1763,7 +1763,7 @@ asset_type = Endpoint confidence = medium explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. -annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"]} known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. providing_technologies = [] @@ -3974,6 +3974,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"]} known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -4014,6 +4024,36 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.001"]} +known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for Kerberos Service Ticket requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for TGT requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic leverages Event Id 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify one source endpoint trying to obtain an unusual number Kerberos TGT ticket for non existing users. This behavior could represent an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol to perform a user enumeration attack against an Active Directory environment. When Kerberos is sent a TGT request with no preauthentication for an invalid username, it responds with KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or 0x6. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Kerberos protocol to validate a list of users use them to perform further attacks.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1589", "T1589.002"]} +known_false_positives = Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -4444,6 +4484,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Act known_false_positives = None identified. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup. +how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -6593,6 +6643,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.00 known_false_positives = unknown. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your endpoint events and populating the Endpoint and Network data models. +annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +known_false_positives = Custom applications may leverage the Kerberos protocol. Filter as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] type = detection asset_type = @@ -6975,6 +7035,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp known_false_positives = Unknown at this point providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7005,6 +7075,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [ known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where forfiles.exe may be used. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Similarly, forfiles.exe may be used in legitimate batch scripts. Filter these results as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where pcalua.exe may be used. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Filter these results as needed. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -7149,6 +7239,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": [ known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Endpoint +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +providing_technologies = [] + [savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] type = detection asset_type = Endpoint @@ -8619,6 +8729,46 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exp known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives. providing_technologies = [] +[savedsearch://ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = The jsp file names are static names used in current proof of concept code. = +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first". +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may occur and filtering may be required. Restrict analytic to asset type. +providing_technologies = [] + +[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule] +type = detection +asset_type = Web Server +confidence = medium +explanation = The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called. +how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. +providing_technologies = [] + ### END DETECTIONS ### ### STORIES ### @@ -8653,7 +8803,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule"] description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments. narrative = Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\ This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks. @@ -9301,7 +9451,7 @@ version = 1 references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"] maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule"] description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more. narrative = Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction. @@ -9428,7 +9578,7 @@ version = 2 references = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"] maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}] spec_version = 3 -searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"] +searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"] description = Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment. narrative = Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior. @@ -9833,6 +9983,23 @@ searches = ["ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Open R description = Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product. narrative = This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly. +[analytic_story://Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965] +category = Adversary Tactics +last_updated = 2022-04-05 +version = 1 +references = ["https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"] +maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}] +spec_version = 3 +searches = ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule", "ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule"] +description = Spring4Shell is the nickname given to a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Framework, a programming and configuration model for Java-based enterprise applications. +narrative = An attacker could exploit Spring4Shell by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server. However, exploitation of Spring4Shell requires certain prerequisites, whereas the original Log4Shell vulnerability affected all versions of Log4j 2 using the default configuration. \ +According to Spring, the following requirements were included in the vulnerability report, however the post cautions that there may be other ways in which this can be exploited so this may not be a complete list of requirements at this time: \ +- Java Development Kit (JDK) 9 or greater \ +- Apache Tomcat as the Servlet container \ +- Packaged as a WAR \ +- spring-webmvc or spring-webflux dependency \ + + [analytic_story://SQL Injection] category = Adversary Tactics last_updated = 2017-09-19 diff --git a/dist/escu/default/app.conf b/dist/escu/default/app.conf index 2bc9979e8f..1501e572ac 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/app.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/app.conf @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ is_configured = false state = enabled state_change_requires_restart = false -build = 7040 +build = 7195 [triggers] reload.analytic_stories = simple @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reload.es_investigations = simple [launcher] author = Splunk -version = 3.37.1 +version = 3.38.0 description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates. [ui] diff --git a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf index b0ae33c402..52ac7032d1 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf b/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf index 9c81b9ce7c..3eb034b7d5 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/content-version.conf @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ [content-version] -version = 3.37.1 +version = 3.38.0 diff --git a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf index 08fd249193..ce0330eea2 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf index e39489e852..6011775be2 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -1557,6 +1557,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[java_writing_jsp_file_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -1573,6 +1577,18 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[kerberos_user_enumeration_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -1745,6 +1761,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[macos_plutil_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2581,6 +2601,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2729,6 +2753,10 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2741,6 +2769,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -2789,6 +2825,14 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter] definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. @@ -3353,6 +3397,22 @@ description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false definition = search * description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. +[spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_jsp_request_via_url_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + +[web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter] +definition = search * +description = Update this macro to limit the output results to filter out false positives. + [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks] definition = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf index 186a32e749..d36ae49b55 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# @@ -6187,7 +6187,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Argumen action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] @@ -6198,7 +6198,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -6226,8 +6226,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-01 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -6255,7 +6255,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` [ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -6313,7 +6313,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "field", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] @@ -6324,7 +6324,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Unusual Processes", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 2"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Unknown"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"], "observable": [{"name": "field", "role": ["Unknown"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -6789,7 +6789,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 64}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 64}] @@ -6800,7 +6800,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -7225,19 +7225,19 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -7248,7 +7248,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -7271,19 +7271,19 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. -action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"]} +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"]} action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -7294,7 +7294,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "HAFNIUM Group", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -7973,7 +7973,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] @@ -7984,7 +7984,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -9576,7 +9576,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following behavior was identified and typically related to PowerShell-Empire on $ComputerName$ by $User$. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}] @@ -9587,7 +9587,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -9747,8 +9747,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -9776,7 +9776,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=hh.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter` [ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -9982,7 +9982,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Blo action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following behavior was identified and typically related to MimiKatz being loaded within the context of PowerShell on $ComputerName$ by $User$. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}] @@ -9993,7 +9993,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -10069,8 +10069,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -10098,7 +10098,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=mshta.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` [ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -10790,8 +10790,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -10819,7 +10819,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name!=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name!=psexec64.exe) AND Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter` [ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -13708,7 +13708,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 90}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 90}] @@ -13719,7 +13719,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -17032,6 +17032,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent="*Java*" Web.http_method="GET" Web.url="*.class*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter` +[ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing a jsp file to disk, potentially indicative of exploitation. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Java Writing JSP File +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("java","java.exe", "javaw.exe") by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.jsp*" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_writing_jsp_file_filter` + [ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -17094,7 +17140,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encrypt action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential kerberoasting attack via service principal name requests detected on $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] @@ -17105,7 +17151,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -17216,6 +17262,138 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND Message="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter` +[ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.001"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for Kerberos Service Ticket requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-15 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-15 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Kerberos Service TTicket request with RC4 encryption was requested from $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name="*$" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter` + +[ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for TGT requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-04 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-04 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A Kerberos TGT request with RC4 encryption was requested for $Account_Name$ from $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 Account_Name!=*$ | `kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter` + +[ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic leverages Event Id 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify one source endpoint trying to obtain an unusual number Kerberos TGT ticket for non existing users. This behavior could represent an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol to perform a user enumeration attack against an Active Directory environment. When Kerberos is sent a TGT request with no preauthentication for an invalid username, it responds with KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or 0x6. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Kerberos protocol to validate a list of users use them to perform further attacks.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1589", "T1589.002"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic leverages Event Id 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify one source endpoint trying to obtain an unusual number Kerberos TGT ticket for non existing users. This behavior could represent an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol to perform a user enumeration attack against an Active Directory environment. When Kerberos is sent a TGT request with no preauthentication for an invalid username, it responds with KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or 0x6. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Kerberos protocol to validate a list of users use them to perform further attacks.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-10 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-10 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Potential Kerberos based user enumeration attack $Client_Address$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 24}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1589", "T1589.002"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +schedule_window = auto +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `kerberos_user_enumeration_filter` + [ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -17884,7 +18062,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ spawning a Linux shell, potentially indicative of exploitation. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -17895,7 +18073,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -18914,7 +19092,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rul action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] @@ -18925,7 +19103,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -18988,7 +19166,53 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN ("find*", "crontab*", "screencapture*", "openssl*", "curl*", "wget*", "killall*", "funzip*") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter` +search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN ("find*", "crontab*", "screencapture*", "openssl*", "curl*", "wget*", "killall*", "funzip*") | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path | where dc_path > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter` + +[ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup. +action.escu.how_to_implement = This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-29 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-29 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Living Off The Land"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = plutil are executed on $host$ from $user$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup. +action.notable.param.rule_title = MacOS plutil +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil | rename columns.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by username host cmdline pid path parent signing_id | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_plutil_filter` [ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -19150,7 +19374,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Com action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}] @@ -19161,7 +19385,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -19236,7 +19460,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscat action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell.exe running with potential obfuscated arguments on $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] @@ -19247,7 +19471,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -19734,7 +19958,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - R action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by $Image$ outside of the normal system paths on endpoint $Computer$, potentally related to DLL side-loading. action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process name"}] @@ -19745,7 +19969,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-41379"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-41379"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process Name"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -21210,7 +21434,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious file modification or replace in $file_path$ in host $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"threat_object_field": "file_path", "threat_object_type": "file"}] @@ -21221,7 +21445,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "file_path", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "File"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21397,7 +21621,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] @@ -21408,7 +21632,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Credential Access"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21523,7 +21747,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 45}] @@ -21534,7 +21758,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21609,7 +21833,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ executing suspicious commands. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"threat_object_field": "parent_process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}, {"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -21620,7 +21844,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "parent_process_name", "role": ["Parent Process"], "type": "Process"}, {"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -21649,7 +21873,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidd action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = PowerShell processes $process$ started with parameters to modify the execution policy of the run, run in a hidden window, and connect to the Internet on host $dest$ executed by user $user$. action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 81}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 81}, {"threat_object_field": "process", "threat_object_type": "process"}] @@ -21660,7 +21884,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "HAFNIUM Group", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Command And Control"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command \u0026 Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "process", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "Process"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -21785,7 +22009,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains domain enumeration command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 42}] @@ -21796,7 +22020,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21833,7 +22057,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - R action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] @@ -21844,7 +22068,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "observable": [{"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21879,7 +22103,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 5}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 5}] @@ -21890,7 +22114,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21931,7 +22155,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains GetProcAddress API in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 48}] @@ -21942,7 +22166,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -21986,7 +22210,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains base64 command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] @@ -21997,7 +22221,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -22123,7 +22347,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $Message$ to load .net code in memory with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] @@ -22134,7 +22358,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -22171,7 +22395,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rul action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $Message$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] @@ -22182,7 +22406,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -22355,7 +22579,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains memorystream command in $Message$ as new object backstore with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 40}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 40}] @@ -22366,7 +22590,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -22910,7 +23134,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains AV recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 56}] @@ -22921,7 +23145,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -22956,7 +23180,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $Message$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 60}] @@ -22967,7 +23191,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -23186,7 +23410,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalatio action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 76}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 76}] @@ -23197,7 +23421,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 95, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Persistence"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -24156,7 +24380,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor *" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter` [ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -24220,7 +24444,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = elevated process using runas on $dest$ by $user$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] @@ -24231,7 +24455,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -25300,7 +25524,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 72}] @@ -25311,7 +25535,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -25793,7 +26017,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A registry modification in $registry_path$ with reg key $registry_key_name$ and reg value $registry_value_name$ in host $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 48}, {"threat_object_field": "registry_path", "threat_object_type": "unknown"}] @@ -25804,7 +26028,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "registry_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Unknown"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "registry_path", "role": ["Other"], "type": "Unknown"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -26897,7 +27121,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $Account_Name$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] @@ -26908,7 +27132,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -26985,8 +27209,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-20 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-20 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -27014,7 +27238,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter` [ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -27117,8 +27341,8 @@ action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. -action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12 -action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12 +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07 action.escu.confidence = high action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection @@ -27137,12 +27361,6 @@ action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "Cobalt Strike", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 8"], "confidence": 90, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion", "Stage:Execution"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto -action.notable = 1 -action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] -action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. -action.notable.param.rule_title = Suspicious MSBuild Rename -action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint -action.notable.param.severity = high alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true enableSched = 1 @@ -27152,7 +27370,7 @@ relation = greater than quantity = 0 realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false -search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter` +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter` [ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule] action.escu = 0 @@ -27802,7 +28020,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious TGT was requested was requested action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 60}] @@ -27813,7 +28031,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -28244,7 +28462,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] @@ -28255,7 +28473,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -28504,6 +28722,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= "* /qn *" Processes.process= "*/X*" Processes.process= "*REBOOT=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter` +[ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol. +action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your endpoint events and populating the Endpoint and Network data models. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Custom applications may leverage the Kerberos protocol. Filter as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-09 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-09 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "src_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "dest_ip", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "observable": [{"name": "src_ip", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "dest_ip", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=lsass.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 88 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port | `unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter` + [ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -28570,7 +28834,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible AMSI Unloading via Reflection using PowerShell on $ComputerName$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 49}] @@ -28581,7 +28845,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Execution", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -28872,7 +29136,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Possible Web Shell execution on $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 56}] @@ -28883,7 +29147,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyShell"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Initial Access", "Stage:Execution"], "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -30154,6 +30418,52 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\syswow64\\drivers\\*") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field="file_name" "\.(?[^\.]*$)" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter` +[ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-ADComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADComputer*" AND Message = "*TrustedForDelegation*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter` + [ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -30274,6 +30584,98 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter` +[ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where forfiles.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Similarly, forfiles.exe may be used in legitimate batch scripts. Filter these results as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Living Off The Land"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The Program Compatability Assistant (pcalua.exe) launched the process $process_name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*forfiles* /c *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where pcalua.exe may be used. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Filter these results as needed. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Living Off The Land"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = The Program Compatability Assistant (pcalua.exe) launched the process $process_name$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"threat_object_field": "process_name", "threat_object_type": "process"}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Defense Evasion"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "observable": [{"name": "process_name", "role": ["Child Process"], "type": "Process"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*pcalua* -a*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter` + [ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -30883,6 +31285,98 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter` +[ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-31 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-31 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR Message = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (Message = "*-TrustedToAuth*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter` + +[ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = [] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.escu.how_to_implement = The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. +action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-28 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-28 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 35}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 35}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 70, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Discovery"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery +action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR Message = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (Message = "*-Unconstrained*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter` + [ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule] action.escu = 0 action.escu.enabled = 1 @@ -32012,7 +32506,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Ru action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Malicious PowerShell"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = Suspicious powerShell script execution by $user$ on $ComputerName$ via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "ComputerName", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 30}, {"risk_object_field": "User", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 30}] @@ -32023,7 +32517,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Recon"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "observable": [{"name": "ComputerName", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}, {"name": "User", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -32512,7 +33006,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Ru action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] @@ -32523,7 +33017,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 7"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -32892,7 +33386,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - R action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Hermetic Wiper", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}] @@ -32903,7 +33397,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 12"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -33910,7 +34404,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = tbd action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 25}, {"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 25}] @@ -33921,7 +34415,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.PT", "DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}, {"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -34551,7 +35045,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$ action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 80}, {"risk_object_field": "user", "risk_object_type": "user", "risk_score": 80}] @@ -34562,7 +35056,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Hermetic Wiper"], "confidence": 100, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Privilege Escalation"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "user", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "User"}]} schedule_window = auto action.notable = 1 action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] @@ -35077,7 +35571,7 @@ action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets action.escu.search_type = detection action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] action.escu.providing_technologies = [] -action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"] action.risk = 1 action.risk.param._risk_message = action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "Client_Address", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] @@ -35088,7 +35582,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule -action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Source:Endpoint", "Stage:Lateral Movement"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "observable": [{"name": "Client_Address", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Endpoint"}]} schedule_window = auto alert.digest_mode = 1 disabled = true @@ -37138,6 +37632,190 @@ realtime_schedule = 0 is_visible = false search = | from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 "[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)(?\w+)(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?(?[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-\_\$]+)" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter` +[ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +action.escu.known_false_positives = The jsp file names are static names used in current proof of concept code. = +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 36}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "IP Address"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Spring4Shell Payload URL Request +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*tomcatwar.jsp*","*poc.jsp*","*shell.jsp*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter` + +[ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Web JSP Request via URL +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*.jsp?cmd=*","*j&cmd=*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first". +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first". +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur and filtering may be required. Restrict analytic to asset type. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-06 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-06 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A http body request related to Spring4Shell has been sent to $dest$ by $src$. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 72}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 80, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first". +action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = `stream_http` http_method IN ("POST") | stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | search http_request_body IN ("*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat=_*", "*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern*","*suffix=.jsp*") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter` + +[ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule] +action.escu = 0 +action.escu.enabled = 1 +description = The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called. +action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]} +action.escu.data_models = ["Web"] +action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called. +action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. +action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. +action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05 +action.escu.confidence = high +action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule +action.escu.search_type = detection +action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"] +action.escu.providing_technologies = [] +action.escu.analytic_story = ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"] +action.risk = 1 +action.risk.param._risk_message = A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to a vulnerability in Spring Cloud. +action.risk.param._risk = [{"risk_object_field": "dest", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}, {"risk_object_field": "src", "risk_object_type": "system", "risk_score": 42}] +action.risk.param._risk_score = 0 +action.risk.param.verbose = 0 +cron_schedule = 0 * * * * +dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m +dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m +action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1 +action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule +action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 16"], "confidence": 60, "context": ["Scope:Network"], "cve": ["CVE-2022-22963"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "observable": [{"name": "dest", "role": ["Victim"], "type": "Hostname"}, {"name": "src", "role": ["Attacker"], "type": "IP Address"}]} +schedule_window = auto +action.notable = 1 +action.notable.param.nes_fields = [] +action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called. +action.notable.param.rule_title = Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter +action.notable.param.security_domain = network +action.notable.param.severity = high +alert.digest_mode = 1 +disabled = true +enableSched = 1 +allow_skew = 100% +counttype = number of events +relation = greater than +quantity = 0 +realtime_schedule = 0 +is_visible = false +search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("POST") Web.url="*/functionRouter*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.status sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter` + ### END ESCU DETECTIONS ### ### ESCU BASELINES ### diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf index bac41bb0cf..313959e51e 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf index b775ba509b..64b82893ee 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-04T18:01:09 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/docs/_pages/detections.md b/docs/_pages/detections.md index b846ccd7e7..24ee9c9c17 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/detections.md +++ b/docs/_pages/detections.md @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ sidebar: | [Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection](/cloud/amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection/) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Anomalous usage of 7zip](/endpoint/anomalous_usage_of_7zip/) | [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Attacker Tools On Endpoint](/endpoint/attacker_tools_on_endpoint/) | [Match Legitimate Name or Location](/tags/#match-legitimate-name-or-location), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Active Scanning](/tags/#active-scanning) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store](/endpoint/attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store/) | [Install Root Certificate](/tags/#install-root-certificate), [Subvert Trust Controls](/tags/#subvert-trust-controls) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Attempt To Stop Security Service](/endpoint/attempt_to_stop_security_service/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -393,10 +393,14 @@ sidebar: | [Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters](/endpoint/impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell](/endpoint/interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Java Class File download by Java User Agent](/endpoint/java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Java Writing JSP File](/endpoint/java_writing_jsp_file/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Jscript Execution Using Cscript App](/endpoint/jscript_execution_using_cscript_app/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption](/endpoint/kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Golden Ticket](/tags/#golden-ticket) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption](/endpoint/kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Kerberos User Enumeration](/endpoint/kerberos_user_enumeration/) | [Gather Victim Identity Information](/tags/#gather-victim-identity-information), [Email Addresses](/tags/#email-addresses) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](/endpoint/known_services_killed_by_ransomware/) | [Inhibit System Recovery](/tags/#inhibit-system-recovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account]() | None | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod]() | None | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -472,6 +476,7 @@ sidebar: | [MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary](/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [MacOS - Re-opened Applications]() | None | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [MacOS LOLbin](/endpoint/macos_lolbin/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [MacOS plutil](/endpoint/macos_plutil/) | [Plist Modification](/tags/#plist-modification) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Mailsniper Invoke functions](/endpoint/mailsniper_invoke_functions/) | [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Local Email Collection](/tags/#local-email-collection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Malicious InProcServer32 Modification](/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification/) | [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -676,6 +681,7 @@ sidebar: | [Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access](/endpoint/spoolsv_suspicious_process_access/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Spoolsv Writing a DLL](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon](/endpoint/spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Spring4Shell Payload URL Request](/web/spring4shell_payload_url_request/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Sqlite Module In Temp Folder](/endpoint/sqlite_module_in_temp_folder/) | [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Start Up During Safe Mode Boot](/endpoint/start_up_during_safe_mode_boot/) | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event](/endpoint/sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event/) | [Exploitation for Client Execution](/tags/#exploitation-for-client-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -696,7 +702,7 @@ sidebar: | [Suspicious Java Classes]() | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands](/endpoint/suspicious_linux_discovery_commands/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Suspicious MSBuild Spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery](/endpoint/suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery/) | [Launch Agent](/tags/#launch-agent), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -739,6 +745,7 @@ sidebar: | [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Unified Messaging Service Spawning a Process](/endpoint/unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Uninstall App Using MsiExec](/endpoint/uninstall_app_using_msiexec/) | [Msiexec](/tags/#msiexec), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol](/endpoint/unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Unload Sysmon Filter Driver](/endpoint/unload_sysmon_filter_driver/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS](/deprecated/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -765,7 +772,10 @@ sidebar: | [Web Fraud - Account Harvesting](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_account_harvesting/) | [Create Account](/tags/#create-account) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed](/deprecated/web_fraud_-_anomalous_user_clickspeed/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts]() | None | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Web JSP Request via URL](/web/web_jsp_request_via_url/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes](/application/web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes/) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter](/web/web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module](/web/web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services](/endpoint/wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services/) | [Gather Victim Network Information](/tags/#gather-victim-network-information), [IP Addresses](/tags/#ip-addresses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Wermgr Process Create Executable File](/endpoint/wermgr_process_create_executable_file/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process](/endpoint/wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -796,9 +806,12 @@ sidebar: | [Windows Event Log Cleared](/endpoint/windows_event_log_cleared/) | [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Clear Windows Event Logs](/tags/#clear-windows-event-logs) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event](/endpoint/windows_excessive_disabled_services_event/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry](/endpoint/windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows High File Deletion Frequency](/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft](/endpoint/windows_installutil_credential_theft/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line](/endpoint/windows_installutil_url_in_command_line/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | @@ -812,6 +825,8 @@ sidebar: | [Windows NirSoft Utilities](/endpoint/windows_nirsoft_utilities/) | [Tool](/tags/#tool) | [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass](/endpoint/windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Possible Credential Dumping](/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | +| [Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine](/endpoint/windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion](/endpoint/windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion/) | [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | | [Windows Rasautou DLL Execution](/endpoint/windows_rasautou_dll_execution/) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](/tags/#dynamic-link-library-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection) | [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) | diff --git a/docs/_pages/stories.md b/docs/_pages/stories.md index 2a06a4b485..faa5b15021 100644 --- a/docs/_pages/stories.md +++ b/docs/_pages/stories.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ sidebar: | [AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities](aws_suspicious_provisioning_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion) | | [AWS User Monitoring](aws_user_monitoring) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Active Directory Discovery](active_directory_discovery) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery), [Permission Groups Discovery](/tags/#permission-groups-discovery), [Domain Groups](/tags/#domain-groups), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Password Policy Discovery](/tags/#password-policy-discovery), [Local Groups](/tags/#local-groups), [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [System Network Connections Discovery](/tags/#system-network-connections-discovery), [System Network Configuration Discovery](/tags/#system-network-configuration-discovery), [Internet Connection Discovery](/tags/#internet-connection-discovery), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | -| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](active_directory_kerberos_attacks) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | +| [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](active_directory_kerberos_attacks) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Golden Ticket](/tags/#golden-ticket), [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Gather Victim Identity Information](/tags/#gather-victim-identity-information), [Email Addresses](/tags/#email-addresses), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts), [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Active Directory Lateral Movement](active_directory_lateral_movement) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Hash](/tags/#pass-the-hash), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Active Directory Password Spraying](active_directory_password_spraying) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access) | | [Apache Struts Vulnerability](apache_struts_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | @@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ sidebar: | [F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902](f5_tmui_rce_cve-2020-5902) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [FIN7](fin7) | [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [JavaScript](/tags/#javascript), [Credentials from Password Stores](/tags/#credentials-from-password-stores), [Credentials from Web Browsers](/tags/#credentials-from-web-browsers), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Visual Basic](/tags/#visual-basic), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Parent PID Spoofing](/tags/#parent-pid-spoofing), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [XSL Script Processing](/tags/#xsl-script-processing) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [GCP Cross Account Activity](gcp_cross_account_activity) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [HAFNIUM Group](hafnium_group) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | -| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [HAFNIUM Group](hafnium_group) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [System Services](/tags/#system-services), [Service Execution](/tags/#service-execution), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [Email Collection](/tags/#email-collection), [Remote Email Collection](/tags/#remote-email-collection) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Hermetic Wiper](hermetic_wiper) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows)), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Impact](/tags/#impact), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Hidden Cobra Malware](hidden_cobra_malware) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Network Share Connection Removal](/tags/#network-share-connection-removal), [Remote Desktop Protocol](/tags/#remote-desktop-protocol), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [File Transfer Protocols](/tags/#file-transfer-protocols), [Application Layer Protocol](/tags/#application-layer-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares), [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement) | | [Host Redirection](host_redirection) | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol](/tags/#exfiltration-over-unencrypted/obfuscated-non-c2-protocol), [DNS](/tags/#dns) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | | [IcedID](icedid) | [Domain Account](/tags/#domain-account), [Account Discovery](/tags/#account-discovery), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [User Execution](/tags/#user-execution), [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Archive via Utility](/tags/#archive-via-utility), [Archive Collected Data](/tags/#archive-collected-data), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Domain Trust Discovery](/tags/#domain-trust-discovery), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](/tags/#registry-run-keys-/-startup-folder), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Data from Local System](/tags/#data-from-local-system), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task) | [Collection](/tags/#collection), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Information Sabotage](information_sabotage) | [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](/tags/#transfer-data-to-cloud-account) | [Exfiltration](/tags/#exfiltration) | -| [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | +| [Ingress Tool Transfer](ingress_tool_transfer) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | | [JBoss Vulnerability](jboss_vulnerability) | [System Information Discovery](/tags/#system-information-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Scanning Activity](kubernetes_scanning_activity) | [Cloud Service Discovery](/tags/#cloud-service-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery) | | [Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity]() | None | None | @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ sidebar: | [Linux Persistence Techniques](linux_persistence_techniques) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Linux Post-Exploitation](linux_post-exploitation) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell) | [Execution](/tags/#execution) | | [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux_privilege_escalation) | [Cron](/tags/#cron), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account), [At (Linux)](/tags/#at-(linux)), [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#linux-and-mac-file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [File and Directory Permissions Modification](/tags/#file-and-directory-permissions-modification), [Setuid and Setgid](/tags/#setuid-and-setgid), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Sudo and Sudo Caching](/tags/#sudo-and-sudo-caching), [Kernel Modules and Extensions](/tags/#kernel-modules-and-extensions), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution), [RC Scripts](/tags/#rc-scripts), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](/tags/#unix-shell-configuration-modification), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation), [SSH Authorized Keys](/tags/#ssh-authorized-keys), [Account Manipulation](/tags/#account-manipulation), [/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow](/tags/#/etc/passwd-and-/etc/shadow), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](/tags/#dynamic-linker-hijacking), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Systemd Timers](/tags/#systemd-timers) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | -| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](log4shell_cve-2021-44228) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | -| [Malicious PowerShell](malicious_powershell) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | +| [Living Off The Land](living_off_the_land) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Compiled HTML File](/tags/#compiled-html-file), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta), [Regsvcs/Regasm](/tags/#regsvcs/regasm), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Disable or Modify Tools](/tags/#disable-or-modify-tools), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses), [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory), [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism), [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Plist Modification](/tags/#plist-modification), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Services Registry Permissions Weakness](/tags/#services-registry-permissions-weakness), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [At (Windows)](/tags/#at-(windows)), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | +| [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](log4shell_cve-2021-44228) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | +| [Malicious PowerShell](malicious_powershell) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools), [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information), [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses) | [Command And Control](/tags/#command-and-control), [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Execution](/tags/#execution), [Lateral Movement](/tags/#lateral-movement), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation), [Reconnaissance](/tags/#reconnaissance) | | [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) | [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32), [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Impact](/tags/#impact) | | [Meterpreter](meterpreter) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [System Owner/User Discovery](/tags/#system-owner/user-discovery) | [Discovery](/tags/#discovery), [Execution](/tags/#execution) | | [Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444](microsoft_mshtml_remote_code_execution_cve-2021-40444) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Control Panel](/tags/#control-panel), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ sidebar: | [Spearphishing Attachments](spearphishing_attachments) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing), [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Spearphishing Link](/tags/#spearphishing-link) | [Credential Access](/tags/#credential-access), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access) | | [Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities]() | None | None | | [Splunk Vulnerabilities](splunk_vulnerabilities) | [Network Denial of Service](/tags/#network-denial-of-service) | [Impact](/tags/#impact) | +| [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component) | [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence) | | [Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities](suspicious_aws_ec2_activities) | [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts), [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Suspicious AWS Login Activities](suspicious_aws_login_activities) | [Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions](/tags/#unused/unsupported-cloud-regions), [Cloud Accounts](/tags/#cloud-accounts) | [Defense Evasion](/tags/#defense-evasion), [Initial Access](/tags/#initial-access), [Persistence](/tags/#persistence), [Privilege Escalation](/tags/#privilege-escalation) | | [Suspicious AWS S3 Activities](suspicious_aws_s3_activities) | [Data from Cloud Storage Object](/tags/#data-from-cloud-storage-object) | [Collection](/tags/#collection) | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md b/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md index 20abefa5c9..a2e82ada6f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-01-07-spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre an #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md index 0917a3d674..6a1e9ba7d6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as ro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md index b62622a8d1..5f3ace6721 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) Note that **extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md index 0e4e2f3e76..7be962bec3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) Note that **unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md index e5c9ae0f7f..619c2c2f17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-15-no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md index bf41182a1c..6a544cc4dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-19-email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extensio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a playbook called "Sus None at this time #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_) * [Suspicious Emails](/stories/suspicious_emails) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md index 4598b7b4fb..28d0d2df60 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md index c015834cab..984d86f228 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-con #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md index 163e5617e9..aa8e30e97c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md index c5aaa2b026..0a930280fc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml) Note that **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md b/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md index d16ce4afab..3c1186b06c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-11-27-detect_usb_device_insertion.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for succe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_usb_device_insertion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md index 10efb31fcf..55455e2a93 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-01-05-monitor_email_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md index d095fbfb1e..9615d0a10f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) Note that **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md index 1fc97ee6db..b21dabfa94 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) Note that **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md index 4d59c747a4..53065f388f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-01-detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md index 7d801f8b3a..1a6cd28465 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-06-28-detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [aws_s3_accesslogs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_s3_accesslogs.yml) Note that **detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md index 36a268849e..fb2f3b310d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) Note that **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md index 403fb22f13..f7858e136a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) Note that **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md index 4bde8d2248..d74cbb489e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-11-02-windows_hosts_file_modification.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints ac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_hosts_file_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md index ecd91f468b..2a416fa40c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md index 4edf3cf3c7..20d63ca05c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-usn_journal_deletion.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **usn_journal_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md index d60dff7d38..2d8d893263 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md index 56efa8a693..5b20abccc9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-file_with_samsam_extension.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The search looks for file writes with extensions consistent with a SamSam ransom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **file_with_samsam_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md index 2a52f177ee..9e2ddccfb1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-14-samsam_test_file_write.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system direc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **samsam_test_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md index 98c8b113a5..113a9aa642 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credentia #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md index 327f63ad93..30e04bdf55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory usi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md index 26bd210d99..24c82572b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-01-web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious processes on all systems labeled as web servers #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md index 77da09a603..3b65e97b8b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md @@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) Note that **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md index a0131a1d50..0c6d185bed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-05-08-unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **unusually_long_command_line_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md index 4b15df2f96..ac327183b0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml) Note that **prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md index c54433e48d..2ddfc74d8d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md index b0ba58deb9..69d4ec50a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md index 19c8bc230a..fc550147a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md index 5946b6f4b2..8aa14d73c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md index 38606d00cd..19cc20b9a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md index 5470d7ae6e..d2e9057518 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-10-creation_of_shadow_copy.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **creation_of_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md b/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md index a04f40c20d..796c176592 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-01-22-dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk.md @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dns_query_length_outliers_-_mltk_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md index a964f7ba27..443884aedb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md index 1a734ea018..dafdaa43af 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-macos_-_re-opened_applications.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **macos_-_re-opened_applications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md index 08c7ff195d..823e222c5f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md index 015266cda9..4293d2201c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-02-remote_registry_key_modifications.md @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_registry_key_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md index 4261c35303..7bf76c3922 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associate #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md index f03e33d5d8..e3eb455fb4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-detect_rare_executables.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems runn #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [filter_rare_process_allow_list](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/filter_rare_process_allow_list.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rare_executables_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md index 61227044bb..81d60f00d1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-process_execution_via_wmi.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typica #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **process_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md index 4e454d0e2d..f92431359f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-03-16-script_execution_via_wmi.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for scripts launched via WMI. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **script_execution_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md index 661bd66a7c..e8ad51aaa3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) Note that **amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md index a6346aea8f..801ecb2e37 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides detection information on unauthenticated requests against K #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks.yml) Note that **amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md index df4169f032..d79054926c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md index c6f67e1323..260f3db8a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-03-detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe.md @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md index c53a4ec86a..71bf389485 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-short_lived_windows_accounts.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects accounts that were created and deleted in a short time perio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **short_lived_windows_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md index 5fe6fe26ad..082d9f1dc2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **windows_event_log_cleared_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md index 2eb14ff048..216b152650 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-07-remote_desktop_network_traffic.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md index 052f8233cd..788f5d7e61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **detect_new_local_admin_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md index a246fb3df8..8c67489011 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md index 50b9b087cf..0cf370ebd6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md @@ -123,14 +123,14 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) * [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) Note that **detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md index b18dc909c4..e229c3e9a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high nu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md index 6e06cf8484..3d030849c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_long_dns_txt_record_response.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md index 912387e432..ac45919672 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outbound_smb_traffic.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for outbound SMB connections made by hosts within your network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md index 8dc1096616..561e955bb4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.md @@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is wr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md index f8f3d5e76a..3630f904b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md index b4679c36b8..421de97085 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [dynamic_dns_web_traffic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_web_traffic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md index f57c3c016a..91039392d5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the exec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md index cf2dd06696..2a3183ad30 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml) -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) +* [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md index c20cd71e8f..58712a4b85 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files creat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md index c73e0ff14c..9c19c3179a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_command_line_argument.md @@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execut #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md index b37c976fbc..2710475c14 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) * [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) +* [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) Note that **first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md index 74ca087556..b9dbf9f82e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as h #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md index 10b6bd6cff..4a0ec89d6b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md index 131764c0e4..be306598f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-overwriting_accessibility_binaries.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a ke #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do no #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md index e62f64d154..943d7685ad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-prohibited_network_traffic_allowed.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic defined by port and transport layer protoc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md index 4c55abfac6..0f2d652b6c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-protocol_or_port_mismatch.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer proto #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md index 7309b95c4d..0c09e597ed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-remote_desktop_process_running_on_system.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems up #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md index 063f6913a4..4133408875 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modificatio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md index 0adc1b3fc5..890286ee36 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md index e48b2a88bd..7412408a3e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_changes_to_file_associations.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file assoc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md index 746344acbe..ecc4abba68 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, dom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_email_-_uba_anomaly_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md index fad26fb353..4eea2cc394 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) Note that **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ If Splunk Phantom is also configured in your environment, a Playbook called "Sus None identified #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A ](/stories/emotet_malware__dhs_report_ta18-201a_) * [Suspicious Emails](/stories/suspicious_emails) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md index 9c8f73d6e0..858350cf0b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_reg_exe_process.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started b #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md index 5a1aa00ddb..47ebc94eed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by somethin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md index 8001dd1e4e..0f6d463c77 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-tor_traffic.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for network traffic identified as The Onion Router (TOR), a be #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **tor_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md index ffccb288b3..c2f3496ce5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) Note that **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ None identified #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Unusual Processes](/stories/unusual_processes) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md index 67c9dc6275..fb4f7c67fb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-unload_sysmon_filter_driver.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md index 64b17deb2a..2f4d5110f6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-29-cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previ #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md index c62e53acfe..a0703e78c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md index 50ec849700..9ed66e2bed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md index acfcc29d2a..4ed9be8ec4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md index 93ae6e9aa2..b83b837b7b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen citie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md index 369753c2c9..2eabd5a4ff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security E #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md index 37506021e4..9485f22559 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-28-detect_software_download_to_network_device.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operatin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md index 9523f43cb4..e505cb5098 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-ryuk_test_files_detected.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **ryuk_test_files_detected_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md index ffa3d2b441..386792548e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed usi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md index 36c61ed7ff..b46bbbd8ab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-06-windows_security_account_manager_stopped.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md index f02fcac7ba..cfe00e44ed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_extensions.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The search looks for file modifications with extensions commonly used by Ransomw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [ransomware_extensions](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_extensions.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **common_ransomware_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md index 543db29468..d0e72a99a2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-common_ransomware_notes.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [ransomware_notes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_notes.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [ransomware_notes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ransomware_notes.yml) Note that **common_ransomware_notes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md index fa8862e06e..3fa45a8248 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-deleting_shadow_copies.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **deleting_shadow_copies_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md index e75d7d4931..fa73379f76 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-09-detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of ac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md index 502f692553..6f774eb5a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network config #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [system_network_configuration_discovery_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/system_network_configuration_discovery_tools.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [system_network_configuration_discovery_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/system_network_configuration_discovery_tools.yml) Note that **detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md index 31b758e8ec..d87de697c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) Note that **detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md index 7c6c0f01f0..28e1fd13a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-18-execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md index 87ee25c640..e8db8805fa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-19-execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md index 18a23c62e3..4605551454 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-processes_created_by_netsh.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **processes_created_by_netsh_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md index 6bd8aaf93b..196654164c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-23-shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently cre #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md index bc69dca97c..5fc1cbecb2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-26-reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md index 28e8dc1375..b25e73bcc3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-07-schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md index ad652b1afd..d74331d111 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-shim_database_file_creation.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **shim_database_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md index b5ea8e9863..fc85a44d04 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-single_letter_process_on_endpoint.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for process names that consist only of a single letter. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md index c66624c3ed..b38e8a9e01 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [is_windows_system_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_windows_system_file.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [is_windows_system_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_windows_system_file.yml) Note that **system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md index fb85f45b4f..eee05e67d8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-unusually_long_command_line.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **unusually_long_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md index 0aa0abaa98..58d9b858c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md index fc881e7ca1..7d6f775d11 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-15-o365_suspicious_rights_delegation.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects the assignment of rights to accesss content from another mai #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md index a7bc06c011..a1feec17b7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_pst_export_alert.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ This search detects when a user has performed an Ediscovery search or exported a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_pst_export_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md index b3a5e29bb6..04e2b59d7a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mail #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md index 86a3931e47..0634013b73 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-16-o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search detects when multiple user configured a forwarding rule to the same #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md index 447549f4e1..08a124a8c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-21-bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md index 4f82c754df..34f9e9515c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microso #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_microsoftworkflowcompiler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_microsoftworkflowcompiler.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_microsoftworkflowcompiler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_microsoftworkflowcompiler.yml) Note that **suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md index dee294e18d..98c91a25c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) Note that **suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md index b9fcb706d2..d970843447 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_mshta_child_process.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from "mshta.exe". Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md index a10e6b0b72..feb4a248a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious p #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) Note that **detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md index 68b79bc194..02f536107b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have cha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on pr These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments.md index 572f984ae5..c64b984e40 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's n #### Associated Analytic story * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md index e62daac2cd..6c58881a61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md index ac404e307b..5540330e5b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) Note that **suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md index cc81f64a4c..1efb104c01 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-22-wbadmin_delete_system_backups.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md index 946445f63d..37096e6cd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-25-nltest_domain_trust_discovery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md index 36145ee1f4..7f98814d02 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-certutil_exe_certificate_extraction.md @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md index ecf695a712..5345acd787 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md index a225ee8e1e..9be212edfa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon erro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md index 8dd8f7ba2b..855dbf36c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-o365_new_federated_domain_added.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the addition of a new Federated domain. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md index eef8f09ac5..97a85c9898 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (interna #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md index c6f240a0d1..f531e003be 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-ntdsutil_export_ntds.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This technique uses "Install from Media" (IFM), which will extract a copy of the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md index e764f38121..c4c4425d81 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md index b199cbcbe9..98eeed668c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md index 741234e4b5..13d41443d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md index 9ed7164403..4fa2c7c236 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md index 499d28c51f..fb8c3c63d3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md index 38f657eacc..2560476de1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md index 022359a98f..e5a6890a65 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md index 7389ff250a..feabbedba2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-11-detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md index 0ed0bf6012..7d3064f5f9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md index b21be132e1..78499b44aa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-12-detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particula #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md index 71a536bbeb..0e70fa2818 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md index 51d6763076..b5270fdc18 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_curl_network_connection.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md index 3a1aa8c4af..6207c587f1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_plistbuddy_usage.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ Upon triage, capture the property list file being written to disk and review for #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md index b5069a51cb..38d308f434 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS prefer #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md index 337c7b7e45..eef9219584 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-fodhelper_uac_bypass.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ Upon triage, fodhelper.exe will have a child process and read access will occur #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md index ad6d500487..06420d1df1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-ryuk_wake_on_lan_command.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md index 58ebb99a88..68a2cb82b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-01-suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following detection identifies Scheduled Tasks registering (creating a new t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md index 0528d9497c..047d95b9d0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection identifies Microsoft Exchange Server's Unified Messaging services #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **unified_messaging_service_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md index 5305e0d427..ec559314dc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-windows_disableantispyware_registry.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md index 2069f8b673..bacca10368 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md index 97538a40fe..6b3e2b46f1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **w3wp_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on pr Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) * [ProxyShell](/stories/proxyshell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md index d459b46915..13b8c77cf1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md index 188fc9f4a8..288f0307a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-resize_shadowstorage_volume.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware m #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md index e9a10ed2b3..895cad31c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **high_process_termination_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md index 5a565e980e..15fab392c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md index dc7696c984..8001922462 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **clop_common_exec_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md index 536095696c..892635bcec 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-23-certutil_with_decode_argument.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and scrip #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) Note that **certutil_with_decode_argument_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md index a6616c6bc8..ace986afa6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_start-bitstransfer_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md index e68bcc78f8..d3e0b86e6a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh applicati #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md index 206d347377..a4698c305f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-dsquery_domain_discovery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ In addition to trust discovery, review parallel processes for additional behavio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dsquery_domain_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md index 4c59958230..ca78de69bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it v #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md index 6eac61e2c2..8cedc3af8b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typicall #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excel_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md index 7ad41cf22b..d2f58981f2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_windows_script_host.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md index 2e40959111..3d06f1ae2c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via Task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md index 8854125ea7..f23543ca3a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winword_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md index f1f4f8875e..32a544f3a3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_windows_script_host.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md index 9fe96c948b..bde3e1e13c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md index e1df7ecf2f..2df2c08b22 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md index 712dd21be0..4b21420204 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **office_document_executing_macro_code_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md index ed23e6ccca..086a8d5463 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-15-dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md index 81a76ff8c8..c43e81b053 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md index 21a66d2af0..ecd709a0e6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md index 4b63079399..ef713b2e06 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md index 41f98dbe17..73bc6c0ec9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md index ba6c575f79..cd138f7ea3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that dr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md index 63185cd9c2..8956745d4c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md index 1c79405b19..ed31a7793f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md index 1da816b5f4..d753d5416f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltrat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md index e9cc22551c..026dfb4c89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-anomalous_usage_of_7zip.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllh #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md index 0e60a65f2b..0e869ae9cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md index b554f66150..d0977c1006 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md index bbb43cd8df..72583d6da2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-winword_spawning_cmd.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winword_spawning_cmd_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md index 0e0916d061..a4cd573df4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md index fede6fa04a..b0766c7f02 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_certutil.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_certutil_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md index c9ebe37cff..ec978ba92b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_mshta_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md index 0eadc14902..1158b6cf9a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **trickbot_named_pipe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md index 1a44f88cfd..ea76065a36 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-icacls_deny_command.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies a potential adversary that changes the security permiss #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **icacls_deny_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md index 4639b50b53..7db21c16a7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is comm #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md index a8ebca20c2..0b79a8782f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **xmrig_driver_loaded_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md index d1e7071bbe..87cc18a125 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **deleting_of_net_users_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md index 52b011b607..c87608b2af 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user accou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **disabling_net_user_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md index 5ed2cfa27c..86c2ef3983 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_attempt_to_disable_services.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md index 38f4430c31..db01ae7de5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md index bff59e613c..db6f449866 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_usage_of_taskkill.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This app #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md index 79dbc6a308..00f48d4a42 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-icacls_grant_command.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies potential adversaries that modify the security permissi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **icacls_grant_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md index 240d794365..1051071a84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md index 055a5135e2..479de8e89e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-05-suspicious_process_file_path.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytic will detect a suspicious process running in a file path w #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_process_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md index 552c212ffa..a854bfb692 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram appli #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **download_files_using_telegram_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md index 31daed681e..bf23163ed6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md index dc1591bc82..a5e5987dd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a buc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md index f0077b025d..2afccf3098 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious executable or scripts (known file extensi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md index 172b4f0ac3..419bbf60f9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-excessive_usage_of_cacls_app.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md index 2b6feaaaa9..71a7b0c3b8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-07-schtasks_run_task_on_demand.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This analytic identifies an on demand run of a Windows Schedule Task through she #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md index cbfc56943f..223abd9485 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md index 5f00a8936a..b0016a85a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLU #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md index ad740ff550..83aa471b84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_runas_elevated.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interfac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **slui_runas_elevated_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md index 37ae2ee3f5..78d3e13e15 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-slui_spawning_a_process.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interfac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **slui_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md index 054ab7177a..111aed62b4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-18-services_escalate_exe.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The b #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **services_escalate_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md index f7c266b411..35b71e522a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md index 901e844500..d5bb1e9705 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md index 18854bca6a..9f3c16547c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-20-cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation.md @@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md index 6c50a0ad1c..6295e08729 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-21-winrm_spawning_a_process.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmp #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winrm_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md index 5ede6720a5..e4a14eac94 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-26-secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping crede #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md index a65e888144..1fec708062 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_file_modifications.md @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. Shar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md index 3f19325d68..40aecd78e8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-27-detect_sharphound_usage.md @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_sharphound_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md index 5e255baf5d..1d85446375 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments.md @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by Azure #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_azurehound_command-line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md index 7037ea35b7..7362e6878b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_azurehound_file_modifications.md @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this ins #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md index 3c7a631b60..b9a9bf2a31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-01-detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments.md @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_sharphound_command-line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md index d6723b7f04..3c42239755 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-conti_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **conti_common_exec_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md index df6790b3d3..a296abe1a9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **modification_of_wallpaper_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md index 26fa5f1342..b9ba0e42cc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-revil_common_exec_parameter.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **revil_common_exec_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md index b2016bf0c5..1e9dc12127 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md index 170d22adf3..cba315f686 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-07-excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md index 83f9367acd..89786f94bd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri Limited false positives. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md index 20cc430662..c436df0014 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri False positives should be limited. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index 5447ecbb75..d5af947138 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index 81f86ff70d..653767ecf9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md index 761926455f..3489e9b732 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md index f0d527ce43..5d3073b19d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md index 6f2b1af284..65afbb55b4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-disable_logs_using_wevtutil.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This techniq #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md index dbc2ab8cb9..bfa5dec6d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-permission_modification_using_takeown_app.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using ta #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md index 6115340021..9fbef4241b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md index 226ad31a52..8472549c2b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_domain_enumeration_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md index 6ccd153a6a..07027979f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md index 7a46260c9a..a6f89e18e2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri powershell may used this function to process compressed data. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md index 5d7ae5728c..b09cbe39ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri powershell may used this function to store out object into memory. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md index 5ba60d93de..5baf9cff8c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failur #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md index f54f1619a4..d3ec7e113f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri network administrator may used this command for checking purposes #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md index 39627d5823..7e3055f850 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, wher #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **recon_using_wmi_class_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri network administrator may used this command for checking purposes #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md index bb588df593..79c867585f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Scri network administrator may used this command for checking purposes #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md index 986c97fc50..fa06692d54 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md index 8173d871c1..62f0415a0f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md index 93f0cb6512..b02e4f9638 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md index fe2bb8a091..87e25072b0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the po network operator may enable or disable this windows feature. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) * [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md index 9ade789aa2..750e3d8fd9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or di #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md index bf45950160..f5c4db4a96 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md index a5a9cc2a68..ce80c8adff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow netw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md index 12b22c558f..4750ec2ea0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md index 6671a1b142..43af8b2ce6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-25-excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md index ea46591f80..11eae06c74 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md index 3a912ebefc..dbce47b9c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md index f549313207..e28f396237 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md index f6d5b756f5..501852c4f6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md index 421a6bb7bf..8d4265d98a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in no #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md index dd084f95c4..d05b0aebbf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows d #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md index cf52d7e01a..8c1957878b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md index 8c47f9ca87..8d5c2f2a31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-13-cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not crea #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md index 4f2a431103..baf3ea3f04 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md index d7f05c74fb..6e63fe163e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-office_product_spawn_cmd_process.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd chil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md index 593f93e968..e58a9b76a6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md index c56733a83c..9fbc6d0603 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md index dc22f72471..f3edc8694b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md index 99dd65d479..005995d14f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md index b4917c9792..1f9afb3edf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit param #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md index fced024e03..c04c536540 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-chcp_command_execution.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **chcp_command_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md index 0cc35633a2..2143f4cde2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to lo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md index 537bb14e8d..e3d3f392d6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md index dab7ce0922..1642ea8715 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **drop_icedid_license_dat_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md index 74c84eaf29..6edf12b83c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md index 64bc66ec43..39d676b24b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md index 8af853fd04..3d6d7f91e5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% fol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md index 0b9dd66eb8..63c7d6be6e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This tec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md index 7d70e2753c..9a5c199b9e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-09-uninstall_app_using_msiexec.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiex #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md index 53e2481c1d..c5fe368766 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This techniqu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_execute_com_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the pr network operrator may use this command. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) * [Ransomware](/stories/ransomware) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md index f4d554b272..dc4782029c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-11-fsutil_zeroing_file.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **fsutil_zeroing_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md index 6b4f16d95a..0de21d0535 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md index 13226cb1c5..f718a90ab5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared out #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_drive](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_drive.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_drive](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_drive.yml) Note that **gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md index 5f10c86d78..b9dacba00e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-16-gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) Note that **gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md index d609a050de..1e10de16f5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md index 821666721c..65e14a484f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to ext #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) Note that **gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md index 7b4df0e9af..52a0b1d3ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-powershell_4104_hunting.md @@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ The following Hunting analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be import Limited false positives. May filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md index 94c73a8cc5..21549c9cd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) * [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md index 17d48e69de..8cb486ef45 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) Note that **gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md index 792c4cde1e..a7212972b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensiti #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md index 619162a960..5122249467 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 3b1b485d3a..01a5f02d09 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md index 371d9b9057..86a408ba21 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md index 523e28b3c3..bc1d07ffdc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md index 7f91afb3f4..987ffab910 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abuse #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_gmail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_gmail.yml) Note that **gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md index 0f485dcb01..8cae71b6f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [gsuite_drive](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_drive.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [gsuite_drive](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/gsuite_drive.yml) Note that **gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md index a9cc95cf1b..26b95b6aaa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md index c45d9dd9fb..ecf17a28be 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line argumen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 2a36720e6e..4e8250baca 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md index 1ee95e1903..fb049ae102 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md index 4ff50492dd..172fefda09 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domai #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get-domaintrust_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6c565d2699..ee1767427f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md index 9a408350ad..da6bf17bf2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_aduser_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 558f516974..f656c826b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md index 8d25b236cb..993d558e2e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6f526d8776..0ec7e439b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md index bbc1f91c9a..24227437e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index 1d7ad2997a..fe07b877e2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index bd72a25c37..561808acbb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md index 4700b5ffc0..634ec4039f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_net.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md index ed160f58cb..54e47508fa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md index 1f91ecbd22..fc74198d78 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_net.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md index cbfd8b9b6d..1b075bc95a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md index 4b3a54b22c..39bc5e2074 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md index 15a5c8f89c..d0eec5c74a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getadgroup_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6bce78d975..6926089dd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md index f4167d61f3..56f3a3b277 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getdomaingroup_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md index f10e734570..09a49edb71 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line util #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md index 40b9bcec09..41cd7eaa23 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md index 5e4319e7de..8c3be639c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md index 1e5abf7b0c..c726c55842 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 7304dc73dd..4c44107636 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md index 7181ea5035..88912538b2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUs #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 9a2c8c73c8..1c6466c013 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md index 59a92beff2..c3fe62d009 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-Dom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 7fc5d84c27..00426647a8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index 669cc8eec9..7339f283ea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md index 074ac6c176..b58d657a1f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-password_policy_discovery_with_net.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md index e2c3fb2e82..99b8bb3f10 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `* #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md index c15a96ad84..bd0a1dca76 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a manageme #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md index f2902e7957..15533bf1f2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line argument #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md index e29a587403..7c484cf91b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-30-remote_system_discovery_with_net.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md index 2a711dfc8a..80b87bd7d6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious ac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md index 72ea84432a..ace1d3011d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication tic #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authen #### Associated Analytic story * [PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services](/stories/petitpotam_ntlm_relay_on_active_directory_certificate_services) +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md index 2257445617..1689c8eea5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line argumen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md index de512ad817..413d248d1b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-circle_ci_disable_security_step.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for disable security step in CircleCI pipeline. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [circleci](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/circleci.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [circleci](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/circleci.yml) Note that **circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md index 08187b3666..fba3ea15c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md index ded28ae614..8756290679 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line argumen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 06ef4b38a0..1f66e9b74a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md index e5e3068d65..49e614d830 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md index 6cfc74bc7e..41d3f22454 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github_known_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github_known_users.yml) * [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github_known_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github_known_users.yml) Note that **github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index 59c88fc53a..a0ecf85f47 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md index c2020345d4..114ee9caac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md index 15a7466b8c..4eb3d0488b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-circle_ci_disable_security_job.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for disable security job in CircleCI pipeline. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [circleci](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/circleci.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [circleci](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/circleci.yml) Note that **circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md index 77392f5e2f..7543d491f5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather dom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get-foresttrust_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index 54a0879385..28f3510082 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index bab9ea64b1..3544d08a5a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md index 8587fa0d68..d9c44e8e26 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md index f95cb82a9b..40ca2e08c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md index 9e88e01d9d..2511260eea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-06-change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md index af3985fa64..ac1557f390 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getadcomputer_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md index 652c2bbf63..af4b7dc446 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md index 70c9b0df61..00a3011d8d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md index 1db32dc7a8..4718bfffb1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md index b0576cbb0c..5679158b61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md index a2c924e506..383d81124b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-system_information_discovery_detection.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand c #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **system_information_discovery_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md index 3578087dc0..aa46993c4a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-control_loading_from_world_writable_directory.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf fro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md index 89b17543f7..35ab180cfc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of local administrator accounts using net.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md index 551671112f..e12612ba8e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-office_spawning_control.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_spawning_control_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md index 0586fc46a3..8c2f938acf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md index 90e713da54..bc74085bcf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md index 06c0639f90..ac2e04ddc1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) Note that **extraction_of_registry_hives_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md index 6fe995e38e..e9d852091f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6379015a2f..c17b914d02 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md index 15e62a9286..77a2381f84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_arp.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md index 2dcd1588cd..eb6c64257e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_net.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md index 137f00e536..727f59bbaa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-network_connection_discovery_with_netstat.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line argumen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md index e138e64cf9..6984d6e8e4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index c9b55ec456..91fb69a4bb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md index 3b7b2966f0..2eef80d7c4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-jscript_execution_using_cscript_app.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md index d466c29b33..48a0b4de9a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md index 25a5d34c04..b9c551bed9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md index 2ad7dbf583..4702a3f9c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_query.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **system_user_discovery_with_query_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md index 00563ff01e..154f2b9492 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-system_user_discovery_with_whoami.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md index b2b7f846f6..9cb6d6fda2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line argu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md index 97b7343e2b..06f3e8204d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md index a3f25d5dae..410f68d575 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md index 4bf3e11d30..d8f27b583b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md index 6195a6221a..c2fb13e6aa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index d831dda2a3..7a4ee3550b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md index c227813936..37f4d94617 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-net_localgroup_discovery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery usi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **net_localgroup_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md index 9a1ea5802b..9dbeea78da 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index a5eb79605f..a7d5560642 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md index 899fc48279..90fedae751 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-wmic_group_discovery.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious beh #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wmic_group_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md index cfede24e2d..a78f6fae12 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or sh #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md index 7faccae078..c19b4e40ec 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md index bc541ca2ed..0e2aea7d72 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the f #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 64ae29ee01..1f3589d4ee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md index 1c8666c377..629b9c13e1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) Note that **attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md index 7c06697df9..96724343cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md index 2d4fdb42fb..ef2e67a029 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **bits_job_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md index 23db7765d2..2e6f8a337c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **bitsadmin_download_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md index d2c24cb583..fee83d189b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md index 61583f829d..ade274efcc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects credential dumping using copy command from a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md index 33451ed69f..fd399b6fad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md index 70ba92f123..c4df912c5d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md index 60e92b6fbc..075eaab9cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTM #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_hh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_hh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md index bd840b3f26..ab5f8de9e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol han #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) Note that **detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md index 608c69a9cc..89651dc8d9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utilit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) Note that **detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md index d6fe2a985e..2351ec5cab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` fla #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) Note that **detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md index cdd806c7cf..fdb88b2d85 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_7-zip.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stag #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_renamed_7-zip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md index 08d288f6b1..3191c9bf44 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_rclone.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_renamed_rclone_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md index b7382fef74..e1002a78ee 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_renamed_winrar.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cas #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_renamed_winrar_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md index d264a0a768..a012cd382a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md index e7a843e35e..b5bc1c8bce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **local_account_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md index e54711cdfa..feff4b1303 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md index f494214095..c62350b622 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md index f1098a5fe4..c00900d76e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **processes_launching_netsh_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md index 2101d93e7b..0b897e5aa3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-20-office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin ch #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md index c2bdeb5212..2a5228ae5e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-21-remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md index 4d935feed9..e0662a48de 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-change_default_file_association.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **change_default_file_association_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ unknown * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md index 531281d931..73a40e321f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-logon_script_event_trigger_execution.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ unknown #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md index a7608a770c..3a34469a77 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-27-screensaver_event_trigger_execution.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through sc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ unknown * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md index 038eaba732..6344fd89c4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-28-print_processor_registry_autostart.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **print_processor_registry_autostart_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry. #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md index 23f7c281a4..90ebfbe0e2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious fil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) Note that **verclsid_clsid_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md index 7c3c0c36bf..f867ce1306 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-01-vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md index 80ad4f52c8..69bc8ac6e4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) Note that **msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md index 0b848f73e6..c16b1032d2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with sile #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md index 5d213c80d5..917bdaa5a9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-malicious_inprocserver32_modification.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md index a466d1f6bb..62958751ae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-process_writing_dynamicwrapperx.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md index 0a449794a3..abf1c80157 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md index d29ff00567..5bd5600992 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_copy](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_copy.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md index ba25a484ff..9882f5a421 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-winhlp32_spawning_a_process.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md index 85c2e6cbb9..5b800fc09a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-sdelete_application_execution.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_sdelete](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_sdelete.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **sdelete_application_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md index ba70937134..6d65ab661d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-06-wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md index caf2f1a03f..4d58347ee1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-11-suspicious_wevtutil_usage.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md index cb3dcd3623..fc944b6613 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md index 35960549ea..3de56a7ff9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_setspn](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_setspn.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_setspn](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_setspn.yml) Note that **serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md index 2943b0a04b..07a2274a25 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-18-disable_schedule_task.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **disable_schedule_task_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md index 54892ffba6..87f2bdd205 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, iden #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md index 5af6decbb8..4f9d9cb719 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that ha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_task_scheduler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_task_scheduler.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_task_scheduler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_task_scheduler.yml) Note that **winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md index 19d164fe8a..c8b089a7b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-20-wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious wmic commandlined that uninstall applica #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md index 2d33a7e038..7e407788a4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-03-windows_adfind_exe.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_adfind_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md index 66f2db97da..0eb050e01e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-04-attacker_tools_on_endpoint.md @@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ This search looks for execution of commonly used attacker tools on an endpoint. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md index 66e1b03764..fc071abd50 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md index 2ce2d86564..34ccc24dd6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments ut #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md index d50220cb14..dc2409a1e6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments ut #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md index 7c2b9a8602..ecc8f02835 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md index f13678a0ac..e62a610236 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `at.exe` with command-line arguments ut #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md index 1d9253db6d..3125e7e06e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line argume #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md index 1cfa95eeef..a28e02e2b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `schtasks.exe` with command-line argume #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md index 9348248b8a..08e781b633 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md index 3efe4e5ef7..e995b9818b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_csc](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_csc.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_csc](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_csc.yml) Note that **csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md index 4b5f89536f..2422d91026 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-firewall_allowed_program_enable.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allow #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md index 7eecaf5da4..a929569f28 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-network_discovery_using_route_windows_app.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adver #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_route](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_route.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md index 9b12b47e4b..a186a6135a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md index b2382b49ab..45c82d1600 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user opt #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) Note that **runas_execution_in_commandline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual e #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md index 4d11b99aa7..4dcc0262e3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md index 0cd3b1d6ff..703e35936e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md @@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md index 45defa4f5e..c3cad50e0a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md index b632a18fed..4d642713fd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md index b6b7d0635b..7d29398499 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md index db4d3aac0b..785cef016a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md index 2ee027b6a5..88d8a22cf3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md index 749164711c..e9d5087279 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-windows_diskcryptor_usage.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor process name of dcrypt.exe or int #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md index 28c2e723f9..cc6c13908a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md index 461370826c..03b0f31d66 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md index a9d65d562c..14b40bcb17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-17-windows_dism_remove_defender.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `di #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_dism_remove_defender_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md index 784a9a7c38..d06acd60ed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md index c80c3e0ed1..5dd955aa03 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md index 46501b0957..b91f2b6f47 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line executio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_dxdiag](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dxdiag.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md index cb2f6fef65..8df00bc93c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-possible_browser_pass_view_parameter.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline paramet #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 9cfdc8ebea..c7358fc973 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 5bd13df00c..729cd94caf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `svchost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 7ffe682eb2..5ce0d5479b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index 276d318044..f649bc3fd2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md index b017b11469..f4da0ca5b2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-23-mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md index 936a9f865e..d793ad1130 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md index 09c6ba2284..fd9b2fd61b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows de #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md index 5bfdd9c05e..1f0713fa35 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.ex #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rclone_command-line_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md index 35abe42876..b2dfab2f23 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.md @@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ The following analytic assists with identifying a PowerShell process spawned as #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the pr Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Active Directory Lateral Movement](/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md index ccf60fde95..6df23d2125 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-01-unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested.md @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not #### Associated Analytic story * [Active Directory Lateral Movement](/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement) +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md index 2036a963e1..1c5a060ed3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-06-suspicious_linux_discovery_commands.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The search logic specifically looks for high number of distinct commands run in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md index f299a1bfef..1f4c67fdd1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md index dfc9568416..2a51ad7d93 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being load #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md index 9d5565668b..04a4b6a881 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-10-curl_download_and_bash_execution.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md index d1767dc18e..698580d00f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-11-wget_download_and_bash_execution.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md index f2694b1706..44802f8569 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat sp #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [linux_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/linux_shells.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [linux_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/linux_shells.yml) Note that **linux_java_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -135,7 +135,9 @@ To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the pr Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228) +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md index f7896912d1..9ce50096f2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection.md @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md index 898543d1d4..bda7197ef7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md index 81c9aec0fc..251e71c08f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-windows_java_spawning_shells.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spaw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_java_spawning_shells_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md index 3ad2b9f0a3..1e7fe36812 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation in known cron table #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md index 1988954c6e..b22edfc587 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_allow_config_file_creation.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious file creation of /etc/at.allow or #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md index 15399f7704..f1547af2d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_at_application_execution.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creation of At applicatio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_at_application_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md index 5dcf88553e..79cf2eae8b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_edit_cron_table_parameter.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious cronjobs modification using cront #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md index 302ab92b97..8cffcecc11 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that may use to append user entry #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md index 473119e53b..f4aeecec58 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for possible suspicious commandline that may use to append a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md index c5a8a034a7..1cb36ac983 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-17-linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for possible modification of cronjobs file using editor. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md index ddc781bd15..4315a875f7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md index a1e453bfe1..18c79cd026 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md index 2d585b9989..5b38061a48 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to mo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md index c8d4e2ed1e..217a4b6445 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in systemd timer directory in l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md index 29b47b0992..703755e490 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_restarted.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for restarted or re-enable services in linux platform. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_service_restarted_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md index d7dac183bd..ba21128630 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-linux_service_started_or_enabled.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic looks for created or enable services in linux platform. This techn #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md index 9afc56d003..9288cc7567 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-20-suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request.md @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not iden #### Associated Analytic story * [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](/stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md index 215aaa0b06..9bb2e6da55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_add_user_account.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_add_user_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md index 787bf9cf07..bffa9d94fd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_change_file_owner_to_root.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using c #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md index 1435ec4b25..2e35062cc2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md index 0a1f0db1f2..cd955f229f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md index 68d970d4fc..032370489d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md index d4b1ebd892..635333b6c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-linux_visudo_utility_execution.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md index 458587f4f1..190e88f27d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-21-suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request.md @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT requ #### Associated Analytic story * [sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation](/stories/samaccountname_spoofing_and_domain_controller_impersonation) +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md index e03f211383..e7eec37626 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md index 93b650fe0a..ffe968338d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility fu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md index 2c8bf702b9..9a00b17d52 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md index b2ab9b1edc..ce8b6b607f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-22-linux_preload_hijack_library_calls.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library functi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md index 630260d649..5145ad6a08 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_common_process_for_elevation_control.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common kn #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md index 5ecd7ddeb9..3fc911ce45 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-23-linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md index a4091d5bd5..990ea25592 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-04-linux_sudo_or_su_execution.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operatin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md index fed38517b7..e199d2fb38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_conf_file_creation.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md index 1599d008a8..4bab1c3341 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-05-linux_doas_tool_execution.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_doas_tool_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md index 8abacad923..a68baf76b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_credential_files.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of / #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md index d32def4018..37fff063bf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-10-linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers fil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md index 646b74e3e7..d7c41c5d61 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be acces #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md index 44b67839f1..064027d5cc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-11-linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md index 1028de66cd..1667fb4176 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md @@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to popu Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) * [Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns](/stories/possible_backdoor_activity_associated_with_mudcarp_espionage_campaigns) * [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md index cd569b7713..de5dd6c1d4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into L #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md index 60c7093de5..ac3bb8bf38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md index 5834b33c54..efcd926a07 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to det #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score.yml) Note that **potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md index 34a10929a9..c88d8bcf6c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md index cbc824d6df..9900b5ed28 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters.md @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typica #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md index 64629a89f1..32a6abe049 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md @@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on pr System administrators may use this option, but it's not common. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) * [NOBELIUM Group](/stories/nobelium_group) * [WhisperGate](/stories/whispergate) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md index e3619c665e..abc63bd53c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the W #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md index 20ea3aa0e0..625116b089 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md index c102f70073..790b96d787 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known i #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md index db5f6c5ee2..d2a1593c63 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) Note that **windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md index e887c103b9..2151067a4b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running fro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md index 19efd5ad59..8c544b007e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defend #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md index fb4539a7d4..18e92b3fae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **ping_sleep_batch_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md index 2e355530e0..5078976b82 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-21-windows_nirsoft_advancedrun.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe ha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md index 58c3176a80..e0a423e605 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_nirsoft_software.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_nirsoft_software.yml) Note that **windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md index 0a50b83139..361c32c9f9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-active_setup_registry_autostart.md @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ Active setup installer may add or modify this registry. #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md index ac25bfdba6..0d15d75183 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **log4shell_cve-2021-44228_exploitation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md index 76ccb4209f..9343633c68 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation.md @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and * [Suspicious Windows Registry Activities](/stories/suspicious_windows_registry_activities) * [Cloud Federated Credential Abuse](/stories/cloud_federated_credential_abuse) * [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md index cc81080794..49ce735d75 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-26-time_provider_persistence_registry.md @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ unknown * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md index f3f96dfe7f..4ec0f102de 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md index a36690f13f..75e5d6e139 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-etw_registry_disabled.md @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ unknown * [Windows Persistence Techniques](/stories/windows_persistence_techniques) * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Windows Registry Abuse](/stories/windows_registry_abuse) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md index 98c5d90bf3..7c7fcdc9c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-28-linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line argumen #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md index 9c374923f6..aa1a868bc5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters lev #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md index e9fa2bc27b..a7f41d2ddc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-01-rubeus_command_line_parameters.md @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily ad ``` -| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor *" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line paramet * [https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus) * [http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/) * [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/) +* [https://en.hackndo.com/kerberos-silver-golden-tickets/](https://en.hackndo.com/kerberos-silver-golden-tickets/) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md index 6a83c2e061..8a7b6a777c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) Note that **certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md index 7a179fcdcf..e16582243b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_certutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_certutil.yml) Note that **certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md index aa4f03c7bd..8b5966519c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_added_service_principal.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ This search detects the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting about a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_added_service_principal_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md index 56227cb9c5..7779bd19cf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search detects newly added IP addresses/CIDR blocks to the list of MFA Trus #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md index 12662ec347..84322bf3fe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-03-o365_disable_mfa.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search detects when multi factor authentication has been disabled, what ent #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_disable_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md index db38882aa7..b3a2bd7c5d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md index 0f60a6cb66..59dc098559 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [windows_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/windows_shells.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md index 4dcf94b19a..d8e870c17a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system.md @@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ The following analytic identifies Schtasks.exe creating a new task to start and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_schtasks](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_schtasks.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md index 35cd16df7b..5f65d085c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ord #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md index 7be28a30c8..75b0670ea5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) Note that **kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate fals #### Associated Analytic story * [Windows Privilege Escalation](/stories/windows_privilege_escalation) * [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md index 9d6dac3223..2c0e0894f3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-14-linux_dd_file_overwrite.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was ab #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md index c6a5449ad3..71d2b5ea18 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [process_diskshadow](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_diskshadow.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md index 9bec2a26f5..c13f758e80 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-15-windows_rasautou_dll_execution.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasaut #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md index f5db7edcb5..27f66158ab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the maste #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md index 697c39bd16..33ed55e6c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a publ #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md index 24486be582..5fcf4a6cbc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md index e1c59dcffd..68ec5a3cf6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md index 4f3d05ca85..e73ee7ac5f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md index 5a1d767dda..2272a169c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-net_profiler_uac_bypass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md index e8f0f99335..7f1e6efa35 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [o365_management_activity](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/o365_management_activity.yml) Note that **o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md index 3eeb6d0ab4..2fa3827afe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md index 640a455271..a1454b06df 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **rundll32_dnsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md index e2c3712343..ad2c3f2a3f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrest #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to popu Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate. #### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) * [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) * [Credential Dumping](/stories/credential_dumping) * [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md index f20f996b8e..a6023ab62f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md index f7b8fe52f7..9a48eed0ef 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the creation or deletion of a scheduled task u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md index f0cd00e8be..b801a07f2b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) Note that **windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md index 82db512bd7..42e2822799 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) Note that **kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md index 55982e231d..0b6820e344 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md index 4920f10377..f03705abc2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder lik #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md index 09fa8ebf84..819ed31cf9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.md index b6fd1bc350..a260113d4b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-28-excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions. We have ob #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68855019bd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +--- +title: "Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-04 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Use Alternate Authentication Material + - Defense Evasion + - Lateral Movement + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-04 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: 18916468-9c04-11ec-bdc6-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1550](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/) | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Defense Evasion, Lateral Movement | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 Account_Name!=*$ +| `kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) + +Note that **kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Ticket_Encryption_Type +* Account_Name +* Client_Address + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. + +#### Known False Positives +Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for TGT requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | A Kerberos TGT request with RC4 encryption was requested for $Account_Name$ from $Client_Address$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/](https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/) +* [https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/ptk](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/ptk) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/impacket/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/impacket/windows-security.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-macos_lolbin.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-macos_lolbin.md index 3d61e4171d..1512d4c20c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-macos_lolbin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-04-macos_lolbin.md @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ Detect multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries in a short p | rename columns.* as * | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id, dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path +| where dc_path > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter` @@ -114,8 +115,8 @@ Detect multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries in a short p #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [osquery](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/osquery.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [osquery](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/osquery.yml) Note that **macos_lolbin_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md index 3c46db4ea8..94eaac3a31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md @@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) Note that **suspicious_msbuild_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-09-unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-09-unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3629e977a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-09-unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.md @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +--- +title: "Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol" +excerpt: "Use Alternate Authentication Material +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-09 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Use Alternate Authentication Material + - Defense Evasion + - Lateral Movement + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Network_Traffic +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-09 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: c91a0852-9fbb-11ec-af44-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1550](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/) | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Defense Evasion, Lateral Movement | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=lsass.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| join process_id [ +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 88 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port +| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] +| table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port +| `unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* All_Traffic.dest_ip +* All_Traffic.dest_port +* All_Traffic.src_ip +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.dest +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.process +* Processes.parent_process_name + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your endpoint events and populating the Endpoint and Network data models. + +#### Known False Positives +Custom applications may leverage the Kerberos protocol. Filter as needed. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/](https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/) +* [https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/ptk](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/ptk) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/rubeus/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/rubeus/windows-security.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-10-kerberos_user_enumeration.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-10-kerberos_user_enumeration.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f9ecccaea --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-10-kerberos_user_enumeration.md @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +--- +title: "Kerberos User Enumeration" +excerpt: "Gather Victim Identity Information +, Email Addresses +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-10 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Gather Victim Identity Information + - Email Addresses + - Reconnaissance + - Reconnaissance + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic leverages Event Id 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify one source endpoint trying to obtain an unusual number Kerberos TGT ticket for non existing users. This behavior could represent an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol to perform a user enumeration attack against an Active Directory environment. When Kerberos is sent a TGT request with no preauthentication for an invalid username, it responds with KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or 0x6. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Kerberos protocol to validate a list of users use them to perform further attacks.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. + +- **Type**: [Anomaly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-10 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: d82d4af4-a0bd-11ec-9445-3e22fbd008af + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1589](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/) | Gather Victim Identity Information | Reconnaissance | + +| [T1589.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002/) | Email Addresses | Reconnaissance | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!="*$" +| bucket span=2m _time +| stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address +| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address +| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) +| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) +| search isOutlier=1 +| `kerberos_user_enumeration_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) + +Note that **kerberos_user_enumeration_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Result_Code +* Account_Name +* Client_Address + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. + +#### Known False Positives +Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 24.0 | 30 | 80 | Potential Kerberos based user enumeration attack $Client_Address$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute](https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute) +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002/) +* [https://www.redsiege.com/blog/2020/04/user-enumeration-part-3-windows/](https://www.redsiege.com/blog/2020/04/user-enumeration-part-3-windows/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1589.002/kerbrute/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1589.002/kerbrute/windows-security.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/kerberos_user_enumeration.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 190d61e635..9f437d20cf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regasm](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regasm.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regasm](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regasm.yml) Note that **detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 74812b1354..1b09ce3473 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) Note that **detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index 772ed5f046..6ae68ab0ac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments wit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index dac22000fe..b2d06297ca 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments an #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b76329ebcc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +--- +title: "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption" +excerpt: "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets +, Golden Ticket +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-15 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets + - Golden Ticket + - Credential Access + - Credential Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-15 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: 7d90f334-a482-11ec-908c-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1558](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/) | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | Credential Access | + +| [T1558.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/) | Golden Ticket | Credential Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name="*$" (Ticket_Options=0x40810000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40800000 OR Ticket_Options=0x40810010) Ticket_Encryption_Type=0x17 +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, Ticket_Encryption_Type, Ticket_Options +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) + +Note that **kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Ticket_Options +* Ticket_Encryption_Type +* dest +* service +* service_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. + +#### Known False Positives +Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for Kerberos Service Ticket requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 45.0 | 90 | 50 | A Kerberos Service TTicket request with RC4 encryption was requested from $Client_Address$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769) +* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515) +* [https://gist.github.com/TarlogicSecurity/2f221924fef8c14a1d8e29f3cb5c5c4a](https://gist.github.com/TarlogicSecurity/2f221924fef8c14a1d8e29f3cb5c5c4a) +* [https://en.hackndo.com/kerberos-silver-golden-tickets/](https://en.hackndo.com/kerberos-silver-golden-tickets/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.001/impacket/windows-security.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.001/impacket/windows-security.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index c2ad89a4c9..9d60c47bd0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments an #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md index f31630945d..2f49f3fc5a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line ar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index b9db2e133e..c92d005b31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_dllhost](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dllhost.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_dllhost](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dllhost.yml) Note that **suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md index 0b1c616369..ff9cc07e7f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_gpupdate](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_gpupdate.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md index 94299762a1..5593f6b8ef 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index 986cc33ef5..396e063181 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line ar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md index 6ba3466b6c..0585252a58 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md index 167481cd52..42ed4b524f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-17-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-17-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md index 3b06db008c..91520b029e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-17-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-17-modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-24-splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-24-splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.md index 0c17715d52..737a8e6d4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-24-splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-24-splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request.md @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ On March 24th, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a possible Denial
| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | | ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | -| [CVE-2021-3422](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3422) | The lack of validation of a key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk protocol results in a denial-of-service in Splunk Enterprise instances configured to index Universal Forwarder traffic. The vulnerability impacts Splunk Enterprise versions before 7.3.9, 8.0 versions before 8.0.9, and 8.1 versions before 8.1.3. It does not impact Universal Forwarders. When Splunk forwarding is secured using TLS or a Token, the attack requires compromising the certificate or token, or both. Implementation of either or both reduces the severity to Medium. | None | +| [CVE-2021-3422](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3422) | The lack of validation of a key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk protocol results in a denial-of-service in Splunk Enterprise instances configured to index Universal Forwarder traffic. The vulnerability impacts Splunk Enterprise versions before 7.3.9, 8.0 versions before 8.0.9, and 8.1 versions before 8.1.3. It does not impact Universal Forwarders. When Splunk forwarding is secured using TLS or a Token, the attack requires compromising the certificate or token, or both. Implementation of either or both reduces the severity to Medium. | 4.3 | diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc9c4fbfea --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-28 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Remote System Discovery + - Discovery + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-28 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: c8640777-469f-4638-ab44-c34a3233ffac + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1018](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) | Remote System Discovery | Discovery | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-ADComputer*" AND Message = "*TrustedForDelegation*") +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) + +Note that **windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Message +* ComputerName +* User + + +#### How To Implement +The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. + +#### Known False Positives +Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 35.0 | 50 | 70 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-ADComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) +* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos) +* [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation) +* [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/unconstrained2/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/unconstrained2/windows-powershell.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45018c433e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +--- +title: "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-28 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Remote System Discovery + - Discovery + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-28 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: fbf9e47f-e531-4fea-942d-5c95af7ed4d6 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1018](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) | Remote System Discovery | Discovery | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` +`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR Message = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (Message = "*-Unconstrained*") +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) + +Note that **windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Message +* ComputerName +* User + + +#### How To Implement +The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. + +#### Known False Positives +Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 35.0 | 50 | 70 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) +* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos) +* [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation) +* [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/unconstrained/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/unconstrained/windows-powershell.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md index 9dfd2c5d9e..1a620cbbac 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) Note that **windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-29-macos_plutil.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-29-macos_plutil.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c8939d95c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-29-macos_plutil.md @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +--- +title: "MacOS plutil" +excerpt: "Plist Modification +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-29 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Plist Modification + - Persistence + - Privilege Escalation + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-29 +- **Author**: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk +- **ID**: c11f2b57-92c1-4cd2-b46c-064eafb833ac + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1547.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011/) | Plist Modification | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Actions on Objectives + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` +`osquery` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil +| rename columns.* as * +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by username host cmdline pid path parent signing_id +| rename username as User, cmdline as process, path as process_path +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `macos_plutil_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [osquery](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/osquery.yml) + +Note that **macos_plutil_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* columns.cmdline +* columns.pid +* columns.parent +* columns.path +* columns.signing_id +* columns.username +* host + + +#### How To Implement +This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery. + +#### Known False Positives +Administrators using plutil to change plist files. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | plutil are executed on $host$ from $user$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/](https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.011/atomic_red_team/osquery.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.011/atomic_red_team/osquery.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/macos_plutil.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..50a5cf0397 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +--- +title: "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery" +excerpt: "Remote System Discovery +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-03-31 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Remote System Discovery + - Discovery + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud + +- **Last Updated**: 2022-03-31 +- **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk +- **ID**: 86dc8176-6e6c-42d6-9684-5444c6557ab3 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1018](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) | Remote System Discovery | Discovery | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Reconnaissance + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` +`powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR Message = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (Message = "*-TrustedToAuth*") +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) + +Note that **windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* EventCode +* Message +* ComputerName +* User + + +#### How To Implement +The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging. + +#### Known False Positives +Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Active Directory Kerberos Attacks](/stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 35.0 | 50 | 70 | Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $ComputerName$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/) +* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos) +* [https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/](https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/) +* [https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation) +* [https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation](https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/constrained/windows-powershell.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/constrained/windows-powershell.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-java_writing_jsp_file.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-java_writing_jsp_file.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4e0d54091f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-java_writing_jsp_file.md @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +--- +title: "Java Writing JSP File" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2022-22965 + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: eb65619c-4f8d-4383-a975-d352765d344b + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2022-22965](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965) | A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data binding. The specific exploit requires the application to run on Tomcat as a WAR deployment. If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit. However, the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it. | 7.5 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("java","java.exe", "javaw.exe") by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| join process_guid [ +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.jsp*" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user +| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` +| fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] +| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `java_writing_jsp_file_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **java_writing_jsp_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id +* Filesystem.dest +* Filesystem.file_create_time +* Filesystem.file_name +* Filesystem.file_path +* Filesystem.process_guid +* Filesystem.user + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 42.0 | 60 | 70 | An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ writing a jsp file to disk, potentially indicative of exploitation. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/) +* [https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell](https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell) +* [https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability](https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/java_write_jsp-linux-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/java_write_jsp-linux-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/java_writing_jsp_file.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-spring4shell_payload_url_request.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-spring4shell_payload_url_request.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc5c8cd06b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-spring4shell_payload_url_request.md @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +--- +title: "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request" +excerpt: "Web Shell +, Server Software Component +, Exploit Public-Facing Application +" +categories: + - Web +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Web Shell + - Server Software Component + - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Persistence + - Persistence + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2022-22965 + - Web +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 2850c734-2d44-4431-8139-1a56f6f54c01 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/) | Web Shell | Persistence | + +| [T1505](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/) | Server Software Component | Persistence | + +| [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2022-22965](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965) | A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data binding. The specific exploit requires the application to run on Tomcat as a WAR deployment. If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit. However, the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it. | 7.5 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*tomcatwar.jsp*","*poc.jsp*","*shell.jsp*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype +| `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that **spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Web.http_method +* Web.url +* Web.url_length +* Web.src +* Web.dest +* Web.http_user_agent + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. + +#### Known False Positives +The jsp file names are static names used in current proof of concept code. = + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 36.0 | 60 | 60 | A URL was requested related to Spring4Shell POC code on $dest$ by $src$. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/) +* [https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell](https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell) +* [https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability](https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/spring4shell_nginx.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/spring4shell_nginx.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/web/spring4shell_payload_url_request.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_jsp_request_via_url.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_jsp_request_via_url.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0fb2827ebb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_jsp_request_via_url.md @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +--- +title: "Web JSP Request via URL" +excerpt: "Web Shell +, Server Software Component +, Exploit Public-Facing Application +" +categories: + - Web +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Web Shell + - Server Software Component + - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Persistence + - Persistence + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2022-22965 + - Web +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 2850c734-2d44-4431-8139-1a56f6f54c01 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/) | Web Shell | Persistence | + +| [T1505](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/) | Server Software Component | Persistence | + +| [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2022-22965](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965) | A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data binding. The specific exploit requires the application to run on Tomcat as a WAR deployment. If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit. However, the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it. | 7.5 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*.jsp?cmd=*","*j&cmd=*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype +| `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that **web_jsp_request_via_url_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Web.http_method +* Web.url +* Web.url_length +* Web.src +* Web.dest +* Web.http_user_agent + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 72.0 | 90 | 80 | A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to web shell activity. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/04/springshell-rce-vulnerability-guidance-for-protecting-against-and-detecting-cve-2022-22965/) +* [https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell](https://github.com/TheGejr/SpringShell) +* [https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability](https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/spring4shell_nginx.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/spring4shell_nginx.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/web/web_jsp_request_via_url.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7c9e98e873 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +--- +title: "Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" +categories: + - Web +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2022-22963 + - Web +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 89dddbad-369a-4f8a-ace2-2439218735bc + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2022-22963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22963) | In Spring Cloud Function versions 3.1.6, 3.2.2 and older unsupported versions, when using routing functionality it is possible for a user to provide a specially crafted SpEL as a routing-expression that may result in remote code execution and access to local resources. | 7.5 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("POST") Web.url="*/functionRouter*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.status sourcetype +| `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that **web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Web.http_method +* Web.url +* Web.url_length +* Web.src +* Web.dest +* Web.http_user_agent + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on Web traffic that include fields relavent for traffic into the `Web` datamodel. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 42.0 | 70 | 60 | A suspicious URL has been requested against $dest$ by $src$, related to a vulnerability in Spring Cloud. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16395](https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16395) +* [https://github.com/hktalent/spring-spel-0day-poc](https://github.com/hktalent/spring-spel-0day-poc) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/all_functionrouter_http_streams.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/all_functionrouter_http_streams.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/web/web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05149cd412 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles" +excerpt: "Indirect Command Execution +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Indirect Command Execution + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Eric McGinnis, Splunk +- **ID**: 1fdf31c9-ff4d-4c48-b799-0e8666e08787 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1202](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/) | Indirect Command Execution | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.AE + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 +* CIS 10 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*forfiles* /c *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_id +* Processes.process_path + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where forfiles.exe may be used. + +#### Known False Positives +Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Similarly, forfiles.exe may be used in legitimate batch scripts. Filter these results as needed. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Program Compatability Assistant (pcalua.exe) launched the process $process_name$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128](https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128) +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/forfiles](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/forfiles) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1202/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1202/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c73210d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-05-windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.md @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +--- +title: "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua" +excerpt: "Indirect Command Execution +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Indirect Command Execution + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Eric McGinnis, Splunk +- **ID**: 3428ac18-a410-4823-816c-ce697d26f7a8 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1202](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/) | Indirect Command Execution | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.AE + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 +* CIS 10 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*pcalua* -a*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_id +* Processes.process_path + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the full process path in the process field of CIM's Process data model. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where pcalua.exe may be used. + +#### Known False Positives +Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Filter these results as needed. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 25.0 | 50 | 50 | The Program Compatability Assistant (pcalua.exe) launched the process $process_name$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128](https://twitter.com/KyleHanslovan/status/912659279806640128) +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcalua/](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcalua/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1202/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1202/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30f6b3def1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +--- +title: "Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module" +excerpt: "Exploit Public-Facing Application +" +categories: + - Web +last_modified_at: 2022-04-06 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Exploit Public-Facing Application + - Initial Access + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2022-22965 + - Web +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first". + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-06 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: fcdfd69d-0ca3-4476-920e-9b633cb4593e + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1190](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/) | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 3 +* CIS 5 +* CIS 16 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2022-22965](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965) | A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data binding. The specific exploit requires the application to run on Tomcat as a WAR deployment. If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit. However, the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it. | 7.5 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` +`stream_http` http_method IN ("POST") +| stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out +| search http_request_body IN ("*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat=_*", "*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern*","*suffix=.jsp*") +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) + +Note that **web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* http_request_body +* http_method +* http_user_agent +* uri_path +* url +* bytes_in +* bytes_out + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the stream HTTP logs or network logs that catch network traffic. Make sure that the http-request-body, payload, or request field is enabled. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives may occur and filtering may be required. Restrict analytic to asset type. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965](/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 72.0 | 90 | 80 | A http body request related to Spring4Shell has been sent to $dest$ by $src$. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/DDuarte/springshell-rce-poc/blob/master/poc.py](https://github.com/DDuarte/springshell-rce-poc/blob/master/poc.py) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/http_request_body_streams.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/spring4shell/http_request_body_streams.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/web/web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e6a2ca2fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +--- +title: "Any Powershell DownloadFile" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +, Ingress Tool Transfer +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Command and Scripting Interpreter + - PowerShell + - Ingress Tool Transfer + - Execution + - Execution + - Command And Control + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - CVE-2021-44228 + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1059](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/) | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Execution | + +| [T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/) | PowerShell | Execution | + +| [T1105](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/) | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command And Control | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+| ID | Summary | [CVSS](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss) | +| ----------- | ----------- | -------------- | +| [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) | Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. | 9.3 | + + + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **any_powershell_downloadfile_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) +* [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) +* [Ingress Tool Transfer](/stories/ingress_tool_transfer) +* [Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228](/stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadFile within PowerShell. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-5.0) +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34426bc1e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +--- +title: "Any Powershell DownloadString" +excerpt: "Command and Scripting Interpreter +, PowerShell +, Ingress Tool Transfer +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Command and Scripting Interpreter + - PowerShell + - Ingress Tool Transfer + - Execution + - Execution + - Command And Control + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant. + +- **Type**: [TTP](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1059](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/) | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Execution | + +| [T1059.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/) | PowerShell | Execution | + +| [T1105](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/) | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command And Control | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **any_powershell_downloadstring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Hermetic Wiper](/stories/hermetic_wiper) +* [Malicious PowerShell](/stories/malicious_powershell) +* [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) +* [Ingress Tool Transfer](/stories/ingress_tool_transfer) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 56.0 | 80 | 70 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior identifies the use of DownloadString within PowerShell. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-5.0) +* [https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/](https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_html_help_renamed.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_html_help_renamed.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..18579240aa --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_html_help_renamed.md @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +--- +title: "Detect HTML Help Renamed" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Compiled HTML File +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Signed Binary Proxy Execution + - Compiled HTML File + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1218.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/) | Compiled HTML File | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Actions on Objectives + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=hh.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_html_help_renamed_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **detect_html_help_renamed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity](/stories/suspicious_compiled_html_activity) +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md) +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_mshta_renamed.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_mshta_renamed.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..332ace0b72 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_mshta_renamed.md @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +--- +title: "Detect mshta renamed" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Mshta +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Signed Binary Proxy Execution + - Mshta + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1218.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/) | Mshta | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=mshta.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_mshta_renamed_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **detect_mshta_renamed_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious MSHTA Activity](/stories/suspicious_mshta_activity) +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 80.0 | 80 | 100 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses](https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses) +* [https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/](https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_renamed_psexec.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_renamed_psexec.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ec215a7e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-detect_renamed_psexec.md @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +--- +title: "Detect Renamed PSExec" +excerpt: "System Services +, Service Execution +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - System Services + - Service Execution + - Execution + - Execution + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1569](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/) | System Services | Execution | + +| [T1569.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/) | Service Execution | Execution | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name!=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name!=psexec64.exe) AND Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `detect_renamed_psexec_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **detect_renamed_psexec_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [SamSam Ransomware](/stories/samsam_ransomware) +* [DHS Report TA18-074A](/stories/dhs_report_ta18-074a) +* [HAFNIUM Group](/stories/hafnium_group) +* [DarkSide Ransomware](/stories/darkside_ransomware) +* [Active Directory Lateral Movement](/stories/active_directory_lateral_movement) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 27.0 | 30 | 90 | The following $process_name$ has been identified as renamed, spawning from $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ by $user$. | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.yaml) +* [https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/](https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-hunting-psexec-lateral-movement/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/detect_renamed_psexec.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84a98847ef --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.md @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Rename System Utilities +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Masquerading + - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution + - Rename System Utilities + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1036](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/) | Masquerading | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1127](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/) | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/) | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution) +* [Cobalt Strike](/stories/cobalt_strike) +* [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-6---microsoftworkflowcompilerexe-payload-execution) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename.yml) \| *version*: **4** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b02550696 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_msbuild_rename.md @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious MSBuild Rename" +excerpt: "Masquerading +, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution +, Rename System Utilities +, MSBuild +" +categories: + - Endpoint +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Masquerading + - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution + - Rename System Utilities + - MSBuild + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint)- **Datasource**: [Splunk Add-on for Sysmon](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1036](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/) | Masquerading | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1127](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/) | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/) | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1127.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/) | MSBuild | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Exploitation + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild](/stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild) +* [Cobalt Strike](/stories/cobalt_strike) +* [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) +* [Living Off The Land](/stories/living_off_the_land) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md) +* [https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/](https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename.yml) \| *version*: **3** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f85bea2f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-suspicious_rundll32_rename.md @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +--- +title: "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename" +excerpt: "Signed Binary Proxy Execution +, Masquerading +, Rundll32 +, Rename System Utilities +" +categories: + - Deprecated +last_modified_at: 2022-04-07 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Signed Binary Proxy Execution + - Masquerading + - Rundll32 + - Rename System Utilities + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Defense Evasion + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint +--- + + + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_splunk_app_enrichmentus/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. + +- **Type**: [Hunting](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/wiki/Detection-Analytic-Types) +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-07 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: 7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114 + + +#### Annotations + +
+ ATT&CK + +
+ + +| ID | Technique | Tactic | +| -------------- | ---------------- |-------------------- | +| [T1218](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/) | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/) | Masquerading | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1218.011](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion | + +| [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/) | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion | + +
+
+ + +
+ Kill Chain Phase + +
+ +* Actions on Objectives + + +
+
+ + +
+ NIST + +
+ +* PR.PT +* DE.CM + + + +
+
+ +
+ CIS20 + +
+ +* CIS 8 + + + +
+
+ +
+ CVE + +
+ + +
+
+ +#### Search + +``` + +| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name +| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` +| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` +| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` +| `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter` +``` + +#### Macros +The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) + +Note that **suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. + +#### Required field +* _time +* Processes.dest +* Processes.user +* Processes.parent_process_name +* Processes.parent_process +* Processes.original_file_name +* Processes.process_name +* Processes.process +* Processes.process_id +* Processes.parent_process_path +* Processes.process_path +* Processes.parent_process_id + + +#### How To Implement +To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product. + +#### Known False Positives +Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive. + +#### Associated Analytic story +* [Suspicious Rundll32 Activity](/stories/suspicious_rundll32_activity) +* [Masquerading - Rename System Utilities](/stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities) + + + + +#### RBA + +| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|--------------| +| 63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | + + +#### Reference + +* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/) +* [https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md) +* [https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32) + + + +#### Test Dataset +Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our [replay.py](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-replaypy) tool or the [UI](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data#using-ui). +Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a [Splunk Attack Range](https://github.com/splunk/attack_range#replay-dumps-into-attack-range-splunk-server) + + +* [https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log](https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.011/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/detections/deprecated/suspicious_rundll32_rename.yml) \| *version*: **5** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md b/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md index f9a6ae633c..33808b4147 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_stories/active_directory_kerberos_attacks.md @@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud - Endpoint + - Network_Traffic - Exploitation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ tags: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Network_Traffic](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/NetworkTraffic) - **Last Updated**: 2022-02-02 - **Author**: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk - **ID**: 38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122 @@ -36,15 +38,26 @@ Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mytholog | [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | | [Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell](/endpoint/kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | +| [Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption](/endpoint/kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Golden Ticket](/tags/#golden-ticket)| TTP | +| [Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption](/endpoint/kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material)| TTP | +| [Kerberos User Enumeration](/endpoint/kerberos_user_enumeration/) | [Gather Victim Identity Information](/tags/#gather-victim-identity-information), [Email Addresses](/tags/#email-addresses)| Anomaly | | [Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters](/endpoint/mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket)| TTP | | [Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos](/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request](/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | | [Rubeus Command Line Parameters](/endpoint/rubeus_command_line_parameters/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket), [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting), [AS-REP Roasting](/tags/#as-rep-roasting)| TTP | | [Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access](/endpoint/rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material), [Pass the Ticket](/tags/#pass-the-ticket)| TTP | | [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | | [ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN](/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn/) | [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts)| TTP | +| [Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request](/endpoint/suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts), [Domain Accounts](/tags/#domain-accounts)| Hunting | +| [Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol](/endpoint/unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol/) | [Use Alternate Authentication Material](/tags/#use-alternate-authentication-material)| TTP | | [Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| Anomaly | | [Windows Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate Kerberos](/endpoint/windows_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | | [Windows Invalid Users Failed Authentication via Kerberos](/endpoint/windows_invalid_users_failed_authentication_via_kerberos/) | [Password Spraying](/tags/#password-spraying), [Brute Force](/tags/#brute-force)| Anomaly | +| [Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery](/endpoint/windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery/) | [Remote System Discovery](/tags/#remote-system-discovery)| TTP | +| [Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested](/endpoint/unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested/) | [Valid Accounts](/tags/#valid-accounts)| Hunting | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md b/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md index fc7c2e5637..b023ae9ba4 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md +++ b/docs/_stories/cobalt_strike.md @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ While investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the | [Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | | [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | | [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| Hunting | | [Suspicious Rundll32 StartW](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_startw/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | | [Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Rundll32](/tags/#rundll32)| TTP | | [Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments](/endpoint/suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments/) | [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md b/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md index 2cea75a9bd..ddbe954a9a 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md +++ b/docs/_stories/hafnium_group.md @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups trade | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| | [Dump LSASS via procdump Rename](/deprecated/dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename/) | [LSASS Memory](/tags/#lsass-memory)| Hunting | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [Detect Exchange Web Shell](/endpoint/detect_exchange_web_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | | [Detect New Local Admin account](/endpoint/detect_new_local_admin_account/) | [Local Account](/tags/#local-account), [Create Account](/tags/#create-account)| TTP | | [Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag](/endpoint/detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md b/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md index 5a3b61ef6b..918d838175 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md +++ b/docs/_stories/hermetic_wiper.md @@ -7,8 +7,14 @@ tags: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud + - Email - Endpoint + - Actions on Objectives + - Command & Control + - Delivery - Exploitation + - Installation + - Reconnaissance --- [Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} @@ -18,7 +24,7 @@ tags: This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more. - **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud -- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) +- **Datamodel**: [Email](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Email), [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint) - **Last Updated**: 2022-03-02 - **Author**: Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk - **ID**: b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122 @@ -31,16 +37,57 @@ Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments](/deprecated/suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Uncommon Processes On Endpoint](/deprecated/uncommon_processes_on_endpoint/) | [Malicious File](/tags/#malicious-file)| Hunting | +| [Active Setup Registry Autostart](/endpoint/active_setup_registry_autostart/) | [Active Setup](/tags/#active-setup), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Change Default File Association](/endpoint/change_default_file_association/) | [Change Default File Association](/tags/#change-default-file-association), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | | [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | +| [ETW Registry Disabled](/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled/) | [Indicator Blocking](/tags/#indicator-blocking), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | | [Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share](/endpoint/executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](/tags/#smb/windows-admin-shares)| TTP | | [Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path](/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading)| TTP | +| [Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption](/endpoint/kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption/) | [Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets](/tags/#steal-or-forge-kerberos-tickets), [Kerberoasting](/tags/#kerberoasting)| TTP | +| [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Logon Script Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution/) | [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](/tags/#boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts), [Logon Script (Windows)](/tags/#logon-script-(windows))| TTP | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | +| [Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary](/endpoint/msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary/) | [DLL Side-Loading](/tags/#dll-side-loading), [Hijack Execution Flow](/tags/#hijack-execution-flow)| Hunting | +| [Overwriting Accessibility Binaries](/endpoint/overwriting_accessibility_binaries/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Accessibility Features](/tags/#accessibility-features)| TTP | +| [Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn](/endpoint/possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model), [Windows Remote Management](/tags/#windows-remote-management), [Windows Management Instrumentation](/tags/#windows-management-instrumentation), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Windows Service](/tags/#windows-service), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [PowerShell 4104 Hunting](/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| Hunting | +| [PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window](/endpoint/powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | +| [PowerShell Domain Enumeration](/endpoint/powershell_domain_enumeration/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](/endpoint/powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [Indicator Removal from Tools](/tags/#indicator-removal-from-tools)| TTP | +| [Powershell Execute COM Object](/endpoint/powershell_execute_com_object/) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](/tags/#component-object-model-hijacking), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | +| [Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Process Injection](/tags/#process-injection), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content](/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection](/endpoint/powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Processing Stream Of Data](/endpoint/powershell_processing_stream_of_data/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Powershell Using memory As Backing Store](/endpoint/powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store/) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](/tags/#deobfuscate/decode-files-or-information)| TTP | +| [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](/endpoint/recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Recon Using WMI Class](/endpoint/recon_using_wmi_class/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation](/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation/) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](/tags/#image-file-execution-options-injection), [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution)| TTP | | [Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading](/endpoint/regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Regsvr32](/tags/#regsvr32)| Anomaly | +| [Runas Execution in CommandLine](/endpoint/runas_execution_in_commandline/) | [Access Token Manipulation](/tags/#access-token-manipulation), [Token Impersonation/Theft](/tags/#token-impersonation/theft)| Hunting | +| [Screensaver Event Trigger Execution](/endpoint/screensaver_event_trigger_execution/) | [Event Triggered Execution](/tags/#event-triggered-execution), [Screensaver](/tags/#screensaver)| TTP | +| [Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass](/endpoint/set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | | [Suspicious Process File Path](/endpoint/suspicious_process_file_path/) | [Create or Modify System Process](/tags/#create-or-modify-system-process)| TTP | +| [Time Provider Persistence Registry](/endpoint/time_provider_persistence_registry/) | [Time Providers](/tags/#time-providers), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | +| [Unloading AMSI via Reflection](/endpoint/unloading_amsi_via_reflection/) | [Impair Defenses](/tags/#impair-defenses)| TTP | +| [W3WP Spawning Shell](/endpoint/w3wp_spawning_shell/) | [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell)| TTP | | [Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump](/endpoint/windows_disable_memory_crash_dump/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | | [Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder](/endpoint/windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction)| TTP | | [Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry](/endpoint/windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry/) | [Modify Registry](/tags/#modify-registry)| TTP | | [Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| Anomaly | | [Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive](/endpoint/windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive/) | [Disk Structure Wipe](/tags/#disk-structure-wipe), [Disk Wipe](/tags/#disk-wipe)| TTP | +| [WMI Recon Running Process Or Services](/endpoint/wmi_recon_running_process_or_services/) | [Gather Victim Host Information](/tags/#gather-victim-host-information)| TTP | +| [Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces](/application/email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces/) | None| Anomaly | +| [Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions](/application/suspicious_email_attachment_extensions/) | [Spearphishing Attachment](/tags/#spearphishing-attachment), [Phishing](/tags/#phishing)| Anomaly | +| [Child Processes of Spoolsv exe](/endpoint/child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe/) | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](/tags/#exploitation-for-privilege-escalation)| TTP | +| [Print Processor Registry Autostart](/endpoint/print_processor_registry_autostart/) | [Print Processors](/tags/#print-processors), [Boot or Logon Autostart Execution](/tags/#boot-or-logon-autostart-execution)| TTP | #### Reference diff --git a/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md b/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md index df55e037e3..1063859b5d 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md +++ b/docs/_stories/ingress_tool_transfer.md @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command and Control. Behaviors | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [BITSAdmin Download File](/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file/) | [BITS Jobs](/tags/#bits-jobs), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments](/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md b/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md index 094aee3618..1e9d595678 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md +++ b/docs/_stories/living_off_the_land.md @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applicati | [Esentutl SAM Copy](/endpoint/esentutl_sam_copy/) | [Security Account Manager](/tags/#security-account-manager), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| Hunting | | [Eventvwr UAC Bypass](/endpoint/eventvwr_uac_bypass/) | [Bypass User Account Control](/tags/#bypass-user-account-control), [Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](/tags/#abuse-elevation-control-mechanism)| TTP | | [MacOS LOLbin](/endpoint/macos_lolbin/) | [Unix Shell](/tags/#unix-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| TTP | +| [MacOS plutil](/endpoint/macos_plutil/) | [Plist Modification](/tags/#plist-modification)| TTP | | [Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Remote Services](/tags/#remote-services), [Distributed Component Object Model](/tags/#distributed-component-object-model)| TTP | | [Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process](/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | | [Ntdsutil Export NTDS](/endpoint/ntdsutil_export_ntds/) | [NTDS](/tags/#ntds), [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applicati | [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | | [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution)| TTP | | [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| Hunting | | [Suspicious MSBuild Spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | | [Suspicious mshta child process](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_child_process/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | | [Suspicious mshta spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [Mshta](/tags/#mshta)| TTP | @@ -100,6 +101,8 @@ Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applicati | [Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory](/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory/) | [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task), [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job)| Anomaly | | [Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn](/endpoint/svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn/) | [Scheduled Task/Job](/tags/#scheduled-task/job), [Scheduled Task](/tags/#scheduled-task)| TTP | | [Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution](/endpoint/windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution/) | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution)| TTP | +| [Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua](/endpoint/windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua/) | [Indirect Command Execution](/tags/#indirect-command-execution)| TTP | | [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | | [Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection](/endpoint/windows_installutil_remote_network_connection/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | | [Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option](/endpoint/windows_installutil_uninstall_option/) | [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md b/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md index 725845d49e..98d47310f3 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md +++ b/docs/_stories/log4shell_cve-2021-44228.md @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code executio | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter](/endpoint/cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter/) | [Windows Command Shell](/tags/#windows-command-shell), [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter)| Hunting | | [Curl Download and Bash Execution](/endpoint/curl_download_and_bash_execution/) | [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [Hunting for Log4Shell](/endpoint/hunting_for_log4shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| Hunting | diff --git a/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md b/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md index 7987d57e67..e69d65efad 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_stories/malicious_powershell.md @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ Most recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block loggi | Name | Technique | Type | | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| | [Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments](/deprecated/suspicious_powershell_command-line_arguments/) | [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | -| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | -| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadFile](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadfile/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | +| [Any Powershell DownloadString](/endpoint/any_powershell_downloadstring/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell), [Ingress Tool Transfer](/tags/#ingress-tool-transfer)| TTP | | [Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](/tags/#command-and-scripting-interpreter), [PowerShell](/tags/#powershell)| TTP | | [Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging](/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging/) | [OS Credential Dumping](/tags/#os-credential-dumping)| TTP | | [Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command](/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command/) | [Obfuscated Files or Information](/tags/#obfuscated-files-or-information)| Hunting | diff --git a/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md b/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md index 26cff5c908..b59b0fc547 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md +++ b/docs/_stories/masquerading_-_rename_system_utilities.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ There will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran | [Sdelete Application Execution](/endpoint/sdelete_application_execution/) | [Data Destruction](/tags/#data-destruction), [File Deletion](/tags/#file-deletion), [Indicator Removal on Host](/tags/#indicator-removal-on-host)| TTP | | [Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename](/endpoint/suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| Hunting | | [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| Hunting | | [System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations](/endpoint/system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities)| TTP | | [Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | | [Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path](/endpoint/windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](/tags/#signed-binary-proxy-execution), [InstallUtil](/tags/#installutil)| TTP | diff --git a/docs/_stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.md b/docs/_stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfba249196 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +--- +title: "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965" +last_modified_at: 2022-04-05 +toc: true +toc_label: "" +tags: + - Splunk Enterprise + - Splunk Enterprise Security + - Splunk Cloud + - Endpoint + - Web + - Exploitation +--- + +[Try in Splunk Security Cloud](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/cyber-security.html){: .btn .btn--success} + +#### Description + +Spring4Shell is the nickname given to a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Framework, a programming and configuration model for Java-based enterprise applications. + +- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud +- **Datamodel**: [Endpoint](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Endpoint), [Web](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/CIM/latest/User/Web) +- **Last Updated**: 2022-04-05 +- **Author**: Michael Haag, Splunk +- **ID**: dcc19913-6918-4ed2-bbba-a6b484c10ef4 + +#### Narrative + +An attacker could exploit Spring4Shell by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server. However, exploitation of Spring4Shell requires certain prerequisites, whereas the original Log4Shell vulnerability affected all versions of Log4j 2 using the default configuration. \ +According to Spring, the following requirements were included in the vulnerability report, however the post cautions that there may be other ways in which this can be exploited so this may not be a complete list of requirements at this time: \ +- Java Development Kit (JDK) 9 or greater \ +- Apache Tomcat as the Servlet container \ +- Packaged as a WAR \ +- spring-webmvc or spring-webflux dependency \ + + +#### Detections + +| Name | Technique | Type | +| ----------- | ----------- |--------------| +| [Java Writing JSP File](/endpoint/java_writing_jsp_file/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Linux Java Spawning Shell](/endpoint/linux_java_spawning_shell/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Spring4Shell Payload URL Request](/web/spring4shell_payload_url_request/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Web JSP Request via URL](/web/web_jsp_request_via_url/) | [Web Shell](/tags/#web-shell), [Server Software Component](/tags/#server-software-component), [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module](/web/web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | +| [Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter](/web/web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter/) | [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/tags/#exploit-public-facing-application)| TTP | + +#### Reference + +* [https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability](https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) + + + +[*source*](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/tree/develop/stories/spring4shell_cve-2022-22965.yml) \| *version*: **1** \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md index 59c7199927..a0ca7c63b0 100644 --- a/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md +++ b/docs/_stories/trusted_developer_utilities_proxy_execution_msbuild.md @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ The objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or m | ----------- | ----------- |--------------| | [MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process](/endpoint/msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process/) | [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution)| TTP | | [Suspicious msbuild path](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_path/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | -| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | +| [Suspicious MSBuild Rename](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_rename/) | [Masquerading](/tags/#masquerading), [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [Rename System Utilities](/tags/#rename-system-utilities), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| Hunting | | [Suspicious MSBuild Spawn](/endpoint/suspicious_msbuild_spawn/) | [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](/tags/#trusted-developer-utilities-proxy-execution), [MSBuild](/tags/#msbuild)| TTP | #### Reference From 41e354485e5917d3366ef735a9c5b25a20d3b8cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: research bot Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 00:00:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] updating docs and package bits [ci skip] --- dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/collections.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/macros.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/transforms.conf | 2 +- dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf | 2 +- ...xtended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md | 2 +- .../2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md | 2 +- ...23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md | 2 +- ...-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md | 2 +- .../2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md | 2 +- .../2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md | 2 +- ...18-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md | 2 +- .../2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md | 2 +- ...7-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md | 2 +- ...2-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md | 2 +- .../2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md | 2 +- .../2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md | 2 +- .../2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md | 2 +- ...stance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md | 2 +- .../2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md | 2 +- .../2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md | 4 ++-- docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md | 2 +- ...-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md | 2 +- ...dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md | 8 ++++---- .../2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md | 2 +- ...1-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md | 2 +- ...21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md | 2 +- .../2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md | 2 +- ...icious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md | 2 +- .../2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md | 2 +- ...7-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md | 2 +- ...0-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md | 2 +- ...isioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md | 2 +- ...provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md | 2 +- ...020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md | 2 +- ...09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md | 2 +- ...d_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md | 2 +- ...15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md | 2 +- ...ses_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md | 2 +- ...-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md | 2 +- ...2-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md | 2 +- ...20-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md | 2 +- ...users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md | 2 +- ...detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md | 2 +- ...ork_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md | 2 +- .../2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md | 2 +- ...-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md | 2 +- ...detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md | 2 +- ...ious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md | 2 +- .../2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md | 2 +- ...1-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md | 2 +- .../2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md | 2 +- ...21-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md | 2 +- ...-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md | 2 +- ...etect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md | 2 +- ...tect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md | 2 +- ...tect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md | 2 +- .../2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md | 2 +- ...22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md | 2 +- .../2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md | 2 +- .../2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md | 2 +- .../2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md | 2 +- .../2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md | 2 +- .../2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md | 2 +- ...21-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md | 2 +- ...-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md | 2 +- ...4-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md | 2 +- ...021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md | 2 +- .../2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md | 2 +- .../2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md | 2 +- ...9-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md | 2 +- ...021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md | 2 +- ...1-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md | 2 +- ...-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md | 2 +- .../2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md | 2 +- ...19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md | 2 +- ...2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md | 2 +- ...-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md | 2 +- .../2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md | 2 +- ...21-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md | 2 +- .../2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md | 2 +- .../2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md | 2 +- ...shell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md | 2 +- ...ell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md | 2 +- ...-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md | 2 +- ...etect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md | 2 +- ...owershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md | 2 +- ...2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md | 2 +- ...021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md | 2 +- ...1-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md | 2 +- .../2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md | 2 +- ...1-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md | 4 ++-- ...detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md | 2 +- .../2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md | 2 +- ...021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md | 2 +- ...21-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md | 2 +- ...021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md | 2 +- ...021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md | 2 +- ...021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md | 2 +- ...2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md | 2 +- ...ntainer_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md | 2 +- ...21-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md | 2 +- ...-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md | 2 +- ...021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...wmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md | 2 +- ...-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...1-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...4-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...ltdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...esultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...1-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md | 2 +- .../2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md | 2 +- ...21-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md | 2 +- ...21-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...twmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md | 2 +- .../2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md | 2 +- ...021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md | 2 +- ...-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...9-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...hcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md | 2 +- ...08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md | 2 +- .../2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md | 2 +- ...10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md | 2 +- .../2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md | 2 +- ...ser_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md | 2 +- ...wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md | 2 +- ..._get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md | 2 +- ...-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md | 2 +- ...9-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md | 2 +- ...attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md | 4 ++-- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md | 2 +- ...16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md | 4 ++-- .../2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md | 2 +- .../2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md | 2 +- .../2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md | 2 +- ...-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md | 2 +- ...10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md | 2 +- ...-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md | 2 +- ...2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md | 2 +- ...inevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md | 2 +- ...021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md | 2 +- .../2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md | 2 +- .../2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md | 2 +- .../2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md | 2 +- .../2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md | 2 +- .../2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md | 2 +- ...emote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md | 2 +- ..._instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md | 2 +- ...s_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...mote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md | 2 +- ...instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md | 2 +- ...executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md | 2 +- ...1-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md | 2 +- ...indows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md | 2 +- ...21-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md | 2 +- ...1-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md | 2 +- .../_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md | 2 +- .../2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md | 2 +- ...powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md | 2 +- ...1-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md | 2 +- ...22-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md | 2 +- ...022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md | 2 +- ...1-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md | 2 +- ...-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md | 2 +- ...spicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md | 2 +- ...022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md | 2 +- ...22-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md | 2 +- ...2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md | 2 +- ...01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md | 2 +- .../2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md | 2 +- ...eus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md | 2 +- ...02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md | 2 +- ...2-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md | 2 +- .../2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md | 2 +- .../2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md | 2 +- ...erberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md | 2 +- ...eractive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md | 2 +- .../2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md | 2 +- ...rberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md | 2 +- ...os_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md | 2 +- ...022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md | 2 +- ...2-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_createaccesskey.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_updateloginprofile.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md | 2 +- ...-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...erberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md | 2 +- ...undll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md | 2 +- ...-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md | 2 +- ...03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md | 2 +- ...6-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md | 2 +- ...s_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md | 2 +- ...indows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md | 2 +- .../2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md | 2 +- ...-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md | 2 +- ...2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md | 2 +- .../2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md | 2 +- ...22-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md | 2 +- docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md | 2 +- 320 files changed, 327 insertions(+), 327 deletions(-) diff --git a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf index 2f9d54bed2..d331bfd4d4 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/analyticstories.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf index 52ac7032d1..1d9a60ed10 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/collections.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/collections.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf index ce0330eea2..1b048ced5a 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/es_investigations.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf index 6011775be2..b0a7875368 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/macros.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/macros.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf index d36ae49b55..3b9d2d8e94 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/savedsearches.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf index 313959e51e..96a61b9aa1 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/transforms.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf index 64b82893ee..f669aa01c4 100644 --- a/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf +++ b/dist/escu/default/workflow_actions.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ ############# # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content -# On Date: 2022-04-11T22:43:19 UTC +# On Date: 2022-04-11T23:46:59 UTC # Author: Splunk Security Research # Contact: research@splunk.com ############# diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md index 5f3ace6721..b62622a8d1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md index 7be962bec3..0e4e2f3e76 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-12-unsuccessful_netbackup_backups.md @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [netbackup](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/netbackup.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md index aa8e30e97c..6aff52ae89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [brand_abuse_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_dns.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md index 0a930280fc..27a70790cb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2017-09-23-monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse.md @@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you w #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [brand_abuse_web](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/brand_abuse_web.yml) Note that **monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md index e6310902ca..9ab3027499 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-02-23-ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a pa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md b/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md index 9739a63334..f94d3d2d96 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-03-12-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md index 316f2aeec1..f1af016a55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-16-detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or tha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md index 9615d0a10f..d095fbfb1e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-04-18-detect_spike_in_security_group_activity.md @@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to securit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_group_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_group_api_calls.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md index 545f923c77..a0c5914d7d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-17-detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS acc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md index b21dabfa94..1fc97ee6db 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-05-21-detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity.md @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [network_acl_events](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/network_acl_events.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md index fb2f3b310d..36a268849e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_permanent_event_subscription.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md index f7858e136a..403fb22f13 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-10-23-wmi_temporary_event_subscription.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wmi](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wmi.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md index 2a416fa40c..ca2ece7f32 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-03-remote_wmi_command_attempt.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md index 2d8d893263..d60dff7d38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2018-12-06-suspicious_java_classes.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit rem #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) Note that **suspicious_java_classes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md index 113a9aa642..98c8b113a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-02-27-detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credentia #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md index 3b65e97b8b..abb49fa3d2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-04-25-suspicious_file_write.md @@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [suspicious_writes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_writes.yml) Note that **suspicious_file_write_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md index ac327183b0..1b2a78d77c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-10-11-prohibited_software_on_endpoint.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [prohibited_softwares](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_softwares.yml) Note that **prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md index 2ddfc74d8d..c54433e48d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for reading lsass memory consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md index 69d4ec50a4..b0ba58deb9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-03-detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md index fc550147a8..19c8bc230a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect memory dumping of the LSASS process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md index 8aa14d73c6..5946b6f4b2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-create_remote_thread_into_lsass.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect remote thread creation into LSASS consistent with credential dumping. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md index 19cc20b9a4..38606d00cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2019-12-06-unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md index 443884aedb..a964f7ba27 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-03-creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md index 3d6d3bd303..43dc1ecf84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-07-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instanc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md index 823e222c5f..21a716fc3f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-02-21-dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ Detect the usage of comsvcs.dll for dumping the lsass process. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md index 62c22beed4..4203ca40fa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-04-15-gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [google_gcp_pubsub_message](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/google_gcp_pubsub_message.yml) Note that **gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md index d79054926c..53051afdcb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-05-20-first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has no #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md index 082d9f1dc2..d3cbb74247 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-06-windows_event_log_cleared.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **windows_event_log_cleared_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md index 788f5d7e61..052f8233cd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-08-detect_new_local_admin_account.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for newly created accounts that have been elevated to local ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_new_local_admin_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md index 8c67489011..ddc6a6cd78 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-attempt_to_stop_security_service.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md index 6060e39577..8577bf1e0b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md index 0cf370ebd6..d28d866b3b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2.md @@ -124,13 +124,13 @@ This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging Evil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [evilginx_phishlets_github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_github.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [evilginx_phishlets_aws](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_aws.yml) * [evilginx_phishlets_amazon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_amazon.yml) -* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) * [evilginx_phishlets_0365](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_0365.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_outlook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_outlook.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_google](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_google.yml) +* [evilginx_phishlets_facebook](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/evilginx_phishlets_facebook.yml) Note that **detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md index 9a11a10b9e..273ce7537d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-detect_new_user_aws_console_login.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a u #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md index 2a3183ad30..2e5b3f6302 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [ec2_modification_api_calls](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/ec2_modification_api_calls.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md index c91ae03d9a..7e2df37260 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md index 2710475c14..b37c976fbc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-first_time_seen_running_windows_service.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [previously_seen_windows_services_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_seen_windows_services_window.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md index 4a0ec89d6b..40e0bd94bb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-21-malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypas #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_-_execution_policy_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md index 4eea2cc394..3019769d2e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_email_attachment_extensions.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for emails that have attachments with suspicious file extensio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [suspicious_email_attachments](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/suspicious_email_attachments.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md index 47ebc94eed..5a1aa00ddb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by somethin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md index c2f3496ce5..5ce41fd407 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-22-uncommon_processes_on_endpoint.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [uncommon_processes](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/uncommon_processes.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md index 8b976ae96a..139a7c944f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-07-28-detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search detects SIGRed via Splunk Stream. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_tcp](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_tcp.yml) * [stream_dns](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_dns.yml) +* [stream_tcp](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_tcp.yml) Note that **detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md index a0703e78c8..c62e53acfe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP ad #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md index 9ed66e2bed..50ec849700 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-08-16-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md index 8e6d952edd..ff803f6754 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-08-cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted.md @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by clo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md index 4ed9be8ec4..132ddb2368 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-09-16-create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares using net.exe. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md index b83b837b7b..93ae6e9aa2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-09-cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen citie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md index 2eabd5a4ff..369753c2c9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-10-15-detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security E #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md index 6f774eb5a4..7c3f0e4f0c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network config #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [system_network_configuration_discovery_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/system_network_configuration_discovery_tools.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [system_network_configuration_discovery_tools](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/system_network_configuration_discovery_tools.yml) Note that **detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md index d87de697c8..0ff4508f1f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-11-10-detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe.md @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [prohibited_apps_launching_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/prohibited_apps_launching_cmd.yml) Note that **detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md index b38e8a9e01..197647ea9c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-08-system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ During triage, review the parallel processes - what process moved the native Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [is_windows_system_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_windows_system_file.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [is_windows_system_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_windows_system_file.yml) Note that **system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md index 58d9b858c1..0aa0abaa98 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2020-12-14-sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md index 32c4fc9331..0e2c303a9a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessibl #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md index aa8a2bf23f..ea27ea6f41 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption spec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md index c3854cdbd8..a20843401c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-11-aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were cr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md index 6a01a575a2..74562f94e1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-aws_network_access_control_list_deleted.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by clo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md index 34f9e9515c..1fbbfb507c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microso #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_microsoftworkflowcompiler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_microsoftworkflowcompiler.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_microsoftworkflowcompiler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_microsoftworkflowcompiler.yml) Note that **suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md index 98c91a25c1..87a8e37bd6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-12-suspicious_msbuild_spawn.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md index feb4a248a5..2a1a873d73 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-14-detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious p #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [dynamic_dns_providers](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/dynamic_dns_providers.yml) Note that **detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md index 02f536107b..f0a42112b4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-19-malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have cha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md index 6c58881a61..aa7ca6e533 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md index 5540330e5b..b97bcb2f82 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-20-suspicious_mshta_spawn.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md index c659f13c37..a33efb5185 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md index a8e75ff12f..12b3589f24 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-26-aws_saml_update_identity_provider.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SA #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md index 97a85c9898..a39ec1c37a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (interna #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md index c4c4425d81..0e3f9f3ebc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-01-28-suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md index 98eeed668c..b199cbcbe9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-01-dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md index 13d41443d4..d3c2d9b8ba 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_advpack_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md index 4fa2c7c236..7b70b574c7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupa #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_setupapi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md index fb8c3c63d3..e1f77f3a1b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass_-_syssetup_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md index 2560476de1..7f890de882 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-04-suspicious_rundll32_startw.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md index e5a6890a65..3ce4102d72 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-09-suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md index f2b5767364..5fddfe8ebe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources.md @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy versio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md index 0e70fa2818..71a536bbeb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-02-22-cobalt_strike_named_pipes.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ Upon triage, review the process performing the named pipe. If it is explorer.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md index e3c4503e8c..64a41e2444 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-02-aws_setdefaultpolicyversion.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default polic #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md index bacca10368..85370c1aea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-nishang_powershelltcponeline.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md index 6b3e2b46f1..dc874418fe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-03-w3wp_spawning_shell.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **w3wp_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md index 13b8c77cf1..d459b46915 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-12-ransomware_notes_bulk_creation.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md index 895cad31c1..e9a10ed2b3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-high_process_termination_frequency.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytics are designed to indentify a high frequency of process termination #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **high_process_termination_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md index 15fab392c7..5a565e980e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-16-windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search looks for high frequency of file deletion relative to process name a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md index 8b7470b10f..a0c77a5d05 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-17-clop_ransomware_known_service_name.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md index ace986afa6..3cf73b3525 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-29-powershell_start-bitstransfer.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_start-bitstransfer_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md index 255d9f47a4..4c3a3cbd67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-aws_iam_successful_group_deletion.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being delete #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md index d3e0b86e6a..6f41ce89c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-03-31-disabling_firewall_with_netsh.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh applicati #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md index 45408a589f..15947dcf4d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md index e3d7e22345..1575dfd36a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_delete_policy.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_iam_delete_policy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md index 00e4683600..b793b9283d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-01-aws_iam_failure_group_deletion.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md index ff16833ce2..d2943a0edb 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-07-malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md index ca78de69bf..4c59958230 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-08-winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or was it v #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md index 8cedc3af8b..8769d24df3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-excel_spawning_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typicall #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **excel_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md index 3d06f1ae2c..2e40959111 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ Upon triage, identify the task scheduled source. Was it schtasks.exe or via Task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md index f23543ca3a..9f2736cd5a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-12-winword_spawning_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **winword_spawning_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md index f2c20b14e6..d6de864826 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-aws_excessive_security_scanning.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md index bde3e1e13c..6c3b38bfdd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-13-office_application_spawn_rundll32_process.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md index 2df2c08b22..e1df7ecf2f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_creating_schedule_task.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search detects a potential malicious office document that create schedule t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md index 4b21420204..712dd21be0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-14-office_document_executing_macro_code.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **office_document_executing_macro_code_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md index c43e81b053..81a76ff8c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to in #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md index ecd709a0e6..21a66d2af0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md index ef713b2e06..4b63079399 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, `A scheduled task #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md index 73bc6c0ec9..41f98dbe17 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to co #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md index cd138f7ea3..ba6c575f79 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_create_executable_file.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that dr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md index 8956745d4c..061b5193b6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-19-wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md index ed31a7793f..1c79405b19 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md index d753d5416f..1da816b5f4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-21-multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltrat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) Note that **multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md index 0e869ae9cd..ce9b807814 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md index d0977c1006..b554f66150 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-22-plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) Note that **plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md index a4cd573df4..395aaadd33 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_bitsadmin.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md index ec978ba92b..35e84d7380 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-office_product_spawning_mshta.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different mal #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_mshta_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md index 1158b6cf9a..0eadc14902 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-26-trickbot_named_pipe.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **trickbot_named_pipe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md index 7db21c16a7..4639b50b53 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-suspicious_driver_loaded_path.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is comm #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md index 0b79a8782f..a8ebca20c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-04-29-xmrig_driver_loaded.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **xmrig_driver_loaded_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md index 87cc18a125..9d6a8c3781 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-deleting_of_net_users.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **deleting_of_net_users_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md index c87608b2af..4699b81a13 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-disabling_net_user_account.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user accou #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **disabling_net_user_account_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md index db01ae7de5..38b3a5fbfe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-excessive_service_stop_attempt.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md index 1051071a84..dad7f75cb2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-04-process_kill_base_on_file_path.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md index a854bfb692..552c212ffa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-download_files_using_telegram.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram appli #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **download_files_using_telegram_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md index bf23163ed6..31daed681e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md index a5e5987dd7..c7da4e949e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-06-excessive_usage_of_net_app.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a buc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md index 223abd9485..cbfc56943f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-12-delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md index b0016a85a6..5f00a8936a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-13-cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLU #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md index 35b71e522a..f7c266b411 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md index d5bb1e9705..901e844500 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-05-19-mailsniper_invoke_functions.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. T #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md index a296abe1a9..df6790b3d3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-modification_of_wallpaper.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **modification_of_wallpaper_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md index 1e9dc12127..b2016bf0c5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-02-wbemprox_com_object_execution.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ this search is designed to detect potential malicious process loading COM object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md index 8955a7020a..e03accc979 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-04-known_services_killed_by_ransomware.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransom #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md index 89786f94bd..99a2c0b97f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md index c436df0014..90d9809de5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-08-powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index d5af947138..5e23bdcc4b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md index 653767ecf9..32a4ee8d2d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md index 3489e9b732..719003cc88 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-09-unloading_amsi_via_reflection.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md index 9fbef4241b..6115340021 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_creating_thread_mutex.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md index 8472549c2b..c779915afa 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_domain_enumeration.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_domain_enumeration_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md index 07027979f8..34207dc574 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md index a6f89e18e2..eff542efff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_processing_stream_of_data.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md index b09cbe39ae..e14b1e2669 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md index d3ec7e113f..8188e12a0a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md index 7e3055f850..c4ef2b0fe4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-10-recon_using_wmi_class.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, wher #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **recon_using_wmi_class_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md index 79c867585f..05a0825272 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-14-wmi_recon_running_process_or_services.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via Eve #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md index fa06692d54..986c97fc50 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-16-detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToCons #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md index 62f0415a0f..8173d871c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-17-suspicious_event_log_service_behavior.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md index 87e25072b0..701dd293f9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-22-powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md index f5c4db4a96..e66f03e701 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md index ce80c8adff..f2bc9ae796 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-23-allow_network_discovery_in_firewall.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow netw #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md index 4750ec2ea0..12b22c558f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-06-24-excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machin #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md index 39e80769c2..385e312b70 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Captu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) Note that **print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md index 83cbd2e90b..58e744450b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in.md @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Captu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [printservice](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/printservice.yml) Note that **print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug-in_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md index 11eae06c74..cd7527b79f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_spawning_rundll32.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md index dbce47b9c7..3a912ebefc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md index e28f396237..f549313207 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_suspicious_process_access.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md index 501852c4f6..f6d5b756f5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-01-spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **spoolsv_writing_a_dll_-_sysmon_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md index d05b0aebbf..ae96cf1d74 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-05-powershell_disable_security_monitoring.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows d #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md index 8c1957878b..cf52d7e01a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-12-uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md index f800e58822..d00adf12c1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-aws_createloginprofile.md @@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a l #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_createloginprofile_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md index 364ee513a4..a31e892d5a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md index a3c79a5700..4ae443a594 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md index baf3ea3f04..ac07b15b4c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-19-mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or r #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) +* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md index e58a9b76a6..593f93e968 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-21-detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md index 9fbc6d0603..c56733a83c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md index f3edc8694b..dc22f72471 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.e #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md index 005995d14f..8a062b9a7c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md index 1f9afb3edf..c6aeb7557b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-26-suspicious_rundll32_plugininit.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit param #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md index 2143f4cde2..2d8f724e67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-27-regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to lo #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md index e3d3f392d6..537bb14e8d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-29-rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md index 1642ea8715..dab7ce0922 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-drop_icedid_license_dat.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **drop_icedid_license_dat_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md index 6edf12b83c..74c84eaf29 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md index 39d676b24b..a8dda377c2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-07-30-office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md index 3d6d7f91e5..8af853fd04 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-03-sqlite_module_in_temp_folder.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% fol #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md index 63c7d6be6e..0b9dd66eb8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-04-create_remote_thread_in_shell_application.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This tec #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md index c5fe368766..58528eb6fd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-10-powershell_execute_com_object.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This techniqu #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_execute_com_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md index 0de21d0535..6b4f16d95a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-13-uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md index 2ee0d5fd8a..053ef6340c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md index 0778c43a9f..70c74390d1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md index 58d17ed3e6..847ba4d0b9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-17-aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md index c7396f3f5e..35ef7091f8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-18-esentutl_sam_copy.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to c #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_esentutl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_esentutl.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **esentutl_sam_copy_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md index 7707095da2..2e87df2551 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md index 21549c9cd7..bbc2f23ba4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-19-aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service ( #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [aws_ecr_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/aws_ecr_users.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md index e4386e0f36..8cb069125a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-20-github_commit_changes_in_master.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that **github_commit_changes_in_master_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 01a5f02d09..3b1b485d3a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md index bc1d07ffdc..523e28b3c3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-23-getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md index 26b95b6aaa..a9cc95cf1b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-adsisearcher_account_discovery.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 4e8250baca..a0e8fc87ad 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-domain_account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index ee1767427f..6c565d2699 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get-domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md index f656c826b1..558f516974 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md index 0ec7e439b6..6f526d8776 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index fe07b877e2..1d7ad2997a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-24-getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index 561808acbb..bd72a25c37 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md index 1b075bc95a..cbfd8b9b6d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index 6926089dd7..6bce78d975 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md index 8c3be639c5..5e4319e7de 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-25-getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 4c44107636..7304dc73dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 1c6466c013..9a2c8c73c8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md index 00426647a8..7fc5d84c27 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md index 7339f283ea..669cc8eec9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-26-getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md index bd0a1dca76..c15a96ad84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-27-exchange_powershell_module_usage.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ Module - New-managementroleassignment can assign a management role to a manageme #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md index 80b87bd7d6..2a711dfc8a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_network_share_access_request.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ During triage, review parallel security events to identify further suspicious ac #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md index ace1d3011d..7d81a15a3e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-08-31-petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication tic #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 1f66e9b74a..06ef4b38a0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 49e614d830..e5e3068d65 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md index 295fa24353..25c3927186 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_commit_in_develop.md @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that **github_commit_in_develop_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md index bb9da9f88c..9498c4e6a2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_dependabot_alert.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for Dependabot Alerts in Github logs. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that **github_dependabot_alert_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md index 41d3f22454..3d1baf9a67 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-github_pull_request_from_unknown_user.md @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ This search looks for Pull Request from unknown user. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [github_known_users](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github_known_users.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that **github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md index a0ecf85f47..59c88fc53a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-01-remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md index 28f3510082..54a0879385 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get-foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md index 3544d08a5a..bab9ea64b1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md index d9c44e8e26..8587fa0d68 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-02-getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md index 5679158b61..b0576cbb0c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-07-schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md index 8c2f938acf..01131f25c4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_hunt.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` wi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md index bc74085bcf..82b16635a2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-08-rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md index ac2e04ddc1..3e97237b15 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-extraction_of_registry_hives.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **extraction_of_registry_hives_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md index e9d852091f..6fe995e38e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-09-mshtml_module_load_in_office_product.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following detection identifies the module load of mshtml.dll into an Office #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md index c17b914d02..6379015a2f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-10-getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md index 91fb69a4bb..c9b55ec456 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md index 48a0b4de9a..d466c29b33 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md index b9c551bed9..25a5d34c04 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe o #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md index 06f3e8204d..97b7343e2b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md index 410f68d575..adc653cb31 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-13-xsl_script_execution_with_wmic.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index 7a4ee3550b..d831dda2a3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md index a7d5560642..a5eb79605f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-14-powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md index c19b4e40ec..7faccae078 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-chrome process accessing the fi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md index 0e2aea7d72..bc541ca2ed 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-15-non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect an anomaly event of non-firefox process accessing the f #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md index 1f3589d4ee..c5b95e5c97 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-account_discovery_with_net_app.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ this search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **account_discovery_with_net_app_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md index 96724343cd..bc6256789a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.md @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_cmd](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_cmd.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_reg](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_reg.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md index ef2e67a029..541dbb3c60 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bits_job_persistence.md @@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) Note that **bits_job_persistence_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md index 2e6f8a337c..d42b750922 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-bitsadmin_download_file.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_bitsadmin](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_bitsadmin.yml) Note that **bitsadmin_download_file_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md index fee83d189b..a771cad203 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell.md @@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ This search detects the use of wmic and Powershell to create a shadow copy. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md index ab5f8de9e7..849dfafdc8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol han #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md index 89651dc8d9..b49acd11d3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utilit #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_mshta](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_mshta.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md index 2351ec5cab..ea3718651a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` fla #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_psexec](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_psexec.yml) Note that **detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md index a012cd382a..35fd14421e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-dump_lsass_via_procdump.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ During triage, confirm this is procdump.exe executing. If it is the first time a #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_procdump](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_procdump.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md index b5bc1c8bce..e613988893 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_net.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-li #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_net](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_net.yml) Note that **local_account_discovery_with_net_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md index feff4b1303..ff15a01c6a 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-local_account_discovery_with_wmic.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md index c62350b622..1cd32fc04c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-office_product_spawning_wmic.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malwar #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **office_product_spawning_wmic_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md index c00900d76e..eb96b3a1ea 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-16-processes_launching_netsh.md @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scr #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_netsh](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_netsh.yml) Note that **processes_launching_netsh_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md index 90ebfbe0e2..aeca9d6439 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-09-29-verclsid_clsid_execution.md @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious fil #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_verclsid](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_verclsid.yml) Note that **verclsid_clsid_execution_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md index 69bc8ac6e4..34ee269044 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md index c16b1032d2..65125a3eb7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-04-regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with sile #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvr32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvr32.yml) Note that **regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md index abf1c80157..08f8dd4272 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-rundll32_shimcache_flush.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md index 5bd5600992..d6a70c2486 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-05-suspicious_copy_on_system32.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [process_copy](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_copy.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md index fc944b6613..cb3dcd3623 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-14-serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md index 87f2bdd205..1c227fecb2 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.md @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ During triage, review parallel processes for further behavior. In addition, iden #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) Note that **windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md index 4f9d9cb719..5af6decbb8 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-10-19-winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious tasks that ha #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_task_scheduler](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_task_scheduler.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md index fc071abd50..b06cd5209d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-10-windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination.md @@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ Adversaries may use one of the three methods based on the remote destination and #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_curl](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_curl.yml) Note that **windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md index 08e781b633..45e5ccf511 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-11-wmic_xsl_execution_via_url.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible St #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md index 14aa94136a..601af0aab9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md index e995b9818b..2a31021be0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_csc](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_csc.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md index a186a6135a..6cb031f913 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md index 45c82d1600..070ee89f89 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-runas_execution_in_commandline.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user opt #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_runas](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_runas.yml) Note that **runas_execution_in_commandline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md index 4dcc0262e3..4d11b99aa7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_credential_theft.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md index 703e35936e..6a0ac43f65 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_uninstall_option.md @@ -111,9 +111,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md index c3cad50e0a..e0670c9532 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-12-windows_installutil_url_in_command_line.md @@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md index 4d642713fd..ed2ee33339 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md index 7d29398499..b6b7d0635b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md index 785cef016a..93be6d25d3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md index 88d8a22cf3..2ee027b6a5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-15-remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md index cc6c13908a..06f1fecad3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilize #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md index 03b0f31d66..461370826c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-16-remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md index d06acd60ed..784a9a7c38 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md index 5dd955aa03..c80c3e0ed1 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-18-loading_of_dynwrapx_module.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Win #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md index b91f2b6f47..7a42514dce 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-19-system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application.md @@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line executio #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_dxdiag](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dxdiag.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) +* [process_dxdiag](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dxdiag.yml) Note that **system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md index dc60511f07..3b338d2744 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md index 022efd6778..b9d4f933a3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-22-windows_service_created_within_public_path.md @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, t #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md index fd9b2fd61b..09c6ba2284 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-25-powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows de #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md index 1f0713fa35..cc7e86a526 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-11-29-detect_rclone_command-line_usage.md @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.ex #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_rclone](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rclone.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_rclone_command-line_usage_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md index 2a51ad7d93..a84ea6b241 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-08-msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ In addition, `msi.dll` has been abused in DLL side-loading attacks by being load #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **msi_module_loaded_by_non-system_binary_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md index 44802f8569..04d857ff51 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2021-12-13-linux_java_spawning_shell.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat sp #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [linux_shells](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/linux_shells.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **linux_java_spawning_shell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md index 1667fb4176..4e522a942e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window.md @@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the Wind #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **powershell_-_connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md index de5dd6c1d4..cd569b7713 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into L #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md index ac3bb8bf38..60c7093de5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-12-windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_non-system_account_targeting_lsass_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md index efcd926a07..70a9136394 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-14-potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline.md @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to det #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score.yml) Note that **potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md index 32a6abe049..cb9a40f508 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **malicious_powershell_process_-_encoded_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md index abc63bd53c..e3619c665e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the W #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md index 625116b089..20ea3aa0e0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-18-suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md index 790b96d787..c102f70073 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known i #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md index d2a1593c63..20288a14c6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operat #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [is_net_windows_file](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_net_windows_file.yml) Note that **windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md index 2151067a4b..7ccb62226d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-19-windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path.md @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running fro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md index 8c544b007e..19efd5ad59 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ This analytic will identify excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defend #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md index 18e92b3fae..d96b03ca2d 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-20-ping_sleep_batch_command.md @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_ping](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_ping.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **ping_sleep_batch_command_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md index e0a423e605..a46d3647bc 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-24-windows_nirsoft_utilities.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [is_nirsoft_software](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/is_nirsoft_software.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md index 4ec0f102de..f3f96dfe7f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-01-27-windows_possible_credential_dumping.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The idea behind using ntdll.dll is to blend in by using native api of ntdll.dll. #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md index b3a2bd7c5d..db38882aa7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-07-rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access.md @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system pro #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md index 5f65d085c9..10b5ccf990 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-08-rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ord #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md index 75b0670ea5..d2ad6023e7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-09-kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption.md @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md index 27f66158ab..f5db7edcb5 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-17-windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the maste #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md index 33ed55e6c3..697c39bd16 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regasm_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a publ #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md index 5fcf4a6cbc..24486be582 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a pub #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md index 68ec5a3cf6..e1c59dcffd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md index e73ee7ac5f..4f3d05ca85 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md index 2fa3827afe..3eeb6d0ab4 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-process_deleting_its_process_file_path.md @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the proc #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md index a1454b06df..640a455271 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-18-rundll32_dnsquery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connect #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **rundll32_dnsquery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md index a6023ab62f..f20f996b8e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **disabled_kerberos_pre-authentication_discovery_with_get-aduser_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md index b801a07f2b..49b61a5b71 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-22-windows_wmi_process_call_create.md @@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_wmic](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_wmic.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md index 42e2822799..82db512bd7 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell.md @@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **kerberos_pre-authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md index 2b50b29d1e..f9f0572550 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-23-windows_excessive_disabled_services_event.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of serv #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md index 819ed31cf9..09fa8ebf84 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-02-25-windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_createaccesskey.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_createaccesskey.md index 6dd7347cd5..aadceda6d0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_createaccesskey.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_createaccesskey.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_createaccesskey_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_updateloginprofile.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_updateloginprofile.md index ecbe2fa65c..0a3fd5cbb0 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_updateloginprofile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-03-aws_updateloginprofile.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [cloudtrail](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/cloudtrail.yml) Note that **aws_updateloginprofile_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md index 94eaac3a31..c6fb1a3133 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-08-suspicious_msbuild_path.md @@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_msbuild](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_msbuild.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_msbuild_path_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 9f437d20cf..6f06eb6c55 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. Thi #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_regasm](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regasm.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md index 1b09ce3473..5c850a1da6 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. Th #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_regsvcs](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_regsvcs.yml) Note that **detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md index b76329ebcc..84d447d319 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [wineventlog_security](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_security.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md index 9d60c47bd0..98a8c001df 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments an #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md index c92d005b31..b5079114dd 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_dllhost](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_dllhost.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md index 5593f6b8ef..3707383ea3 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-15-suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments.md @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. I #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) -* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) * [process_rundll32](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_rundll32.yml) +* [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md index 0585252a58..7052c80cbe 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_remote_network_connection.md @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md index 42ed4b524f..4012f5273c 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-16-windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network.md @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ During triage review resulting network connections, file modifications, and para #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: +* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) -* [process_installutil](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_installutil.yml) Note that **windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md index bc9c4fbfea..41003ddcaf 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_get-adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md index 45018c433e..3f0e9144ab 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md index 1a620cbbac..9dfd2c5d9e 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-28-windows_terminating_lsass_process.md @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [sysmon](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/sysmon.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md b/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md index 50a5cf0397..35c6723611 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-03-31-windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery.md @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) * [powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/powershell.yml) +* [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) Note that **windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md index 1fcf9c74ae..8e7431bdff 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-github_actions_disable_security_workflow.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ This search detects a disabled security workflow in GitHub Actions. An attacker #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [github](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/github.yml) Note that **github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md index 5c68e5cdea..efdc32bf2b 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-04-windows_event_for_service_disabled.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modifie #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [wineventlog_system](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/wineventlog_system.yml) Note that **windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md index 30f6b3def1..0ef0c15aae 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-06-web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module.md @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022- #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [stream_http](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/stream_http.yml) Note that **web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md index e6a2ca2fc3..5166bb12b9 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadfile.md @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **any_powershell_downloadfile_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. diff --git a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md index 34426bc1e4..dd92ad468f 100644 --- a/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md +++ b/docs/_posts/2022-04-07-any_powershell_downloadstring.md @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using #### Macros The SPL above uses the following Macros: -* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_ctime](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_ctime.yml) +* [process_powershell](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/process_powershell.yml) * [security_content_summariesonly](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/macros/security_content_summariesonly.yml) Note that **any_powershell_downloadstring_filter** is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. From 58aa54a1da0ebb71690ce98981c7627dd09e7b85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 12:21:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] Update linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml --- detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml index 2bc48352c3..7916b932c9 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_iptables_firewall_modification.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html tags: analytic_story: - - CyclopsBLink + - Cyclops BLink asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 @@ -68,4 +68,4 @@ tags: - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 49 - security_domain: endpoint \ No newline at end of file + security_domain: endpoint From 43c89619b2f81c5829dc62215fbf755b6160b259 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 12:21:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] Update linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml --- detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml index cfd453165e..262de4698b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_kworker_process_commandline.yml @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html tags: analytic_story: - - CyclopsBLink + - Cyclops BLink asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 From 143b243003bc2a8d914a9c96cf99404188285e30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 12:21:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] Update linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml --- .../endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml index ba535c341f..d72e417d28 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file.yml @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html tags: analytic_story: - - CyclopsBLink + - Cyclops BLink asset_type: Endpoint cis20: - CIS 3 From ba3dd9f2a64be2bbbd7a40205bc17204c37dd681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: tccontre <26181693+tccontre@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 12:21:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] Update cyclops_blink.yml --- stories/cyclops_blink.yml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/stories/cyclops_blink.yml b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml index eeecaf6bc0..0bbfac8a59 100644 --- a/stories/cyclops_blink.yml +++ b/stories/cyclops_blink.yml @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ references: - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html tags: - analytic_story: CyclopsBLink + analytic_story: Cyclops BLink category: - Malware product: